Case Law[2024] ZAWCHC 65South Africa
Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Enviroment and Another v Ulwandle Fishing (Pty) Ltd and Others (21613/23) [2024] ZAWCHC 65 (1 March 2024)
Headnotes
rights to the horse mackerel fishery until 31 December 2015; they were right-holder applicants and categorised as Category A applicants. The second category relates to applicants who held rights in sectors other than the horse mackerel fishery from 2006 to 2015 and are considered new entrant applicants; they were categorised as Category B applicants. The third category comprised
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Enviroment and Another v Ulwandle Fishing (Pty) Ltd and Others (21613/23) [2024] ZAWCHC 65 (1 March 2024)
Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Enviroment and Another v Ulwandle Fishing (Pty) Ltd and Others (21613/23) [2024] ZAWCHC 65 (1 March 2024)
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sino date 1 March 2024
In the High Court of
South Africa
(Western Cape
Division, Cape Town)
Case No: 21613/23
In the matter between:
THE MINISTER OF
FORESTRY,
FISHERIES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
First
Applicant
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE
FISHERIES BRANCH OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF
FORESTRY, FISHERIES
AND ENVIRONMENT Second
Applicant
And
ULWANDLE FISHING (PTY)
LTD First
Respondent
ULWANDLE INSHORE (PTY)
LTD Second
Respondent
FISHERMEN FRESH CC
Third
Respondent
PREMIER FISHING SA
(PTY) LTD
Fourth
Respondent
LETAP CC
Fifth
Respondent
MAYIBUYE FISHING (PTY)
LTD
Sixth
Respondent
OFFSHORE FISHING
COMPANY (PTY) LTD
Seventh
Respondent
CAPENIS INVESTMENTS
(PTY) LTD Eighth
Respondent
JC FISHING
CC
Ninth
Respondent
ALGOA MARINE EXPORTERS
(PTY) LTD
Tenth
Respondent
ZIMKITHA FISHING (PTY)
LTD
Eleventh Respondent
VECTO TRADE 126 (PTY)
LTD Twelfth
Respondent
TIMOWISE (PTY) LTD
Thirteenth
Respondent
ZWM FISHING (PTY) LTD
Fourteenth
Respondent
BAYANA BAYANA FISHING
CC Fifteenth
Respondent
UKLOBA FISHING (PTY)
LTD Sixteenth
Respondent
DYER EILAND VISSRYE
(EDMS) BEPERK
Seventeenth
Respondent
Heard: 14 December
2023
Delivered
(electronically): 01 March 2024
JUDGMENT
LEKHULENI J
Introduction
[1] This
is an urgent application in which the applicants seek an order
authorising the second applicant,
including the officials of the
Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment under the
control of the second applicant,
to refuse to issue fishing permits
to current Category B right holders in the horse mackerel fishing
sector for the 2024 fishing
season pending the handing down of
judgments in the review applications instituted in this court by the
thirteenth to the seventeenth
respondents under case numbers 8760/22;
17233/20; 17234/24 and 6084/2023.
[2] In
addition, the applicants seek an order interdicting any Category B
right holder who has already
been issued with a grant of right letter
from being issued with a fishing permit for the horse mackerel 2024
fishing season in
terms of such permit, pending the finalisation of
the pending review applications. The applicants further seek an order
that the
pending review applications set out above, be subjected to a
case management process by the Acting Judge President to ensure that
they are finalised by 29 February 2024.
[3] The
second respondent opposed the applicant's application and implored
the court to strike the
application off the roll for lack of urgency.
The Background Facts
[4] The
first applicant, the Minister of Forestry, Fisheries, and the
Environment ("the Minister"),
is responsible for the
administration of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 ("the
MLRA") and for overseeing the
functions and strategic objectives
of the Fisheries Management Branch within the Department. In the
conduct of her duties, the
Minister is guided by the principles set
out in section 2 of the MLRA, which include transforming the fishing
industry, something
that is particularly relevant to the Category B
applicants for fishing rights. The purpose is to encourage new and
particularly
previously disadvantaged entities and persons to become
involved in the fishing industry.
[5] The
Minister is also the Appeal Authority stipulated in the MLRA, to whom
appeals in terms of section
80(1) of the MLRA lay. The second
applicant is the Deputy Director General: Fisheries Management
Branch, Department of Forestry,
Fisheries, and the Environment ("the
DDG"). Acting in terms of section 79 of the MLRA, the Minister
delegated the power
to grant rights in each fishery to the DDG.
[6] Commercial
fishing is a regulated economic activity in terms of the MLRA which
requires the granting
of a commercial fishing right by the Minister
in terms of section 18(1) and the annual issue of permits in terms of
section 13(1)
of the MLRA. The issues that arise in this application
concern the allocation of commercial fishing rights in the 205/2016
Fishing
Rights Allocation Process (FRAP:2015/2016) in the horse
mackerel fishery sector. As part of the initial allocation process,
the
Department streamed fishing entities into three evaluation
categories for fishing rights in the horse mackerel fishery in FRAP
2015/2016 to ensure fairness and rationality during the application
process.
