Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 602South Africa
Proud Heritage Properties 60 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Alexander and Another (2025/208493) [2025] ZAWCHC 602 (2 December 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Proud Heritage Properties 60 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Alexander and Another (2025/208493) [2025] ZAWCHC 602 (2 December 2025)
Proud Heritage Properties 60 (Pty) Ltd and Others v Alexander and Another (2025/208493) [2025] ZAWCHC 602 (2 December 2025)
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sino date 2 December 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
Number: 2025-208493
In
the matter between:
PROUD
HERITAGE PROPERTIES 60 (PTY) LTD
First
Applicant
HARALD
MANFRED SEICK N.O.
Second
Applicant
MATTHEW
LAMONT WALTON N.O.
Third
Applicant
HARALD
MANFRED SEICK
Fourth
Applicant
and
ROY
ALEXANDER
First
Respondent
JO-ANNE
GLADYS LEFSON
Second
Respondent
Coram:
Greig AJ
Heard:
20 November 2025
Delivered:
2 December 2025
JUDGEMENT
GREIG
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an urgent application claiming final relief composed of two
parts seeking:
(a) The eviction of the
first respondent, Roy Alexander, from one of the rooms (the Vineyard
Room) at the guest establishment operated
by the first applicant,
Proud Heritage Properties 60 (Pty) Ltd, known as ‘La Villa
Retreat’ in Franschhoek.
(b) A mandamus compelling
the second respondent, Jo-Anne Lefson, to take all necessary steps to
have herself removed as a signatory
on Proud Heritage’s Nedbank
account, and to have the general manager of Proud Heritage, Michelle
Cronje, appointed as the
only person authorised on the account.
Background
[2]
For about 11 years Ms Lefson and the fourth applicant, Harald Seick,
were in a romantic relationship during the course of which
they
separately acquired shares in various companies. One such company was
Proud Heritage. Their romantic relationship ended in
August 2024,
resulting in various disputes between them, including an application
at the instance of Mr Seick to liquidate Proud
Heritage on just and
equitable grounds. This application is set down for hearing in April
2026.
[3]
There are also in the background two further applications in this
court which have been heard but which at the time of the hearing
of
this application still awaited judgement. In one, Ms Lefson and Mr
Stevenson sought to interdict the third applicant, Matthew
Walton,
from continuing to purport to act on behalf of Proud Heritage, and to
interdict Mr Seick from conducting its business.
In the other, Ms
Lefson and Mr Stevenson anticipated the return day of a rule nisi
following an ex parte application brought on
behalf of the Proud
Heritage by Walton, in which Ms Lefson was evicted from the La Villa
facility. The papers in these proceedings
were not placed before me,
and I mention them only by way of background and because the
respondents allege that this application
should be stayed on the
basis that they render it
lis pendens
.
[4]
Proud Heritage alleges that Mr Alexander is occupying the Vineyard
Room without its permission and has not rented the room.
Proud
Heritage says that the Vineyard Room is used for ‘ancillary
purposes’ such as temporary accommodation for employees
and
storage of luggage for guests, particularly over the Christmas
season.
[5]
Ms Lefson claims that Mr Alexander is entitled to occupy the Vineyard
Room as her ‘special guest’. She says that,
as a
shareholder of Proud Heritage, she has permitted this occupation
based on the fact that Mr Alexander is assisting in her business
operated on part of the property, Farm Sanctuary.
[6]
Proud Heritage disputes Mr Alexander’s right to occupy the
Vineyard Room on this basis, although it concedes that ‘when
this room is not in use for the commercial purposes of Proud
Heritage, it is available to accommodate directors, shareholders and
other special guests who have been given permission to do so’.
[7]
Proud Heritage submits, however, that shareholders have no right to
dispose of company property in this way, and that only the
board of
the company or its delegates can do so. Proud Heritage says that its
sole director,
[1]
the third
applicant, Walton, has not given his consent for the occupation by Mr
Alexander of the Vineyard Room.
[8]
As to the issue of Ms Lefson’s status as a signatory on the
Nedbank account, whilst the romantic relationship between
Ms Lefson
and Mr Seick continued, Ms Lefson was the sole director of Proud
Heritage. However, on 1 June 2025, Ms Lefson resigned
as a director.
Proud Heritage claims that on this basis ‘the reason for her
being a signatory on the account fell away’
but that, despite
demand, she refused to relinquish her status as a signatory. The
applicant alleges that Ms Lefson has unlawfully
misappropriated more
than R 63,000 to pay for her own expenses and unlawfully allowed
Mr Alexander to use a debit card on
the account.
Urgency
[9]
As is evident from the above, there are two distinct and largely
unrelated claims for relief in the notice of motion. Aside
from the
post-initiation timetable set by the applicants, which is common to
both claims, the urgency of these disparate claims
falls to be
assessed against different factual backgrounds.
[10]
In
this regard it is trite than an applicant who seeks urgent relief
must provide a full explanation for its alleged urgency and
for any
delays in bringing the application in its founding affidavit.
