Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 335South Africa
P.N v D.N (10481/2018) [2025] ZAWCHC 335 (6 August 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
6 August 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## P.N v D.N (10481/2018) [2025] ZAWCHC 335 (6 August 2025)
P.N v D.N (10481/2018) [2025] ZAWCHC 335 (6 August 2025)
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sino date 6 August 2025
Latest
amended version: 12 August 2025
FLYNOTES:
FAMILY
– Divorce –
Forfeiture
–
Alleged
gambling addiction – Forfeiture requires proving substantial
misconduct resulting in undue benefit – Fault
alone is
insufficient – No conclusive evidence that plaintiff's
gambling was an addiction or sole cause of restaurant's
failure –
Had not concealed gambling activities – Contributed
significantly to joint estate – Defendant's
own financial
mismanagement also contributed to estate's decline – No
basis for forfeiture order –
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
,
s 9(1).
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
AMMENDED
JUDGEMENT
Case NO: 10481/2018
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
In
the matter between:
P[...]
N[...]
PLAINTIFF
and
D[...]
N[...]
DEFENDANT
Coram:
Kholong, AJ
Date
of hearing: 14 May
2025
Date
of Judgement: 6 August
2025
JUDGEMENT
KHOLONG
AJ
Introduction
1.
In this action, the plaintiff seeks a decree of divorce and an order
dividing
the proceeds of the joint estate equitably on the strength
of a marriage entered into by plaintiff and defendant on 10 January
2003. Plaintiff prays that she is entitled to the relief she seeks in
the particulars of claim on account of irretrievable breakdown
of
marriage. Defendant who in his plea does not contest that the
marriage has broken down irretrievably, counterclaimed and sought
forfeiture of benefits wholly or in part against plaintiff in his
favor on account of alleged substantial misconduct by Plaintiff
during the marriage.
2.
The Plaintiff is Mrs. P[...] N[...] (born R[...]) (herein-after
“plaintiff”),
an adult female resident of Cape Town who
until institution of these proceedings had been staying with
defendant as his wife, having
been married in community of property.
3.
The defendant, Dr. D[...] N[...] (herein-after “defendant”)
is an
adult male medical practitioner who resides in Cape Town and is
a husband of the plaintiff.
Background
4.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in community of property on 10
January 2003.
The Plaintiff and defendant have one minor son who
currently resides with defendant. Whilst in the pleadings plaintiff
sought custody
and maintenance in respect of the minor child who at
that point lived with her, given changed living arrangements, in
respect of
the minor child who had moved to stay with his father,
this prayer was not pursued by the plaintiff during these
proceedings. Plaintiff
claims that the marriage relationship between
herself and defendant has irretrievably broken down. The reason being
that the parties
frequently quarrel and argue. They no longer share
common interests and are no longer compatible with each other.
Plaintiff claimed
that defendant is emotionally abusive and that it
is in their interest that they seek a decree of divorce.
5.
Plaintiff pleaded that she no longer wished to remain married to
defendant as
she had suffered emotional and psychological turmoil and
has no desire for reconciliation. Defendant both in the pleadings and
in evidence accepted that the marriage has irretrievably broken down.
6.
The central issue which remained for this Court to determine
therefore is whether
the Plaintiff should forfeit all or part of the
patrimonial benefits of the marriage in terms of
Section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act
[1
].
The
Counter-claim
7.
In his counter-claim defendant pleaded that the marriage relationship
irretrievably
broke down because of compulsive gambling addiction by
plaintiff. That when plaintiff was provided with support to deal with
this
gambling addiction amongst others, she becomes aggressive and
verbally abusive. That this gambling addiction caused severe strain.
8.
In respect of arrangements for the child, the defendant sought this
Court to
order that both parties shall be the minor child’s
co-guardians with both having full parental rights and
responsibilities.
That the care and primary residence of the minor
child be awarded to defendant subject to reasonable contact.
Defendant tendered
to retain the minor child on his medical aid and
sought both parties to be equally liable and responsible for school
fees and related
costs.
9.
Defendant seeks Plaintiff to forfeit her patrimonial benefits of the
marriage
in favor of the defendant either wholly or in part as
Plaintiff is said to have a gambling addiction which has contributed
to the
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and caused losses to
the estate. That this addiction systematically, particularly between
2013 and 2018 diminished the joint estate rather than contributed to
its growth. Defendant pleaded that Plaintiff’s gambling
addiction constitutes substantial misconduct as contemplated in
Section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act
[2
].
10.
In her plea to defendant’s claim in reconvention plaintiff
denies gambling addiction
and denies that there is any basis upon
which she should forfeit any patrimonial benefits of the marriage
which may be due to her.
That there hasn’t been any misconduct
let alone substantial misconduct to justify forfeiture.
.
Plaintiff’s
evidence
11.
Plaintiff led her evidence of how the parties at various stages of
the marriage conducted
their financial affairs and contributed to the
marriage. She testified about how the parties, from the
beginning contributed
towards the acquisition and maintenance of the
various assets of their joint estate. Although in the particulars of
claim plaintiff
pleaded irretrievable breakdown of marriage and
sought that the primary residence of the minor child to be with her
and maintenance.
