Case Law[2024] ZAWCHC 349South Africa
N.Z v Member of the Executive Council for Health Western Cape (8734/2017) [2024] ZAWCHC 349; [2025] 1 All SA 838 (WCC) (1 November 2024)
Headnotes
the view that it was substandard, in that on admission to the MOU the Plaintiff was in labour and there was a concern that the baby was big. This together with her age, obesity and post-dates should have prompted immediate referral to hospital for delivery.
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## N.Z v Member of the Executive Council for Health Western Cape (8734/2017) [2024] ZAWCHC 349; [2025] 1 All SA 838 (WCC) (1 November 2024)
N.Z v Member of the Executive Council for Health Western Cape (8734/2017) [2024] ZAWCHC 349; [2025] 1 All SA 838 (WCC) (1 November 2024)
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sino date 1 November 2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
REPORTABLE
CASE
NO: 8734/2017
In the matter between:
N[...]
Z[...]
Plaintiff
And
THE MEMBER OF THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR
HEALTH – WESTERN
CAPE
Defendant
Coram: Parker, AJ
Matter heard on: 23, 25,
29, 30 April and 24 July 2024
Judgment delivered
electronically on:
01 November 2024
JUDGMENT
PARKER, AJ:
Introduction
[1]
Plaintiff claims damages in her personal capacity and on behalf of
her minor son arising
out of the treatment administered to the
Plaintiff during her pregnancy and the birth of S[...] (“baby”)
at the Mitchells
Plain Midwife Obstetric Unit (“MOU”) on
19 December 2010.
[2]
Since merits and quantum have been separated I am to decide on
liability only.
[3]
The Plaintiff averred in her particulars of claim that the injury was
caused by the
substandard care and for the negligence of medical
staff at the MOU, who failed to implement the appropriate procedures
when it
was evident that she presented with shoulder dystocia.
Furthermore, that the administration of the appropriate procedures
would
have prevented the shoulder dystocia and the resultant brachial
plexus injury and Erb’s palsy to the baby.
Common cause
[4]
It is common cause the delivery was complicated by shoulder
dystocia
[1]
.
[5]
There was a time interval of eight minutes between the delivery of
the baby and the
baby’s head, and, as a result of the delivery
he suffered an injury to his brachial plexus in the form of Erb’s
palsy
and was also diagnosed with hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy.
[6]
The baby’s birth weight was recorded as 4530g. Therefore, the
baby is considered
as a large newborn and falls into the category of
macrosomia. After the baby was born he required resuscitation.
[7]
The baby was transferred to Mowbray Maternity Hospital for further
management and
upon arrival had seizures. Treatment administered
included head cooling and medication for seizures.
The issues
[8]
Whether the staff at the MOU were negligent in treating the Plaintiff
during the Plaintiff’s
management and delivery; and
[9]
Whether that negligence had caused the injury.
List of Witnesses
[10]
For plaintiff:
10.1.
Ms. L. Fletcher – nurse and midwife
10.2.
Dr. CP. Davis – obstetrician and
gynaecologist
10.3.
Dr. A. Keshave – paediatric
neurologist
10.4.
Dr. H. Lewis – paediatrician
10.5.
Professor S. Andronikou – professor
of radiology
[11]
For defendant:
11.1
Sister Faro – midwife
11.2
Dr. Wright – Specialist obstetrician
and gynaecologist
Plaintiff’s
evidence
[12]
She is a widow with three children. S[...] is her youngest child and
currently 13 years old.
She was 35 years old when she fell
pregnant with him. When she was six months pregnant, she made her
initial visit to the antenatal
facility on 13 October 2010. Her HIV
status was negative and her diabetes and blood pressure were assessed
as normal. However,
she was mildly anaemic. Ferrous sulphate and
folic acid were initiated at 36 weeks of gestation.
[13]
When she was about 41 weeks pregnant she attended the antenatal
clinic (10 December 2010). A
letter of referral was issued to her for
an appointment at Mowbray Maternity hospital on 20 December 2010, if
she had not delivered
before then.
[14]
On 19 December 2010 her waters broke at home, she experienced
contractions and was admitted to
the MOU, where she was placed on a
hospital bed with the back of the bed raised. She described in court
how she was positioned
with her upper torso at an angle, legs apart
with her knees bent. She recalls when the baby was on the way, the
staff changed her
position on the bed and her legs were brought
closer to her abdomen.
[15]
She remembered people in the room at the time, one of the staff
members stood at the end of the
bed to receive the baby. Another
stood behind her, massaging her back, whilst, another stood next to
her and placed both hands
just below her breastbone and pushed her
tummy down under her ribs.