[7] The
three evaluation categories are the following: the first category was
those applicants who
held rights to the horse mackerel fishery until
31 December 2015; they were right-holder applicants and categorised
as Category
A applicants. The second category relates to applicants
who held rights in sectors other than the horse mackerel fishery from
2006
to 2015 and are considered new entrant applicants; they were
categorised as Category B applicants. The third category comprised
applicants who had not held fishing rights in any of the commercial
fishery sectors in South Africa during the long-term Rights
Allocation Management Process and were categorised as category C
applicants.
[8] In
the instant matter, each of the first to the seventeenth respondents
holds fishing rights in
at least one fishing sector and is
categorised as a Category B applicant. The first to the twelfth
respondents are Category B rights
holders in the horse mackerel
fishery who have been awarded commercial horse mackerel fishing
rights. The thirteenth to the seventeenth
respondents are category B
applicants and are the applicants in different court challenges
against the Minister, all of which relate
to the horse mackerel
fishery. The DDG initially allocated the thirteenth to the
seventeenth respondents commercial horse mackerel
fishing rights;
however, they failed to qualify for a commercial horse mackerel
fishing right on appeal in terms of the Minister's
appeal decision of
31 March 2022.
[9] According
to the Minister, the interdictory relief sought in the Notice of
Motion seeks to ensure
that all affected category B fishing entities
are treated the same; that is, no one will be permitted to fish horse
mackerel pending
the determination and finalisation of the litigation
(review applications) instituted in respect of category B of the
horse mackerel
fishery. As stated above, the critical issues in this
application concern the allocation of commercial fishing rights in
the FRAP
2015/2016 Fishing Rights Allocation Process in the horse
mackerel fishery.
[10] The
current horse mackerel fishing season ended on 31 December 2023, and
the new season commenced
on 01 January 2024. The total allowable
catch for each fishing season is determined prior to the commencement
of each fishing season.
Once the total allowable catch is set in
tons, right holders can immediately calculate how much fish they are
entitled to catch
as soon as the new season begins by applying their
percentage allocation against the total tonnage of fish available to
be caught
in the upcoming season.
[11] At
the commencement of each fishing season, each successful right holder
is permitted to catch
its allocated percentage of the total allowable
catch, as determined annually. In other words, if the total allowable
catch for
a sector is 100 tons for the new season, and if 10 right
holders were each allocated 10 per cent of the total allowable catch
by
the DDG in the original decision, that right holder will be
entitled to catch 10 tons of fish the moment the new fishing season
opens.
[12] The
fishing allocation process for 2015/2016 commenced with an invitation
by the Department of
Forestry, Fisheries and Environment to
interested parties to submit applications. The Department received a
total of eighty (80)
applications for the allocation of rights in the
hose mackerel fishery. The process followed on the reversion of the
rights granted
to rights holders under section 18 of the MLRA. To
ensure fairness and rationality during the application process, the
eighty (80)
applications were streamed into one of the 3 evaluation
categories: A, B and C, as explained above.
[13] Following
an extensive multi-stage process, on 10 November 2016, the DDG
published the General
Published Reasons for the Decisions on the
Allocation of 2015/2016 Fishing Rights and Quantum in the Horse
Mackerel Fishery. In
terms thereof, the DDG provisionally decided to
allocate a total of 33 commercial horse mackerel fishing rights for a
period of
15 years commencing on 01 January 2017 and terminating and
reverting to the State on 31 December 2031. Of the 33 commercial
horse
mackerel fishing rights provisionally granted, 6 were allocated
to Category A applicants, 27 were allocated to Category B applicants,
and 4 were allocated to Category C applicants.
[14] Furthermore,
the DDG provisionally allocated the rights to 23 Category B
applicants because they
were the top-scoring applicants in their
stream in view of the score of above 50 per cent and, in so doing,
had regard to the policy
objectives as well as Section 2 and section
18 of the MLRA.
[15] Subsequently,
the DDG invited applicants to comment on the provisional decisions,
including the
provisional allocations and proposed quantum allocation
methodology. On 20 December 2016, following receipt and consideration
of
the comments, the DDG published the Addendum to the DDG General
Published Reasons, which sets out the extent to which the provisional
decisions published on 10 November 2016 were amended and further
recorded and confirmed the DDG's final decision. The application
of
the DDG's quantum methodology resulted in the new entrants' pool
comprising a cumulative total of 57,12 per cent of the total
allowable catch for horse mackerel. The quantum was allocated to
those Category B and Category C applicants who scored above 50
points.
