Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 383South Africa
My Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (7630/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 383 (21 August 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
21 August 2025
Judgment
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## My Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (7630/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 383 (21 August 2025)
My Vote Counts NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (7630/2023) [2025] ZAWCHC 383 (21 August 2025)
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FLYNOTES:
CONSTITUTION – Political rights –
Party
funding disclosure
–
Challenge
to donation limit and disclosure threshold – Delegation of
regulatory authority to President – Parliament
had delegated
regulatory authority to President which was constitutionally
permissible – Failed to demonstrate why
existing guidelines
were inadequate – Failed to establish factual grounds for
challenges – Speculative and vague
– No
unconstitutional limitations on rights – Application
dismissed – Electoral Matters Amendment Act 14
of 2024 –
Political Party Funding Act 6 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable
/ Not reportable
Case No: 7630/2023
In the matter between:
MY
VOTE COUNTS NPC
Applicant
and
PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
First
Respondent
MINISTER
OF JUSTICE AND
CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
Second
Respondent
MINISTER
OF HOME AFFAIRS
Third
Respondent
INDEPENDENT
ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Fourth
Respondent
AFRICAN
NATIONAL CONGRESS
Fifth
Respondent
DEMOCRATIC
ALLIANCE
Sixth
Respondent
ECONOMIC
FREEDOM FIGHTERS
Seventh
Respondent
INKATHA
FREEDOM PARTY
Eight
Respondent
NATIONAL
FREEDOM PARTY
Nineth
Respondent
UNITED
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
Tenth
Respondent
FREEDOM
FRONT PLUS
Eleventh
Respondent
CONGRESS
OF THE PEOPLE
Twelfth
Respondent
AFRICAN
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Thirteenth
Respondent
AFRICAN
INDEPENDENT CONGRESS
Fourteenth
Respondent
PAN
AFRICANIST CONGRESS
Fifteenth
Respondent
AFRICAN
TRANSFORMATION MOVEMENT
Sixteenth
Respondent
GOOD
PARTY
Seventeenth
Respondent
AL
JAMA-AH
Eighteenth
Respondent
ACTION
SA
Nineteenth
Respondent
Coram:
ERASMUS, J et SLINGERS, J et HOLDERNESS, J
Heard:
18 February 2025
Delivered:
21 August 2025
This judgment is handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives’ email addresses.
ORDER
1.
The application is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT
[1]
The applicant describes itself as a campaigner for
a more inclusive, transparent and accountable political and electoral
system
in South Africa, which has as its objective increased
accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of elections and
politics
in South Africa. The applicant avers that it strives
to achieve its objective by
inter alia
campaigning for reform of the political party
funding system in South Africa through the introduction of
legislation and other measures.
[2]
In
2017 the applicant successfully challenged the constitutionality of
the Promotion of Access to Information Act, Act 2 of 2000
(‘PAIA’)
to
the extent that it failed to provide for access to information on the
private funding of political parties
[1]
.
This failure rendered PAIA inconsistent with the constitutional right
to access information, the state’s obligation
to protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, the citizen’s
political rights.
[3]
Subsequent to the applicant’s successful
constitutional challenge, Parliament was afforded 18 months to amend
PAIA and to
take any other measure it deemed appropriate to provide
for the recordal, the preservation and facilitation of reasonable
access
to information on the private funding of political parties and
independent candidates.
[4]
This
resulted in the enactment of the Political Party Funding Act of 2018
(‘the
PPFA’)
and
the PAIA amendment Act. In terms of the PPFA, a political party
could not accept a donation from a person or entity in
excess of R15
million within a financial year
(‘the
donation limitation’)
[2]
and a
political party was obliged to disclose to the Electoral Commission
all donations received above R100 000 within a financial
year
(‘disclosure
threshold’)
.
[3]
A juristic person or entity which donated more than R100 000 within a
financial year was obliged to disclose this donation
to the Electoral
Commission.
[5]
Section 12(2)(d)(ii) of the PPFA obliged the
accounting officer to prepare a statement showing all donations and
membership fees,
and any levy imposed by the political party on its
elected representatives during that financial year.