[16]
Despite pushing to the best of her ability,
the baby did not emerge. One of the medical staff assisted her by
pressing on the top
part of her abdomen, while others were holding
her legs up. At the time, she was lying on her back on the hospital
bed. She was
unable to see what they were doing, however, recalls
that the baby was born not long after the episiotomy. She did not see
the
baby until she went to the ambulance. She testified that “
I
will never forget the day of the delivery of my baby because it was
the day that I gave birth and I remember very well that the
people
were there more than two of them
”.
Ms Fletcher –
nurse and midwife
[17]
Ms. Fletcher, testified that her expertise was primarily focused on
nursing education and medico
legal compliance. She also acknowledged
that she had never encountered a shoulder dystocia occurrence.
[18]
She testified on the Guidelines for Maternity Care in South Africa,
and her view is that the
Plaintiff ought to have been referred to a
hospital for assessment on the grounds that she was over the age of
34. According to
the records, her body mass index (BMI) - the
Plaintiff was obese which is associated with an increased risk of
delivery of a larger
than normal baby. The Plaintiff’s
hemoglobin level was low (9.7), and in terms of the Guidelines the
Plaintiff suffered from
mild anaemia, which should have been
investigated and treated. This was not done. She further described
that a post term pregnancy
is one that exceeds 41 weeks gestation.
According to her, a number of problems including birth asphyxia,
meconium aspiration, cephalo-pelvic
disproportion and post-maturity
syndrome are associated with a post term pregnancy.
[19]
She describes the nursing records at the MOU as woefully inadequate
and in some instances non-existent.
Antenatal records were
incomplete, omitting important information such as the Plaintiff’s
HIV status, steps to address anaemia
etc. Apart from the partogram,
there were no records that detailed the progression of Plaintiff’s
labour, particularly when
the second stage of labour began. She
described that the McRobert’s manoeuvre is a specific
intervention that is required
for shoulder dystocia, used in an
obstetric emergency. It was anticipated that nurses would generate a
comprehensive and exhaustive
report subsequent to the delivery. In
the available records, the only record of shoulder dystocia was found
in a very brief report
written after the delivery and before transfer
to the Mowbray Maternity Hospital. Ms. Fletcher asserts that she
would have anticipated
comprehensive notes of information such as
when the baby’s head was delivered, why there was a delay
between the delivery
of the head and the body and, in particular,
what manoeuvres were performed. This would have been a retrospective
report because
during the delivery it would not have been possible to
compile a contemporaneous report.
[20]
In her view, the nursing care was substandard in the antenatal period
due to the fact that the
Plaintiff was not referred for assessment by
a medical practitioner or to the hospital, despite being a
requirement in terms of
her age. The Plaintiff and the infant were at
risk of premature labour and postpartum haemorrhage due to the
apparent lack of attention
given to the anaemia the Plaintiff had
experienced.
[21]
At the last antenatal visit on 10 December 2010 the Plaintiff should
have been referred to a
hospital for assessment. When the appointment
was made for the Plaintiff to attend at the Mowbray Maternity
Hospital for induction
of labour on 20 December 2010, she was not
informed to go to the hospital when she went into labour.
[22]
In examining the nursing care during labour she held the view that it
was substandard, in that
on admission to the MOU the Plaintiff was in
labour and there was a concern that the baby was big. This
together with her
age, obesity and post-dates should have prompted
immediate referral to hospital for delivery.
[23]
The Plaintiff's evidence suggests that the nursing care during the
delivery was also substandard.
Although an attempt was made to
conduct a manoeuvre, the technique used was not the correct
application of the Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre. The Plaintiff was not
positioned correctly on the bed, as she was not placed at the side or
along the edge of the bed.
The suprapubic pressure was not
administered, and the fundal pressure was incorrectly employed.
[24]
If the Plaintiff has been referred to a hospital during pregnancy but
especially when she was
admitted to the MOU in labour, the
probability of medical assistance when the emergency occurred
(shoulder dystocia) would have
been high and the outcome would
probably have been different.
Defendant’s
Witness: Sister Faro – Midwife
[25]
Sister Faro is a speciality professional nurse. On 19 December 2010
she was on duty at the MOU.
According to her, three midwives and two
nurses would be on duty. She has encountered cases of shoulder
dystocia quite a few times
in her career and estimates that there
would be two to three cases per month at the MOU.
[26]
She has no independent recollection of this specific case, however
was able to identify her handwriting
in some of the notes. She read
some of the recorded notes which were available that the Plaintiff
gave birth to an “
alive male infant (very sick) by normal
vaginal delivery (NVD)”,
and “
Head out at 11h35
and shoulder dystocia, body following at 11h43, ONLY!!”
