M.N v J.E and Others (Reasons) (2025/221659) [2025] ZAWCHC 604 (24 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAWCHC 604 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## M.N v J.E and Others (Reasons) (2025/221659) [2025] ZAWCHC 604 (24 December 2025) M.N v J.E and Others (Reasons) (2025/221659) [2025] ZAWCHC 604 (24 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAWCHC/Data/2025_604.html sino date 24 December 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy FLYNOTES: FAMILY – Contempt – Return of child – Absconded with child and concealed whereabouts – Continued to hide child for more than two weeks – Evaded efforts by father and police – Attorney filed multiple irregular applications and misrepresented authority – Assisted mother in avoiding enforcement – Sustained refusal to return child – Pattern of obstructive conduct – Demonstrated wilful and bad faith disobedience of order – Declared in contempt. IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE DIVISION) Case number: 2025-221659 In the matter between: M[...] N[...] Applicant And J[...] E[...] First Respondent PEARL WALSH Second Respondent RAEL KASSEL t/a  KASSEL SKLAAR COHEN AND CO. Third Respondent Coram:                         Pangarker, J Hearing and order:      8 December 2025 Reasons delivered:     24 December 2025 WRITTEN REASONS FOR ORDER GRANTED ON 8 DECEMBER 2025 PANGARKER J Background and order granted on 21 November 2025 (Greig AJ order) 1. The applicant (father) and first respondent (mother) are the unmarried, biological parents of a four-year-old minor girl, LDN (the child). On 21 November 2025, Greig AJ granted an order in the fast lane Urgent Court in favour of the father in terms of Part A of the Notice of Motion brought on the father’s behalf by his legal representatives (the order). The application was launched on 19 November 2025. 2. In summary, Greig AJ granted an order in terms of Part A, pending the relief sought in Part B, that the minor child be returned to her father ” with immediate effect” and that she should remain in his primary care, and that the mother be allowed to have reasonable contact (excluding sleep-overs) with the child at the father’s residence and a public venue, as  specified further in the order. Furthermore, the Family Advocate and a childcare expert were to be appointed to commence an enquiry and investigation into care and contact and the child’s best interests. Part B of the Notice of Motion related to relief in respect of section 18 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, more specifically, care and contact of the minor child. 3. It is important to highlight that the order required the parties to co-operate and participate meaningfully in the Family Advocate and experts’ enquiry. For purposes of these reasons, it is not necessary to detail all the facts alleged by the father in his urgent application filed on 19 November 2025. A summary of the salient facts, which became relevant in the matters and hearing before me on 8 December 2025 instant, follow below. 4. The father alleged that the mother was “ in a highly irrational state” [1] and was associating with drug users and violent offenders. The parents and child had shared a home in Brackenfell, with the child attending a local crèche. However, on 28 October 2025, the mother vacated the shared common home with the child to take up residence in a tent at Hardekraaltjie Caravan Resort Park in Bellville. 5. Despite the relocation to the caravan park, the father was still allowed limited contact with his daughter. His mother (the child’s paternal grandmother) collected the child to take her to crèche. However, this routine changed when on 17 November 2025 the mother indicated that the paternal grandmother, Ms N[...], would no longer be allowed to collect the child. The result was that the mother had decided unilaterally that the child would no longer attend crèche. Furthermore, according to the father, the mother was involved in a relationship with someone who allegedly had a criminal record and/or was facing serious criminal charges. 6. The father’s case before Greig AJ also emphasized his concern that his daughter was living in a small tent, exposed to the elements and had previously been hospitalized for two weeks due to pneumonia. He expressed concern for the child’s health and well-being, that unilateral decisions were taken about her upbringing and schooling, that his contact was halted and that his daughter was living out of a suitcase with her mother and maternal grandmother. 7. Greig AJ found that the father’s application was urgent and granted an order that the minor child be returned to her father immediately. However, as will be seen, the mother failed and/or refused to return the child and at the end of the proceedings before me on 8 December 2025, she had still not returned the child as per the order. At approximately 17h35, after I had granted an order to which these Reasons relate, I was informed by my Registrar that the mother had disclosed the child’s whereabouts per WhatsApp message to the father’s attorney and paternal grandmother, and that they were on their way to collect the child to return her to the father as ordered on 21 November 2025. 8.         The Family Advocate, specifically Adv R Alves, had provided a brief Memorandum to the urgent Court on 21 November 2025, indicating that she had no concerns about the relief sought by the father in Part A of his Notice of Motion, but that Part B required investigation. The Family Advocate’s view in respect of the 21 November 2025 urgent application, was that there were risks related to the child’s well-being, safety and stability. Procedural aspects and various applications in the mother’s name 9.         The mother was served with the urgent application on 19 November 2025, at 09h19, on her known email address and personally by the Sheriff, at the caravan park on the same day. 10.       