[6]
Section 12(3)(c) obliged the auditor to perform an
audit of the financial statements and express an on opinion on those
statements
inter alia
listing
the donations under the disclosure threshold.
[7]
The donation limitation and disclosure threshold
are viewed as unconstitutional by the applicant which is sees as
negatively impacting
on:
(i)
the effective and informed exercise of citizen’s
rights to vote as enshrined in sections 19(1) and (3) of the
Constitution;
(ii)
free and fair elections in accordance with section
19(2) of the Constitution; and
(iii)
ensuring that the state carries out its duties to
promote, respect and fulfil the Bill of Rights, including the right
to vote, the
right to free and fair elections and the right to access
to information.
[8]
Therefore, it
instituted
these application proceedings wherein it sought an order for the
following substantive relief:
(i)
declaring sections 8(2), 9(1)(a), 12(2)(d)(ii),
12(3)(c), 22 and 24(1) of, and regulations 7 and 9 in Schedule 2 to
the PPFA
inconsistent with the Constitution
and invalid;
(ii)
to the extent necessary, declaring the PPFA and
the
Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000
to be inconsistent
with the Constitution and invalid to the extent set forth in its
founding affidavit dated 11 May 2023, alternatively
the Court’s
judgment;
(iii)
suspending the above declarations of invalidity
save to the extent set forth in (a) and (b) below, for 12 months and
directing Parliament
to remedy the defects in the PPFA (including
Schedule 2 thereto), in accordance with the Court’s judgment,
within the suspension
period:
(a)
the declaration of invalidity of section 9(1)(a)
of, and regulation 9 of Schedule 2 to the PPFA shall be effective as
from the date
of the Court’s Order with full retrospective
effect;
(b)
during the suspension period, section 9(2) of the
PPFA shall read as ‘
A person or
entity that makes a donation must disclose that donation to the
Commission in the prescribed form and manner.’
(iv)
in the event that Parliament does not remedy the
constitutional defects in accordance with the Court’s order
and/or judgment,
within the suspension period, paragraph (a) and (b)
shall continue to apply; and
(v)
directing the first to third respondents, jointly
and severally with any other respondent who may oppose the relief
sought in this
application, to pay the applicant’s costs,
including the costs of two counsel.
[9]
The applicant approached this court in terms of
section 38(a) and 38(d) of the Constitution for an order in terms of
section 172(1).
The applicant argued that it instituted the
application to affirm and to meaningfully realise the constitutional
imperatives that:
(i)
citizens be able to access information required
for the effective and informed exercise of their right to vote as
enshrined in section
19(1) and (3) of the Constitution;
(ii)
elections are free and fair in accordance with
section 19(2) of the Constitution; and
(iii)
the state carries out its duties to promote,
respect and fulfil the Bill of Rights, including the right to vote
and other constitutional
rights.
[10]
It is the applicant’s case that access to
accurate information about the private funding of political parties
is reasonably
required for the effective exercise of the right to
vote and to make political choices as envisaged by sections 19 and
32(1) of
the Constitution. It also argues that the absence of
proper disclosure and regulation mechanism endangers the fundamental
democratic values and that transparency in the funding of political
parties is required for the effective prevention and detection
of
corruption.
[11]
The applicant argues that the PPFA and the
impugned regulations thereto limit the disclosure of any single or a
combination of donations
by the same donor to amounts over the
threshold of R100 000.00 and do not regulate cumulative donations by
donors which are related
to one another and entitles political
parties to accept private direct donations up to an excess of R15
million and only requires
juristic persons to the exclusion of
natural person to disclose donations made in excess of the prescribed
threshold.
[12]
The applicant contends that the setting of a
threshold on the disclosure of private donations is not
constitutionally permissible
as the constitutional imperatives
dictate that all donations must be disclosed. Furthermore, even
if the setting of a threshold
was permissible, the current threshold
is too high.
[13]
The applicant also complains that there is no
provision in the legislation to address the cumulative sums of
donations from donors
who are related to one another.