[27]
She explained the operations of the MOU, how it was run, and on
average the MOU saw about 320
deliveries per month. None of the staff
who were on duty on the date of the delivery of the baby were
traceable. She could therefore
only provide context on notes which
were made, since she was not the scribe, save where it was
recognisable as her own. Issues
of admissibility of her evidence was
raised by the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, she stated that the
standard practice would be
for a member of staff to record
information on a piece of paper, which would be used by the midwife
to write her summary later.
She testified that fundal pressure would
never have been used before the delivery of the baby.
The experts
Drs CP. Davis –
obstetrician and gynaecologist and D. Wright – Specialist
obstetrician and gynaecologist
[28]
There was little dispute between both Drs Davis and Wright. Both
described what the Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre is and when it is
employed in a delivery.
[29]
Their agreed findings are that the Plaintiff was obese, she was most
probably post term, there
was an entry on the partogram that this
might be a big baby and are all warning signs that this might be a
big baby. The attending
staff should always be alert to the
possibility of shoulder dystocia. The prediction of shoulder dystocia
is largely inaccurate.
All birth attendants should be familiar with
the techniques to facilitate delivery in cases of shoulder dystocia.
The Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre should be performed immediately when
shoulder impaction is encountered. Due to substandard record keeping
no evidence
could be found that any of the accepted manoeuvres were
performed to deliver the baby.
[30]
Dr Davis was of the opinion that the bruising and swelling of the
baby’s right arm, as
well as the fact that the delivery was a
standard vertex delivery, indicate that an alternative delivery
method was employed to
deliver the posterior arm and the McRobert’s
manoeuvre was not performed. Dr Wright was of the opinion that the Mc
Robert’s
manoeuvre was probably attempted but failed and
therefore some other manoeuvre, such as delivery of the posterior arm
was also
performed. This would account for the trauma to the baby.
Not all instances of brachial plexus injury are due to substandard
care.
Dr Davis was of the opinion that there is no evidence that the
Mc Robert’s manoeuvre was performed and therefore the delivery
was conducted in a substandard manner. Dr Wright was of the opinion
that in the absence of adequate documentation in this case,
it was
impossible to judge the standard of care administered to manage this
complication.
Dr Keshave –
paediatric neurologist
[31]
Defendant admitted his medico legal report. Dr. Keshave posits
that S[...]'s cognitive
function and language are further compromised
by the hypoxic injury she sustained at delivery, as evidenced by the
following: low
Apgar scores; delay from delivery of the head to the
body; the need for intubation and resuscitation after delivery;
oxygen saturation
noted to be 48% despite intubation at 5 minutes
after delivery; seizures documented at Day 1 of life; and the maximum
hypoxic-ischemic
encephalopathy (HIE) score of 15 (grade 3 HIE).
Dr. Humphrey Lewis –
paediatrician
[32]
Dr Humphrey Lewis, perused the relevant hospital records and
testified: that Neonatal encephalopathy
is a clinical syndrome that
presents with abnormal neurological function and is characterized by
difficulty in maintaining respiration,
decreased activity in level of
consciousness, reduced motor tone, persistence of primitive reflexes
and seizures in term and late
preterm newborns. Hypoxic ischemic
encephalopathy (HIE), which is defined as disturbed cerebral function
due to lack of oxygen
to the brain following antenatal/perinatal
adverse events, is the most common cause of neonatal
encephalopathy.
[2]
33.1
The seizures which were noted on admission
to the Mowbray Maternity Hospital were signs of abnormal neurological
status due to the
baby having been exposed to hypoxia at birth.
33.2
S[...] received hypothermia therapy at
Mowbray Maternity Hospital which is cooling of the whole body for a
period of time.
The effect of the hypothermia therapy did a lot
to improve this child’s outcome with a heart rate of 34 he may
have died.
33.3
Regardless of motor impairments in late
childhood and adolescence, children with a history of HIE are at risk
for cognitive and
executive function difficulties.
Dr. Lewis –
paediatrician
[34]
Dr Lewis concluded that there is no doubt that the baby had a
significant period of intrapartum
asphyxia as a result of obstructed
labour due to shoulder dystocia. The infant required
resuscitation as there was a severe
bradycardia (low heart rate) and
the Apgar scores were 1/10 at 1 and 5 minutes respectively.
Prof Andronikou –
professor of radiology
[35]
Professor Andronikou, gave evidence concerning a MRI brain scan
performed on the baby on 24
th
February 2017 at the age of 6 years and two months. He found no
abnormalities on the scan and there were no features of hypoxic
ischemic injury. More advanced radiological studies such as
diffusion tensor imaging could be performed. Professor Andronikou
referred to an academic article dealing with MRI imaging done on
South African children in the diagnosis of the causes of cerebral
palsy.
[3]
The authors
retrospectively reviewed brain MRI reports from 1600 medical legal
data bases, comprising cerebral palsy cases
referred for medical
legal evaluations long after an alleged perinatal hypoxic ischemic
event occurred. Of these cases, 8.2%
were categorized as normal
based on the MRI scan, although all the children suffered from
cerebral palsy.