On 20 November 2025, the mother obtained an ex parte order in terms of section 21 to 23 of the Children’s Act [2] from the Children’s Court, Bellville. In terms of its order, the Children's Court referred the matter to a social worker for investigation, found that the minor child may be a child in need of care and protection and granted the father supervised contact under the facilitation of a social worker. There is no indication in the Children’s Court proceedings, attended by the mother, that she advised that Court that she had already been served with an urgent High Court application seeking orders related to the minor child, more specifically, that she returns the child to the father. 11.       On 21 November 2025, the Greig AJ order was served on the mother per email and WhatsApp message. The documents also indicate that a criminal charge [3] was laid at Bellville SAPS and that despite the police’s efforts to trace the mother and child, they were unsuccessful. At the date of the proceedings of 8 December, an urgent application was also made, the police had still not found the child. 12.       On 22 November 2025, attorney Rael Kassel contacted Ms Burgess, the father’s attorney, per WhatsApp message informing her that he was instructed to act for the mother. He sought a suspension of the matter and the Greig AJ order to attempt an amicable resolution of the matter. From the messages and correspondence exchanged between these legal representatives, as well as the documents filed of record, the following important aspects are highlighted: firstly, Mr Kassel indicated a day after the order was served on the mother (his client), that he was unaware of her whereabouts; and secondly, Ms Burgess’ urged Mr Kassel, as was his duty as an officer of the Court, to inform his client of the consequences of her contempt of the Court order. I may only describe Mr Kassel’s response as disdainful, informing Ms Burgess that she would be wasting her time at the Legal Practice Council (LPC). This was a reference to reporting Mr Kassel to the LPC. 13.       On 24 November 2025, Ms Walsh, again purportedly on behalf of the mother, sought a recission and also an order in terms of Rule 30(1), in relation to the Greig AJ order on the basis that proceedings before him on 21 November 2025 were opposed, should have been removed from the Urgent / Fast lane roll and placed on the opposed roll for a later date in November. Once again, Ms Walsh relied on a POA from the mother which allowed her to bring the application and depose to an affidavit in the mother’s place. 14.       On 26 November 2025, Ms Walsh continued her mission, and filed an application for Greig AJ’s recusal from case number 2025-221659, recission of his order, re-enrolment of the matter before another Judge and placement on the opposed roll. Yet again, Ms Walsh purported to act under a POA granted to her by the mother. 15.       On 28 November 2025, Ms Walsh filed an application for reconsideration in terms of Rule 6(12)(c) on behalf of the mother and under a Power of Attorney (POA) apparently granted to her by the mother. 16.       On 1 December 2025 the father filed his answering affidavit to the Rule 6(12)(c) application, which also served as a founding affidavit to his urgent counter-application delivered on the same date. The counter-application cited the mother as first respondent, Ms Walsh as second respondent and Rael Kassel t/a Kassel Sklaar Cohen and Co. (Kassel Sklaar) as the third respondent, and it sought to hold all the respondents in contempt of the Greig AJ order; additionally, that the minor child be handed over by 4 December 2025 and various costs orders, including costs de bonis propriis against Mr Kassel/Kassel Sklaar. The counter-application was due to be heard on 4 December in the Urgent Fast Lane Court. As at 8 December 2025, the contempt application was unopposed. 17.       The further documents filed of record indicate that Ms Walsh, who described herself as a lay assistant, communicated with Ms Burgess, and effectively took over and stepped in the shoes of the mother, this despite Ms Burgess questioning Ms Walsh’s mandate to act on behalf of the mother, and requesting the necessary LPC documents, including proof of admission as an attorney/advocate and fidelity fund certificate. Despite Ms Burgess’ indication that she would not engage in litigation through correspondence, Ms Walsh persisted that the urgent application should be removed from the roll and enrolled on the opposed Motion roll. 18.       On 2 December 2025, two days prior to the hearing of the father’s counter-application and opposition to the Rule 6(12)(c) application, Ms Walsh, again on behalf of the mother, delivered a Notice of Motion seeking the following relief: a stay/suspension of the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Greig AJ order; a rescission of Greig AJ’s order; an order in terms of Rule 30(1) declaring the proceedings before Greig AJ as irregular; a recusal of Greig AJ; an application for leave to appeal his order; an order rescinding and reviewing/setting aside his order; suspending the removal of the minor child from the mother’s care and reinstating the status quo prior to the 21 November 2025 order pending an assessment by the Family Advocate, a psychologist and a “ proper hearing before this Honourable Court” [4] . The father delivered a Notice of Intention to Oppose the “stay application”. 19.       It is noted that all these applications and supporting/additional documents were uploaded onto the Court Online system. Furthermore, the indexed record also contains an Interim Protection Order (IPO) which the mother obtained against the father from the Bellville Magistrates’ Court on 12 November 2025. At the time Ms Walsh launched the stay application [5] ,  the IPO had not yet been served on him. This is indicated in paragraph 6 of the stay application and similarly highlighted in the father’s supplementary affidavit in the urgent application of 21 November 2025. To clarify, he denied having been served with an IPO and indicated that he had weekend contact with the child after 12 November 2025. [6] 20.       