This plea in respect of the minor child was not
pursued in evidence and plaintiff appeared resigned during
examination in chief
and cross examination to the primary residence
of the minor child being with defendant. She also did not pursue
life-long maintenance
with respect to herself.
12.
Her evidence was that when the parties married they both brought
assets into the marriage.
She testified that defendant brought an
immovable property known as SS C[...] T[...] and a Toyota conquest.
That she had bought
an immovable property known as SS T[...] G[...]
and a BMW vehicle. That her property, which she had bought, was used
as the couples’
marital home at the beginning of the marriage
for approximately three years until it was sold on 18 January 2006.
That towards
latter part of the marriage, one of their property
investments, C[...] T[...] after much trading in investment
properties was sold
eventually in 2024 after delays, according to
her, caused by defendant.
13.
Her evidence is that for the first few years of the marriage,
starting with her employment
at the SABC, she used her money to help
pay bond instalments; rates and taxes for property like T[...] G[...]
and for various other
household expenses to the benefit of the joint
estate. That when they moved to Cape Town the proceeds of her
property went into
paying household expenses for the estate. Her
evidence is that she paid monthly rentals and deposit for their
rental accommodation
at Century City until they bought the D[...]
road property.
14.
Her evidence is further that for a number of years after their
marriage she took over the
administration of the immovable properties
in the joint estate. That she would for example receive rental income
from SS C[...]
T[...] and she would in turn pay levies and rates
thereon. That this approach, which included her paying for shortfalls
in some
instances was broadly used until about October 2017. This
evidence is by and large not contradicted by defendant save the
complaint
that her gambling addiction especially post 2012 and more
so post 2018 contributed to the neglect of this responsibility and
spending
in furtherance of this gambling addiction to the detriment
of the joint estate.
15.
Plaintiff testified that during 2004 they bought a Witkoppen property
which they sold at
a profit in 2012. She had signed the debit order
for the bond on this property. That the proceeds of the sale of this
property
went to the purchase around 2013 of another property,
Melkbosch Strand, Erf 3[…], which is the property defendant
has been
occupying since March 2019, and according to plaintiff’s
Counsel the biggest remaining asset in the estate. Plaintiff’s
evidence is that there were two sectional title properties bought and
sold during 2004 which defendant secured the purchase of
using blank
cheques issued by her. That in 2005 the parties bought various
properties in Johannesburg pointedly Crestview 9, 12
and 16.
16.
The evidence is that Crestview 12 was sold in 2015 at a profit. The
plaintiff’s evidence
is that the proceeds went to her and she
used that money to pay for C[...] T[...] and the atlantic beach bond.
That crestview 16
was sold in 2016 for about R750 000 and the
proceeds went to defendant. That Crestview 9 was sold with minimal
proceeds because
of various debts that had accrued on it. She
testified that they acquired and sold SS Lamone during their marriage
with defendant
receiving the proceeds.
17.
The evidence is further that in 2007 they bought Erf 1[...] in
Milnerton together with others.
Plaintiff paid the bond and rates and
collected rental. The property was sold in 2020 for R1 140 000. It
appears at this point
there was conflict between the parties about
how to share the proceeds, a matter apparently resolved by a
rule 43
order allowing both parties to share equally.
18.
It is Plaintiff’s evidence that when she worked at various
institutions, she contributed
meaningfully to the joint estate. She
testified that when she worked and resigned from Faber Coach Works
she was granted R1.2 Million
of which R250 000 of was paid over to
defendant, the balance being used for joint household expenses. It
was her evidence that
whilst later employed at Foschini Group around
2008 she bought a golf vehicle for defendant to use to travel to and
from work at
his Vredenburg medical practice. That she paid for the
golf until it was replaced by another vehicle, a Toyota. That this
Toyota
was paid for by the restaurant she operated, the I[...]
C[...], which at that point ran as a successful business until the
business
was liquidated and Toyota vehicle consequently repossessed.
19.
Plaintiff conceded that she started gambling socially around 2012
when her son turned 3
and was at school. That at that point she had
won about R4000 from the R500 her mother had given her. That gambling
became an enjoyable
habit for her to have fun. Plaintiff could not
give a definitive figure of the amounts gambled over time in total.
She admitted
taking money from the business she ran, the I[...]
C[...], to fund her gambling habits. She claimed that from her
winnings she
would not deposit it back into the business but took it
home and dispensed it towards household expenses. That she
contributed
to paying for some parts of the roof at the Atlantic
Beach house where defendant currently resides.
20.
Plaintiff testified that the environment in the marriage was positive
as long as she was
bringing in money. The environment changed when
her revenue generating abilities diminished. She states that when
money dried out
the environment changed and defendant became abusive.