[16] The
Addendum to the DDG's general published reasons further recorded
every applicant's entitlement
to appeal against any aspect of the
DDG's decision. Pursuant thereto, appeals were submitted by
unsuccessful Category B entities
against the DDG's exclusion or
scoring them. In response to the appeals, the DDG submitted a report
concerning the appeals in terms
of Regulation 5(3) of the Regulations
promulgated under the MLRA. On 24 May 2019, the former Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (Zokwana) published his appeal
decision. The appeal decision issued by Minister Zokwana led to two
Category B appellants
being granted commercial horse mackerel rights
on appeal, namely, Bayana Bayana and Ukloba.
[17] Regarding
Bayana Bayana, the Minister found on appeal that the application fee
was paid in full
before the stipulated closing date and time and that
the perceived short payment resulting in its exclusion was a result
of Bayana
Bayana attaching the wrong proof of payment. The Minister
awarded Bayana Bayana a score of 63,24, which was above the 50%
threshold,
and thus allocated a horse mackerel fishing right to it.
In respect of Ukloba, the Minister held on appeal that the decision
by
the DDG to exclude Ukloba should be reversed. Ukloba was awarded a
score of 65,91%, which was above the 50 per cent threshold, and
therefore, Ukloba was allocated the right to horse mackerel fishing.
[18] Following
the publication of the 2019 Appeal Decision, three entities, namely,
Blue Continent
Products (Pty) Ltd, Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd
and Ivrin Johnson Ltd, instituted an application to review and set
aside
Minister Zokwana's 2019 Appeal Decision in relation to the
appeals in the horse mackerel fishery. On 3 December 2020, an order
by agreement reviewing Minister Zokwana's appeal decision in its
entirety was granted, and the Minister was directed to make her
decision within seven months from the date of the order. As a result
of this order, the Minister was required to reconsider all
the
appeals concerning Category A, B, and C in the horse mackerel fishery
afresh.
[19] Subsequent
thereto, in terms of a notice dated 19 March 2021, the current
Minister invited applicants
in the horse mackerel fishery to furnish
supplementary representations. Having received and considered various
comments and representations,
on 28 December 2021, the current
Minister published her Provisional General Published Reasons for the
Decisions on Appeal in the
horse mackerel fishery 2015/2016 on the
Department's website. The Provisional Published Reasons on Appeal set
out the Minister's
provisional decision on the allocation of rights
and quantum, which was subject to confirmation or variation upon
receipt of comments
from the affected Category B right holders and
addressed the grounds of appeal raised by the applicants. The
Minister's appeal
decision was pursuant to court orders granted in
respect of the review applications in which she was required to
reconsider afresh
all the appeals in relation to Category A, B, and C
appellants in the horse mackerel fishery.
[20] The
Minister consulted with the technical advisory team on horse mackerel
to determine the proposed
quantum allocation methodology regarding
the allocation of rights to a successful appearance on appeal. In
addition, the Minister
appointed an appeal advisory team consisting
of a panel of practising advocates, which made preliminary appeal
recommendations
after evaluating and assessing the appeals. In her
appeal finding, the Minister proposed, among others, to allow 12
top-scoring
Category B entities and 7 Category C entities into the
sector. The result was that 13 previously successful category B
entities
were outscored and unsuccessful. The entities that scored
the highest in Category B were the respondents from the first one to
the twelfth one.
[21] On
10 January 2022, the Minister issued a notice to all applicants in
the horse mackerel fishery
and informed the applicants in that sector
that she proposed to deviate from the quantum allocation methodology
that the DDG previously
implemented. This deviation would have the
effect that 13 right holders who were previously allocated rights in
the horse mackerel
fishery would no longer qualify for commercial
fishing rights in the horse mackerel fishing sector. As a result,
affected right
holders were invited to make written representations
in terms of section 80(3) of the MLRA as to why the proposed quantum
allocation
methodology should not be adopted or to provide the
reasons as to why they should not be excluded from successful
applicants for
a fishing right.
[22] Upon
receipt and consideration of the comments and/or representations from
the horse mackerel
fishery, on 31 March 2022, the Minister published
the Final General Published Reasons for the decisions on appeal in
the horse
mackerel fishery 2015/2016. According to the Minister's
Final General Published Reasons; Decisions of Appeal, the Minister
deviated
from the quantum allocation methodology of the DDG, which
provided for an allocation of commercial horse mackerel fishing
rights
to applicants who scored above 50 percent. Instead, the
Minister determined that an appropriate quantum allocation
methodology
would be one that allows the 12 top-scoring Category B
entities into the horse mackerel fishery and would allocate 20
percent of
the total allowable catch to the 12 top-scoring category B
entities.
