Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 345South Africa
Old Mutual Alternate Risk Transfer Insure Limited v SA Guarantee Specialists Proprietary Limited and Another (2025/127863) [2025] ZAWCHC 345 (13 August 2025)
Headnotes
by the Underwriting Manager as and when such data is requested by M&F
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Old Mutual Alternate Risk Transfer Insure Limited v SA Guarantee Specialists Proprietary Limited and Another (2025/127863) [2025] ZAWCHC 345 (13 August 2025)
Old Mutual Alternate Risk Transfer Insure Limited v SA Guarantee Specialists Proprietary Limited and Another (2025/127863) [2025] ZAWCHC 345 (13 August 2025)
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sino date 13 August 2025
FLYNOTES:
CONTRACT – Interpretation –
Conduct
of parties
–
Existence
of binding contract – Letter of intent and request for
quotation contemplated further negotiations –
No binding
contract was formed until final terms were agreed –
Protracted negotiations and unresolved disputes over
key terms –
Demonstrated an absence of a meeting of minds – Lack of
evidence for misrepresentation – Conduct
of parties
indicated that no valid agreement existed – No misdirection
– Appeal dismissed.
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case no:
2025-127863
In the matter between:
OLD MUTUAL ALTERNATE
RISK TRANSFER
INSURE
LIMITED
APPLICANT
and
SA GUARANTEE
SPECIALISTS PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT
CAREL DANIEL
HANEKOM
SECOND RESPONDENT
Coram:
MORRISSEY AJ
Heard
:
7 August 2025
# JUDGMENT: 13 AUGUST
2025
JUDGMENT: 13 AUGUST
2025
Morrissey AJ:
[1] This is an
urgent application in which the applicant, Old Mutual Alternative
Risk Transfer Insure Ltd (“
OMART
”) essentially
seeks authority to access, by force if necessary, certain business
premises of the first respondent, SA Guarantee
Specialists (Pty) Ltd
(“
SAGS
”); to search those premises for certain
documents and electronic data; and to copy or retain those documents
and data.
[2] SAGS says
the relief amounts to an Anton Pillar order and should not be
permitted because the primary requirement
for such an order, the
anticipated destruction of evidence, has not been established.
[3] OMART says that
it does not seek an Anton Pillar order. It contends that it is
seeking the enforcement of its contractual
rights against SAGS, and
has been compelled to ask the Court for assistance because, despite
demand, SAGS has failed to comply
with those obligations.
[4] OMART insure is
licensed as a non-life insurer in terms of the Insurance Act, 18 of
2017. In terms of its license, OMART
is authorised to write insurance
in various classes and subclasses of insurance business, including
the class “
guarantee
”. The guarantee policies it
is permitted to issue must be in respect of business within South
Africa. OMART is not authorised
to conduct guarantee business outside
of South Africa, and breaches its license if it does so.
[5] OMART is what
is referred to as a cell captive insurer. This is effectively a
contractual relationship between a licensed
insurer and another
company, whereby the latter subscribes for a unique class of shares
from the former to establish a ring-fenced
accounting unit (a “cell”)
within the insurer. From this cell the company is able to operate,
manage and administer
insurance on the relevant insurer’s
license.
[6]
Essentially, the arrangement allows a company that is not a licensed
insurer to administer and manage insurance
business for and on behalf
of such an insurer, and to share in the profits and losses generated
within the unit or cell from which
the company operates. Such a
company is referred to as an underwriting manager. These types
of arrangements are regulated
by statue.
[7] SAGS is a
licensed financial services provider in terms of the
Financial
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002
. It is an
OMART underwriting manager as just described. The second
respondent, Mr Carel Daniel Hanekom, is a director
of SAGS’ and
OMART’s point of contact with it.
[8] The contractual
arrangements between OMART and SAGS comprised a shareholders
agreement (in respect of the preference shares
OMART issued to SAGS
in respect of the relevant “cell”), and a so-called
binder agreement.
[9] The
binder agreement was concluded between OMART and SAGS on 8 October
2020. At that stage their names were Mutual
& Federal mutual Risk
Financing Limited and South African Guarantee Specialists (Pty)
Limited respectively. The binder agreement
is central to this
application as it is the contract OMART says contains the contractual
provisions it relies upon for the relief
it seeks. It is thus
necessary to set out some of its terms.
[10] Clause 4.1
deals with the scope of SAGS’ appointment. It provides that
SAGS, defined in the agreement as the “
Underwriting
Manager
”, shall render the services in terms of the
agreement: “…
for and on behalf of M&F risk
financing [OMART] as an underwriting manager and an independent
contractor
”. The clause goes on to provide that:
“
The
appointment of the Underwriting Manager in terms of this Agreement,
and this Agreement itself, shall not be construed in any
way to...
authorise the Underwriting Manager to perform any functions on behalf
of M&F Risk financing outside of the mandate
granted it terms of
the agreement.
”
[11] Clause
13 deals with the services SAGS will provide. It provides that SAGS:
“…
is
hereby mandated and appointed by M&F Risk Financing, and the
Underwriting Manager accepts such appointment, on the terms
and
conditions contained in this agreement, as an underwriting manager
for the purpose of rendering the following services:
The entering into,
variation and/or renewal of policies on the terms set out in annexure
B1 to this Agreement.
Determining premiums
under a personal lines short term policy on the terms set out in
annexure B3 to this Agreement.
Reporting on the
binder activities the information relating the policies, on the terms
as contained in the Annexures to this Agreement.
Administering the IT
platform used to manage the delivery of the services to the
policyholders, on the terms set out in annexure
B4 to this Agreement.
The settlement of
claims of policies on the terms set out in Annexure A to this
Agreement.
The
underwriting guideline to determine premiums will be made available
by the Underwriting Manager to M&F financing on request.
”
[12] Clause
25.2 expressly provides that the Underwriting Manager shall only
transact insurance business within the
Republic of South Africa.
[13]
Clause 14.1 deals with service levels. Clause 14.1.2
requires that “
with specific regard to dealing with a
policy
” the Underwriting Manager must report to M&F
Risk Financing “…
as soon as it becomes aware of any
particular risk in relation to the service it renders in terms of
this agreement
”.
[14]
“
Data
” is defined to mean “
policy,
policyholder data, documents, information, graphics, text and/or
other material in an electronic or tangible medium which
the
underwriting manager or MF risk financing generates collects,
processes, stores or transmits in relation to the business
”.
“
The Business
” is defined to mean “…
all aspects of M&F Risk Financing’s business and or any
business conducted by Affiliates, including, without limitation,
the
business of marketing, selling, administering, financing, reinsuring
and supporting insurance and financial services and related
products
”.
[15]
Clause 6 is headed “
information technology (“IT”)
systems
”. Clause 6.6 provides that the Underwriting Manager
acknowledges that M&F Risk Financing has a right to “…
access any data regarding any policy and policyholder held by the
Underwriting Manager as and when such data is requested by M&F
risk financing
”. Clause 6.10 provides that the Underwriting
Manager must “…
provide the specific data to M&F
Risk Financing as required, to ensure the fulfillment of M&F Risk
Financing’s ongoing
regulatory responsibilities
”.
[16]
Clause 7 is headed “
keeping of records
”. It
provides that “…
the Underwriting Manager must keep
and maintain books of account and records relating to the policies,
the services and each policyholder
and must allow M&F Risk
Financing, any statutory actuary appointed by M&F Risk Financing
and its auditors, full and unfettered
access to those books of
account and records
”.
[17]
Clause 9 is headed “
audit and monitoring
”. It
provides that M&F Risk Financing will undertake audit and
monitoring on an ongoing basis and “…
may at any time
on reasonable notice to the Underwriting Manager, do an inspection
(including, but not limited to, access to all
data, records, policies
and other information processing activities carried out by the
Underwriting Manager relating to this Agreement)
should reasonable
risk and/or performance management and regulatory compliance
requirements require such intervention
”. Clause 9.5
permits M&F Risk Financing to undertake an annual audit on 5
business days’ notice.
[18]
Clause 18 is headed “
data protection and privacy
”.
Clause 18.1 read with clause 18.1.8 provides that the parties agree
they have appropriate technical and organisational
measures in place
to “…
safeguard the security, integrity and
authenticity of all information being processed in terms of this
Agreement. At a minimum,
those measures must include controls related
to the following... ensure that it [SAGS] is able to identify all
data relating to
this Agreement and persons insured by M&F Risk
Financing separately from other data under its control
”.