[14]
The applicant avers that there is no evidence that
the legislature has done any analysis on the propriety and
reasonableness of
the R100 000 disclosure threshold and on whether
disclosure of donations above this limit is necessary to exercise the
right to
vote in an informed fashion. It argues that there is
no analysis on whether donations only above R100 000 and would have a
material influence on political discourse or the policies of a
political parties. Therefore, the threshold of R100
000
is arbitrary.
[15]
The applicant argues that even if it is found that
there has to be a limitation on donations, that the upper donation
limit of R15
million is excessive and unjustifiable. The
applicant argues that the prescribed limit of R15 million gives
wealthy private
donors the undue ability to influence political
parties in a manner that undermines the right to vote, as it leave
the door wide
open for private interests to direct the course of
politics.
[16]
On 8 May 2024 the Electoral Matters Amendment Act
(‘EMAA’)
became
operational, amending the PPFA. This resulted in the applicant
amending its notice of motion wherein it sought the
following amended
relief:
(i)
declaring section 8(2),
9(1)(a), 9(2), 12(2)(d)(ii), 12(3)(c), 22 and 24(1) of, and
regulations 7 and 9 in Schedule 2 to the PPFA,
as amended by the
EMMA, alternatively in their pre amendment form to be inconsistent
with the Constitution and invalid;
(ii)
declaring sections 27, 29(g) and 29(h) of the EMMA
to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid;
(iii)
the to extent necessary:
(iii)(a) declaring
that the failure by the President to determine the upper limit and
the disclosure threshold immediately
upon the enactment of the EMMA
or within a reasonable time thereafter in terms of regulation 7 and
9, respectively is irrational,
unlawful and unconstitutional and
invalid, and that the failure by the National Assembly forthwith
after the enactment of the EMMA
to enable the President to do so is
likewise irrational, unlawful, and unconstitutional and invalid;
(iii)(b) directing
the disclosure thresholds (R100 000 per annum) and upper limits (R15
million per annum) which were provided
in regulations 7 and 9 under
the PPFA prior to its amendment by the EMMA shall be effective as
from 8 May 2024 onwards, the date
that the EMMA entered into force;
and
(iv)
directing that all donations accepted or received
by political parties and independent candidates – or made by
any person
or entity to any political party or independent candidate,
from the date of the enactment of the EMAA to the date of this
Court’s
order, above R15 million annual limit in terms of
section 8(2) of the PPFA, read together with regulation 7 to schedule
2 of the
PPFA (the R15 million limit), alternatively such parts of
such donations as breach the R15 million limit, shall be paid back by
such political parties and independent candidates to the relevant
donors whence the donation emanated. All terms in this
paragraph are defined in the PPFA;
(v)
directing that all donations accepted or received
by political parties and independent candidates (as both terms are
defined in
the PPFA), from any person or entity (alternatively, those
donations which are beyond the R100 000 per annum disclosure
threshold
in terms of section 9(1)(a) of the PPFA be repaid.
[17]
Following the applicant’s amended notice of
motion, the speaker and the chairperson of the National Council of
Provinces were
joined to the proceedings in terms of an order taken
by agreement on 17 October 2024.
[18]
Section 24(1) of the PPFA, as amended, provides
that:
‘
(a)
The President, acting on a resolution of the National Assembly, may
by proclamation in the Gazette make regulations in respect
of matters
in Section 6(2), 7(2)(e), 7(3)(d), 8(2), 8(5) an 9(1)(a).’
[19]
Regulation 7 addresses the upper limit of
donations and provides that:
‘
7(1)
The President may, from time to time after a National Assembly
resolution and by notice in the Gazette, determine
the amount
contemplated in section 8(2) of the Act.’
Section 8(2) simply
provides that ‘
a political party may not accept a donation
from a person or entity in excess of the prescribed amount with a
financial year.’
[20]
Regulation 9 addresses the disclosure limit and
provides that:
‘
The
President must, from time to time after a National Assembly
resolution and by notice in the Gazette, determine the threshold
referred to in section 9(1)(a) of the Act.’
Section 9(1)(a) of the
PFFA, as amended provides that a political party, independent
representative or independent candidate must
disclose to the
Commission all donations received above the prescribed threshold.