[23] The
Minister asserted that in arriving at her decision, she considered
and balanced a wide range
of factors which, amongst others, include
the principles applicable to the allocations of fishing rights as
derived from the Constitution
and the MLRA, the need to broaden
access to the fishery by introducing new entrants, the fact that in
most instances, Category
A and B entities have rights in other
sectors and are thus not wholly reliant on the horse mackerel
allocation alone and the desirability
of giving successful applicants
reasonable prospects of active and meaningful participation in the
fishery. Having considered all
the relevant information, including
individual appeals, as well as the comments received in response to
the Provisional Appeals
reasons, on 31 March 2022, the Minister
determined the entities in Category A, B, and C which would be
awarded a right in the horse
mackerel sector.
[24] Dissatisfied
with the Minister's Appeal decision not to award them a long-term
commercial horse
mackerel fishing right, the thirteenth to the
seventeenth respondents instituted review applications challenging
the Minister's
appeal decision of 31 March 2022. The thirteenth
respondent instituted review proceedings in this court under case
number 8760/22
in which it sought an order to review and set aside
the Minister's decision to terminate or revoke the 15-year-long
commercial
horse mackerel fishing right granted to it on 20 December
2016 by the DDG. The application was heard on 14 March 2023.
[25] A
review court order was granted in that application on 12 June 2023.
In terms of that order,
the Minister's decision of 31 March 2022 to
revoke the thirteenth respondent's 15-yearlong fishing right was
reviewed and set aside.
The Minister was directed to uphold the
thirteenth respondent's appeal against the DDG and to issue a permit
to the thirteenth
respondent in terms of section 13 of the MLRA to
allow the thirteenth respondent to exercise the right in the 2023
fishing season.
The Minister avers that on 23 June 2023, her attorney
of record requested reasons of judgment for this order, and as of 29
November
2023, reasons for the order have not yet been furnished.
[26] The
fourteenth respondent also instituted review proceedings under case
number 14208/2022 against
the Minister's decision to refuse it a
fishing right. The fourteenth respondent challenged the scoring of
its application for a
long-term commercial horse mackerel fishing
right submitted in Category B of the horse mackerel fishery for the
FRAP 2015/2016.
The review application of the fourteenth respondent
was granted by agreement on 30 May 2023. The decision of the Minister
refusing
the fourteenth respondent a long-term fishing right was
remitted to the Minister for reconsideration, and the Minister was
ordered
to communicate her reconsidered decision in writing to the
fourteenth respondent within 90 days from the date of order. The
Minister
indicates she has reconsidered the fourteenth respondent's
appeal and will communicate her reconsidered decision to the
fourteenth
respondent in due course.
[27] The
fifteenth respondent also instituted a review application against the
decision of the Minister
under case number 17233/2020, contending
that it was scored incorrectly on appeal regarding its application
for a commercial horse
mackerel fishing right. The Minister and the
DDG opposed the application. The application was heard on 11 and 12
October 2023.
As of 29 November 2023, when the Minister's affidavit
was deposed, judgment had yet to be handed down with respect to the
fifteenth
respondent's application. The sixteenth respondent also
launched a review application under case number 17234/2022 against
the
Minister's decision, contending that it was incorrectly scored
and was entitled to a commercial horse mackerel fishing right. The
application was also heard on 11 and 12 October 2023. As of 29
November 2023, when the affidavit was deposed, judgment had not
yet
been handed down with respect to the sixteenth respondent's
application.
[28] The
seventeenth respondent also instituted a review application against
the decision of the Minister
under case number 6084/2023, seeking an
order to review and set aside the decision of the Minister of 31
March 2022 to terminate
or otherwise revoke the seventeenth
respondent's commercial horse mackerel fishing right granted on 20
December 2016 by the DDG.
The seventeenth respondent contended that
it was incorrectly scored and that if it was correctly scored, it
ought to be the 8th
highest scoring Category B appellant and would
have been eligible to continue holding a commercial horse mackerel
fishing right.
The Minister and the DDG have opposed the seventeenth
respondent's review application. The Minister averred that the
seventeenth
respondent's application had not yet been heard since it
was not yet ripe for hearing.
[29] The
Minister contends that her decision to allow 12 top-scoring Category
B entities into the horse
mackerel fishery has not been challenged or
impugned by the respondents. Thus, the impact of the litigation, if
successful, is
that, in reconsidering her appeal decision and
awarding category B entities a commercial horse mackerel right
pursuant to an order
of this court, the Minister must determine a new
list of the 12 top-scoring category B applicants. In providing a
practical explanation
of the impact of the ongoing litigation, the
Minister stated that if, on reconsideration of the thirteenth
respondent's appeal,
she determines that, indeed, the thirteenth
respondent is entitled to a commercial horse mackerel fishing right,
one of the category
B right holders will need to be excluded. This is
because the Minister has determined a cut-off of the 12 top-scoring
category
B entities who would be awarded a commercial horse mackerel
fishing right.