[19]
Clauses 3, 26 and 27 deal with the term and termination of the binder
agreement. Cause
3 provides that the agreement “…
shall commence on the effective date, whereafter it shall continue
indefinitely until terminated for any reason by either party giving
90 days written notice of termination to the other or until cancelled
in terms of the applicable provisions within this agreement
”.
[20]
Clause 26 deals with breach. It permits either party to cancel
the agreement on 90 days’
written notice (amongst other
remedies) if a breach committed by the other party is not remedied
within seven days of receipt of
a written notice to do so. It
also contains a form of acceleration clause in favour of the innocent
party regarding amounts
owing under the agreement, and permits that
party to certain legal costs associated with the cancellation.
[21]
Clause 27 provides that OMART may terminate the binder agreement by
giving not less than 90 days
written notice to SAGS where certain
events identified in clause 27.1 have occurred. Those events
include a situation where
SAGS “…
or any of its
shareholders or its directors is alleged to have committed or is
convicted of fraud, theft or any other crime involving
dishonesty
”
(clause 27.1.1); or if SAGS “…
breaches any of the
material obligations or any warranty contained in this agreement
”
(cause 27.1.8).
[22]
Clause 27.2.1 provides that”
“
If
one of the events in clause 27.1 occurs and notice of termination is
given to the Underwriting Manager… M&F Risk Financing
will
obtain all the information from the Underwriting Manager relating to
the Policies and the Policyholders and M&F Risk Financing
will
perform any activities that the Underwriting Manager is required to
perform in terms of this agreement.
”
[23]
Clause 28 is headed “
effect of termination
”.
Clause 28.1 provides that until any termination or cancellation
becomes effective, both parties will remain bound by their
respective
responsibilities and duties in terms of the Agreement. Clause 28.2
goes on to state that:
“
During
the 90 day notice period, M&F Risk Financing may, in its sole and
absolute discretion:
limit or prevent the
Underwriting Manager from performing certain or all of the binder
activities and/or incidental activities for
the remaining duration of
the agreement; and/or
…
take
any other reasonable measures to limit any risks it may be exposed to
as a result of the Underwriting Manager's breach and/or
resulting
from or associated with this Agreement and/or its termination.
”
[24]
Clause 28.3 sets out what SAGS must do once the termination date
arrives, namely, once the 90-day
termination period has elapsed.
Those obligations include SAGS immediately returning “…
All documents, information and data relating to every
policyholder, M&F Risk Financing, any confidential information
made available
to the Underwriting Manager, and any other documents
pertaining to the business and/or the delivery of the services, in
the format
required by M&F risk financing so as to enable it to
ensure continuity of service to the Policyholders
”.
SAGS is also required to account to OMART “…
to
reconcile the financial position of all transactions relating to the
services and will provide any assistance and information
to M&F
risk financing required for this purpose
”.
[25]
Clause 29 is headed “
step in the right
”. I cite it
in full:
“
29.1
If the Underwriting Manager is unable to perform the binder function
as a result of any of the following:
29.1.1
being placed under curatorship;
29.1.2
business rescue;
29.1.3
becomes insolvent;
29.1.3
is liquidated;
or is for any other
reason unable to continue to render the services it is obliged to
render in accordance with this Agreement,
M&F Risk Financing or
any duly authorised financial services provider appointed by the M&F
Risk Financing shall take over
the Insurance Business in the interest
of Policyholders and perform any activities that the Underwriting
Manager is required to
perform in terms of this Agreement and the
cost of performing such activities or services will be payable by the
Underwriting Manager
on demand.
29.2
Where M&F Risk Financing or the authorised financial services
provider performs such activities
and services during the termination
period, the Underwriting Manager is prohibited from performing any of
those Binder Activities
or incidental activities without the express
written consent of M&F Risk Financing and the Underwriting
Manager will co-operate
with M&F Risk Financing or the appointed
financial services provider to limit any risks that M&F Risk
Financing or any
Insured may be exposed to resulting from or
associated with this Agreement or its termination.
”
[26]
On 20 June 2025, Mr Walter Cronje, OMART’s managing director,
received a telephone call
from a Mr Domenico Ferrinia of Ninety One
Securitisation S.A (“
Ninety One
”).
[27]
During that call Mr Ferrinia expressed concern about a guarantee SAGS
had issued to Ninety One
on behalf of OMART not being paid, despite
the necessary demand having been made. That guarantee was
referred to as the “
Franki Guarantee
” in the
papers and I will also refer to it by that name. Mr Ferrini followed
the call up with an email of the same date,
in which he recorded the
following summary of the situation:
“
One
of our funds, the European Credit Opportunities Fund 1, has a loan
which is guaranteed by an on-demand bond issued by OMART
and arranged
by SAGS.
We made a valid demand
under the bond to 30 days ago on 20 May, and in accordance with the
bond’s terms the payment was due
by yesterday, 19 June, at the
latest.
We are very concerned
because, in breach of OMART’s obligations, we did not receive
payment yesterday as required by the demand
and the bond.
SAGS raised numerous
information requests and serious unsupported claims to which we
responded fully and comprehensively ahead of
the date for receipt of
payment.
As we did not receive
payment yesterday, our London solicitors sent a pre-action letter
last night solicitors instructed by Danie
[Mr Hanekom] to represent
OMART and SAGS (a london-based firm named Humphries Kersetter).
A
copy of this letter is attached for your reference. We can also
provide previous correspondence if you would like to receive this.
”
[28]
Mr Ferrini’s email went on to record that Ninety One were
taking the matter very seriously.
He indicated he was open to
an amicable resolution given the relationship between OMART and
Ninety One. He concluded by stating
that “…
The
matter is urgent and you can call me at any time on my mobile number
below. Are you available to speak with me later today?
”.
[29]
Mr Cronje stated that prior to Mr Ferrini’s call, neither he
nor any other OMART employee
were aware of the Franki Guarantee or
any of the facts recorded in Mr. Ferrini’s email. At
approximately 13h30 on 20
June 2025, just under an hour of having
received Mr Ferrini’s email, Mr Cronje forwarded it to Mr
Hanekom, saying he required
“…
A detailed response
from you by this evening including copies of all relevant guarantees,
security documentation and progress on
reinsurance payments
”.
[30]
Mr Hanekom responded just after 18h00 on the same day. He
attached certain documentation
relating to the Franki Guarantee.
He also stated that Ninety One was in breach of the terms of the
Franki Guarantee and that
“…
We have already
identified several misrepresentations on their part and continue to
investigate further matters. Accordingly, we
have denied liability
and appointed Humphreys Kerstetter LLP, specialist litigation firm in
London, to represent us in this matter
and to formally engage with
Ninety One’s attorneys
”. Mr Hanekom went on to
provide some further background to the matter.
[31]
It appears that by that stage Mr Cronje appreciated that the Franki
Guarantee was issued in foreign
currency to a party outside of South
Africa, beyond the terms of OMART’s license. On 21 June
2025 (a Saturday) he sent
a further email to Mr Hanekom, raising the
following queries:
“
On
what basis are you issuing bonds to foreign entities denominated in
foreign currency? OMART Insure is not licensed for this and
this
constitutes a breach of our licensing conditions.
The limits you have
issued are way in excess of our treaty limits as I understand -
please explain.
Of concern as well in
that this bond does not appear on the list of
policies/bonds/guarantees you furnished me at our last meeting?
Why
not?
What were the premium
charges for this bond, where were they paid and in what currency?
[32]
Mr Cronje went on that state that “…
These
are
serious issues once again Danie
placing us at significant risk and serious reputational damage.
Please reply urgently
”
.
[33]
Mr Hanekom responded a few hours later. He recorded that during
2022/23, SAGS had disclosed
to OMART that it intended to establish an
international platform to write bonds in other jurisdictions and that
is had engaged
with various advisers to assist it in that regard. He
explained that SAGS had engaged Ninety One during 2023, which had led
to
the issue of the Franki Guarantee. Mr Hanekom said that had
been done because the potential carriers (issuers) for the
international
platform had wanted to determine the pipeline for
future business, and that “…
SAGS had to showcase
their transaction to the international carriers based in Bermuda that
showed a key interest
”.
[34]
It thus appears that the idea between SAGS and Ninety One was for the
Franki Guarantee to have
been swapped for another one issued by an
international carrier in Bermuda shortly after it was issued, but
that had not occurred.
