Case Law[2022] ZAWCHC 276South Africa
Zato v Madikande and Others (349/21) [2022] ZAWCHC 276 (9 February 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
9 February 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Zato v Madikande and Others (349/21) [2022] ZAWCHC 276 (9 February 2022)
Zato v Madikande and Others (349/21) [2022] ZAWCHC 276 (9 February 2022)
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sino date 9 February 2022
OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE NO:349/21
LP
ZATU
Applicant
V
NC
MADIKANE
1
st
Respondent
ABSA
BANK LIMITED
2
nd
Respondent
REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS, CAPE TOWN
3
rd
Respondent
NATIONAL
PRIDE PROPERTIES
4
th
Respondent
THABO
QOKO N.O.
5
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON
THIS 9
th
DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022
FORTUIN, J:
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application by Ms L[…] P Zatu (“Zatu”)
to set aside the transfer
of immovable property, described as Erf
2[…], Khayelitsha, situate in the City of Cape Town (”the
property”)
effected pursuant to a written sale agreement (“the
agreement”) by:
1.1
cancelling the title deed number T15[…];
1.2
cancelling the mortgage bond with
registration number B77[…]; and
1.3
registering a title deed in respect of the property in the name of
the applicant.
[2]
The relief sought is opposed by the first respondent, Nosipho
Caroline Madikane (“Madikane”)
on the basis that she
concluded an agreement during June 2017 with Zatu to purchase the
property for an amount of R280 000.00.
[3]
It is the first respondent’s case that the intention of the
parties, i.e. to transfer the
property on payment of R280 000.00, was
achieved when the property was registered in her name on 18 April
2018.
[4]
It is further the first respondent’s case that, should the
court find in favour of the applicant,
she will proceed with her
counter application seeking an order that Zatu repays the purchase
price plus interest.
B.
COMMON CAUSE BACKGROUND FACTS
[5]
Zatu is the surviving spouse of the late N[…] R[…] P[…]
(“the deceased”)
to whom she was married in community of
property on 7 November 1992. Zatu was appointed as executor of the
deceased estate on 20
March 2017.
[6]
On 10 October 2016, after receiving a call from Thabo Qoko (“Qoko”),
the fifth respondent,
an estate agent employed by National Pride
Properties (the fourth respondent), Zatu met with him and gave him a
mandate to market
the property and find a buyer and that he will be
paid commission of R20 000.00. In July 2017, Qoko found
Madikane as a buyer
in line with the terms of the mandate he
concluded with Zatu. The Offer to Purchase was signed by Madikane
together with someone
who signed as “Zatu”.
[7]
On 8 August 2017, Zatu attended at the offices of Velile Tinto Cape
Inc (“VTC”) where
she met with one Jody-Lee Harrington
(“Jody”). It is common cause that Jody explained the
terms of the transaction
to Zatu during this consultation. She
accordingly signed the required documents to pass transfer.
[8]
During August 2017, Zatu corresponded with VTC regarding documents
required to cancel the existing
bond registered over the property. In
compliance, Zatu forwarded a copy of her marriage certificate to VTC
on 18 August 2017.
Application in terms of s45(1) of the Deeds
Registry’s Act 47of 1937 was in fact made whereby Zatu, as
executer of the4 estate
of the deceased was granted permission with
deal with the property as she pleased.
[9]
Hereafter, Zatu changed her mind and decided to cancel the
transaction. She conveyed this decision
to Madikane telephonically,
but she did not accept the cancellation.
[10]
During January 2018, VTC requested Zatu to make payment of the
municipal rates and taxes. Even though Zatu
did not reply hereto,
Qoko replied on her behalf indicating that Zatu was not in a
financial position to settle the rates and taxes.
[11] On
4 March 2018, WWT Electrical attended to the property and an
electrical certificate was obtained.
[12] On
11 April 2018, Qoko informed the attorneys for Madikane, Van der Berg
Attorneys, that Zatu would be giving
vacant occupation of the
property on 14 April 2018.
[13] It
is common cause that registration of the property occurred on 18
April 2018. Since this date, the full
payment of the purchase price
was made to the conveyancing attorneys, and Madikane continues to pay
the monthly bond instalments
to the bank. Zatu and her children,
however, remains in possession of the property. During July 2020,
Madikane, as the registered
owner of the property, instituted
eviction proceedings against the occupants of the property (Zatu and
her children).
C.