[30] In
the same way, regarding the fourteenth respondent, if on
reconsideration of the review order
granted in favour of the
fourteenth respondent under case 14208/2022, she determines that the
fourteenth respondent is entitled
to a total score of 79,11 per cent
as alleged in its review application, the fourteenth respondent would
fall into the twelve top
scoring Category B appellants and will rank
in seventh place. This would mean that one of the top-scoring would
no longer qualify
for a commercial horse mackerel fishing right and
would be excluded. The Minister further averred that current Category
B right
holders will be impacted by this court's orders regarding the
above-mentioned ongoing litigation. According to the Minister, the
ongoing litigation is interlinked and impacts on each other. For this
reason, she did not publish a revised decision regarding
the
fourteenth respondent's appeal.
[31] During
February 2023, the Minister convened a meeting with the Department's
officials and tasked
them to find a holistic solution to the constant
upheaval in the sector. The Minister indicated that she wanted the
piecemeal litigation
and decision-making to end and needed the
Department and the industry entities to find a way to end the
litigation. The Minister
asserted that she hoped a solution could be
found to obviate the need for such litigation. In the eighth months
since February
2023, it became apparent that this would not be
possible, and it was for that reason that he gave instructions to her
legal representatives
to institute legal proceedings in respect of
the Category B sector. To this end, the Minister seeks to ensure that
until certainty
has been achieved, no category B right holder will be
permitted to fish.
[32] The
Minister averred that this application was brought urgently because
right holders commence
with permit applications between October and
November of the preceding year, and the Department is in the process
of issuing these
permits as they are required in law to do. The
Minister further asseverated that as a result, she is left with no
choice but to
seek urgent interim relief directing that no permits be
issued to category B right holders pending the finalisation of the
litigation
instituted in respect of Category B of the horse mackerel
fishery. To the extent that permits have already been issued, the
holders
of those permits be interdicted from utilising them. If the
relief is not granted, the Minister contended that the very purpose
of the relief sought would be defeated in that successful appellants
being introduced into the industry will have to wait until
2025 to
start fishing while those who ought not to be fishing will be
permitted to fish for another season.
The second
respondent’s opposition to the applicant’s application
[33] The
second respondent is a Category B right holder in the Horse Mackerel
fishery. The second respondent
contended that on 31 March 2022, after
several appeals, the Minister published her Final General Published
Reasons for the Decisions
on Appeal in the horse mackerel fishery. In
terms thereof, the second respondent was allocated 7.78 per cent of
the total allowable
catch. Pursuant thereto, the second respondent
has exercised its Category B right to fish horse mackerel since
receipt of the right
following the FRAP:2015/2016 process in November
2016.
[34] The
second respondent asserted that it planned to exercise its Category B
right to fish horse
mackerel in the 2024 season and avers it cannot
afford not to do so. The second respondent further asserted that the
Minister's
application is entirely misconceived and not necessary or
appropriate. First, the second respondent contends that the matter is
not urgent. The Minister has known about the pending litigation for
months. According to the second respondent, the review applications
instituted by the fourteenth to the seventeenth respondents were
launched almost 14 months ago.
[35] The
second respondent reckons that the founding affidavit of the Minister
is silent as to why
the Minister sees it fit to launch this
application on the eve of the 2024 fishing season, notwithstanding
the fact that the 2022
and 2023 fishing seasons operated under the
current situation. Since 2020, there have been several review
applications in this
sector, and despite the same, the fishing
seasons operated based on the decisions that applied at that time.
Before this, the Minister
had not sought interdictory relief against
the industry pursuant to all the review applications launched since
at least 2020, and
the industry continued operating without the
relief currently being sought on an urgent basis.
[36] Secondly,
the second respondent explained that the relief sought by the
Minister is both impractical
and undesirable in that the likelihood
that the pending review applications, subsequent appeals, and
consequent public participation
process will be determined during
2024 is unlikely. For instance, the review application of the
seventeenth respondent is far from
being finalised. The applicant, in
that matter, has yet to file its supplementary founding affidavit.
[37] Thirdly,
the second respondent also relies firmly on the established principle
in our law that
an exercise of public power cannot be ignored as a
nullity based on the supposition that it might have been invalidly
made. Rather,
an impugned act, such as the allocation of Category B
fishing rights in March 2022, remains valid until set aside by a
court. Fourthly,
the second respondent contended that the Minister
does not assert any right that is threatened by an impending imminent
or irreparable
harm which requires protection by way of an interdict.
[38] According
to the second respondent, the Minister's desire for stability and
consistency is not
a recognised legal basis for interfering with the
second respondent's Category B fishing right, which it currently
enjoys lawfully,
and which right is not disputed. The second
respondent also believes that the Minister has not established all
the requirements
for the grant of an interim interdict. There is no
credible evidence before this court that the Minister or the
applicants in the
pending review applications will suffer irreparable
harm if the interdictory relief is not granted. To the contrary, the
second
respondent could suffer certain financial losses in the
millions, and the broader horse mackerel fishery will be disrupted.