Per Mr Hanekom’s email:
“…
We
informed Ninety-One of the fact that SAGS will swap out the bond
during the first three months after having issued the bond,
replacing
OMART with the international character carrier and Ninety-One agreed
to this. The Bermuda Insurer at the last minute
changed their mind
and decided against a cell captive specialising solely on bonds
”
.
[35]
Mr Hanekom concluded his email in the following way:
“
The
intention was never for the bond to be on the books of OMARt for more
than 3 months.
I accept that none of
the above is of any comfort and I also accept there will be
consequences for SAGS.
If
possible, allow SAGS four months to defend against the breaches of
the bond conditions by Ninety-One.
”
[36]
As I read Mr Hanekom’s email, he recognised that the issue of
the Franki Guarantee was
beyond OMART’s licence conditions.
It had been issued to show potential third parties who were
authorised to issue
such guarantees that SAGS could generate business
for such bonds, with a view to it being transferred to such a third
party shortly
after it was issued.
[37]
Mr Cronje responded on the evening of 21 June 2025 in the following
way:
“
I
am utterly astounded at the contents of your e-mail. You have not
disclosed any of the information below and have acted beyond
the
mandate of your binder with OMART Insure. I need the following
information urgently...
”
[38]
Mr Cronje then set out five queries he required Mr Hanekom to respond
to, one of which read as
follows:
“
I
require full disclosure immediately of any other such arrangements
you have entered into without our authority to do so.
”
[39]
Mr Cronje’s email concluded as follows:
“…
Please
be advised that with immediate effect (irrespective of the date of
any guarantee or bond) your authority to bind OMART Insure
on any new
or renewal business is hereby withdrawn pending the resolution of
this matter. You may not issue any form of guarantee
or bond on
behalf of OMART Insure without written approval from me and with my
personal signature attached. Additional correspondence
in this regard
will follow in the week. I require the immediate confirmation of your
understanding of - and your compliance with
this instruction.
”
[40]
Mr Hanekom responded about half an hour later. He said he would
respond to Mr Cronje’s
five queries, but that in the interim he
confirmed “…
the withdrawal of the authority of SAGS,
the procedure per your instruction below, and SAGS compliance with
it
”.
[41]
Mr Hanekom wrote to Mr Cronje again on the morning of Sunday, 22 June
2025, responding to the
five queries the latter had raised the
evening before. His response to the request for disclosure of
“
arrangements
” SAGS had entered into without
OMART’s authority, Mr Hanekom stated that:
“
There
are no other such arrangements
”
[42]
There was another email exchange between Mr Cronje and Mr Hanekom
later on 22 June, and by about
that date, OMART had at least the
following information pertaining to the Franki Guarantee:
·
It had been issued to Ninety One, a company
registered and incorporated in Luxembourg, on 7 June 2024,
guaranteeing a principal
debt owed to it by a German entity named
Westend Project-und Streungsmanagement GmBH (“
Westend
”
).
Westend’s indebtedness apparently arises from funding Ninety
One provided to it for a property development in Germany.
·
The maximum amount payable under the guarantee was
originally €36 600 000.00, but was increased by an
amendment on
1 April 2025 to €47 710 000.00
(approximately R989 million).
·
Per correspondence from Ninety One’s London
lawyers to SAGS, Ninety One unsuccessfully demanded payment from
Westend on 6
May 2025. The correspondence goes on to state that
on 20 May 2025, Ninety One demanded payment from SAGS under the
Franki
Guarantee in the amount of €39 747 902.09, such
amount to be paid by 19 June 2025. OMART says it has still
not
had sight of this demand, and first became aware of any issues once
Mr Cronje took Mr Ferrinia’s call on 20 June 2025.
The
proceedings between Ninety One and SAGS on the Franki Guarantee are
apparently ongoing in the London courts.
[43]
On 24 June 2025, OMART wrote to SAGS, cancelling the binder
agreement. Essentially, OMART
based its cancellation on the
fact that SAGS had breached the binder agreement when issuing the
Franki Guarantee because doing
so amounted to transacting insurance
business outside of South Africa and beyond the ambit of OMART’s
license. OMART
stated that it “…
hereby gives
formal notice of termination of the Binder Agreement in terms of
clause 27.1, with termination to take effect 90 (ninety)
days from
the date of this letter
”.
[44]
OMART went on to state that during the 90-day notice period, SAGS
must immediately:
“
Cease
issuing any new guarantees or policies in the name of OMART Insure;
Cease renewing
existing guarantees without the prior written approval of the writer.
Any renewal guarantees must be counter
signed by the writer.
Continue handling
claims in the appropriate manner. OMART Insure will provide further
details in due course, regarding the handling
of outstanding and new
claims going forward.
Comply with the
applicable provisions of Clause 28.3 and provide confirmation of the
new insurer.
Refrain
from making any representations, whether explicit or implied, to
Ninety One or any other third party, suggesting that SA
Guarantee has
the authority or mandate to issue guarantees or instruments on behalf
of OMART Insure outside of the Republic South
Africa. Any such
representations would be inaccurate, misleading and potentially
fraudulent.
”
[45]
The letter went on to demand the following:
“
SA
Guarantee must within 2 (two) business days of this letter provide
OMART Insure with a report on all the active guarantees issued
to
date. The report must include, as a minimum: Guarantee Number, Broker
Name, Inception Date, Expiry Date, Guarantee Type, Value,
Client
Name, Principal Name and Premium Charged. Accompanying this report
must be copies of all information and data relating to
the guarantees
in issue as well as all relevant security documentation relating
thereto.
OMART
Insure must be granted access to the SA Guarantee system to enable
full visibility and retrieval of all data and information
relating to
active and expired guarantees.
”
[46]
On 20 June 2025, and pursuant to discussions with Ninety One, OMART
discovered that SAGS had
issued another offshore guarantee in favour
of Ninety One during June 2024. That guarantee, referred to in
the papers as
the “
Blade Guarantee
”, was for an
amount of £23 800 000.00.
[47]
OMART contends that the discovery of the Blade Guarantee shows that
Mr Hanekom was dishonest
when he said there were “
no other
such arrangements
” when responding to Mr Cronje’s
question of 21 June as to whether there were other arrangements SAGS
had entered into
without OMRT’s authority to do so.
[48]
Mr Hanekom disputed any such dishonesty in his answering affidavit.
He explained that he
answered Mr Cronje truthfully because the
“
arrangement
” under the Franki Guarantee was a
unique one, and his response did not constitute a denial of other
guarantees. I have
some difficulty accepting Mr Hanekom’s
interpretation of Mr Cronje’s request as being so narrow as to
encompass only
guarantees on identical or substantially similar terms
to those of the Franki Guarantee. Significantly, Mr Hanekom
chose
not to use the opportunity his answering affidavit presented to
clarify whether or not any other offshore guarantees had been
concluded,
over and above those OMART has since discovered.
[49]
Between about 24 June and 29 July 2025, OMART engaged with SAGS to
obtain the documents and information
demanded in the 24 June
termination letter. I do not intend to chronicle those
engagements in detail, and limit what follows
to a summary of events
over that period.
[50]
There initially appeared to be a level of compliance on Mr Hanekom’s
part. For example,
when Mr Cronje wrote to Mr Hanekom on 24
June, asking to send someone to SAGS’ offices to collect copies
of all guarantees
in force, Mr Hanekom responded by saying he would
start printing hard copies of the scanned originals. Mr Hanekom
also confirmed
that SAGS would comply with the demands referred to in
paragraph [44] above. Mr Hanekom also answered certain queries
Mr
Cronje put to him, by email, WhatsApp and during telephone calls.
[51]
Mr Cronje and Mr Hanekom met for about an hour on 2 July 2025 at
SAGS’ offices. Mr
Cronje said that during that meeting Mr
Hanekom again
denied the existence of any
other guarantees issued to entities outside of South Africa. He
also said he was in the process
of retrieving the original security
documentation for all the guarantees issued by SAGS from an off-site
secure document storage
facility, and that he would scan the
documents and courier the originals to OMART. Mr Hanekom also
said that all the information
requested in the termination notice was
being collated and would be provided.
[52]
Some data was provided to OMART via WeTransfer on 9 July 2025.
Mr Cronje said it was of
limited benefit to OMART
because
although it contained lists for banks, agents and bond types, there
was no information that could be used for the purposes
of managing or
dealing with the SAGS book of business, which OMART had by then
sought to take over. Mr Cronje said that for OMART
to benefit from
the use of the information, the data had to be in the form of a
backup of the SAGS system, which had not been provided.