Pursuant to a meeting called by Greig AJ on 25 November 2025 [7] , Ms Burgess again requested that Mr Kassel urgently advise her of the child’s whereabouts. Mr Kassel’s response was that he had not had contact with his client and was endeavoring to reach her urgently. This message followed earlier requests that Mr Kassel and his firm provide an address where the child could be collected, which were not forthcoming. Ms Burgess indicated to Mr Kassel that his “ futile attempt to plead ignorance is noted” [8] and that his conduct would be reported to the presiding officer in future Court proceedings in the matter. 21.       Mr Kassel/Kassel Sklaar served a Notice of Appointment as Attorneys of Record on 24 November 2025. The documents indicate that a copy of the order was also served on Mr Kassel/his firm on Saturday 22 November instant. 22.       Notwithstanding the above, Ms Walsh addressed an email on 24 November 2025 to Ms Burgess and included Mr Kassel therein. She stated that the mother had already made prior arrangements to be away for a few days and that her client’s rights were reserved. On the same day, Mr Kassel advised Ms Burgess that the mother took off a few days due to health reasons and attached what was referred to as opposing papers. These opposing papers, on my understanding, were the recusal, rescission, leave to appeal and/or variation and irregular step, uploaded to Court online on 24 November 2025. 23.       At this stage, it is prudent to point out that the Notice of Motion was signed and prepared by Ms Walsh on behalf of the mother and she also deposed to the affidavit supporting the application. She explained that she was authorized by the mother in terms of a POA issued by the latter (her client) on account of “ her severe emotional distress, her debilitating migraines and her inability to prepare or depose to an affidavit herself at this time” . [9] Ms Walsh also described herself as the mother’s friend and that she had personal knowledge of the mother’s  current physical and emotional condition. 24.       No medical reports indicating the mother’s psychological and/or health condition(s) were attached to the numerous affidavits nor to any other subsequent documents filed in the matter. The mother also failed to file/provide any confirmatory or supporting affidavit in support of the numerous applications filed by Ms Walsh and Mr Kassel on her behalf. From the documents filed of record and Ms Walsh’s affidavit filed on 24 November 2025, it is apparent that she was aware of and/or in possession of and had sight of the order granted by Greig AJ a few days earlier. 25.       In respect of the POA relied upon, the document headed “Power of Attorney”, attached to Ms Walsh’s affidavit filed on 24 November 2025, is signed by the mother and Ms Walsh, dated 21 November 2025, and grants Ms Walsh the power to: “ 1.        Attend court proceedings on my behalf; 2.         Address the Court for the limited purposes of: · Requesting the removal of the matter from the urgent roll; · Confirming the Registrar’s proposed dates for the opposed motion roll; · Handing up documents, draft order, notices, or correspondence; · Placing my position on record; 3.         Receive and acknowledge any Court directives or instructions; 4.         Perform all acts necessary for the proper handling of the matter in my absence.” 26.       Significantly, the POA indicates that it was valid for the proceedings of 21 November only. The Court was requested to accept her representative for the appearance of 21 November. The witnesses to the POA were the child’s maternal grandmother and the mother’s partner. 26.       Aside from the Notice of Motion of 24 November 2025, the details of Mr Kassel and Kassel Sklaar appear on all the applications/documents filed by Ms Walsh on behalf of the mother under the guise of “Attorney of Record, Kassel Cohen & Co.”; and, secondly, in each of the further applications, Ms Walsh relies on a POA which existed and was valid only for the proceedings of 21 November 2025. No extended or new POA was attached to any of the other applications. 27.       On 28 November 2025, Kassel Sklaar filed a Notice of Withdrawal of the recusal and leave to appeal application. No costs were tendered and more importantly, the withdrawal occurred after the hearing date was known, without the consent of Ms Burgess for the father and/or without leave of the Court, as required by Rule 41(1)(a). In an email dated the same day, Ms Walsh addressed Mr Kassel and informed him as follows: “ Please do not serve a notice of withdrawal yet until we discuss matters, please?” [10] 28.       Having set out most of the procedural background and events, it then transpired that the father’s counter-application and mother’s reconsideration application came before the urgent duty Judge on 4 December 2025. Due to a conflict, I was informed that the duty Judge could not hear the matter and it was then arranged that I would hear the matter on Monday 8 December 2025, at 10h00. At that stage, neither the mother, Ms Walsh nor Mr Kassel had ensured that the four-year-old child was returned to her father. 29.       On 8 December, Mr Kassel advised that he represented Ms Walsh and Ms N[...], the mother, and his firm as the third respondent in the counter-application. Counsel for the father confirmed that aside from the counter-application and reconsideration application, because the mother had not complied with Rule 41(1)(a) and there was no tender of costs, thus the recusal and rescission applications were still before Court. 30.       