The
second respondent implored this court to dismiss the Minister's
application with costs.
The principal
submission by the parties
[39] Mr
Jacobs SC, the Minister’s legal Counsel, submitted that this
urgent application for interdictory
relief is aimed at establishing
the horse mackerel fishing industry. Counsel submitted that the
decision of the Minister to determine
a cut-off to the effect that in
respect of Category B applicants, only the 12 top-scoring applicants
would be allowed into the
sector and allocated a commercial horse
mackerel fishing right remains extant. Pursuant to the publication of
the Minister’s
final decision of appeals, the fourteenth to the
seventeenth respondents instituted review applications in respect of
the Minister
decision not to award them a long-term commercial horse
mackerel. These review applications have not been finalised and are
at
various stages of completion.
[40] Mr
Jacobs submitted that the effect of the litigation, if successful, is
that in reconsidering
her decision on appeal and awarding Category B
entities a commercial horse mackerel right pursuant to an order of
this court, the
Minister must determine a new list of the top scoring
Category B applicants. As matter stands, the contention proceeded,
entities
who ought not to be fishing may be fishing, while entities
who ought to be entitled to fish do not hold the right yet. This is
because of the pending litigation proceedings referred to above. Mr
Jacobs further submitted that the interdictory relief seeks
to ensure
that all affected category B fishing entities are treated the same
way and that no one will be permitted to fish horse
mackerel pending
the determination and finalisation of the litigation instituted in
respect of category B the horse mackerel fishery.
Counsel implored
the court to grant the relief sought in the notice of motion.
[41] Mr
Rosenberg SC, the second respondent's Counsel, submitted that the
second respondent is a Category
B right holder in the horse mackerel
fishery. The allocation of its fishing rights occurred under the
2015/2016. The second respondent
has exercised its Category B right
to fish horse mackerel since receipt of the right following the FRAP
2015/2016. Mr Rosenberg
submitted that as it has done in previous
years, the second respondent plans to exercise its category B right
to fish horse mackerel
in the 2024 season. Counsel submitted further
that the applicant's application is entirely misconceived and not
necessary or appropriate.
[42] Mr
Rosenberg argued that the matter is not urgent as the Minister has
known about the pending
review applications, which sought to impugn
her decision for months. In tandem with the second respondent's
answering affidavit,
Mr Rosenberg argued that the Minister does not
assert any right which requires protection by way of an interdict.
According to
Mr Rosenberg, the Minister's desire for stability and
consistency is not a recognised legal basis for the interference with
the
second respondent's Category B fishing right, which it currently
enjoys lawfully, which right is not in dispute. To disrupt vested
rights in respect of the 2024 horse mackerel fishing season on the
vague and uncertain basis put forward by the Minister, the argument
proceeded, cannot be supported. It was Counsel's submission that the
interdict would potentially have a significant negative impact
on the
industry and would prevent vessels from operating for at least three
months, in addition to the ancillary effects on service
providers
dependent on those vessels operating.
[43] Counsel
further submitted that the pending review applications are not before
this court, and
the minister himself has refrained from engaging on
the prospect of success of each undetermined review application. In
these circumstances,
the argument went, it is inconceivable that this
court should be asked to effectively prejudge some of those matters
by interdicting
the category B fishing rights pending a determination
thereof. It was also submitted on behalf of the second respondent
that the
Minister has not satisfied all the requirements for interim
relief. To that end, Mr Rosenberg implored the court to dismiss the
Minister's application with costs, alternatively, to strike it from
the roll together with a punitive costs order that includes
the costs
of two Counsels.
Issues to be decided
[44] The
critical question to be decided in this matter is whether the
Minister and the DDG have made
out a case for an interim interdict
restraining the Category B right holders who have already been issued
with a fishing permit
(including the second respondent) for the horse
mackerel 2024 from fishing in terms of such permit pending the
finalisation of
the review applications of the thirteenth to the
seventeenth respondents. Ancillary to this question, this court is
enjoined to
consider whether the Minister has made out a case for an
order authorising the DDG and officials of the Department to refuse
to
issue fishing permits to current Category B right holders in the
horse mackerel fishing sector for the 2024 fishing season pending
the
outcome of the review applications instituted by the thirteenth to
the seventeenth respondents.
Relevant legal
principles and discussion
Urgency
[45] The
second respondent has challenged the Minister’s application on
the basis that it is
not urgent. It is trite that the general
principles applicable in establishing urgency are dealt with in Rule
6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court. The court will first consider
whether an applicant has averred facts which, objectively speaking,
demonstrate urgency.
In terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court, an applicant is, in law, required to set out the circumstances
which justify
the hearing of an application on an urgent basis and
the basis on which it contends that it would not obtain substantial
redress
at a hearing in due course.