She pointed out that when she was out of a job around 2012 defendant
on occasion
would suggest that she go to Johannesburg with the minor
child to look for a job. That she, at the beginning, took sole
responsibility
for the physical care of the minor child as an infant,
something defendant didn’t have interest in.
21.
In cross examination she testified that there are occasions defendant
punched her and periodically
emotionally abused her. She testified
those experiences left her afraid of defendant as husband. That
defendant during the marriage
has bought various vehicles some of
which she doesn’t know where they may have ended up or how
proceeds thereof may have
been used if ever they were sold. She
further had no idea what happened to some assets in the estate
including shares they held
in the joint estate.
Defendant’s
Evidence
22.
The defendant in evidence confirmed the plea and admitted that the
marriage relationship
has irretrievably broken down. He confirmed his
counterclaim claiming forfeiture by plaintiff of all or part of the
patrimonial
benefits of the marriage.
23.
The defendant’s evidence is that Plaintiff’s conduct has
resulted in significant
financial losses to the joint estate. His
testimony is that plaintiff withdrew and gambled substantial sums
from the joint accounts
and the business accounts of the I[...]
C[...] without defendant’s knowledge or consent. It was
defendant’s testimony
that the gambling losses ran into the
millions of rands. His testimony is that when they first discovered
the gambling problem
with plaintiff’s brother, plaintiff
admitted to them when questioned. At first stating that she gambled
R3000; with further
probing she admitted to gambling R5000. When his
brother put a figure of R10 000 to her, it was defendant’s
testimony that
she didn’t respond and kept quiet.
24.
It was defendant’s evidence that plaintiff failed to apply
herself fully given her
experience and qualifications for the benefit
of the joint estate. That whilst she studied various courses during
the marriage,
she did not bring these to bear for the benefit of the
family. That she failed to contribute meaningfully to the maintenance
of
the joint estate, household expenses and the minor child’s
needs since the breakdown of the marriage. His testimony is that
he
has been the primary financial contributor to the estate throughout
and has maintained the properties in addition to supporting
the minor
child since institution of divorce proceedings.
25.
Defendant testified that plaintiff would be unduly benefited if she
were to receive half
of the joint estate given her conduct and
limited contribution to its growth. His submission to this Court was
that one cannot
claim or get what they do not deserve or worked for.
He states that his medical degree cannot be used unduly as a
retirement package.
Defendant’s evidence was that he was the
primary breadwinner throughout the marriage working as a medical
practitioner at
places like the Men’s Clinic International;
Transnet and the Vredenburg practice. That this hard work allowed the
family
to have a reasonably comfortable life.
26.
He testified that he identified various investment opportunities
especially as it relates
to various property. That he secured funding
for those opportunities and paid bonds. Defendant conceded that
Plaintiff’s
role was managing the properties he, as defendant,
would have sourced. That she would collect rent and pay necessary
running costs
for those properties. That the rest of the money was
for Plaintiff to keep and use as she wished.
27.
Defendant’s evidence was that his work at Transnet added
additional sources of revenue
for the family that allowed them to
have a good life. That he paid for renovations at the Atlantic Beach
property thereby spending
something in the region of R1.8 Million.
That since 2018 he maintained the Atlantic Beach property and paid
the bond on the D[...]
Road property. That he has been responsible
for the maintenance and education of their son.
28.
It is Defendant’s further evidence that he only discovered
plaintiff’s gambling
addiction on or around 20 January 2018
when she failed to return home and it was discovered later that she
had been gambling at
Grand West Casino. That when confronted,
plaintiff initially minimized her gambling problem, claiming she had
spent small amounts
of money. That upon this realization he took
plaintiff to Grand West Casino to sign a self-exclusion.
29.
It was Defendant’s evidence that the I[...] C[...] Restaurant
failed due to Plaintiff’s
mismanagement and squandering of
funds with gambling and diversion of funds with her family
connections. That plaintiff had been
borrowing money from other
people to cover her expenses to the detriment of the estate.
Defendant testified that the joint estate
had debts on bonds in the
region of R4.5 Million. In cross examination defendant put the
outstanding bond on the Atlantic beach
property at about R2.7
Million. That the bill to home owner association was about R100 000;
municipal bills estimated at about
R450 000.
30.
In cross examination defendant conceded that he understood that the
marriage was in community
of property and that he opted not to settle
an ant-nuptial contract. The defense led the evidence of Mr. Kamal
Naicker and Mrs.
Niranj Pather. These witnesses’ evidence
essentially related to debts incurred and donations made from the
joint estate by
the plaintiff and defendant respectively. Save
to confirm debts incurred and donations made, not much could be made
of this
evidence, however, in determining the central question of
forfeiture.
31.
The Defense further led the evidence of the minor son of plaintiff
and defendant. This witness’s
evidence was in summary that his
relationship with his mother is strained and was happy staying with
his father. That before 2018
he never heard his parents argue. This
evidence confirms in this Court’s view arrangements as to the
care and contact of
the minor child after divorce as submitted by the
parties.
The
Law
32.