The matter stood down for a short while for the parties to engage and thereafter the legal representatives came to see me in chambers. Ms Walsh’s request to be present in chambers was refused as Mr Kassel advised that he represented all the respondents. 31.       During an attempt to obtain clarity on the several applications, I was then advised (and this was repeated in Court) that Mr Kassel wished to hand in a replying affidavit to the reconsideration application. I address this below. Given the urgency of the situation, I requested disclosure of the child’s whereabouts. Mr Kassel’s response was that he did not know the mother and child’s whereabouts. Reconsideration application in terms of Rule 6(12)(c) 32.       It became clear that the reconsideration application was not prepared by Mr Kassel, but by Ms Walsh, notwithstanding that his firm came on record on 24 November 2025 and the reconsideration application was filed on 28 November 2025. 33.       Mr Kassel attempted to hand in affidavits from the bar which purported to be a replying affidavit to the reconsideration application and an answering affidavit to the counter-application with what he referred to as an extended POA. In respect of my query as to why the mother had failed to comply with the timelines set out in the counter-application by 3 December, Mr Kassel submitted that it was unreasonable to expect the mother to file the affidavits in such a short time and that he had other work to do. In the same instance, Mr Kassel also sated that he had worked on the matter during the weekend. 34.       The submission was unconvincing. I pointed out that there was non-compliance prior to the hearing date of 4 December and that the mother had more than sufficient time to comply in what was clearly a very urgent application as the order of Greig AJ was not complied with. No condonation application was brought and none sought and the attempt to simply hand in the affidavits from the bar was not allowed. 35.       On the issue of the extended POA, at the time the reconsideration application was brought, there was no extended POA and that which existed for the proceedings of 21 November, had already lapsed. Additionally, the mother could not make out her case in reply as Mr Kassel’s submission sought to do. Accordingly, there was no new or extended valid POA granted by the mother to Ms Walsh at the time the reconsideration application was brought. 36.      In the result, and as no valid POA was attached to the reconsideration application, Ms Walsh’s authority to act and depose to an affidavit on the mother’s behalf, had not been established. Thus, the reconsideration application was fatally flawed. In the circumstances, the point in limine taken by the father, that Ms Walsh had no authority to act on behalf of the mother as the POA was for one day only, was properly taken. The order granted, after providing reasons ex tempore, was that the p oint i n limine was upheld, the reconsideration application was dismissed and costs stood over until conclusion of the matter. Counter-application: contempt of Court 37.       The father's counter application sought to hold all three respondents in contempt of the Greig AJ order. As indicated above, the application was unopposed as the attempt to hand in affidavits purportedly by or in favour of the mother, was refused. To the extent that the mother’s recusal application and review, leave to appeal and rescission applications had also been brought on the same November 2021 POA, these were incompetent to say the least. The recusal application, which related to Greig AJ as the presiding officer, should have been brought before the Acting Judge during proceedings before him. 38. Similarly, the irregular step application and an insistence that the matter be removed from th e urgent roll were incompetent and brought in circumstances where Ms Walsh had no authority to act on the mother’s behalf. 39.       Mr Kassel submitted that the second and third respondents should have been joined to the proceedings in the counter-application in terms of Rule 10. Counsel for the father submitted that Rule 6(7) allows for a situation where a party is entitled to bring a counter-application. In this instance, the main application was the urgent application of 21 November 2025, thereafter a reconsideration which the father opposed together with his counter-application for urgent relief in the form of contempt of Court, return of the child and costs. 40.       Having considered the submissions, I was satisfied that in these circumstances, the father was not obliged to act in terms of Rule 10. In this matter, it is evident that the counter-application was brought in terms of Rule 6(12), served on all the respondents and that they were given notice thereof. When considering Rule 6(7)(a), it is evident on an ordinary reading of the sub-rule that the party wishing to bring a counter-application has an election and may act in terms of Rule 10. 41.       Furthermore, it is also not uncommon to find that a counter-application is brought on an urgent basis where the main application had previously been brought as an urgent application in terms of Rule 6912). With respect to the circumstances and procedures adopted in this matter, and given the very urgent nature of such circumstances, the role, conduct and involvement of the second and third respondents, Rule 6(7)(a) must also be read with Rule 6(12)(a), and in the result, I accepted the submissions of the father’s counsel. At worst, the failure to apply Rule 10 strictly, is condoned when having regard to the urgency of the matter and circumstances, and the matter was disposed of as I deemed fit on 8 December 2025. In my view, therefore, any failure to join Ms Walsh and Mr Kassel/Kassel Sklaar in terms of Rule 10, did not render the counter-application defective. 42.       