[53]
Between then and about 21 July, OMART’s requests for documents
became more and more pressing
and SAGS responses were less and less
forthcoming: The documents Mr Cronje had said were in the process of
being scanned had still
not been delivered and some correspondence
and communications from OMART went unanswered.
[54]
On 21 July 2025, OMART’s attorneys of record addressed a
lengthy letter to SAGS.
That letter set out some of the history
of the matter and some of the terms of the binder agreement. It
concluded by demanding
an inspection at SAGS premises on 25 July
2025, on the following basis:
“
Given
SAGS’ failure to comply with the numerous previous requests
from OMART INSURE as set out above, OMART INSURE hereby
notifies SAGS
that in accordance with clauses 6.6, 7, 9.1, 9.7 and 28.3 of the
Binder Agreement, OMART INSURE will be attending
at SAGS offices on
25 July 2025 at 10h00 to carry out an inspection, and to take copies
(in electronic or hard copy as the case
may be) of the following
information/documents:
All data held all data
held by SAGS on its IT system or otherwise pertaining to OMART INSURE
or the services contemplated in the
Binder Agreement;
All documents,
information, correspondence and data relating to every policyholder
in terms of which SAGS entered into a policy
with on behalf of OMART
INSURE;
Books of account and
records relating to any policies entered into by SAGS on behalf of
OMART INSURE, including details of any premium
payments, bank account
details of bank accounts into which that premium was paid, and bank
statements of these accounts;
All documentation in
possession or under the control of SAGS which bears the name or logo
of OMART INSURE / M&F Risk Financing;
and
Any other documents,
records, files, material, software, assets or correspondence
pertaining to the services contemplated in the
Binder Agreement.
[55]
The letter went on to conclude that if SAGS did not assist with the
inspection, failed to provide
documents timeously or in any way
hinder or obstruct it, OMART would approach the Court for urgent
relief.
[56]
On 22 July 2025, one Ms Amelia Costa, a partner at OMART’s
attorneys of record, attempted
to telephone Mr Hanekom to confirm he
had received the 21 July 2025 inspection letter. Mr Hanekom did not
answer and, on 22 July
2025, Ms Costa sent a WhatsApp message to him,
following up. That message was also unanswered and on 24 July 2025,
Ms Costa forwarded
a copy of the 21 July 2025 inspection letter to Mr
Hanekom via WhatsApp. Mr Hanekom responded with a WhatsApp message
about half
an hour later, stating as follows:
“
Dear
Amelia
I am currently out of
the office until Wednesday 6 August with limited connections
I
will have better connection from Monday [28 July] and will start to
dump files to Mphana of OMART. It is approximately 27,000
files and
about 26Gbyte of files
”
[57]
OMART sought to convene the inspection demanded by its attorneys of
record on 25 July 2025. SAGS
offices were found locked, and neither
Mr Hanekom nor any other SAGS employee was present. Attempts to track
Mr Hanekom down at
other addresses were unsuccessful. This is
unsurprising in light of Mr Hanekom’s message to Ms Costa
saying he would
be away from the office until 6 August. In his
answering affidavit Mr Hanekom explained that he had been away in the
Cederberg
mountains between 24 July to 6 August, during which time he
did not have access to cell phone communications. He did not
explain why he did not respond to the 21 July letter demanding an
inspection before he left.
[58]
On 28 July 2025, OMART received links to several WeTransfer folders
containing documents relevant
to SAGS’ business. Those folders
contained about 8 410 documents, comprising 7.45 gigabytes of
data. This is substantially
less than the 26 gigabytes of data that
Mr Hanekom had referred to in his WhatsApp message to Ms Costa of 24
July 2025.
[59]
OMART considered that SAGS had not provided it with all the
documents/data it demanded. On 29
July 2025, it's attorneys of record
addressed further correspondence to SAGS, recording that the
documentation requested had not
been provided, and setting out a long
list of documentation it considered was outstanding. OMART went on to
state that:
“
Given
that you are downloading documents to OMART Insure remotely, it seems
that the documents are stored on an online platform/cloud
storage.
That being so it is far more practical for you to provide OMART
Insure with access to the online platform where the documents
are
stored. The Binder Agreement allows OMART Insure to have access to
this online platform/cloud storage. We accordingly call
on you to
provide us with the login details and passwords that will allow OMART
Insure to access the online platform/cloud storage.”
[60]
The letter went on to demand that the outstanding documents were
furnished by 17h00 the same
day.
[61]
SAGS provided no further documentation by that deadline, but did
provide additional documents
the following day (30 July 2025). OMART
contends that a substantial amount of documentation nevertheless
remains outstanding.
OMART’s attorneys sent a further
letter to SAGS on 30 July. Essentially, that letter recorded that
SAGS had failed to accede
to OMART’s demands in the 21 and 29
July letters, and that OMART now had no option but to approach the
courts for urgent
relief to ensure compliance with them.
[62]
Much of the factual background set out above comes from OMART’s
papers. Although
SAGS filed an answering affidavit deposed to
by Mr Hanekom, that did not respond directly to many of the
obligations made.
This may well have been as a result of the
oppressive timetable OMART imposed on SAGS when bringing its
application.
[63]
Be that as it may, I did not understand SAGS to dispute much of the
factual background.
Rather, the thrust of SAGS’
opposition was that OMART had not validly cancelled the binder
agreement (SAGS contended that
OMART repudiated it) and, even if it
had, the deadline for it to hand over the documentation and data
OMART sought was at the end
of the 90-day termination period, which
will only arrive on 22 September 2025.
[64]
SAGS also said that OMART has impermissibly sought to accelerate the
production of that information
by reliance on the step-in rights
under clause 29 of the binder agreement, but that OMART has
incorrectly relied on that clause
because it only applies where one
of the events in clause 29.1 occurs (SAGS being placed under
curatorship or business rescue,
becoming insolvent or being
liquidated), and it is common cause that none of those events have
occurred.
[65]
That attitude is encapsulated in the following extract from Mr
Hanekom’s affidavit, responding
to OMART’s account of
events between 24 June and 30 July 2025:
“
The
Applicant’s minute-by-minute log of my communications does not
show evasion; It shows constant engagement while I was
trying to
manage a business and collate an enormous volume of data. The
Applicant's own admission that I have already provided
over 8,400
files proves my substantial cooperation. Their complaint that this is
not ‘complete’ based on their own
unsubstantiated
estimate of ‘27,000 files’ is simply unreasonable. A
proper handover requires an appropriate process,
not unending demands
under threat of litigation.
This
is the very reason why a 90 day notice has been established in the
binder agreement - to allow the Respondent to deliver all
documents
and files in a structured and organised manner.
”
[66]
OMART instituted urgent proceedings out of this Court on Thursday, 31
July 2025. It afforded
SAGS until 1 August to file a notice of
opposition and until Monday, 4 August 2025 to file answering
affidavits. It set the matter
down for hearing on Thursday, 7 August
2025. The founding papers were extensive, running to just over 500
pages in total, with
the founding affidavit running to 73 pages.
That meant that SAGS had a very limited opportunity to respond to the
application,
which in turn meant that I had to consider the matter
with what was clearly terse input from the respondents. While a
truncation
of the default time limits for the exchange of affidavits
is a regular feature of urgent applications, an applicant who imposes
too severe a timetable may not only unfairly prejudice a respondent,
but also the Court that has to hear the matter without the
respondent
having a fair opportunity to ventilate its case, notwithstanding the
attendant urgency. As will be seen, I have
sought to
accommodate the limited time the respondents had to address OMART’s
case in my Order.
[67]
As stated in the introduction, OMART
essentially
seeks access to SAGS premises and to search them for certain data
(including electronic date) and to make and retain
copies of it
.
The substantive relief covers about ten pages. My attempt at
summarising it follows:
67.1
SAGS or any adult person in charge of its business
premises at 1[…] G[…] W[…] Avenue in Somerset
West is obliged
to grant access to a “
supervising
attorney
”
, six forensic experts,
a representative of OMART and the sheriff for the district of
Somerset West.
67.2
Such access is to be granted to enable those
parties to:
67.2.1
Search the premises to identify, point out, access
and where necessary remove certain “
data
”
;
67.2.2
Search the premises to find networks, computers,
hard drives and other storage media, and to then search that media
for the “
data
”
by
connecting it to computers used by the forensic experts;
67.2.3
Permit the forensic experts to make copies of
storage media containing the data, with a copy being retained by
OMART; and
67.2.4
Permit the forensic experts to make print-outs of
the data located on digital devices or media if it cannot be copied
electronically.