Section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act states
:
“
when a decree
of divorce is granted on the ground of the irretrievable break-down
of a marriage the Court may make an order that
the patrimonial
benefits of the marriage be forfeited by one party in favor of the
other, either wholly or in part, if the Court,
having regard to the
duration of the marriage, the circumstances which gave rise to the
breakdown thereof and any substantial misconduct
on the part of
either of the parties, is satisfied that, if the order for forfeiture
is not made, the one party will in relation
to the other be unduly
benefited”.
33.
In Wijker
[3]
, citing Hahlo in
The
South African Law of Husband and Wife
,
5
th
edition at 157, the Court noted that a marriage in community of
property was described in the following terms:
“
community of
property is a universal economic partnership of the spouses. All
their assets and liabilities are merged in a joint
estate, in which
both spouses, irrespective of the value of their financial
contributions, hold equal shares”.
34.
The ratio arising from this judgement in Wijker is that in deciding
whether to grant a relief
of forfeiture, a Court has “to
determine whether or not a party against whom the order is sought
will in fact be benefitted”
[4]
.
If so whether such benefit was undue. This inquiry is purely a
factual inquiry. That in undertaking this inquiry, the Court has
to
consider a number of factors which factors need not be cumulative to
find application. These are
i)
The duration of the marriage;
ii)
Circumstances which gave rise to the breakdown of the marriage;
iii)
Consider whether there has been substantial misconduct.
35.
The Court held that it is only after the Court has concluded that a
party would be unduly
benefitted that it is empowered to order a
forfeiture of benefits. That in making this decision it exercises its
discretion in
a narrower sense. The Court in this matter also held
that in interpreting
Section 9(1)
it could never have been the
intention of the legislature that the factors mentioned in the
section should be considered cumulatively.
The dictum arising from
this judgement is that too much importance should not be attached to
misconduct which is not of a serious
nature. The misconduct should be
so gross that it would offend the whole notion of justice to allow
the guilty party to get away
with the spoils of marriage.
36.
In
Engelbrecht
v Engelbrecht
[5]
the Court found that it could never have been the intention of the
legislature that a wife who had for 20 years assisted her husband
studiously should because of adultery forfeit the benefits of
marriage in community of property. In Engelbrecht the Court made
it
plain that joint ownership of another’s property is a right
which each of the spouses acquire on concluding a marriage
in
community of property. That unless the parties made precisely equal
contributions the one that contributed less shall on dissolution
of
the marriage be benefitted above the other if forfeiture is not
ordered. Further that this is the inevitable consequence
of the
parties’ matrimonial property regime. Arising from this
judgement it is plain that the legislature does not give the
greater
contributor the opportunity to complain about this. He can only
complain about this if the benefit was undue. Unless it
is thus
proved what the nature and extent of the benefit was, the Court
cannot decide if the benefit was undue or not. Only if
the nature and
ambit of the benefit is proved is it necessary to look to the factors
which may be brought into consideration in
deciding on the inequity
thereof. It is also apparent from this authority that the legislature
did not intend to elevate fault
in the granting of the forfeiture
order.
37.
In argument, Counsel for defendant argued that using conservative
estimates, using Plaintiff’s
own testimony, using 3 visits per
week at an average of R5000 per visit for approximately 5 years, this
equates to a minimum of
R3.9 Million in gambling expenditure. He
argues that this figure equates to substantial portion of the joint
estate that was wasted
by gambling. He argues that the Court must
disregard the Plaintiff’s testimony that her gambling habits
had the defendant’s
tacit approval given her testimony that
‘when there was money there was no abuse’ by defendant as
she saw it. That
this assertion is contradicted by defendant’s
action of immediately taking plaintiff to grand west casino to sign a
self-exclusion.
That her gambling wasn’t just recreational but
had escalated to a point of causing business failure; accumulation of
debts;
and ultimately the breakdown of the marriage. He argues that
her conduct as foreshadowed meets the threshold for “substantial
misconduct” as contemplated in
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce Act.
38.
Counsel
for defendant further argues that the I[...] C[...]
restaurant, which plaintiff managed, was a significant asset of the
joint estate.
That its failure therefore and subsequent liquidation
represents a substantial financial loss for the joint estate. That
the evidence
establishes a direct link between the plaintiff’s
gambling and business failure. That she admitted to using business
funds
for gambling and failed to properly manage the finances,
resulting in accumulated debts which included an overdraft of R400
000
at First Rand Bank.
39.
Counsel argues that the contrast between the restaurant’s
success before the plaintiff’s
gambling escalated and after the
marriage broke when her brother took over management strongly
suggests that her mismanagement
was the primary cause of its failure.
That her attempts during her testimony to minimize her responsibility
for the failure of
the business by attributing that failure to
competition from another restaurant is contradicted by her own
admission that she took
money from the business to fund gambling.
That her concealment of her financial activities and lack of
accountability constitute
a breach of good faith obligation between
spouses married in community of property further supporting the
argument of substantial
misconduct.
40.