With the passage of time during the Court proceedings on 8 December, and the continuing non-compliance with the Greig AJ order, the urgency of the situation became more pronounced. In short, 17 days after the mother was ordered to return the child to the father, the child’s whereabouts were still unknown to the father, his legal representatives and the police, who had failed to find her and the mother. Appreciating the urgency of the circumstances, counsel for the father requested that the matter stands down until after the lunch adjournment and that Mr Kassel be directed to ensure that the child is returned by 14h00. 43.       Furthermore, counsel’s instructions at that stage from Ms Burgess were that the issue related to orders (including costs) against Mr Kassel and his firm were to stand over to another date. I acceded to the request and requested that Mr Kassel, as an officer of the Court, ensured that the minor child was returned to the father by 14h15. Ms Alves also advised the Court that she would endeavour to assist as far as possible. The matter then stood down until 14h15. 44.       On resumption after the lunch adjournment, the father’s counsel requested that Mr Kassel places the position on record. Mr Kassel advised that he had tried to contact the child's maternal grandmother, but to no avail. He then disclosed that he had become aware earlier that morning, after the meeting in my chambers, that Ms Walsh was aware of the child's whereabouts and was assisting the mother in hiding the child. He was informed by his assistant, who was apparently present during the proceedings, during the lunch break, as to Ms Walsh’s role in the situation. 45.       In view of this information, I requested that the Registrar contacts the mother and Ms Walsh to ascertain the child’s whereabouts. The Registrar’s report back a short while later, in open Court, was that the call to the mother's cell number went to voicemail or was unresponsive, and the call to Ms Walsh’s mobile number was diverted to a male at the caravan park in Bellville. The person was unco-operative when informed about the Court’s enquiry. At that stage, no further communication avenues were available to trace the child. 46.       In view of this dead-end, counsel proceeded to make submissions as to why the mother and Ms Walsh should be held in contempt of Court. Written submissions and a later supplementary note which deals particularly with contempt against a person not mentioned in the Court order, were provided and were considered. Insofar as Ms Walsh was concerned, it was submitted that she assisted the mother and tried to protect her and the child from the Court order and so aided and abetted the mother in disobeying the order and should be held in contempt of Court. As for the mother’s conduct, the submission was that all the requirements for holding her in contempt of Court were all met. Her conduct may be described as wilful and mala fide . A draft order was provided for consideration. 47.       The father’s counsel alerted the Court to a social media post by Ms Walsh posted on 1 December where she slandered, berated and accused him of alleged unprofessional conduct and additionally also alleged bias and prejudice by Greig AJ and complained that that the mother's rights were prejudiced by the Office of the Family Advocate. Mr Kassel had no submissions regarding contempt of Court. 48.       Ms Alves of the Family Advocate’s Office submitted that during the lunch break she had attempted to locate the mother and child and was in contact with Bellville SAPS and DSD, but that the child had not been traced. She raised serious concerns about the actions of the mother and Ms Walsh, who had embarked on slanderous posts on social media regarding the Family Advocate, Cape Town and who had potentially exposed details regarding a pending matter in the public, which could not be in the child’s best interests. The Family Advocate also submitted that the social worker at DSD would only be available the next day to assist with the handing over of the child, and that even if Ms Walsh were arrested, none of the role players nor the presiding Judge would know where the child was because her whereabouts were still not disclosed. Lastly, the Family Advocate made it clear that the High Court order granted by Greig AJ would supersede the Cape Town Children's Court order of 20 November 2025. The legal representatives and Family Advocate were excused and later in the day and order was granted as set out at the conclusion of these Reasons. 49.       In Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [11] , Cameron JA (as he was), writing for the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), stated the following regarding contempt of Court: “ [6] It is a crime unlawfully and intentionally to disobey a court order. This type of contempt of court is part of a broader offence, which can take many forms, but the essence of which lies in violating the dignity, repute or authority of the court.  The offence has in general terms received a constitutional ‘stamp of approval’, since the rule of law – a founding value of the Constitution – ‘requires that the dignity and authority of the courts, as well as their capacity to carry out their functions, should always be maintained’.” (footnotes omitted) 50.       More recently, this Court held in Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries v B Xulu & Partners Incorporated and Others [12] , a matter in which it held an attorney and his law firm in contempt of several Court orders, as follows: “ 18.     Section 1 (c) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 recognises the supremacy of the rule of law as one of the core values upon which South Africa is founded. Civil contempt, which is at the heart of this matter, is the crime of disrespect to the Court and the rule of law [13] . 19.       