Gestation
[36]
Dr Wright
testified that normal pregnancy
in humans are between 37 completed weeks and 42 completed weeks. Once
you get beyond 42 weeks the
morbidity and mortality of mother and
baby increases. Hence the selection of 42 weeks as being the cutoff
point where a normal
pregnancy should probably end. Dr Davis, on the
other hand, opined that a normal pregnancy are from 38 to 41 weeks
and agreed that
the gestation of a baby is an estimate.
Hospital Records
[37]
This brings me to the Hospital records. The purpose of hospital and
medical notes made for a
patient speaks for itself. It is to provide
reliable evidence of, and information about,
'who, what, when, and
why'
something happened. Accurate medical record keeping is vital
for doctors, medical staff, medical establishments and the health
sector, facilitating effective patient management and providing
evidence of proper care. The absence of such records or gaps in
the
record keeping can result in serious circumstances, especially where
events take a serious turn during a medical emergency.
“
It
is very important for the treating doctor to properly document the
management of a patient under his care. Medical record keeping
has
evolved into a science of itself. This will be the only way for the
doctor to prove that the treatment was carried out properly.”
[4]
[38]
The Defendant was unable to account for the absence of medical
records in this matter, particularly
during the critical eight-minute
period of delivery. Whilst I can understand that the health sector
operates under highly stressful
environments and that the MOU where
the delivery occurred is a busy unit, seeing at least 5-7 shoulder
dystocia cases per month,
the keeping of records therefor is
imperative to avoid attracting lawsuits such as this, where the
available records offer little
explanation of the events that
transpired at a critical time of the delivery.
[39]
It is also unclear how the baby sustained an injury to the right arm
in the absence of such recordings
to clarify the manoeuvres that were
executed and whether the McRobert’s manoeuvre was executed. The
right arm injury is an
objective indicator that the shoulder dystocia
was not appropriately managed, as indicated by Dr Davis.
The Plaintiff’s
submissions
[40]
It is argued that defendant’s staff were negligent in the
management of the Plaintiff’s
pregnancy and the delivery of the
baby in the following respects:
40.1
The failure to pay sufficient regard to the
Plaintiff’s obesity and excessive weight which pointed to
macrosomia which could
lead to birth complications;
40.2
The failure to take cognizance of the date
of the Plaintiff’s last menstrual period;
40.3
The failure to adequately examine the
Plaintiff and take note of indications of the possibility of
macrosomia during the antenatal
phase;
40.4
The failure to refer the Plaintiff for an
antenatal ultrasound to establish the gestational age and size;
40.5
The failure to complete the maternal
syphilis treatment antenatally;
40.6
The failure to identity that the pregnancy
was post-dates and thus timeously refer the Plaintiff to a secondary
hospital for induction
of labour;
40.7
The failure to ensure that suitably
qualified medical staff were present to identify any risk factors,
together with the possibility
of a macrocosmic infant;
40.8
The failure to intervene at an earlier
stage thereby allowing the second stage of labour to be unduly
prolonged by failing to apply
the McRobert’s Manoeuvre;
40.9
The failure to conclude that it would be
appropriate to transfer the Plaintiff to the Mowbray Maternity
Hospital for delivery;
40.10
The failure to properly examine the
Plaintiff in circumstances where it would have been established that
the foetus was suffering
from foetal distress;
40.11
The failure to properly evaluate and
examine the Plaintiff in circumstance where it would have been
established that S[...] was
a large baby and that a caesarean section
should be performed.
40.12
The failure to properly examine the
Plaintiff in circumstances where there was lack of progress of birth
and that a caesarean section
was necessary;
40.13
The failure to provide the Plaintiff with
the correct and necessary medical treatment and services;
40.14
The failure to perform the delivery of
S[...] with such skill as would reasonably be expected; and
40.15
The failure to exercise the proper degree
of skill, care, competence and diligence in treating the Plaintiff.
The Defendant’s
submissions
[41]
The Defendant argues that the views and opinions of Ms. Fletcher were
of lesser significance,
as they were unable to aid the court in
reaching a suitable decision. This is due to the fact that Ms.
Fletcher's career was characterised
by a lack of hands-on experience,
with the exception of a brief period. Consequently, she is less
qualified to provide commentary
than the Defendant's midwife, Ms.
Faro. The Defendant argued that Faro’s testimony provided the
court with insight and context
onto the practices in the unit at the
time where she was a senior nurse and Plaintiff’s objections to
her evidence regarding
notes which she, Faro, did not scribe even if
it amounted to opinion evidence, is still admissible.