67.3
SAGS or any adult person in control of the
aforesaid digital devices or media must disclose any passwords or
procedures required
for the effective access to them to give effect
to the searching/copying referred to above.
67.4
In the event that SAGS refuses to grant access to
the premises, the sheriff, assisted by a locksmith if need be, is
authorised to
obtain access “
as
necessary
”
.
67.5
In the event that the relevant copying cannot be
completed on a single day, the sheriff is authorised to take any
digital devices
or media into his custody, and the forensic experts
may complete their work under the supervision of the sheriff and the
instructing
attorney within two days, with the devices or media to
thereafter be returned to SAGS.
67.6
SAGS or any adult person in control of the
aforesaid premises must disclose the whereabouts of the “
data
”
,
be it at those premises or elsewhere.
67.7
OMART is granted leave to approach the Court on
supplemented papers to permit execution of the Order at such other
place where the
“
data
”
is located.
67.8
Certain safeguards have been built into the Order:
67.8.1
The execution of the Order is to be monitored and
overseen by the supervising attorney.
67.8.2
A detailed inventory of documents and other items
removed from the premises is to be prepared and a copy provided to
SAGS, that
inventory to be confirmed by the supervising attorney.
67.8.3
The order may only be executed between 08h00 and
18h00 on a weekday.
67.8.4
OMART must compensate SAGS for any damage caused
by any person exceeding the terms of the Order.
67.9
The “
data
”
OMART seeks concerns:
67.9.1
Documents in respect of all guarantees issued by
SAGS on OMART’s behalf, for which 16 categories of documents
are identified.
They include documents such as quotations, term
sheets, invoices, contractual documents, statements of account, bank
statements
for the accounts into which the premium was paid, demands
and correspondence.
67.9.2
Information in respect of all guarantees issued by
SAGS on OMART’s behalf. Seven categories of information
are identified,
including the amount of the guarantee, the parties to
it, details of the premium and when it was paid and the status of any
outstanding
claims.
67.9.3
Documents and information pertaining to Ninety
One. Seven categories of documents are identified, including
letters of authority
and related correspondence, three years of bank
statements for certain premium accounts and correspondence between
SAGS and Westend.
[68]
Ms Basson
, who appeared for SAGS, described OMART’s
decision to bring its application as the selection of the “
nuclear
option
”. She submitted that OMART was effectively
seeking an Anton Pillar order, and had abused the court’s
process
by instituting a procedural ambush to authorise a
pre-litigation fishing expedition.
Ms Basson
also
submitted that on a proper conspectus of the facts, SAGS had been
involved in a proactive and structured handover of documents
to
OMART, a process that only had to be completed by 22 September 2025
when the binder agreement terminated at the end of the 90-day
notice
period. She further submitted that OMART had failed to
establish any risk of harm should it have to wait out that
90-day
period.
Ms Basson
also challenged OMART’s claim to
invoke the urgent jurisdiction of the Court. Essentially, her
submission was that
OMART had waited almost five weeks from the date
it discovered the Franki Guarantee before bringing its application.
[69]
Mr Green
, for OMART, stressed that OMART did not seek an Anton
Pillar order. Rather, he submitted, OMART sought specific performance
of
its contractual rights under the binder agreement. He
submitted that on a proper interpretation of that agreement, the
relief
OMART was seeking was to have access to data SAGS was obliged
to provide to it.
Mr Green
said that the matter was
urgent because OMART needed to know whether SAGS had concluded any
other guarantees in its name and beyond
its authority other than
those it has discovered to date, and because OMART had taken over
SAGS’ business under the binder
agreement and needed
information to continue running it on a day-to-day basis. He
submitted that OMART had acted prudently
by engaging with SAGS before
bringing these proceedings, and had only resorted to litigation once
it was apparent that SAGS was
not going to comply with its
obligations.
Mr Green
also challenged the proposition
that OMART had to wait until the end of the 90-day period before it
could get the information it
was seeking from SAGS.
[70]
While there can be no doubt that the relief OMART seeks is intrusive
in nature and similar to
that granted in an Anton Pillar matter, the
basis on which that relief is premised is entirely different.
[71]
Anton Pillar applications contemplate a situation where there is a
concern that a party will
destroy evidence if proceedings are
instituted in the ordinary way. They are brought
ex parte
in order to preserve the element of surprise, and are executed in a
raid-like manner in order to prevent the destruction of evidence
between the time the Order is announced and the time it is
implemented. A fundamental component of such an application is
that there is a likelihood of evidence being destroyed.
[72]
While the Order OMART seeks contemplates a type of raid on SAGS, its
application is not motivated
on the basis that SAGS will destroy
evidence. On the contrary, SAGS has been given notice of the
proceedings and has opposed
them.
[73]
Rather, OMART pursues the intrusive relief it does because it says it
is contractually entitled
to it, and because it urgently needs that
information.
[74]
I deal with the contractual entitlement below. Assuming for the
moment that it exists I
consider that OMART’s complaints of
urgency are well-founded on the facts of this case.
[75]
OMART has a problem in that it does not know the extent to which SAGS
has exceeded its authority
by issuing other offshore guarantees
similar to the Franki Guarantee. It does not trust SAGS to
disclose that information
to it, because it considers that Mr Hanekom
was dishonest when he was previously asked about whether there were
any other such
arrangements in place. As I have pointed out, Mr
Hanekom has still not confirmed that no other such guarantees have
been
issued.
Mr Green
submitted that the papers revealed
a real risk that Mr Hanekom/SAGS had engaged in “
rogue
”
trading and that it was critical for OMART to be apprised on any such
activity as soon as possible. I consider that
in the
circumstances, suspicion is justified. As I have mentioned
above, I have difficulty with Mr Hanekom’s explanation
for why
his statement to Mr Cronje that there were no similar arrangements to
the Franki Guarantee was not untruthful. I
also consider that
his failure to respond to OMART’s requests for an inspection of
SAGS’ data (and seemingly having
a preference for SAGS to
supply the data itself) inclines towards an effort to avoid such an
inspection and to rather force a process
where SAGS controls what
information is supplied to OMART.
[76]
The risk created by the issue of other unauthorised guarantees may
well be substantial.
As the Franki Guarantee and the Blade
Guarantee reveal, substantial sums of money might be involved.
Even if they are not,
OMART is not licensed to issue them. The
insurance market can fairly be described as a highly regulated one,
and it is reasonable
to anticipate that the relevant regulator will
require an explanation from OMART as to the nature and extent to
which it has acted
beyond its license, as well as an explanation as
to what it was doing to address the situation that has arisen.
[77]
I mention in passing that in its replying affidavit, OMART says that
the disclosures and documents
it has received from SAGS thus far
reflect a potential exposure of some R2.5 billion, but that its own
engagements with intermediaries
in South Africa indicate the figure
may be more in the region of R4.3 billion. I place limited
weight on those allegations
given that they were only made in reply
and in relatively unsubstantiated terms. They do however raise
the reasonable prospect
that OMART is facing a much larger problem
than it is currently aware of.
[78]
It is apparent from the papers that OMART has adopted the view that
any offshore guarantees issued
in its name are void. The fact
that Ninety One is pursuing a claim on the Franki Guarantee suggests
that that view may be
open to contest. I express no view either
way on the question, but in either event there is every reason for
OMART to want
to know about any other guarantees that exist so that
it can take whatever proactive steps are available to it to limit any
harm
that it or third parties may suffer if those guarantees are
called up. Even if OMART succeeds in showing that offshore
guarantees
are void, there is every reason to believe that such a
finding may cause it to suffer substantial reputational harm,
something
Mr Cronje referred to in his first email of 21 June 2025.
[79]
The correspondence forming annexures to the papers shows that OMART
was initially willing to
afford SAGS an opportunity to put forward
the information it required. Although OMART did seek access to
SAGS’ “
system
” in the cancellation letter of
24 June 2025, at that stage Mr Cronje was still directing requests
for information to Mr Hanekom,
with a view to SAGS collating the
information required instead of OMART going to SAGS’ premises
and getting it itself.
[80]
As time went by, OMART seems to have lost faith in SAGS collating
information and now wants to
scour the data itself. I consider that
OMART acted reasonably by seeking an interactive approach before
bringing this application.
This finding does not detract from
the established authority that requires an applicant seeking urgent
relief to act expeditiously.