Section 165 of the Constitution states that Courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. No person or organ of State may interfere with the functioning of the Courts [14] . Section 165 (5) makes orders of Court binding on all persons and organs of State to whom/which it applies. Writing about the dignity and authority of the Courts in Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni City [15] , Nkabinde J states at paragraph 1 of the judgement: ‘ It follows from this that disobedience towards court orders or decisions risks rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery. The effectiveness of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the assurance that they will be enforced.’” (footnotes retained) 51.       It is apparent from the abovementioned authorities and many others, that disobedience of a Court order is viewed in an extremely serious light, which in circumstances where the disobedience is wilful and mala fide , attracts a criminal sanction. The requirements to prove contempt are: (i) the existence of the order; (ii) that the order must have been served on or brought to the notice of the contemnor; (iii) non-compliance with the order, and (iv) that the non-compliance must be wilful and mala fide [16] . 52.       In his counter-application, the father seeks an order holding the respondents in contempt of the Court order of 21 November 2025. In the draft order, he seeks committal for contempt in respect of the mother and Ms Walsh due to their deliberate and continued disobedience of the Court order. 53.       Turning to the requirements for contempt of Court, it is a common cause fact that the Greig AJ order existed at the time that the counter-application was launched and that the mother failed to comply with it. Furthermore, the order was served on her, and I accepted that she was fully aware of its content and the obligations which the order placed upon her, yet she failed to return the child immediately after the granting of the order as required in paragraph 1.1 thereof. The mother’s non-compliance continued until 8 December. 54.       The only point of discussion was whether her non-compliance was wilful and mala fide . On the facts and evidence relevant to her conduct, there was no doubt that the mother acted in bad faith and wilful defiance of the Greig AJ order. Despite an indication that she was unwell and emotionally unfit to attend to affidavits and Court appearances, an averment by Ms Walsh which was not supported by any medical evidence, the mother saw fit to attend the Children’s Court on 20 November, a day before the High Court urgent application brought by the father, also being a day after she was served with his urgent application. 55.       The mother thus knew when she approached the Children’s Court without notice to the father, that he had launched an urgent High Court application for return of the child and an investigation by the Family Advocate and an expert. I am left with no other view but that the mother’s conduct was underhanded and opportunistic, at the very least. This conduct set the scene for her further behaviour in this matter. 56.       There are no affidavits filed by the mother, whether supporting or confirmatory. All the information provided have been at the behest of Ms Walsh who seemed to have taken the place of the mother and even described herself as the applicant in one of the ill-founded applications. It seemed that a second urgent application calling on the return of the child and that she be held in contempt of Court had little or no effect on the mother. 57.       Despite the service of the order and subsequent service of the counter-application, the mother refused to hand over the child as ordered by Greig AJ, and her wilful actions defying the Court order continued for almost three weeks undeterred by a looming request that she be held in contempt and a possible committal for contempt. The only reason, in my view, that the mother eventually contacted Ms Burgess after the proceedings of 8 December, was due to the order I had granted when she was ordered a second time to return the child and to appear in February 2026 and provide reasons why she should be committed for contempt. 58.       It also became known that when the father’s legal representatives and the police attend Hardekraaltjie Caravan Park, it was discovered that the mother had absconded with the child to an unknown location, and as set out above, several attempts to trace and contact her, proved fruitless. One is left with no other conclusion but that the mother’s actions were a deliberate concealment of the child’s location and a continued refusal to comply with the Greig AJ order. In addition, and with respect to the mother, the submissions by Mr Kassel which followed statements by Ms Walsh in the papers that the mother had taken a few days off, were unconvincing. To emphasise, there was no medical evidence or a doctor’s certificate indicating the mother’s alleged incapacity, hence the view that her lack of confirmatory affidavits should simply be excused as she took time off, was rejected, particularly in light of the issues related to the POA. Accordingly, I thus had no hesitation in finding the mother in contempt of the Court order. 59.       The mother’s conduct, assisted by Ms Walsh, put a halt on the father’s contact with the child and resulted in him having to approach the High Court with two urgent applications, at a cost to himself, and to seek the assistance of Bellville SAPS as the order was simply not complied with. The mother’s failure to adhere to the order also impacted the Family Advocate’s ability to fulfil its Court-appointed mandate in terms of the order to commence its assessment of the child’s best interests. In short, the mother’s conduct is viewed in an extremely serious light, and it is premature to guess at the impact it has had (if any) on the minor child. 60.       