That the plaintiff would be unduly benefitted if forfeiture is not
granted because defendant
had been the primary financial contributor
to the joint estate throughout the marriage, while plaintiff’s
gambling actively
diminished the estate. That since 2018 defendant
has solely maintained the properties and supported their son, with
minimal contribution
from plaintiff. That plaintiff’s gambling
losses have effectively already given her the benefit of millions of
rand from
the joint estate, which would not be accounted for in a
simple 50/50 division. That plaintiff has secured ongoing financial
benefit
from the business relationships established during the
marriage whilst claiming limited financial resources.
41.
In conclusion Counsel for defendant argues that given the current
estimated value of the
joint estate of approximately R22 Million. A
50/50 division would award plaintiff approximately R11 Million
despite her having
already consumed millions through gambling and
having contributed little in recent years.
42.
He argues that plaintiff’s testimony regarding the subsequent
arrangement with her
brother raises serious questions about whether
assets were properly transferred out of the joint estate, whilst
plaintiff claimed
to earn only R20 000 per month as consultant. That
she admitted that the business continued essentially under the same
name and
the same staff. That she never disclosed a record of her
gambling wins and losses. That her vague testimony regarding the
total
amount gambled and her inability to account for winnings
indicates a continued lack of financial transparency.
43.
This court is not persuaded with this argument and finds no merit
therein. This Court accepts
plaintiff’s evidence that for at
least the first 4 years of the marriage she was a significant
contributor to the joint estate.
Defendant does not deny having
stayed in a property at the beginning bought by plaintiff which they
used as a marital home. Defendant
in his evidence in chief and under
cross examination conceded that he moved in with plaintiff into a
property then owned by plaintiff.
The further evidence not
contradicted and which this Court accepts is that when they moved to
Cape Town from Johannesburg plaintiff
essentially laid the foundation
of the couple’s settlement in Cape town inter alia paying
rental for the property, in century
city, they moved into. This Court
also accepts the evidence that plaintiff sold her property investment
in Johannesburg and used
the proceeds thereof to the benefit of the
joint estate. This point was not meaningfully rebutted by defendant.
The acquisition
of the various investments, including property
investments such as the atlantic beach property and the couples’
main residence
at which plaintiff currently resides cannot therefore
reasonably be excluded from the foundations laid by plaintiff’s
contributions
before and during the development of these assets.
44.
In any event it falls upon the defendant to prove to this Court the
inequitable contribution
to establish benefit. On balance this Court
finds that at the beginning of the marriage defendant has not proved
that he brought
more assets than plaintiff. On the contrary they
moved into an asset of plaintiff which was more valuable. The
liabilities at the
beginning of this marriage have not been
established satisfactorily. This Court can thus only infer that the
plaintiff was in a
better financial position than defendant at the
beginning.
45.
What remains is the contribution during the marriage. Evidently over
time defendant through
hard work and identification of investment
opportunities accelerated his contribution to the joint estate to be
more, especially
when the plaintiff stopped working and had her
business ventures failing. This Court however has difficulty on the
evidence before
it finding that to the extend that the plaintiff may
have benefitted from this accelerated contribution of the husband
after having
a child and stopping to work to look after the child;
look after the maintenance of the properties the couples invested in
from
the seed capital she contributed to from the beginning as well
as the contribution to the estate before liquidation of the I[...]
C[...] restaurant, that this benefit is undue. What remains is thus
to examine gambling addiction as submitted by defendant and
its
impact.
46.
The argument by defendant’s Counsel about plaintiff’s
lack of transparency about
transfer of assets and her financial
dealings may have some merit to the extent that it supports
plaintiff’s own contention
that an independent valuer be
appointed by this Court to examine the assets and liabilities of the
estate before ordering division
in the event the parties do not agree
on the question of asset distribution.
47.
Counsel for defendant in argument concedes that defendant has been
unable to properly maintain
the D[...] road property, resulting in
water supply and maintenance challenges. The Atlantic Beach property
where Defendant resides
has accumulated by defendant’s own
version levies debts of approximately R158 000 and municipal debt of
approximately R216
000. C[...] T[...] attracted R89 000 of debt in
unpaid levies. Evidently defendant’s own actions or omissions
have contributed
in causing the estate loss of some value given that
from 2019 the plaintiff had limited means to contribute thereto. This
Court
is not satisfied with evidence before it that plaintiff’s
failure to contribute to maintenance of the assets in the estate
is
due to her lack of trying. The Court accepts her testimony that after
the failure of I[...] C[...], she tried various other
ventures
including assisting with a similar restaurant and shop which brought
her R20 000 monthly consulting income. There would
evidently be no
reason to go around borrowing money to finance her living expenses or
apply for a
rule 43
, which was granted, if she had means.
48.
This Court accepts that the liquidation of the I[...] C[...] and
repossession of the Toyota
hilux caused the joint estate a loss. It
accepts that these and the gambling habits of the plaintiff may have
strained the relationship
of the parties and contributed to the
breakdown of the marriage and some loss to the estate. Fault is
however not a ground upon
which a Court may order forfeiture.