[42]
None of the so-called risk factors alleged by the Plaintiff could be
attributed to the complication
that occurred and the manner in which
it occurred. The complication of shoulder dystocia and the injury
which resulted was not
foreseeable, as the Plaintiff was reasonably
regarded at the MOU as a low-risk patient. Both experts agreed that
the Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre was attempted. Dr. Wright further
said that the fact that it did not work does not imply that it was
incorrectly done.
[43]
The evidence shows and the Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Davis agreed
that up until the time that
the baby’s shoulder got stuck,
Plaintiff’s labour had progressed normally and there would have
been no reason to refer
the Plaintiff to hospital.
[44]
Despite being referred to MMH, the Plaintiff presented herself at the
MOU in active labour. She
was duly admitted and when the complication
occurred the staff’s training kicked in, and ultimately, they
saved S[...]’s
life. The Plaintiff’s expert obstetrician,
Dr. Davis, agreed that that in these circumstances they baby could
have died.
The legal principles
[45]
I am mindful that the evidence of the Plaintiff (as a single witness)
should be treated with
caution, as she is the only party before the
Court testifying on her pregnancy and delivery and as such her
evidence, is credible
to the extent that her uncorroborated evidence
must satisfy the court that on the probabilities it is the truth.
In this
regard, Plaintiff testified that she recalls the birth as if
it was yesterday, despite the fact that she claimed that her waters
had broken at home when she arrived at the MOU or that she was
perplexed about the dates of her most recent antenatal clinic visit.
Her testimony regarding the birth was unequivocal.
[46]
A medical practitioner is required to exercise the degree of skill
and care to be expected from
the skilled practitioner in his or her
field. A Supreme Court of Appeal authority established the test
when a reasonable
practitioner in such circumstances would have
foreseen the likelihood of harm, would have taken the necessary steps
to guard against
its occurrence and that the concerned practitioner
concerned failed to take such steps.
[5]
“
We
cannot determine in the abstract whether a surgeon has to has not
exhibited the reasonable skill and care. We must place ourselves
as
nearly as possible in the exact position in which the surgeon found
himself when he conducted the particular operation and we
must then
determine from all the circumstances whether he acted with reasonable
care or negligently. Did he act as an average surgeon
placed in
circumstances would have acted, or did he manifestly fall short of
the skill, care and judgment of the average surgeon
in similar
circumstances? If he falls short he is negligent”
[6]
[47]
Flowing from this, the Plaintiff must establish that the wrongful and
negligent conduct of the
nursing staff acting within the course and
scope of their employment, caused the harm.
[7]
In this regard the Constitutional Court following the approach to
matters of this nature in Kruger v Scouts, in Upper v Department
of
Health Western Cape
[8]
sets out:
“
[106]
In our law Kruger embodies the classic test. There are two steps. The
first is foreseeably – would a reasonable
person in the
position of the Defendant foresee the reasonable possibility of
injuring another and causing loss” The second
is preventability
– would that person take reasonable steps to guard against the
injury happening?
[107] The
key point is that negligence must be evaluated in light of all the
circumstances. And, because the test is
defendant specific (in the
position of the defendant), the standard is upgraded for medical
professionals. The question for them
is whether a reasonable medical
professional would have foreseen the damage and taken steps to avoid
it. In Mitchell v Dixon the
then appellate division noted that this
standard does not expect the impossible of medical personnel:
- a medical
practitioner is not expected to bring to bear upon a case entrusted
to him the highest possible degree of professional
skill, but he is
bound to employ reasonable skill and care; and he is liable for the
consequences is he does not.
[108] This
means that we must ask, what would exceptionally competent and
exceptionally knowledgeable doctors have done?
We must ask: what can
be expected of the ordinary or average doctor in view of the general
level of knowledge, ability, experience,
skill and diligent possessed
and exercised by the profession, bearing in mind that the doctor is a
human and not a machine and
that no human being is infallible.
Practically, we must ask, was the medical professional’s
approach consistent with a reasonable
and responsible body of medical
opinion? The test always depends on the facts. With a medical
specialist, the standard is that
of a reasonable specialist.”
[48]
Accordingly, to determine whether the Defendant’s staff were
negligent following the approach
as in
Vermeulen
[9]
,
the court will be guided by the determination with regard to the view
of the experts. A court decides whether the “
failure
to act in accordance with a practice accepted as proper in the
relevant field is necessary
”
A court weighing up the views of the parties’ experts has to be
satisfied that” their opinions have a logical
basis” and
whether in their views the experts had directed their minds to the
question of comparative risks and benefits
and reached a defensible
conclusion on the matter.