This brings me to Ms Walsh, who has described herself as a lay assistant and a gender activist during the numerous documents filed under this case number. With respect to Ms Walsh, to the extent that she wished the Court to accept that she was only assisting the mother to point out procedural irregularities, it seems as if her hand is found in all the applications and correspondence with Registrars and legal representatives, even as far as correspondence addressed to the urgent duty Judge. 61.       To put it bluntly, counsel’s submission that Ms Walsh seemed to have been driving the matter on the mother’s behalf, is convincing when I had regard to the numerous documents filed and clearly drafted by her, the most recent being an application to stay of a warrant of arrest and interdict against the police, pending the finalisation of the matter. She also persisted that the urgent application before Greig AJ be removed and placed on the usual/normal opposed Motion roll, seemingly oblivious and unconcerned that the matter involved a minor child, and was in the circumstances which prevailed, inherently urgent. 62.       Furthermore, it is evident that Ms Walsh was present in Court on 21 November 2025 and not only was she aware that an order was imminent but the documents filed in the matters indicate that the order was, at the very least brought to her knowledge and/or attention and this is sufficient to fulfil one of the requirements for contempt [17] . 63.       The question is whether Ms Walsh can in fact be held in contempt of the Greig AJ order when it was not granted against her? The answer is found in Pheko v Ekurhuleni City supra, a unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court in which Nkabinde J, writing for the Court, stated as follows at paragraph [47] [18] : “ [47]   When a court order is disobeyed, not only the person named or party to the suit but all those who, with the knowledge of the order, aid and abet the disobedience or wilfully are party to the disobedience are liable. [19] The reason for extending the ambit of contempt proceedings in this manner is to prevent any attempt to defeat and obstruct the due process of justice and safeguard its administration.  Differently put, the purpose is to ensure that no one may, with impunity, wilfully get in the way of, or otherwise interfere with, the due course of justice or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [20] ” (footnotes retained) 64.       It is thus clear from the above authority that anyone with knowledge of the order, who aids and abets the disobedience thereof or is wilfully a party to such disobedience, is in contempt of such order or liable to be held in contempt of such order. It became apparent during the proceedings of 8 December that Ms Walsh was always aware of the order and the whereabouts of the mother and minor child. Yet, despite such knowledge, she set about to assist the mother, for whatever motive and purpose, to disobey the order by failing and refusing to ensure that the minor child was returned to the father immediately after granting the order. 65.       In this respect, I had no hesitation finding that through her actions in bringing, for instance, an application for recusal of Greig AJ after the Acting Judge had dealt with the urgent matter, an application to stay a warrant of arrest and an interdict against SAPS, that the intention was to delay and frustrate the execution of the Greig AJ order. So too the insistence that an urgent application was to be removed to the normal opposed Motion roll merely because the mother wished to oppose the application. None of these applications were competent. 66.       Considered holistically, Ms Walsh’s conduct constitutes a grave, serious and intentional interference when she acted in a manner to assist the mother in evading the order and wilfully refusing to comply with it. In doing so, the “ ambit of contempt” referred to by the Constitutional Court in Pheko [21] extended to her. She wilfully failed and refused to disclose the child’s whereabouts and interfered with the due process of justice. Having considered the documents filed of record and the submissions, it was apparent to me that Ms Walsh advised and must have encouraged the mother to disobey Greig AJ’s order and actively assisted her in doing so. The looming threat of being found in contempt of Court and criminal charges against the mother did not deter Ms Walsh in aiding and abetting the mother’s non-compliance. In all of these circumstances, Ms Walsh was found to be in contempt of the order. 67.       There were many aspects about this matter which caused grave concern, not least of which were that a person who described themselves as a lay assistant and gender activist would go so far as to assist a litigant to wilfully disobey a Court order and conceal the whereabouts of a child who should have been returned to her father immediately after the granting of such order. It is telling that in terms of the 21 November POA, Ms Walsh was required to receive instructions and acknowledge and directions and instructions from the Court, yet even in the face of a valid Court order, Ms Walsh paid scant regard to the order and direction of the Court and rather embarked on a course to ensure that the order was wilfully disobeyed. 68.       The Court is required to ensure that its decisions and orders are complied with by all, and that includes a litigant and a person who assists the litigant. Whether the view is held that an order was wrongly granted, such order remains extant and must be complied with until set aside by a competent Court. The order granted by Greig AJ was either varied nor set aside and thus had to be obeyed and required immediate compliance by the mother. The disobedience of the order by the mother and Ms Walsh, whose role and conduct are set out above, are very concerning, more so because a minor child was withheld from her father. 69.       