[2]
An applicant may only deviate so far from the rules as is warranted
by the urgency thus established. Urgency may not be self-created
and
‘a litigant may not simply sit back without taking steps to
seek urgent relief or seek such relief without a full and
proper
explanation for any delay in doing so.’
[3]
[11]
An applicant must further responsibly strike a balance between the
rules and its entitlement to deviate from them, remembering
that that
such entitlement is dependent upon and derived from the urgency which
it establishes on the papers.
[4]
Eviction of Mr Alexander
from the Vineyard Room
[12]
Proud Heritage alleges that on 2 September 2025, three days after Ms
Lefson was evicted from La Villa, she covertly installed
Mr Alexander
in the Vineyard Room without the prior permission of Mr Seick.
[13]
On 13 October 2025 a written demand was sent to Mr Alexander to
vacate the Vineyard Room by 17 October 2025. He refused on
the basis
that he is Ms Lefson’s ‘guest’.
[14]
This application was thereafter launched on 4 November 2025. The
respondents were required by the notice of motion to deliver
answering papers by 12 November 2025, with the replying affidavit due
by 17 November 2025.
[15]
Proud Heritage submits that ‘as with all evictions of unlawful
occupants who have arrived unannounced…the relief
sought is
inherently urgent’, and further that any delays were not
unreasonable, referring to
Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality v Greyvenouw
.
[5]
[16]
Proud Heritage further asserts that paying guests, the Millar family,
have booked the entire facility (including the Vineyard
Room) for two
days beginning on 10 December 2025 in terms of a booking made on 14
February 2025. They have paid the full amount,
being R 61,110.00.
Proud Heritage relies on the fact that the booking was made on 14
February 2025 to submit that the urgency
is not self-created. It
concedes, however, that the urgency ‘would have been
self-created if the booking had been made subsequent
to the discovery
of Mr Alexander’s installation.’
[17]
The respondents however submit that the applicants have engineered
the Millar booking to include the Vineyard Room to manufacture
grounds for the eviction. They seek to impugn email correspondence
from Proud Heritage on 11 September 2025 which purports to confirm
an
arrangement made by Mr Seick personally with the Millar family in
February 2025 for the Vineyard Room to be made available ‘to
accommodate [the Millar family] fully’.
[6]
[18]
The applicants’ failure to include any written confirmation of
the original February 2025 booking is strange, but I am
unable to
conclude on the papers that the booking has been ‘manufactured’
as was submitted by the respondents in oral
argument.
[19]
However, the applicants’ inaction from 2 September 2025, or
latest 11 September 2025, for over a month to 13 October
before a
written demand was sent for Mr Alexander to vacate by 17 October, is
not explained.
[20]
The subsequent delay between 17 October 2025 and 4 November 2025,
when this application was launched, does not seem particularly
unreasonable.
[21]
However, the choice of date for the hearing of 20 November 2025 is
questionable. It was submitted by counsel for the applicants
that the
date was chosen to allow sufficient time between the hearing and the
Millar booking. It is no doubt correct that an applicant
should as
far as possible avoid stipulating a date for the hearing which is on
the brink of the alleged harm-causing event. Nonetheless,
the choice
of 20 November 2025, when the Millar booking was still nearly three
weeks away on 10 December 2025, is not sufficiently
explained,
especially as the choice of this hearing date necessarily truncated
the time afforded to the respondents to oppose this
application.
[7]
[22]
One cannot help concluding that, if a further week or so was afforded
to the respondents to respond, their criticism of the
timetable
imposed would have been largely neutralised, with no prejudice to the
applicants, and there would still have been enough
time between the
hearing and the impending Millar booking. There is no explanation for
why this more reasonable course was not
considered.
[23]
There is also little attempt in the founding affidavit to address the
important issue as to why substantial redress may not
be obtained in
due course by means of a claim in damages.
[8]
The suggestion is made that:
‘
if
the Vineyard Room is not available for the guests arriving on 10
December 2025, then Proud Heritage will be in breach of its
contractual obligations and will certainly be subjected to critical
and very damaging online reviews which will harm the company’s
business.’
[24]
But there is no suggestion that damages suffered as a result of this
negative publicity cannot be recovered.
[25]
Accordingly, I am unable to conclude that the alleged urgency of this
leg of the relief has been sufficiently justified.
Removal of Ms Lefson as a
signatory on Proud Heritage’s Nedbank account
[26]
As to this relief it is common cause that since her resignation as a
director of Proud Heritage on 1 June 2025 Ms Lefson has
continued to
have access to and make withdrawals and disbursements from Proud
Heritage’s account. The applicants contend
that Ms Lefson has
abused her status as a signatory to misappropriate company funds. The
respondents for their part contend that
these impugned expenses were
all incurred on behalf of Proud Heritage, including those incurred by
Mr Alexander. They also aver
that the Proud Heritage shareholders’
agreement entitles Ms Lefson to revenues from certain cottages.