Rather, I consider that on the
facts of this case OMART should not be penalised for seeking to
enforce its rights informally, especially
when the initial
indications from SAGS were that it would cooperate with that
enforcement.
[81]
The second reason that OMART relies on for urgent access to SAGS’
data is because it has
taken over SAGS’ business in the
termination period.
[82]
Whether OMART was entitled to do so, and whether it otherwise has a
right to inspect data held
by SAGS, requires an examination of the
binder agreement.
[83]
As stated above, part of the debate turned on whether OMART was
entitled to exercise its step
in rights under clause 29.2 of the
binder agreement, and accordingly insist of SAGS co-operating with it
to “…
limit any risks that M&F Risk Financing or
any Insured may be exposed to resulting from or associated with this
Agreement or
its termination
”.
[84]
In my view the context of the agreement provides the answer to that
question.
[85]
It will be recalled that clause 3 permits either party to terminate
the binder agreement on 90-days’
written notice. In my
view, such a notice can be given by either party at any time,
regardless of whether there is any breach
of the agreement.
Clause 3 is a contractual mechanism to terminate an otherwise
indefinite contract.
[86]
Clause 26 deals with the situation where there is a breach of the
agreement by either party.
In that case the defaulting party
must be given seven days' notice to remedy that breach. If it
does not do so, then the
innocent party may cancel the binder
agreement on 90 days' written notice. However, unlike a
termination under clause 3,
a cancellation notice under clause 26
permits the innocent party to claim immediate performance and/or
payment of all of the obligations
of the breaching party then owing
under the agreement, plus a right to claim certain legal costs.
[87]
Clause 27 grants a right of termination to OMART alone. It
arises where certain events
occur, including SAGS committing a breach
of any of the material obligations under the binder agreement.
[88]
Where that occurs, clause 27.2.1 permits OMART to terminate the
binder agreement on 90 days’
notice and, if it does so, to: (i)
obtain
all the information from SAGS
relating to the Policies and the Policyholders; and (ii) to perform
any activities that SAGS is required
to perform in terms of the
agreement. It seems to me that this is precisely what OMART has
sought to do, and is now using
these proceedings to facilitate a
result.
[89]
Clause 28 applies to a termination under clause 3 and cancellations
under clauses 26 and 27.
It provides that, without more, the
agreement will continue for the 90-day notice period. However,
clause 28.2 reserves
to OMART the right to limit the binder
activities SAGS is to perform, to adjust its remuneration
accordingly, and to take any other
“
reasonable measures
”
to limit any risks it may be exposed to as a result of a breach by
SAGS and/or “…
resulting from or associated with this
agreement and/or its termination
”. Again, it seems to
me that OMART’s demand to access SAGS’ documents and data
is an attempt to take reasonable
measures of the sort contemplated in
this clause.
[90]
Clause 28.3 deals with what happens on the termination date, and
includes an obligation on SAGS
to return to OMART all documents,
information and data relating to every policyholder and OMART, and to
provide an accounting.
[91]
Clause 29 deals with step in rights. It applies where SAGS is
unable to perform its binder
functions due it being placed under
curatorship, business rescue, becoming insolvent, being liquidated,
or for any other reason.
In such a case OMART or another
authorised financial services provider it may appoint may assume
SAGS’ obligations, with
the costs of doing so to be paid by
SAGS on demand.
[92]
Insofar as OMART contended that clause 29.2 applied whenever OMART
exercised its rights to limit
SAGS’ binder activities under
clause 28, I do not think that is correct. It seems to me
that clause 28 contains
its own provisions for what will happen if
OMART limits SAGS’ binder activities, and that clause 29.2 is
exclusively concerned
with the “
impossibility
”
situation contemplated in clause 29.1 For the reasons that
follow, it is unnecessary for me to come to a final view
on that
question.
[93]
OMART’s cancellation notice of 24 June 2025 was stated to be
made in terms of clause 27
of the binder agreement. In my view,
that cancellation notice was validly given. Aside from anything
else, I consider
that SAGS’ conclusion of the Franki Guarantee
constituted a material breach of its obligations under the binder
agreement.
The same is true of the Blade Guarantee. Not
only was such conduct expressly prohibited by clause 25.2, the
materiality of
the breach is underscored by Mr Hanekom’s
unsolicited acknowledgment that the conclusion of the Franki
Guarantee would cause
result in
consequences for SAGS, the shock expressed by Mr Cronje upon finding
out about that conduct, and the initial haste with
which both of them
sought to deal with the issue.
[94]
Having validly given notice of cancellation of the binder agreement
under clause 27, OMART was
entitled to exercise its rights under
clauses 27.2 (including the right to obtain all information from the
underwriting manager)
and 28.2 (to limit SAGS’ binder
activities) during the termination period. In my view, OMART
elected to exercise both
of those rights in the termination letter.
[95]
For those reasons, while I agree with
Ms Basson
that any
request by OMART for information/data under clauses 28.3 or 29.2
would be premature or invalid respectively, those submissions
miss
the point because OMART’s request was not made under clause
28.3 and, to the extent it was invalidly made under clause
29.2, it
was also validly made under other clauses of the binder agreement.
[96]
I do not consider that OMART’s termination notice can be
considered as a repudiation of
the binder agreement. But even
had there not been a cancellation I consider that OMART would have
had an entitlement to the
data/information it seeks.
[97]
Clause 6.6 of the binder agreement contains an express
acknowledgement by SAGS that OMART has
a right to access any data
regarding any policy and Policyholder held by SAGS as and when such
data is requested by OMART.
The provisions of clauses 7 and 9
serve to reinforce clause 6.6, and those obligations do not only
arise in the termination period,
but exist at all times the binder
agreement is extant.
[98]
I also consider that a relatively broad reading of clause 6.6 was
intended by the parties, given
the nature of the relationship between
them. Aside from the binder agreement containing several
provisions indicative of
an intention that OMART should have complete
transparency of the business SAGS wrote in its name, insofar as SAGS
was concluding
policies in OMART’s name, it was acting as its
agent. It is well-established that an agent stands in a
fiduciary relationship
with their principal, and that a principal is
entitled not only to an accounting from that agent, but also to a
debatement of that
account, a process that entails an interrogation
of it (
Grancy Property Ltd and Another v Seena Marena Investments
(Pty) Ltd and others
[2014] 3 All SA 123
(SCA)).
[99]
While such a claim is typically advanced by way of action
proceedings, the concept that a principal
may challenge an agent’s
accounting instead on being required to be content to rely on what
that agent says tends to support
a broad interpretation of the
various provisions in the binder agreement affording OMART access to
SAGS’ data, especially
that regarding particulars of policies
it issued in OMART’s name.
[100] It
follows that, in principle, I consider that OMART is entitled to
access SAGS’ records and data, at least
insofar as it pertains
to the performance of SAGS’ obligations under the binder
agreement.
[101] The
question that then arises is the form the relief should take.
[102] While
the binder agreement articulates OMART’s rights of inspection
under clause 6.6 and its right to information
under clause 27.2.1, it
does so in a theoretical way without explaining the mechanics of how
that inspection will be conducted
or the information will be
furnished.
[103] As I
have shown, OMART’s approach is for it to be granted a right of
entry to SAGS’ premises (by force
is necessary), with
obligations being imposed on SAGS and its representatives to point
out and access data so that OMART may copy
it or take it away.
It is also evident from the notice of motion that OMART has sought to
frame the categories of data and
documents it seeks in the widest
possible terms.
[104] OMART’s
approach is understandable in the circumstances: OMART has lost
faith in Mr Hanekom and wishes
to ensure it gets a complete picture
of what SAGS has been up to. It thus seeks to formulate the
data and documents it will
be entitled to “
seize
”
in a way that ensures it gets that full picture. It does not
want an Order directing SAGS to provide it with information,
as it is
concerned that any such information provided may not be complete.
[105] A
practical difficulty I have is that it is not clear to me that the
“
data
” OMART has requested is limited to what it
is entitled to under the agreement. Given the very limited time
OMART afforded
SAGS to respond to its application, the latter did not
really have an opportunity to engage with the scope of the data
requested,
other than to make generalised statements such as that it
constituted “…
an ill-defined universe of documents,
including “every other guarantee issued,” “all
invoices,” “all
correspondence,” and “bank
statements for the last three years” for multiple accounts
”.
[106] I am
also not convinced that the binder agreement contemplated the
intrusive approach to accessing the data that
is contemplated in the
notice of motion. For example, there is no provision in the
binder agreement permitting OMART to gain
access SAGS premises by
force, or obliging SAGS and its representatives to identify where
data is stored, to furnish computer passwords,
or to allow entire
hard drives and other storage media to be “
mirrored
”
by OMART’s forensic agents.