[21]
In its
amended form, the PPFA did not provide specific amounts in respect of
the donation limit or disclosure threshold but provides
how it is to
be determined. It is common cause that until 18 August
2025 no donation limit or disclosure threshold
has been determined in
terms of section 24(1).
[4]
[22]
Although the PPFA in its pre-amendment form no
longer exists, the applicant persisted with its constitutional
challenge thereto.
Not only was this evident from the
submissions made during the hearing of the matter, but it is also
evident from the relief it
sought in its amended notice of motion.
[23]
The
challenge to the donation limitation and disclosure threshold as
contained in the PPFA in its pre-amended form no longer exists
and
has been rendered moot. Consequently, the determination of any
constitutional challenges hereto will have no practical
effect.
As a court of first instance, it is not for us to determine issues
which have become moot.
[5]
[24]
The EMAA came into effect and removed the donation
limitation and disclosure threshold without the President making new
regulations
in respect thereof in terms of section 24(1) of the PPFA,
as amended.
[25]
This resulted in the applicant approaching the
court on an urgent basis during May 2024. The matter came
before Mr Justice
Thulare who found that the EMAA was
prima
facie
unconstitutional as it created a
lacuna in respect of the donation limitation and disclosure
threshold. To resolve this lacuna,
Mr Justice Thulare granted
interim relief which resurrected the R15 million donation limitation
and R100 000 disclosure threshold.
[26]
In granting the interim relief, it was found that
the EMAA is prima unconstitutional as a result of the lacuna it
created.
[27]
We turn now to the applicant’s challenges to
the PPFA, as amended.
[28]
The applicant challenged the validity of the
public participation process in respect of the Electoral Matters
Amendment Bill, which
was introduced during December 2023, becoming
law in May 2024.
[29]
This public participation challenge must be
evaluated in terms of section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution which
provides that:
‘
Only
the Constitutional Court may decide that Parliament or the President
has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation.’
[30]
In
Doctors
for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly
[6]
the
Constitutional Court held that:
‘
[27]
A construction of s167(4)(e) which gives this Court exclusive
jurisdiction to decide whether Parliament
has complied with its
constitutional obligation to facilitate public participation in its
legislative processes is therefore consistent
with the principles
underlying the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. An order
declaring that Parliament has failed to
fulfil its constitutional
obligation to facilitate public involvement in its legislative
process and directing Parliament to comply
with that obligation
constitutes judicial intrusion into the domain of the principal
legislative organ of the State. Such
an order will inevitably
have important political consequences. Only this Court has this
power.’
[31]
Therefore, this court does not have the
jurisdiction to determine the applicant’s public participation
challenge.
[32]
As seen from paragraphs 16 to 18 above, the
president has been delegated the discretion to determine the donation
limit and the
disclosure threshold. The applicant argues that
not only is this an impermissible delegation of legislative power to
the
president but that it is unconstitutional because the president,
as the leader of the main political party, has a vested interest
in
the setting of the donation limit and disclosure threshold.
Furthermore, it argues that this discretion is unconstitutionally
vague as there are insufficient meaningful guidelines for the
exercise of this discretion.
[33]
We deal firstly with the issue of whether the
delegation by parliament to the president was constitutional or not.
While Parliament
may delegate regulatory authority, it may not
delegate legislative authority.
[34]
In
Executive
Council, WC Legislature v President of the RSA
[7]
the
Constitutional Court held that the test as to whether legislative or
regulatory powers have been delegated is:
‘
...whether
what is challenged as an unauthorised delegation of parliamentary
power is more than the mere giving effect to principles
and policies
which are contained in the statute itself. If it be, then it is
not authorised; for such would constitute a
purported exercise of
legislative power by an authority which is not permitted to do so
under the Constitution.’
[35]
The setting of the donation limitation and
disclosure threshold gives effect to the principles and policies set
out in the PPFA,
as amended and the delegation is thereof of a
regulatory nature and is constitutional.
[36]
The applicant also objects to the delegation to
the president as being inappropriate as he is the leader of the main
political party
with a vested interest in the setting of the donation
limit and disclosure threshold. However, the exercise of this
discretion
would be subject to review if exercised improperly.
The mere possibility that the exercise of a discretion may be
exercised
improperly or for improper reasons does not per se render
it objectionable.