[46] Simply
put, Rule 6(12)(b) requires two things of an applicant in an urgent
application. First,
the applicant must explicitly state the
circumstances that he avers render the matter urgent and, secondly,
why he claims that
he would not be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. Where the application lacks the requisite
element or degree
of urgency, the court can, for that reason, decline
to exercise its powers under Rule 6(12)(a). (See
Commissioner,
South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services (Pty) LTD
[2006] ZASCA 51
;
2006 (4) SA 292
(SCA) para 9).
[47] In
the instant matter, the basis of the second respondent's challenge to
the issue of urgency
is that the applications of the thirteenth to
the seventeenth respondents were issued some time ago, and the
Minister was aware
of these applications. Furthermore, the second
respondent asserted that the Minister's founding affidavit made no
effort to satisfy
these requirements. I do not agree with this
proposition. The Minister has stated that the urgency of this
application lies in
the imminent commencement of the 2024 fishing
season and that without the interdictory relief, the Category B right
holders will
be entitled to fish from 1 January 2024, pending the
outcome of the review application. Importantly, the Minister has made
it plain
that the present application is brought based on the impact
of a piecemeal approach to considering the review applications as and
when they are finalised.
[48] Mr
Jacobs contended that the issues arising in this matter, which bring
about instability in the
horse mackerel fishery, are continuous and
ongoing. This situation, argued Counsel, affects the Minister's
ability to implement
her statutory obligations. Importantly, the
Minister explained that she first made concerted efforts to resolve
the issues without
resorting to litigation. She tasked the
Department's officials to find a holistic solution to the constant
upheaval in the sector.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the Minister
has been left with no alternative but to approach this court for the
relief sought
in the notice of motion. From the totality of the
evidence placed before this court, I am of the view that the Minister
has clearly
set out urgency as envisaged in Rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules. I turn to consider the Minister's application on the merits.
The Minister’s
application on the merits
[49] As
discussed above, pending the finalisation of the review applications
of the thirteenth to the
seventeenth respondents, the applicant seeks
an order authorising the DDG to refuse to issue fishing permits to
the current Category
B right holders in the horse mackerel fishing
sector for the 2024 fishing seasons. The Minister also seeks an
interdictory order
restraining any Category B right holder issued
with a fishing permit from fishing in terms of that permit. In
addition, the Minister
seeks a procedural order directing the pending
review applications to be subjected to a case management process by
the Acting Judge
President to ensure they are finalised by 29
February 2024.
[50] It
is common cause that the pending review applications discussed above
are at different stages.
In two applications (Bayana Bayana –
Case No. 17233/2020) and (Ukloba – Case No. 17234/2022)
judgment is pending. At
the same time, reasons of judgment are still
pending in Timowise – Case No. 8760/2022. It is also common
cause that the seventeenth
respondent's application is far from being
finalised. At the hearing of this matter, the court was informed that
the applicant
in that matter has not yet filed its supplementary
founding affidavit.
[51] In
my view, the relief sought by the Minister is very broad and may
cause strife to the second
respondent. It must be stressed that the
finalisation of the pending review applications may not be the end of
the matter. There
may still be appeals to those judgments in respect
of those applications. Thus, there is no likelihood that the pending
review
applications and subsequent appeals will all be finally
determined during 2024.
[52] Furthermore,
I am of the view that the relief that the applicant seeks directing
that the acting
judge president to case-manage all the review
applications mentioned above is unsustainable, particularly in the
applications where
judgment is pending. It must be stressed that from
the five cases, three have been allocated to judges, and two of them
have recently
been heard, and it is expected that judgment will be
delivered in due course. It is inconceivable how those matters where
judgment
is being considered and is imminent would be case managed by
the Acting Judge President. To this end, I agree with Mr Rosenberg
that the relief the Minister seeks is both impractical and
unsustainable.
[53] What
compounds the difficulty in the Minister's application is that the
pending review applications
are not before this court, and the
Minister has refrained from engaging on the prospects or probability
of success with respect
to each of the undetermined applications.
This court cannot be expected to grant an interdict that would have
serious consequences
to the second respondent when the merits of the
review applications that the Minister relies on to ground her
application are not
raised in this court. In other words, it is
unclear whether there are merits in those review applications to
warrant an interdict
in this case pending an outcome of those
applications. As astutely pointed out by Mr Rosenberg, it is
inconceivable that in these
circumstances, this court should be asked
to effectively prejudge some of those matters by interdicting the
Category B fishing
rights holders pending a determination of those
review applications whose merits in this application were not
canvassed or at least
highlighted.
[54] Significantly,
the Minister has acknowledged that the interdictory relief she seeks
will negatively
impact the category B horse mackerel industry. The
Minister has also affirmed that disallowing the respondents the right
to fish
even for a few months will cause hardship. The second
respondent has explained that the interdict that the Minister seeks
will
potentially have a significant negative impact on the industry
and will prevent vessels from operating for at least three months,
in
addition to ancillary impacts on service providers dependent on those
vessels operating.