[27]
The alleged misappropriations of company funds by Ms Lefson abusing
her access on the account occurred, on the applicants’
version,
as far back as January 2025.
[9]
[28]
By 1 June 2025 Ms Lefson was no longer a director and
‘the
reason for her being a signatory on the account fell away’,
according to the applicants
.
[29]
Several attempts were made by the applicants to remove Ms Lefson as a
signatory by approaching Nedbank, but Nedbank apparently
refused to
countenance any such change without the cooperation of Ms Lefson
herself.
[30]
The alleged misappropriation the following month by Ms Lefson on 8
July 2025 should have dispelled any illusion that the matter
was not
urgent. Indeed, on the applicants’ own version, shortly after
this Walton attended a virtual meeting where he accused
Ms Lefson in
terms of stealing from the account.
[31]
Yet the applicants waited until 4 November 2025 to combine this
relief in an application seeking the eviction of Mr Alexander
from
the Vineyard Room. The applicants’ prior insouciance is not
explained and does not fit comfortably with the allegation
that
ongoing theft was being committed since for nearly a year.
[32]
The applicants’ discovery, after procuring video footage, that
Mr Alexander was using the company debit card at Pick
‘n Pay on
14 October 2025, does not change the position. It is so that Mr
Alexander’s use of the company’s credit
card would have
constituted a grave exacerbation of the abuse of the bank account
which on the applicants’ version was underway.
But the
applicants should have moved to counter unauthorised expenditure
months earlier. Had they done so this would have prevented
Mr
Alexander’s alleged escapade.
[33]
In the absence of any sufficient explanation, I am unable to
completely discount the respondents’ submission that this
second leg of the relief was an attempt at piggybacking on the
Vineyard Room eviction, where the case for urgency was perceived
as
more favourable. In any event, even if this is not the case, there
remains
insufficient justification for the delays
which occurred after the discovery of Ms Lefson’s alleged
misappropriations. And,
as with the eviction of Mr Alexander, the
timetable and hearing date chosen is insufficiently motivated.
Conclusion
[34]
In light of the above, I am not satisfied that the applicants have
established the requisite degree of urgency for the claims
they
advance.
[35]
In respect of the eviction relief, the applicants’ unexplained
inaction for more than a month after discovering Mr Alexander’s
occupation of the Vineyard Room, coupled with the inadequately
motivated choice of the hearing date, undermines the urgency. The
applicants have not demonstrated that a less foreshortened timetable,
which would have allowed the respondents more time to respond,
would
have occasioned them any prejudice, nor have they explained why they
will not achieve substantial redress at a hearing in
due course.
[36]
The position is even clearer regarding the relief directing the
removal of Ms Lefson as a signatory on the Proud Heritage bank
account. If Ms Lefson’s resignation as director on 1 June 2025
rendered her continued access to the account inappropriate,
and the
applicants were aware by 8 July 2025 of her alleged thefts from the
account, the delays that followed, and the bundling
of this relief
together with the eviction application in November 2025, have not
been explained, and instead point to self-created
urgency.
Order
[37]
For
the above reasons the application is struck from the roll with costs.
GREIG
AJ
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Appearances
For Applicants:
Adv R J Howie
Instructed by:
Matthew Walton & Associates
For Respondents: Adv M
van der Berg
Instructed
by: S D P Attorneys
[1]
Proud Heritage contends that the other director, Mr Stevenson, has
not formally been appointed as such as has not delivered to
the
company a written consent to serve as a director in terms of
section
66(7)(b)
of the
Companies Act, 2008
.
[2]
Salt
and Another v Smith
1991 (2) SA186 (Nm);
Luna
Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another (t/a Makin's
Furniture Manufacturers)
1977 (4) SA 135 (W)
[3]
Mhonko's
Security Services CC v City of Cape Town and Others
(21132/2018)
[2018] ZAWCHC 168
(30 November 2018)
[4]
See
Gallagher
v Norman's Transport Lines (Pty) Ltd
1992 (3) SA 500
(W) at 502I.
[5]
2004 (2) SA 81 (SE)
[6]
It
may be noted that the preceding email from Mark Millar on 9
September 2025 confirms a booking for ‘nine rooms for two
nights including breakfast.’ By simple arithmetic the booking,
which is to include ‘2 x Classic rooms, 3 x Superior
Rooms,
Mountain View Retreat, Pool Bar retreat, Stone Cottage and our
Vineyard Room’, would thus seem to require inclusion
of the
Vineyard Room to make nine rooms in total.
[7]
The
respondents were given four court days to file their answering
affidavits, and one court day to file heads of argument, after
receiving the applicants’ replying affidavit on Monday, 17
November 2025.
[8]
See e.g.
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty)
Ltd and Others
(11/33767)
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at para 6.
[9]
On
22 January 2025 when Lefson was still a director a complaint was
raised by the Seick Property Trust that Lefson made unauthorised
purchases of furniture totalling R 619,656.
sino noindex
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