[37]
We turn now to the argument that the absence of
clear and enforceable guidelines for the exercise of the president’s
discretion
violates the rule of law which require laws to be precise
and predictable to ensure fairness and accountability.
[38]
Section 24(1)(b) sets out the following factors
which the president must consider when determining the donation
limitation and disclosure
threshold. These are:
(i)
the amount of money previously appropriated by
Acts of Parliament for the Political Representatives Fund within the
previous five
financial years;
(ii)
the effects of inflation on the value of money
over time; and
(iii)
the costs associated with participating as a
political party, independent representative or independent candidate
in elections and
the democratic process in South Africa.
[39]
Furthermore, the exercise of the discretion is
guided by the general law principle that relevant factors must be
considered.
The exercise of the presidential discretion would
also be circumscribed by the policies and objectives of the PFFA.
[40]
The president’s delegated discretion to set
the donation limit and disclosure threshold remains subject to the
National Assembly’s
direct supervisory role.
[41]
Although it is the applicant’s case that
there are no clear and enforceable guidelines for the exercise of the
presidential
discretion, it has not set out any facts and/or reasons
why the factors set out in section 24(1)(b), together with the
policies
and objectives of the PPFA, as amended are inadequate for
the proper exercise of the discretion. Nor has it set out what
further factors are required for the proper and competent exercise of
the presidential discretion.
[42]
Therefore, we are of the view that there is no
merit in this challenge.
[43]
After the coming into effect of the EMAA on 8 May
the disclosure threshold and the upper limit was removed.
However, the President
did not issue simultaneous proclamations to
set new upper limits and disclosure thresholds, which he has recently
done
[44]
As a result of the ersthwile lacuna, the applicant
launched an urgent application. On 27 May 2024 the court as per
Thulare
J held that the EMAA is
prima
facie
unconstitutional on account of
the lacuna it created and on 16 August the Court confirmed the rule
nisi
issued
on 27 May 2024 and it granted the interim relief. This resulted
in the upper limit and disclosure threshold being reinstated
pending
the either the finalisation of these proceedings or the determination
of the upper limit and disclosure threshold by the
President.
[45]
Thulare J, in reinstating the donation limitation
and disclosure threshold, found that there was a rational and
reasonable basis
for the disclosure threshold and donation
limitation.
[46]
The disclosure threshold and donation limitation
constitute legislative facts which a court should be slow to
interfere with.
[47]
The President and the National Assembly have
recently set a donation limitation and disclosure threshold, which
currently stands
unchallenged.
[48]
The applicant sought an order declaring the
president’s failure to determine the upper donation limit and
disclosure threshold
upon the enactment of the EMAA or within a
reasonable time thereafter in terms of regulation 7 and 9 irrational,
unlawful, unconstitutional
and invalid, and that the failure by the
National Assembly forthwith after the enactment of the EMAA to enable
the president to
do so is likewise irrational, unlawful,
unconstitutional and invalid. This challenge has been rendered
moot by the President’s
recent determination of the upper
donation limit and disclosure threshold.
[49]
In light of the uncontested submissions by the DA
that its operating expenses run to hundreds of millions of rand and
that the preparations
of elections are enormously expensive –
the DA spent approximately R322 million on campaigning for the 2024
elections and
approximately R550 million on the 2019 elections, the
argument cannot be sustained that the donation limit of R15 million
is unreasonably
high or capable of influencing the behaviour of
political parties.
[50]
Furthermore, it must be recognised that donations
to political parties allow citizens to participate in the party’s
activities
thus giving expression to section 19(1)(h) of the
Constitution.
[51]
Donations
to political parties also impact on section 16 of the Constitution as
it amounts to a general expression of support for
the candidate and
his/her views. This accords with the ruling that the right to
freedom of expressions should not be interpreted
narrowly.
[8]
Furthermore, it was held that the ability to donate to political
parties gives expression of the right to freedom of association,
as
set out in section 18 of the Constitution.
[52]
The applicant also seeks an order declaring
section 12(2)(d)(ii) of the PPFA, as amended inconsistent and
constitutionally invalid.