49.
This Court is also not persuaded on the evidence that the failure of
the I[...] C[...] restaurant
is attributable solely due to gambling
habits of the plaintiff. Nor that this gambling was hidden. The
record shows that plaintiff
used her bank cards at the casino and the
casino cards which would be so loaded for gambling. This can hardly
be said to be hidden
activity. The only conclusion which this Court
can draw therefore is that this habit as alleged by the plaintiff was
not a problem
as long as money kept coming into the estate. It only
became a problem when money ran out as alleged by plaintiff.
50.
The explanation by the plaintiff as to the reason of the failure
including increasing competition
in the area the restaurant was
located cannot be discounted without any corroborating evidence. By
defendant’s own admission
plaintiff ran the business whilst he
focused on the medical practice. He rarely went to the business nor
took active interest as
he by his own admission was not concerned in
how his wife used her time and residue from rental collections once
costs were paid
until 2017 and 2018 when the gambling issue of grand
west casino arose.
51.
This Court finds that failure to maintain properties cannot be
attributed solely to plaintiff.
Whilst Counsel for defendant argues
that properties under plaintiff’s management such as crestview;
C[...] T[...] and atlantic
beach owed R158 000 levy arrears and
municipal arrears; The D[...] road property owing R366 000 as
evidence of this failure. This
responsibility if regard is had to the
rule 43
order was not the sole responsibility of plaintiff as the
Court had recognized that the plaintiff at that point had limited
resources
and capacity. The evidence is that the property at which
defendant currently stays is also as aforesaid in debt in respect of
rates
and levies to the detriment of the joint estate.
52.
This Court is also mindful, as contended by plaintiff’s
Counsel, that there are various
judgements and legal costs incurred
by the joint estate but there is no satisfactory explanation by
defendant as to how these were
to be handled to the extent that they
impact plaintiff and were caused by defendant in the event of
forfeiture being granted. It
would be a travesty for this Court to
burden plaintiff with the liabilities arising from the marriage and
exclude her from the
benefits arising from the residue of marriage.
53.
On the question of forfeiture because of gambling addiction as
contended by defendant, this
Court accepts that plaintiff by her own
admission gambled. Evidently this gambling was probably more than
social as plaintiff would
have this Court believe as she concluded a
self-exclusion from grand west casino with the prodding of her
brother and defendant.
There is however no record or evidence before
this Court to enable this Court to prefer the evidence of the
defendant above that
of the plaintiff given the couple’s social
standing and lifestyle to conclude that this gambling fell within the
realm of
addiction. There are no gambling records brought into
evidence before this court nor expert report to assist this Court in
determining
this question of addiction and its extend and impact on
the estate.
54.
The plaintiff’s evidence is that she signed the self-exclusion
to assure and appease
defendant that she would not go to grand west
casino again when she was engaged by defendant and her brother on
this issue. This
Court finds no reason to dismiss this explanation.
This gambling on the evidence cannot be said to fall within the
requirements
of
section 9(1)
if this Court has regard to the facts of
this case. Fault, and there is some attributable to plaintiff, is not
a basis for a Court
to order forfeiture. The evidence which this
Court accepts is that both spouses to a greater and lesser extent
gambled or alternatively
tended to go to gambling areas. The evidence
put before this Court, which defendant did not deny, is that from
time to time defendant
also went to the tout given the couple’s
social standing and lifestyle. The bank records evinces that
defendant himself played
the lottery. So if regard is had to the
circumstances of this marriage the gambling habits of the plaintiff
are not found by this
Court, on the facts, to constitute substantial
misconduct justifying forfeiture as contemplated in
section 9(1)
of
the
Divorce Act.
55.
This
marriage has in any event subsisted for at least 20 years and
the plaintiff has on the evidence before this Court contributed
reasonably
to the joint estate. It is not the requirement of our law
that for a spouse to benefit from the residue of a marriage concluded
in community of property there ought to have been equal contribution
to the joint estate. The law is that forfeiture can only be
granted
if the benefit is undue. The evidence is that the plaintiff
throughout the marriage at least until institution of these
proceedings looked after the couple’s property portfolio and
collected rental. She raised the couple’s young child
until he
moved with his father. This Court cannot ignore this contribution.
Neither can it rely on moving estimates submitted by
the defense to
determine the extent of the benefit. This Court thus finds the
defendant’s counterclaim on forfeiture meritless.
56.
This Court further finds that given the testimony of the parties
themselves and the testimony
of their minor child, that current
obtaining arrangements in respect of the child staying with the
defendant, subject to reasonable
contact by plaintiff, and with both
parties being co-guardians with full parental rights and
responsibilities must be left undisturbed
in the child’s best
interest.
Conclusion
57.
In the result, this Court finds that plaintiff has made out a case
for the relief that she
seeks. It is this Court’s conclusion
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. This court further
concludes that plaintiff
has not unduly benefitted from the joint
estate thereby allowing this Court to can order forfeiture of
benefits in favor of defendant.