APPLICANT’S VERSION
[14]
Zatu’s version is that, while in the Eastern Cape, she received
a phone call from Qoko informing her
that he obtained her contact
details from the occupants of her property in Khayelitsha. They
agreed to meet on 10 October 2016.
During this meeting she asked Qoko
to sell the property for the agreed price of R280 000.00, and that
his commission of R20 000.00
was to be paid from the proceeds of the
transaction. During October 2016, Qoko advised her that, because the
property was registered
only in the name of her late husband, she was
obliged to first report his estate to the Master.
[15] It
is her case that Qoko failed to attend a meeting with her to conclude
the agreement for the sale of the
property. Instead, he called her to
advise that she needed to attend at the offices of VTC to conclude
the transaction.
[16] At
this meeting with Jody on 8 August 2017, a number of documents were
presented to her. An offer to purchase
was however not amongst these
documents. After some delay in effecting transfer, due to problems
relating to the cancellation of
the bond, she advised VTC that she
was no longer interested in transferring the property. She did not
receive a response from VTC
regarding her instruction to cancel the
sale of her property. She did however receive eviction papers from
Madikane during July
2020. This was also the first time that she
discovered that the transfer did, in fact, proceed, against her
wishes.
[17]
Because she never received any communication from VTC after she
cancelled the sale, she instructed her attorneys
to investigate the
transfer. According to her, her attorneys established that:
17.1
fraud was committed because the seller’s signature on the Offer
to Purchase was forged; and
17.2
fraud was committed in that the signature on the application for
bridging finance was forged, as she never
signed these documents.
[18] In
her opinion, the sale agreement did not comply with the provisions of
section 2(1) of the Act. In addition,
no witnesses attested to the
Offer to Purchase. It is therefore her case that Madikane’s
Offer to Purchase was not
properly accepted by her. Moreover,
that the transfer was tainted by fraud.
[19] It
is further Zatu’s case that, in light of the above
circumstances, it is evident that she never intended
to transfer the
property.
D.
FIRST RESPONDENT’S VERSION
[20]
It is Madikane’s version that she became aware that Zatu
intended to sell her house when the property
was advertised in a
local newspaper on more than one occasion during 2016 and 2017.
It was during mid-2017, when she once
again saw the advert that she
decided to make an Offer to Purchase the property.
[21]
She signed an Offer to Purchase on 11 July 2017 for R280 000.00.
She left the signed offer with Qoko,
and he later advised that her
offer had been accepted. She was subsequently advised that VTC
was appointed as conveyancing
attorneys. Both Madikane and Zatu
was required to sign the transfer documents. Zatu signed on 8
August 2017.
[22] It
is her version that she did receive a telephone call from Zatu,
informing her that Zatu wanted to cancel
the sale. However, she did
not accept the unilateral cancellation of this agreement. The court
is asked to consider the following
events, which occurred after
August 2017 in support of Madikane’s contention that Zatu did
not convey her intention to cancel
her transaction to “all
concerned”.
22.1 On
5 September 2017, Zatu was telephonically informed by Erasmus of Van
Berge Attorneys of the progress of
the transfer process.
22.2 On
1 November 2017, VTC enquired from Zatu whether she had any
additional information regarding the bond
registered over the
property. She was informed that they were still not in possession of
the correct details in order to prepare
the required documentation to
cancel the existing bond.
22.3 On
18 January 2018, VTC sent an e-mail to Zatu, requesting her to pay
the municipal rates and taxes. Instead
of indicating to them that she
has cancelled the transaction, Qoko advised Van Berge Attorneys, on
behalf of Zatu, that she was
not in a financial position to settle
the rates and taxes.
22.4 On
4 March 2018, WWT Electrical attended to the property to inspect and
repair the electrical faults with
the aim of issuing the requisite
compliance certificate. The electricians obtained permission to enter
the property from Zatu’s
children, who was occupying the
property at the time.
22.5 On
11 April 2018, Qoko informed Van Berge Attorneys that Zatu would be
giving vacant occupation of the property
on 14 April 2018.
[23] It
is further Madikane’s case that that Zatu did not communicate
her intention to cancel. Moreover,
her alleged intention to cancel
was never delivered in writing, nor was it accepted by Madikane.
E.
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[24]
The
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981
prescribes the
formalities to be complied with.