Onus
of Proof
[49]
It is trite, the general
onus
of proof lies with the Plaintiff. “
He
who asserts must prove
”
[10]
.In
so far as medical negligence is concerned in
Meyers
v MEC, Department of Health, Eastern Cape
[11]
found that once a plaintiff had given explanation for a claim, it was
sufficient to place an evidential burden upon the Defendant
to shed
some light upon the circumstances attending to the Plaintiff. Failure
to do so meant that, on the evidence as it then stood,
the defendant
ran the risk of a finding of negligence against it. Whilst a
plaintiff bore the overall
onus
in a case, the defendant nonetheless had a duty to adduce evidence to
counter the
prima
facie
case made by the plaintiff. It remained for the defendant to advance
an explanatory (albeit not necessarily exculpatory) account
that the
injury must have been due to some unpreventable cause, even if the
exact cause be unknown.
[12]
[50]
The evidential burden stated in
NVM
obo VKM v Tembisa Hospital
[13]
:
[86]
A Plaintiff is not required to show a causal connection between the
conduct or permission and
the eventual harm with certainty. All
that is required is “to establish that the wrongful conduct was
probably a cause
of the loss, which calls for a sensible
retrospective analysis of what would probably have occurred, based
upon the evidence and
what can be expected to occur in the ordinary
course of human affairs rather than an exercise in metaphysics. And
cerebral palsy
cases whether the brain damage is caused by HIE, like
the present one, fall into a particularly challenging field of
medicine,
“where medical certainty is virtually impossible”.
It is a form of harm that calls for a more flexible understanding
of
factual causation.
[87]
In this matter, the applicant adduced sufficient evidence to prove
factual causation, in the
context of a harm which is replete with
uncertainties. Absent any countervailing evidence from the
respondents, the unchallenged
evidence of the applicant’s
medical experts, particularly that of Prof. Kirsten and Dr Pistorius,
together with the admitted
facts and the joint minutes of the
obstetricians, prove the applicant’s claim for damages.
The negligent failure by
the hospital staff to conduct adequate
monitoring of the foetal heart rate during the critical period,
denied them the opportunity
to detect the warning signs of the onset
of hypoxia. That, in turn, resulting in the failure to take
emergency measures to
afford V more time until a caesarean section
could be arranged. On the probabilities, the brain injury would
not have occurred
had all of this been done, or the risk of this
brain injury, would have significantly reduced. In the
premises, had I commanded
the majority, I would have upheld appeal
with costs.”
What is the role of
expert witnesses and how their evidence is to be approached?
[51]
The Court in
JA
obo DA v MEC for Health
with reference to the
Linksfield
matter,
[14]
expressed the following view in relation to expert opinion:
“
[12]
… The cogency of an expert opinion depends on its consistency
with proven facts and on the reasoning by which the conclusion
is
reached. The source for the evaluation of this evidence for
it’s cogency and reliability are (i) the reasons that
have been
provided by the experts for the position adopted by him/her; (ii)
whether that reasoning has a logical basis when measured
against the
established facts; and (iii) the probabilities raised and the facts
of the matter. It means that the opinion
must be logical in its
own context, that is, it must accord with, and be consistent with,
all the established facts, and must not
postulate facts which have
not been proved.
[13]
The inferences drawn from the facts must be sound. The internal logic
of the opinion must be
consistent, and the reasoning adopted in
arriving at the conclusion in question must accord with what the
accepted standard methodology
are in the relevant discipline.
The
reasoning will be illogical or irrational and consequently unreliable
if (i) it is based on a misinterpretation of the facts;
(ii) it is
speculative, or internally contradictory or inconsistent as to be
unreliable; (iii) if the opinion is based on a standard
of conduct
that is higher or lower than what has been found to be an acceptable
standard; and (iv) if the methodology employed
by the expert witness
is flawed. What flows from this is that the mere fact that an
expert opinion is unchallenged does not
necessarily mean that it must
be accepted. However, if that evidence is based on sound
grounds and is supported by the facts,
there exists no reason not to
accept it.”
[15]
Comparable Case Law
[52]
In the matter of
N.P.
v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
[16]
the delivery of the Plaintiff’s baby had been complicated by
shoulder dystocia, as a result of which the baby’s arm
was
injured. According to the evidence during the delivery fundal
pressure had been applied, the McRobert’s manoeuvre
had not
been performed and suprapubic pressure had not been applied.
The Court held as follows on the issue of negligence:
[17]
“
in
the determination whether the doctor and midwife did not act with
reasonable care and without negligence to minimalize or failing
to
prevent the effects of shoulder dystocia, enumerated the risk
indicators
:
1.
The failure to detect all the risk
indicators and to assess their cumulative effect in diagnosing the
likelihood of shoulder dystocia;
2.
The failure to, accordingly, prepare
and put in place a management regimen or plan for dealing with the
potential of shoulder dystocia;
3.