Having considered the matter, I was satisfied that the father had proved all the requirements necessary to hold the mother and Ms Walsh in contempt of Court. I was mindful of the request that orders against the third respondent were to stand over for a later date and have thus not yet made findings regarding the conduct, role and actions of Mr Kassel and Kassel Sklaar Cohen and Co., which raised certain concerns during the proceedings. As for the various applications other than the Rule 6(12)(c), no orders were granted until the mother purges her contempt. 70.       On 10 December Mr Kassel forwarded a Notice of Withdrawal as Attorneys of Record. The Notice indicates that Kassel Sklaar Cohen and Co. withdrew as attorneys of record for all three respondents whose last known address is the address of the said law firm. The notice does not fully comply with Rule 16(4). 71.       A copy of these written Reasons will be forwarded to the legal representatives, Ms E[...] (mother), Ms Walsh and Ms Alves, the Family Advocate. Finally, while no order specified as such, it followed that I viewed the counter-application as extremely urgent. These are the written reasons for the order granted as per “X” on 21 November 2025, which is duplicated below, without the formal heading and the parents’ identity numbers. It is noted that the reference to “First Applicant” on the order should be “Applicant”. M PANGARKER JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT Appearances : For Applicant:           Adv T Benadé Instructed by:            Burgess Attorneys Inc. Kuils River For Respondents:    Mr R Kassel Instructed by:            Kassel Sklaar Cohen and Co. Cape Town Family Advocate, Cape Town: Adv R Alves “ X” Case no. 2025-221659 BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE PANGARKER CAPE TOWN, ON MONDAY THE 8 TH DECEMBER 2025 M[...] N[...] First Applicant And J[...] E[...] First Respondent PEARL WALSH Second Respondent RAEL KASSEL T/A KASSEL SKLAAR COHEN AND CO. Third Respondent ORDER “ Having read the papers filed of record and having heard counsel for the Applicant and the Respondents’ attorneys, and the Family Advocate, Cape Town, an order is made in the following terms: IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The First and Second Respondents are found in contempt of the Greig AJ Order which was issued under the abovementioned Case Number on 21 November 2025; 2. The minor child L[...] D[...] N[...] , shall be handed over to Applicant in accordance with the Order referred to in paragraph 1 above, by no later than 17h00 on MONDAY 8 DECEMBER 2025, failing the South African Police Services (SAPS), with the assistance of a Social Worker/Official of the Department of Social Development (DSD) are hereby authorized to execute the order by Greig AJ wherever the First Respondent and/or the minor child may be found or located. 3. The First and Second Respondents are to appear before this Court on the date mentioned below (19 February 2026 at 10h00) and are required to advance reasons why they should not be committed to prison and/or why a suspended period of imprisonment should not be imposed upon them in light of the order granted at paragraph 1 hereof. 4.The First and Second Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in this application on the scale as between Party and Party (Scale B) and which would include but not be limited to: 4.1       the costs incurred in the main application; 4.2      the wasted costs incurred in the 24 November 2025 rescission application; 4.3      the wasted costs incurred in the 26 November 2025 application for the recusal      of Greig AJ and/or leave to appeal; 4.4       the reconsideration application filed on 28 November 2025 which was dismissed on even date (8 December 2025); 4.5      the application for the Suspension of Execution of a warrant filed on 2 December 2025. 5.   Any orders sought against Third Respondent is postponed until Thursday 19 February 2026 at 10h00 on condition that he co-operates with Applicant’s legal representatives to ensure the return the minor child in terms of the Greig AJ Order. 6.   The First and/or Second Respondents are ordered to refrain from discussing and/or posting comments and detail regarding this matter which involves a minor child, on any social media and/or public forums. 7.   A copy of this order shall be transmitted by the Applicant’s Legal representative to the South African Police Services (SAPS), Bellville for the attention of the Investigating Officer appointed to ensure the execution of the Greig AJ Order and the tracing of the minor child. 8.   A copy of this order shall also be transmitted to the Family Advocate, Cape Town and Bellville Children’s Court, for their attention.” [1] Par 8, founding affidavit, main urgent application. [2] Form 2 [3] It is unclear if this as a kidnapping charge only [4] Stay application, par 4 [5] 2 December 2025 [6] The date of issuing / granting of the IPO [7] This occurred after the urgent application and Ms Walsh’s application for rescission and recusal of 24 November 2025 [8] Burgess Incorporated correspondence dated 22 November 2025 [9] Ms Walsh’s affidavit file 24 November 2025, par 1.3. [10] B16 to counter-application [11] [2006] ZASCA 52 ; 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) par [6] [12] [2021] 3 All SA 166 (WCC) par 18-19 [13] See Pheko para 31 [14] Section 165(2) and (3) [15] 2015 (5) SA 600 at para 1 [16] Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Limited and Others; Shadrack Shivumbu Homu Mkhonto and Others v Compensation Solutions (Pty) Limited 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) par [67] [17] See requirements above [18] The reference to the Cape Times judgment is Cape Times Ltd v Union Trades Directories (Pty) Ltd and Others 1956 (1) SA 105 (N) 106A-B [19] Cape Times above n 24 at 106D-E. [20] Id.  See also Fakie above n 17 at paras 6 and 8. [21] Supra, par [47] sino noindex make_database footer start