[55] What
militates against the Minister's application is the score allocated
to the second respondent
after the Minister's final decision of 31
March 2022. In terms of that decision, the Minister asserted that
after receiving and
considering comments and representations from the
horse mackerel fishery, she published her final reasons for her
decision. In
terms of her decision, 12 Category B applicants were
considered successful. The second respondent was the second highest
entity
on the Minister's scorecard and received a weighted score of
85,38 and an allocation of 7,87 of the total allowable catch in
category
B of the horse mackerel fishery.
[56] From
the Minister's appeal decision, it is abundantly clear that even
after the finalisation of
the review applications, the second
respondent will still score high and will still fall within the 12
top scoring entities determined
by the Minister. It cannot be
suggested whatsoever that the second respondent would fail to meet
the requirements of the Minister
when the rescoring is reevaluated.
In my opinion, the proposed relief will unfairly harm the second
respondent, who has been correctly
scored and meets the Minister's
requirements satisfactorily.
[57] I
appreciate that the Minister seeks to restore stability in the sector
and ensure that all affected
Category B fishing entities are treated
the same. However, I am of the view that the relief is broad and
untenable. It is irrefutable
that the second respondent relied on the
fact that it is the owner of the fishing right allocated to it in
terms of the FRAP 205/2015.
Did the Minister
Satisfy the requirements of an interim interdict?
[58] The
requirements for an interim interdict are well established in our
law. The applicants must
show prima facie right, a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted, a
favourable balance of
convenience, and the absence of any other
satisfactory remedy. These requisites for an interdict should not be
considered separately
or in isolation, but in conjunction with one
another, to determine whether the court should exercise its
discretion in favour of
the grant of the interim relief. (See
Olympic
Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd Ramlagan
1957 (2) SA 382
(D) at
383E-F).
[59] Pursuant
to the view I take, I deem it unnecessary to deal with these
requirements
ad seriatim
in detail. However, I must stress
that the second respondent will suffer irreparable harm as opposed to
the Minister if the interim
interdict is granted. The impact on the
second respondent will be immediate in that the second respondent
will immediately halt
operations. Perhaps it is apposite to remind
ourselves that once a right is granted, the relevant right holder
structures its business,
and employees structure their lives around
having access to the work that comes along with holding such a right.
It cannot be disputed
that the second respondent has arranged its
affairs according to the rights allocated to it, and it has
consequently employed staff
to administer the fishing company.
[60] A
blanket moratorium on the fishing of horse mackerel will affect not
only the second respondent
but also its employees, its contracting
parties, and its customers in the various parts of the African
continent. The second respondent
stated that the horse mackerel
caught in terms of its total allowable catch allocation is exported
to countries in Africa where
customer relationships have been built
over many years. Should the interdict be granted, there will be an
interruption of the supply
of horse mackerel to these markets, and
customers in these countries may look for alternative suppliers of
horse mackerel. In the
circumstances, a court-sanctioned moratorium
on fishing in the sector is not in the interest of justice.
[61] In
addition, as the second respondent submitted, if the interim relief
is granted, the vessel
operators/owners will also suffer prejudice in
that their vessels will be laid up, and they will have to incur
significant costs
to keep the vessels along the quayside without
earning any income. Concerning the alternative remedy, I agree with
the second respondent's
Counsel that the Minister had other
alternative remedies available to her. For instance, the Minister
could have applied to set
aside the fishing rights allocated to the
second respondent or to the holders of rights in Category B of the
horse mackerel fishing
sector. In my view, the Minister has not
satisfied all the requirements for the grant of an interim interdict.
[62] I
am further of the view that the balance of convenience favours the
second respondent and militates
against the grant of the interdictory
relief. If the interim interdict is granted the second respondent
will have suffered a complete
loss of revenue for the period in which
the order is in place. As explained earlier, this will affect its
business, employees,
and trade customers. This hiatus is likely to
endure for a substantial period as the court process with respect to
the review applications
drags out. In my opinion, the grant of the
interdictory relief in these circumstances, will cause untold
hardship to the second
respondent.
[63] In
view of all these considerations, I am of the opinion that the
Minister’s application
for an interdict must fail. Furthermore,
nothing was presented to warrant a departure from the norm that costs
follow the event.
Order
[64] In
the result, the following order is granted:
64.1 The
applicants' application is hereby dismissed. The applicants are
ordered to pay the costs hereof,
including the costs of two Counsels
where so employed.
LEKHULENI JD
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearances
For the Applicant:
Mr Jacobs SC
Ms Matsala
Instructed by:
The State Attorney
22 Long Street
Cape Town
For the Respondent: Mr
Rosenberg SC
Mr G Solik
Instructed by:
Webber Wentzel
90
Rivonia Road
Sandton
Johannesburg
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