The failure to take into account the
obvious and important information imparted to them by the Plaintiff
to the effect that a medical
doctor had ascertained that the foetus
was a large one and the failure to palpitate the Plaintiff to confirm
this;
4.
The failure to arrange for an
attendant or nurse to take exact notes of what was going on as
matters unfolded;
5.
The failure to have sufficient
assistants on standby;
6.
The failure to place the Plaintiff
at the edge or end of the delivery bed so as to assist with the
delivery;
7.
The failure to place the Plaintiff
in the McRobert’s position with the help of assistants, more
especially as there were apparently
at least two other nurses or
assistants available in the labour ward who did not assist or who
were not called upon to assist;
8.
The failure to cut a wide
episiotomy;
9.
The failure to apply suprapubic
pressure to force the anterior shoulder under the symphysis pubis;
10.
The application of fundal pressure;”
11.
[53]
In
ZL
obo AL v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
[18]
the Court dealt with a similar claim relating to a birth injury
complicated by shoulder dystocia. The Court referred to the
joint minutes of the expert witnesses, obstetricians and
gynecologists, who agreed that.
[19]
"(a)
the plaintiff presented with risk factors for shoulder dystocia,
which included macrosomia
and prolonged second stage of labour;
(b)
when managing the shoulder dystocia, the doctor positioned the
plaintiff's leg incorrectly.
This significantly hindered his ability
to overcome the shoulder dystocia;
(c)
this situation was further aggravated by the use of fundal pressure.
If suprapubic pressure had
been applied instead of fundal pressure,
the shoulders would probably have been delivered normally and the
injury would probably
not have occurred;
(d)
the failure to place plaintiff in the McRobert's position and the use
of fundal pressure rather
than suprapubic pressure probably resulted
in the use of greater traction to deliver the baby, thus causing
brachial plexus injury
in the new-born and significant loss of
function to the right arm and;
(e)
if these manoeuvres were carried out correctly the injury would have
been averted and A[....]
would have had normal function of his right
arm."
Conclusion
[54]
Time is of the essence in cases of shoulder dystocia. According to Dr
Wright if the body of the
baby is not delivered within 5 minutes or
sooner after the head, the baby will suffer from hypoxia.
[55]
The plaintiff was required to prove, on a balance of probabilities
that the Defendant’s
employees failed to exercise reasonable
skill and care, in other words, that their conduct fell below the
standard of a reasonably
competent practitioner in their field and
that the aforesaid negligence caused injury. A medical practitioner
is bound to employ
reasonable skill and care, and is liable for the
consequences if he or she does not.
[20]
I am mindful that we are dealing with the conduct of a reasonable
nurse and midwife who attended the delivery.
[56]
In my view I have to agree with Plaintiff that it is manifest that
the evidence presented by
the Plaintiff established on a balance of
probabilities that:
56.1
The hospital staff were negligent in
failing to assess whether the plaintiff, a multigravida, had risk
factors for shoulder dystocia.
Had that been done timeously, a
caesarean section could have been performed, which would have
prevented the injuries from occurring.
56.2
Once the plaintiff had presented with
shoulder dystocia, the hospital staff ought to have applied the
procedures prescribed in the
protocol. Failure to apply those
procedures, and in particular the application of fundal pressure as
opposed to suprapubic
pressure, has served to worsen the situation
and had probably caused the injury.
[57]
Based on the joint findings of the obstetricians, Ms. Fletcher,
coupled with Defendant’s
failure to generate a comprehensive
and detailed report following the delivery, particularly in terms of
the manoeuvres that were
implemented, is a matter of concern. The
Defendant could not procure any witnesses regarding the events that
transpired during
the critical eight minutes, with the exception of
the Plaintiff's Midwife Faro who had, had no recall of the birth.
This leaves
the only version before the court is that of Plaintiff
herself.
[58]
Both gyneacologists confirmed that the injury resulted from the
shoulder dystocia. The reasonable
inference guided by the opinions of
the experts and plaintiff’s own testimony that can be drawn is
that the injury was caused
by the failure of the hospital staff to
apply the correct procedure or an attempted Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre. Unfortunately
this could not be backed up by hospital
records. Furthermore, I am of the view that drawing from the above,
the application of
fundal pressure as expressed by the plaintiff when
she described the delivery that Fundal pressure was applied which
according
to Dr wright was a common practice “…
say
40, 50 years ago. But it has been severely criticised for its
negative effects. And that I think that again today certainly
I know
from my experience when I was at Mowbray Maternity Hospital it was
taboo, you did not see fundal pressure”
[59]
Accordingly based on the evidence before me, the Defendant’s
nursing staff were causally
negligent in the following respects:
59.1
In failing to refer the Plaintiff to a
hospital for the management of her pregnancy and the delivery of
S[...];
59.2
In failing to perform the Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre at all, alternatively in failing to perform the Mc Robert’s
manoeuvre
correctly;
59.3
In applying fundal pressure;
59.4
In failing to apply suprapubic pressure;
and
59.5
Failing to keep detailed hospital notes.