[107] Rather,
it seems to me that the binder agreement anticipated a more
co-operative approach, with the parties being
able to agree on the
practical aspects of how any inspection OMART sought would take
place. Such an approach would enable
the parties to engage on
questions such as how and when data the inspection should take place,
the actual data that fell within
the ambit of the inspection, how it
should be retrieved and by whom, and how OMART’s inspection
rights could be balanced
against the SAGS’ right not to have
irrelevant data fall into OMART’s hands.
[108] Indeed,
it seems to me that such a cooperative approach is reflected in what
occurred when OMART first discovered
the Franki Guarantee: OMART
asked SAGS to provide certain documentation and information to it, on
the basis that it would review
what was supplied and query it if it
was not satisfied with what it received, potentially asking for
additional information if
need be. Although OMART sought an
inspection in the termination letter of 24 June 2025, it was only
once OMART grew frustrated
by SAGS’ delays in furnishing
information that it pressed for one in the letter of 21 July 2025.
[109] Such a
co-operative approach obviously needs the buy in from both parties.
A the absence of co-operation
(or adequate co-operation) is
effectively what OMART complains has arisen here. On the other
hand, SAGS says that it is co-operating
as much as it can, as is
evidenced by the documents it has already furnished.
[110] I
mention that
Mr Green
informed me that no further documents
have been supplied once the application was launched. Although
that was a statement
made from the bar, I did not understand it to
have been disputed by
Ms Basson
.
Ms Basson
did
submit that Mr Hanekom had at all times been under the
bona fide
impression that the documents SAGS was being asked for only had
to be supplied at by the termination date of 22 September 2025.
Given that these are motion proceedings, I am hesitant to reject that
assertion of good faith on the papers.
[111]
In my view a practical approach is required. In the
circumstances of this case, I see little benefit
in making an Order
directing SAGS to co-operate with OMART’s requests for
inspections. Aside from anything else, such
an Order would be
so vague as to be practically meaningless, especially given the
urgency I consider pertains to OMART’s
need to have access to
SAGS’ data.
[112] I
do however not lose sight of the very extensive and intrusive nature
of the relief OMART seeks.
Even though it does not have the
ex
parte
element of an Anton Pillar order, the “
raid
”
it contemplates is similar to such orders. Indeed, OMART’s
recognition that certain safeguards need to be built
into the order
reflects its acceptance of the seriousness of the relief it seeks.
With a view to achieving a just balancing
of the parties’
interests, I consider that SAGS must be afforded an opportunity to
voluntarily comply with its obligations
under the binder agreement
before being obliged to endure the “
nuclear option
”
OMART proposes. Affording SAGS such an opportunity to cooperate
may also resolve the potential difficulty of OMART
seeking access to
information that falls beyond the ambit of what it is entitled to
under the binder agreement.
[113]
To achieve that result I intend granting an Order substantially in
line with that OMART seeks, but to suspend
it for a period of 15
Court days, or such further period the parties may agree to or the
Court may direct. I also intend
to make provision for the
lapsing of the Order on 2 February 2026 (a relatively arbitrary
long-stop date), and for SAGS to be able
challenge the ambit of the
“
data
” OMART seeks.
[114]
My intention in doing so is to encourage both parties to engage while
the Order is suspended. OMART
may wish to do so because it
wants the data urgently and will prefer to negotiate and receive data
earlier than it will if it waits
until the Order becomes effective.
SAGS may choose to cooperate to stave off the “
nuclear
option
”. If a cooperative process can be achieved,
the parties can agree to lengthen the stay of the Order. If
SAGS
considers OMART has refused to engage during the period of the
stay, it may approach the Court to extend it, based on events that
occur since the grant of this Order (I in no way intend to fetter the
discretion of a court adjudicating any further proceedings
in giving
this hypothetical example). If SAGS only wishes to challenge
the ambit of the documents/data OMART seeks, it can
limit a challenge
to that aspect. If agreement cannot be reached, SAGS can seek
to approach the court for assistance.
If there is no Order (or
agreement) extending the stay or the documents OMART may inspect by
the time the time the 15 Court day
period has expired, OMART will be
able to pursue relief it has sought (subject to the further
limitations referred to below). If
the parties are able to finalise
the inspection process without the need to execute the Order, they
can agree for it to be stayed
beyond 31 January 2026, in which case
it will lapse automatically.
[115] I
also consider the following further refinements ought to be made to
the Order proposed by OMART:
115.1
OMART must give SAGS 24 hours’ notice as to
when the Order will be executed. As this is not an
ex
parte
application of the Anton Pillar
variety, and as OMART seeks compelled assistance from SAGS, I think
SAGS should have some idea of
when the Order is to be executed.
SAGS may also wish to have its own observers or experts present to
oversee the execution.
OMART may give that notice during the
suspended period of the Order.
115.2
SAGS must be given a copy of all data copied by
OMART’s forensic team (OMART agreed to this during the
hearing), and OMART
must return any documents removed within one week
of the execution of the Order (those documents being reflected on the
inventory).
OMART may make and retain copies of those
documents.
115.3
The supervising attorney must prepare a report to
the Court regarding the execution of the Order, such report to be
filed in the
relevant Court file.
[116]
While I appreciate that the suspension of an Order in a matter I have
adjudged to be urgent may seem contradictory,
the reason underlying
my approach is to accommodate the expansive nature of the relief
OMART seeks and the limited practical benefit
of issuing a declarator
that SAGS must comply with its contractual obligations. Had the
matter not been urgent, the appropriate
relief may have been for such
a declarator to have been made. I have also sought to take into
account the very limited period
SAGS was afforded by OMART to
ventilate its case. As explained above, SAGS had no real
opportunity to address the ambit of
the “
data
”
OMART seeks to inspect/remove/copy and thus I have sought to afford
it an opportunity to do so.
[117]
As far as costs are concerned, I consider that the respondent’s
opposition to the application was
unsustainable, even if it was
advanced in good faith. While I am of the view that OMART
imposed an unduly harsh timetable
on the respondents once this
application was launched, that is ameliorated by the adjustments to
the Order I have proposed.
Although both respondents opposed
the application, OMART only sought costs from SAGS. I thus
consider that the first respondent
should pay the applicant’s
costs. I also consider that the matter was of sufficient
complexity and urgency to justify
counsel’s costs being awarded
on Scale C.
[118]
In the circumstances, I make the following Order:
1.
This application
is
heard as one of urgency
in terms of
Rule 6(12)
and
the requirements
of the Rules of Court in respect of time periods and service are
dispensed with
and the applicant’s departure
therefrom is condoned
;
2.
This orders in paragraphs 3 to 12 below
:
2.1.
Are suspended for a period of 15 Court days from the date hereof, or
for such further period as may be agreed between the parties or
directed by the Court.
2.2.
Will lapse on Monday, 2 February 2026 or such other date as may be
agreed
between the parties or directed by the Court, such lapsing to
occur on the relevant date even if the suspension referred to in 2.1
is extended for any period.
2.3.
May only be executed between 0
8
h00 and
1
8
h00 on a weekday and on 24 hours’
notice to the first respondent.
3.
The first respondent and/or any other adult
person
in charge or control of the first respondent’s business
premises at
Unit G[…], Paardevlei Rising 2,
1[…] G[…] W[…] Avenue, Paardevlei, Somerset
West, Western Cape
("
the premises
")
are
hereby ordered to
grant to the following persons access to the
premises:
3.1.
Mr Kobus Pieterse, an admitted attorney of the High Court of South
Africa
("
the supervising attorney
"); and
3.2.
The following employees of Cyanre The Digital Forensics Lab
Proprietary
Limited (“
the forensic experts
”):
3.2.1.
Johannes Roux [Identity Number: 7[...]];
3.2.2.
Daniel Jacobus Oosthuizen [Identity Number: 9[...]];
3.2.3.
Thanyani Norman Mabuda [Identity Number: 8[...]];
3.2.4.
Thabang Thello [Identity Number: B[...]];
3.2.5.
Clara Isabella Hattingh [Identity Number: 8[...]];
3.2.6.
Marcel Esterhuizen Mostert [Identity Number: 8[...]] ;
3.3.
Mr
Walter Cronje
, and/or Mr
Mfanafuthi
Radebe
, of the applicant; and
3.4.
the sheriff
or deputy sheriff
of this Court
for the district of
Somerset West HL
("
the
sheriff
");
(collectively “
the
search persons
”)
4.