This section required the accounting
officer appointed by a political party to prepare a statement showing
all donations and membership
fees, and any levy imposed by the
political party on its elected representatives during that financial
year.
[53]
The
challenged provisions of the PPFA, including section 12( 2)(d)(ii)
can only be struck down if it is found to limit constitutional
rights
and if that limitation cannot be justified. This is an
objective enquiry. It is trite that the applicant would
have to
establish facts on which it relies for its claim of infringement of
the particular rights in question.
[9]
[54]
On the papers filed on record, the applicant has
failed to establish any facts that show why or how section
12(2)(d)(ii) of the
PPFA, as amended infringes particular
constitutional rights. Similarly, with sections 12(3)(c) and 22
of the PPFA, as amended.
[55]
The applicant also challenges the PPFA, as amended
on the basis that it does not address related parties who make
donations.
However, the applicant does not set out what would
constitute related parties or how this should be established or how a
shared
intention of related parties is to be ascertained or
established. This challenge is speculative and so vague as to
prevent
a proper response thereto, let alone regulation thereof.
[56]
The applicant requires that all donations be
disclosed because the aggregate thereof can affect party behaviour.
The relief
sought in this regard is defective as it relies on
speculation in the absence of established facts.
[57]
Furthermore, the Electoral Commission published
the sum of small donations received by a political party each year.
Thus,
a voter can ascertain how much a political party receives in
small donations. This is not good enough for the applicant, who
want the identity of the donors to be disclosed without showing why
this disclosure is necessary for the exercise or protection
of
constitutional rights.
[62]
It follows, therefore, that the application stands to be dismissed.
[63]
Regarding costs,
the
applicant argued that if it were successful, it would have been
entitled to costs on a punitive scale. Conversely, they argued
that
the principle set out in
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and others
[1]
(‘
Biowatch’)
applies.
[64]
The first, second, third, 20th and 21st respondents do not seek any
costs against the applicant.
The only other respondent that
participated in these proceedings is the 19th respondent. Although we
are of the view that
Biowatch
does not apply and
that costs should ordinarily follow the result, as the 19th
respondent participated in these proceedings of their
own accord, and
exercising our discretion insofar as it relates to costs, we are of
the view that no order as to costs should be
made.
Order
[65]
The following order shall issue:
1.
The application is
dismissed with no order as to costs.
N
ERASMUS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree
HM
SLINGERS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree
M
HOLDERNESS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For
the applicant:
[1]
My
Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and
Another
2018
(5) SA 380
(CC)
(‘My
Vote Counts 2”)
[2]
Section
8(2) of the PPFA read with regulation 7 to Schedule 2 thereof
[3]
Section
9(1) of the PPFA read with regulation 9 to the Schedule thereof
[4]
On 19
August 2025 the President acting on a resolution taken by the
National Assembly raised the limit for private donations to
political parties to R30 million a year and increased the
declaration threshold to R200 000.
[5]
Minister
of Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Late Stransham-Ford
2017
(3) SA 152 (SCA)
[6]
2006
(6) SA 416
[7]
[1995] ZACC 8
;
1995
(4) SA 877
(CC) at paragraph
[54]
; See also
South
African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another
2015
(5) SA 146 (CC)
[8]
De
Reul v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local
Division)
[2003]
ZACC 19
[2003] ZACC 19
; ;
2004 (1) SA 406
(CC) at paragraph
[48]
[9]
Ferreira
v Levin NO
1996
(1) SA 984
(CC) at paragraph 44
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My Vote Count NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (10607/24) [2024] ZAWCHC 137 (27 May 2024)
[2024] ZAWCHC 137High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)99% similar
T.S v J.V.C.P and Another (20783/24) [2025] ZAWCHC 325 (1 August 2025)
[2025] ZAWCHC 325High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)96% similar
G.W.X. v Magistrate of Regional Division of Western Cape Blue Downs Mashala N.O and Another (17268/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 142 (27 March 2025)
[2025] ZAWCHC 142High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)96% similar
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the Knysna Municipal Council and Others (4247/2023; 4441/2023) [2024] ZAWCHC 141 (28 May 2024)
[2024] ZAWCHC 141High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)96% similar