Costs
[60]
I see no reason to depart from the usual costs order that costs
follow the result, and I have
a discretion whether to allow the fees
of two counsel.
[21]
In
deciding whether or not the fees of a second advocate should be
allowed, the court has regard to whether it was a wise and reasonable
precaution to employ such advocate. The court will also have
regard to the complexity of the matter, the importance of this
case
for the Plaintiff, the nature of the issues in dispute between the
parties, the length of the hearing and the arguments, the
importance
of questions of principle or of law involved and the number of legal
authorities quoted.
[22]
[61]
I see no reason to prejudice the plaintiff’s counsel’
employed and find that a basis
that Senior Counsel’s fees
should be allowed on scale C, and Junior Counsel’s fees on
scale B.
Order
[62]
In the circumstances, the following order is made.
62.1
The Defendant is liable for such damages as the Plaintiff may prove
to have arisen as a result of the injuries
sustained by S[...] during
his birth on 19 December 2010 at the Mitchells Plain Maternity and
Obstetric Unit.
62.2
The Defendant is liable for the Plaintiff’s costs of suit on a
party and party scale, including, but
not limited to:
62.2.1
Senior Counsel’s fees at scale C;
62.2.2
Junior Counsel’s fees at scale B;
62.3
The consultation, preparation of
medico-legal reports, appearances, engagement in preparation of joint
minutes and the reasonable
and necessary qualifying expenses
(including travel and accommodation and drafting the expert reports)
of the following expert
witnesses:
62.3.1
Dr. CP Davis, obstetrician and
gynaecologist;
62.3.2
Dr. H. Lewis, paediatrician;
62.3.3
Professor S. Andronikou, professor of
radiology;
62.3.4
Dr. A. Keshave, paediatric neurologist;
62.3.5
Ms. L. Fletcher, nurse and midwife.
R K PARKER
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Counsel
for Plaintiff
:
Adv. P Corbett SC and Adv. E Benade
Instructing
Attorney
: Rob Menzies Attorneys
– Ms Ingrid Essl
Counsel
for Defendant
:
Adv. E Fitz-Patrick
Instructing
Attorney
: State Attorney – Ms
Natalie Hendricks
[1]
meaning
that one or both his shoulders got stuck inside the pelvis of the
mother at birth.
[2]
Transcript:
p17(5-18); Cognitive Outcomes in Late Childhood and Adolescence of
Neonatal Hypoxic-ischemic Encephalopathy, Bundle
B p107.
[3]
Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Diagnosis of Causes of Cerebral Palsy in a
developing country: a database of South African children.
SAMJ
September 2021, Vol III no 9 M.M. Elsingergy et al.
[4]
Source
Medical records and issues in negligence - PMC Indian J Urol. 2009
Jul-Sep; 25(3): 384–388. doi: 10.4103/0970-1591.56208
PMCID: PMC2779965PMID:
19881136
Medical records and
issues in negligence
Joseph Thomas
[5]
Mukheiber
v Raath
1999 (3) SA 1065
(SCA) at 1077.
[6]
Van
Wyk v Lewis
1924 AD 438
at p 461-462
[7]
Mtetwa
v Minister of Health
1989 (3) SA 600
(D&CLD) at 606B-F
[8]
Kruger
v Scouts, in Upper v Department of Health Western Cape
[9]
Medi-Clinic
LTD v Vermeulen
2015
(1) SA 241
(SCA) at 250B-D
[10]
Van
Wyk v Lewis
(
Supra
)
at 444
[11]
2020(3)
SA 337 (SCA)
[12]
At
356A-C
[13]
[2022]
ZACC11
[14]
JA
obo DA v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
2022 (3) SA 475 (ECB)
[15]
JA
obo DA v MEC for Health (supra)
at 482A – 482E
[16]
(1196/2012)
[2014] ZAECMHC 28 (24 July 2014)
[17]
At
paragraph [40]
[18]
(378/2019)
[2022] ZAECBHC 43 (6 December 2022)
[19]
At
paragraph [17]
[20]
Goliath
v Members of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape 2015 (2)
SA 97 (SCA)
[21]
AD
v MEC for Health & Social Development, Western Cape
2017 (5) SA 134
(WCC) at 139J – 140A.
[22]
City
of Johannesburg v Chairman, Valuation Appeal Board
2014 (4) SA 10
(SCA) at [34];
Henry
v AA Mutual Insurance Association Limited
1979 (1) SA 105
(C) at 107A;
Barlow
v Motors Investments Limited v Smart
1993
(1) SA 347
(W) at 352G.
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