The first respondent and/or any other adult
person in
charge
or control of the premises
is hereby ordered to
grant
access to the premises to the search persons, for the
purposes of:
4.1.
searching the premises in order to enable any of the search persons
to
identify, point out, access, copy and where necessary remove:
4.1.1.
The following documents in respect of each guarantee listed in
annexure WC6 to the founding
affidavit, and every other guarantee
issued by the first respondent on behalf of the applicant (to the
extent that they exist),
or such altered list of documents the
parties may agree upon or as may be contained in an issued order of
court at the time this
order is executed:
4.1.1.1. The
quotation and related correspondence;
4.1.1.2. The
facility agreement / term sheet and any amendments or addendums;
4.1.1.3. All
invoices;
4.1.1.4. The
guarantee and any amendments or addendums thereto;
4.1.1.5. Deed of
indemnity and any amendments or addendums;
4.1.1.6. Suretyship
agreement and any amendments or addendums;
4.1.1.7. Deed of
cession and pledge and any amendments or addendums;
4.1.1.8. Escrow
agreement and any amendments or addendums;
4.1.1.9. Payment
instructions relating to the escrow agreements;
4.1.1.10.
Statements of account relating to the escrow accounts;
4.1.1.11.
Underlying contractual documents relating to the underlying contract
in respect of which the guarantee was
issued;
4.1.1.12.
Status reports relating to underlying projects;
4.1.1.13.
Bank statements relating to premium account into which premium was
paid for the guarantee;
4.1.1.14.
Demand made on the guarantee;
4.1.1.15. Any
correspondence between the first respondent and the beneficiary or
the principal debtor; and
4.1.1.16. Any
correspondence exchanged with the intermediaries or policyholders in
respect of such guarantees and any
matters incidental thereto.
4.1.2.
The following information in respect of every guarantee issued by the
first respondent on behalf
of the applicant to the extent that it
exists, or such altered list of information the parties may agree
upon or as may be contained
in an issued order of court at the time
this order is executed:
4.1.2.1. The
maximum value payable under each such guarantee;
4.1.2.2. Details of
the principal debtor and beneficiary of the guarantee;
4.1.2.3. Details of
all premium received and/or owing in terms of the guarantee;
4.1.2.4. The date
on which premium was paid and into what bank account;
4.1.2.5. All bank
accounts in the name of SAGS into which premium was paid;
4.1.2.6. Statements
of such bank accounts for the last three years;
4.1.2.7. The status
of any outstanding claims;
4.1.3.
The following documents and information pertaining to Ninety One
Securitisation S.A (“
Ninety One
”), or such altered
list of documents and information the parties may agree upon or as
may be contained in an issued order
of court at the time this order
is executed:
4.1.3.1. Any
letters of authority sent by the first respondent to Ninety One the
covering emails thereto and any related correspondence;
4.1.3.2.
Transaction details showing what premium in terms of the bond number
G[...] and bond number G[...]2 was paid to the
respondent by Ninety
One, and into what bank account;
4.1.3.3. Current
bank statements for the last three years for the following premium
accounts:
4.1.3.3.1.
FNB account number 7[...];
4.1.3.3.2.
Barclays Bank Plc account number 5[...]
(IBAN G[...];
4.1.3.3.3.
Barclays Bank Plc account number 4[...]
(IBAN G[...]);
4.1.3.4. All
correspondence between the respondent and Ninety One from conclusion
of bond number G[...] and bond number G[...]2
to date, including a
demand made by Ninety One on 10 May 2025 in relation to bond number
G[...] and the respondent’s response
thereto dated 13 June
2025;
4.1.3.5. A facility
agreement concluded between Ninety One and Westend Projekt-und
Steuerungsmanaement GmbH (“
Westend
”);
4.1.3.6. All
quarterly or other reports issued by Ninety One to the respondent,
and any other correspondence or reports of
this nature in terms of
the performance of Westend in terms of the facility agreement; and
4.1.3.7. Any
correspondence between the respondent and Westend.
(the documents referred
to in paragraphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.3, as adjusted by any agreement(s)
between the parties or Court order(s),
as the case may be, are
collectively referred to as “
the data
”)
4.2.
searching the premises for purposes of finding and thereafter
searching
and examining any networks, desktop computers, laptop
computers, tablet computers, portable information storage devices,
external
data storage devices, including external hard drives, flash
drives, iPods, shufflers, compact discs (CDs), digital versatile
discs
(DVDs), stiffy discs, floppy disks, jazz drives, zip drives,
data cartridges, memory sticks, or media with the capability of
storing
information and/or data digitally, as well as any data, data
storage location or network component (including but not limited to
electronic servers, online platforms, Cloud Hosting, Dropbox, virtual
servers or other data hosted locally or internationally)
to which the
first respondent has access or control over or ownership of by
directly, indirectly or remotely connecting thereto
(collectively
described as "
digital devices or media
") on the
premises by connecting each of the digital devices or media to
forensic computers, for the purpose of identifying
it and determining
whether it contains the data;
4.3.
permitting and allowing the forensic experts to make four disk copies
and/or compact disc copies and/or to capture forensic images and/or
to make four complete mirror images and/or digital images (for
identification purposes) of only the data contained on the hard
drives of any digital devices or media located on the premises,
or to
download or create a data dump of online or hosted data, once it is
determined that such digital devices or media containing
the data,
one of which will be handed to the supervising attorney for safe
keeping, to serve as a record of what was copied, one
of which will
be handed to a representative of the first respondent, one of which
will be handed to the applicant, and one of which
will be retained by
the forensic experts;
4.4.
permitting and allowing the forensic experts to make print-outs of
any
of the data located on any such digital devices or media, if
copies of the hard drives cannot be made.
5.
The first respondent, and/or any other adult
person in control of any
digital devices or media, is hereby ordered to forthwith disclose to
the search persons any passwords
and/or procedures required for
effective access to such digital devices or media for the purposes of
paragraph 4 hereof.
6.
In the event that the first respondent and/or
any other adult person
in charge or control of the premises refuses to grant access to the
premises, it is ordered that the sheriff
assisted, if necessary, by a
locksmith, may obtain access to the premises as necessary.
7.
In the event that the forensic experts are
unable, for any unforeseen
reason, to complete their forensic investigations as contemplated in
this order on the day that it is
executed then is it hereby ordered
that:
7.1.
The sheriff is authorised to take any digital devices or media on the
premises into his custody;
7.2.
The forensic experts are authorised to conduct such forensic
investigations
as contemplated in this order, in the presence of the
supervising attorney and the sheriff, no later than two days after
the digital
devices or media have been taken into custody by the
sheriff where after the digital devices or media shall be returned to
the
first respondent.
8.
The first respondent and/or any other adult
person(s) in charge or
control of the premises, is hereby ordered to disclose to the sheriff
the whereabouts of any item falling
within the categories of items
referred to in paragraphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 hereof, whether at the
premises or elsewhere, to the extent
that such whereabouts are known
to the first respondent or such person(s).
9.
That in the event that any item is disclosed
to be situated at any
other place than the premises the applicant may approach this Court
for leave to permit execution of this
order at such other place.
10.
A detailed inventory of any documents removed from the premises
will
be prepared and confirmed by the supervising attorney, and he shall
provide a clear copy of such inventory to the first respondent
and
the person in charge of the premises, and the applicant’s
attorney.
11.
Any documents removed from the premises will be returned to
the first
respondent within one week of the execution of this Order.
12.
The supervising attorney shall monitor and oversee all aspects
of the
execution of this order and, shall in addition to the inventory
referred to in paragraph 10 above make a list of any other
items
removed in terms of this order, and shall provide a clear copy of
such inventory to the first respondent and the person in
charge of
the premises, and the applicant’s attorney.
13.
The applicant will
compensate the first
respondent for any damage caused to the first respondent by any
person exceeding the terms
of this order;
14.
That the costs of this application shall be paid by the first
respondent, such costs to include the costs of counsel on scale C.
A MORRISSEY
Acting Judge of the
High Court
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the
Applicant:
Adv I P Green SC
green@group621.co.za
Instructed
by:
Clyde & Co
Ms A Costa, Ms K Swart
and Ms C Du Toit
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Adv N Basson
nandi.basson@highcourtadvocate.co.za
Instructed
by:
Roach Attorneys
Ms
Kira Smidt
sino noindex
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