This Court concludes that plaintiff
is entitled to an order for division of the joint estate. The Court
also concludes that a case
having regard to parties’ own
submission in regard to the movement of assets has been made for an
appointment of a receiver
and liquidator.
Costs
58.
Plaintiff and Defendant addressed this Court on costs. Costs follow
the result.
59.
This Court considers that in present circumstances, Defendant must
pay costs including costs
of the
rule 43
order.
Order
60.
Accordingly, I make the following order:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.
A decree of divorce is granted.
2.
An order for an equal division of the parties’ joint estate is
made.
3.
In the event that the parties fail to agree upon the mode and manner
of the division
of their estate within 30 days after the date of the
decree of divorce or any further extended period as may be agreed to
between
the parties in writing, an order in the following terms is
made:
3.1.
Mr. Lambertus von Wielligh Bester of Cape Trustees (Pty) Ltd, Seaside
Village, Otto du Plessis
Drive, Big Bay, Cape Town, an insolvency
practitioner and member of SAPIRA is appointed as receiver and
liquidator, or alternatively
any other professional person agreed to
between the parties in writing within thirty (30) days of this order,
as a receiver and
liquidator for the joint estate of the parties.
3.2.
Direct that the receiver and liquidator shall not be required to
lodge security for his administration
of the joint estate.
3.3.
Direct the plaintiff and defendant to each furnish the receiver and
liquidator within fourteen
(14) days of expiry of the period before
he is appointed, as provided for above, with a complete inventory of
all assets and a
detailed list of liabilities of their joint estate
as at the date of granting of the divorce.
3.4.
Authorize the receiver and liquidator to take control over and or
possession of all movable and
immovable assets of the parties’
joint estate, including any pension interests or pension benefits,
shares or debts due to
the joint estate and to divide the assets by
mutual agreement, alternatively, failing such agreement, to realize
such assets to
the best advantage of the joint estate by way of
public auction or private treaty and to divide the net proceeds
between the parties
in accordance with the provisions below.
3.5.
Authorize the receiver and liquidator to sign all documents to effect
transfer of any immovable
property, movable property or shares on
behalf of either of the parties in the event that they fail to sign
such document after
three (3) days of being requested by him to do so
in writing.
3.6.
Direct that, in addition to the aforesaid authorizations, the
receiver and liquidator shall have
the following powers:
3.6.1. to make all
investigations which are necessary and obtain all necessary
information from the parties themselves, bank managers
and other
financial institutions in relation to money in the joint estate which
may have been invested in accounts under either
of their control.
3.6.2. to obtain
information from the auditors of any business of the parties and
personal accounts of both parties and such
other persons with the
necessary knowledge in relation to their personal affairs.
3.6.3 to call and
obtain balance sheets and other financial information of all
companies and businesses in which the parties
held or hold any
interest.
3.6.4. to inspect books
of accounts relating to any company or business in which the parties
hold or held any financial interest.
3.6.5. to
inspect personal bank statements, paid cheques, deposit books and
personal statements relating to the affairs
and liabilities of the
parties complied for tax and other purposes.
3.6.6. to
physically inspect the assets of the joint estate and to make the
necessary inventories thereof.
3.6.7. to
obtain appraisals or valuations of any assets of the joint estate in
such manner as the receiver and liquidator
regards suitable for the
purposes of determining the value of the joint estate.
3.6.8. to
deal with any pension interest accrued or deferred pension benefits
which have accrued or been deferred by
any party, and in particular
to allocate a portion of one party’s pension interest to the
other party as envisaged by
Section 7(7)
and
7
(8) of the
Divorce Act
of 1979
, as amended, and to cause the appropriate endorsement to be
made to the pension records of such party’s pension fund.
3.6.9. to
sell the assets, both movable and immovable, or any part thereof by
either private agreement and or public
auction as may seem to him the
most beneficial to the joint estate, with leave to both parties in
the event of a sale by public
auction to bid for such assets,
alternatively, to award any such assets to the parties by dissolution
thereof, subject to such
cash adjustments as the circumstances may
deem necessary, provided that should the receiver and liquidator wish
to sell any asset,
he shall first offer for sale such asset in
writing, to the parties for purchase which offer shall be open for
five (5) days. In
the event that either of the parties wishes to
purchase such asset, the necessary cash adjustment as the
circumstances may deem
necessary must be made. If a cash adjustment
cannot be made in the circumstances where a party elected to purchase
an asset, the
purchase price must either be paid in cash or be
secured by a final or unequivocal guarantee from a registered
financial institution
within fourteen (14) days as contemplated
above, provided that the receiver or liquidator may at his sole
discretion, extend the
fourteen (14) days for up to a maximum of
thirty (30) days. Should any of the time periods in this paragraph
not be adhered to
and or complied with, the option to purchase any
such asset offered for purchase by the receiver or liquidator shall
automatically
lapse and shall not be capable of revival save by
mutual written agreement between the parties.
3.6.10. to collect
debts due to the estate.
3.6.11. to pay or
allocate the liabilities of the joint estate, which shall include the
parties’ taxed or agreed legal costs,
subject to any cost order
which a court may have made against any party, such balance to be
paid directly to the attorney of record
of such party.
3.6.12. during the course
of releasing the joint estate, to deal with the assets in his sole
discretion, including the freezing
of bank accounts wherever
reasonably necessary.
3.6.13. to institute
legal proceedings out of any court with the necessary jurisdiction
against any person for the delivery to him
of such documents as he
deems necessary for the purpose of enabling him to discharge his
duties.
3.6.14 to apply to
court on due notice to both parties for any further directions as he
shall or may consider necessary.
3.6.15 to deduct
his professional fees from the amount available for distribution to
the parties after the collection of
all assets and the discharge or
allocation of all liabilities of the joint estate.
3.6.16. to bring into
calculation and or reckoning in his distribution the reasonable
market value of any asset or the actual monetary
value of money
belonging to the joint estate, as at the date of divorce, that either
party may have disposed of, determining whether
such party received
value or full value thereof.
3.6.17. should the
receiver and liquidator not receive objections within seven (7) days
period as provided for above, his account
shall be deemed to have
been confirmed by the parties and the receiver and liquidator shall
be able to proceed to make a determination
in accordance with the
tenor thereof.
3.6.18. direct that, in
the event that the receiver and liquidator receive written objections
from either or both parties, after
providing them with a reasonable
opportunity of submitting representations to him, he shall determine
the objections and amend
his account in accordance with such
determination/s to the parties marked as ‘final amended
account’.
3.6.19. direct that the
receiver and liquidator shall within a reasonable period of time
after having exercised his powers and authority
as provided for in
this order, furnish the parties with a provisional liquidation and
distribution account, to which the parties
will be entitled to raise
objections within seven (7) days from date of receipt thereof.
3.6.20. direct that, in
order to place him in a position to make such determination/s, the
receiver and liquidator shall be entitled
to apply to court, on
notice to parties, for such directions as he considers necessary.
3.6.21. direct that, in
the event of either of the parties not being satisfied with such
‘final amended account’ of
the receiver or liquidator,
the party not so satisfied shall, within seven (7) days of the final
amended account being provided
to the parties, approach the high
court with jurisdiction with such legal proceedings as he may deem
fit, failing which the account
shall become final and binding on the
parties.
3.6.22. direct that after
the account has become final and binding upon the parties as provided
above, the receiver and liquidator
shall make a distribution in
accordance with the relevant account, whereafter he shall be released
of his duties as receiver and
liquidator. In the event of legal
proceedings being instituted in terms of paragraphs 3.6.20 or 3.6.21
above, no distribution shall
be made to any of the parties until such
time as such legal proceedings are concluded.
3.6.23. direct that the
receiver and liquidator shall be entitled to payment of his
reasonable professional fees, which fees shall
be apportioned equally
between the parties and said fees shall be reflected in his account.
4.
Both parties shall remain co-guardians of the minor child as provided
for in
Section 18(2)(c ); 18 (4) and 18 (5) of the Children’s
Act 38 of 2005.
5.
Both parties shall retain their full parental rights and
responsibilities in
terms of
Section 18
,
19
and
20
of the Children’s
Act 38 of 2005 in respect of the minor child.
6.
The child’s primary residence and care is awarded to defendant,
subject
to plaintiff’s rights of reasonable contact, provided
that her contact with the child shall be exercised in accordance with
the minor child’s wishes and with due regard to his scholastic,
social and extra-mural activities.
7.
Defendant shall retain the minor child on his fully comprehensive
medical aid
scheme and shall be responsible for all medical premiums
in respect thereof, provided that any reasonable medical expenses not
covered by the medical aid fund shall be shared between the parties
in equal shares.
8.
The parties shall be equally liable and responsible for the following
reasonable
costs of the minor child:
8.1 School fees;
8.2 extra lessons;
8.3 school books,
stationary and uniforms;
8.4 school tours within
the Republic of South Africa;
8.5 school transport
costs;
8.6 Extra-mural
activities inclusive of outfitting and equipment,
Provided that plaintiff’s
half share of the aforementioned costs will only become due and
payable on date of the final distribution
of the parties’ joint
estate by the receiver and liquidator as provided for in paragraph 3
above.
9.
Defendant is directed to pay the costs of the
rule 43
application
under case number 4584/22.
10.
Defendant is directed to pay the costs of the divorce action.
S
S T KHOLONG
ACTING JUDGE: WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION
Appearances:
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv. Thelma-Anne
Pratt
Instructed
by
Truter and Associates
For
the Defendant:
Mr. T. Dunn
Instructed
by
TJC Dunn Attorneys
[1]
Act 70 of 1979.
[2]
Act 70 of 1979.
[3]
Wijker v Wijker
1993 (4) SA 720
(A) at 33
[4]
Wijker v Wijker, op cit, at 19.
[5]
Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht
1989 (1) SA 597
(c)
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