Sec 2(1)
in particular determines
that:
“
2 (1) No
alienation of land after the commencement of this section shall,
subject to the provisions of
s28
, be of any force or effect unless it
is contained in a deed of alienation signed by the parties thereto or
by their agents acting
on their written authority.
[25]
Section 28(2)
of the Act provides as follows:
“
(2)
Any alienation which does not comply with the provisions of
section 2
(1) shall in all respects be valid ab initio if the alienee had
performed in full in terms of the deed of alienation or contract
and
the land in question has been transferred to the alienee.
”
[26]
These sections were at the centre of numerous decisions in our
courts. It is trite that there are two requirements
to be met before
ownership can pass. Firstly, delivery, which in the case of
immoveable property is effected by registration of
the transfer in
the Deeds Office, and, secondly, a real agreement between the
parties. In this regard see
Du
Plessis v Prophitius and Another
[1]
.
[27]
The question to be asked here is which of the documents make up the
real agreement? Is the Deed of Sale merely
the underlying agreement
reflecting the meeting of the minds of the parties and is not the
real agreement, or are the transfer
documents, excluding the Deed of
Sale, the real agreement.
[28]
In the very old decision of
Wilken
v Kohler
[2]
,
it was held that where an agreement is of no force and effect for
want of compliance with a peremptory statutory provision, but
the
parties nevertheless carried out the terms of the agreement, the
agreement cannot be undone on the mere ground that it was
invalid or
unenforceable in law. This position was confirmed in the later
decision in
Legator
McKenna Inc v Shea
[3]
.
[29]
This position was also codified in
Section 28(2)
of the
Alienation of
Land Act of 1981
[4]
.
F.
DISCUSSION
[30]
I was asked by the applicant to apply the principles laid down in
Burger
v Edenglo
[5]
and
by doing so accept that we are dealing with a transaction that is
“
entirely
tainted and void
ab
initio”. In my view, this matter is distinguishable from
the said matter, as the
Burgers
in
the 2018 matter never intended to sell their property permanently.
The court found that the real agreement was accordingly defective.
[31] In
contrast, Zatu intended to transfer the ownership of the property
permanently. This is evident from
her instructions to Qoko to
sell, the numerous advertisements to sell the property and her
signing of all the necessary documents
in order to register the
transfer.
[32]
In
Fraser
v Viljoen
[6]
the registration of transfer of ownership of the property had not yet
occurred. In my view, therefore, that matter is also not
comparable
with the facts in
casu
where witness signatures were not present on the Deed of Sale. It is
common cause that we are currently dealing with a matter where
registration of transfer did already occur. The same applies to the
matter of
Rockbreakers
and Parts (Pty) Ltd v Rolag Property Trading (Pty) Ltd
[7]
.
As in the
Fraser
matter,
registration of transfer had not taken place. In
casu,
there is no counter-offer as in the Rockbreakers matter. Accordingly,
in my view, the validity of the real-agreement was never
at issue
here.
[33]
The applicant attempted to file an amended notice of motion without a
notice in terms of
Rule 28
delivered to Madikane. This application is
not properly before the court, and I will therefore not consider the
relief sought therein.
I am, accordingly, only considering the main
application.
[34] In
my view, Zatu intended to sell the property to a willing seller for
R280 000.00. Madikane, on her end
intended to acquire that same
property for the same amount. The transfer of ownership of the
property was registered, and Madikane
paid the purchase price to the
conveyancing attorneys she obtained by applying for a bond. She is
required to settle the monthly
bond instalments notwithstanding that
she has still not been placed in occupation of the property.
[35] It
is clear that
the lawful purpose of the
transaction was achieved, as there was compliance with the
requirements to transfer ownership, at which
stage the validity of
the deed of sale became irrelevant. In any event, this deed of sale
is not part of the real agreement between
the parties. The contents,
however, reflects exactly what the intention of the parties were as
is evident from the content of the
transfer documents.
[36]
The applicant seeks final relief on motion. This brings the
principles laid down in
Plascon
– Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[8]
into play. It is trite that where there is a dispute of fact in
motion proceedings, a final order may be granted if those facts
averred in the applicant’s affidavit, which have been admitted
by the respondent, together with the facts alleged by the
respondent,
justify such an order. The evidence of the respondent will prevail,
unless the respondent’s version “
is
palpably implausible, far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the
court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers
.”
[9]
See
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[10]
.
[37]
The disputed issues in
casu
are not material. The fact that
Madikane did not accept the telephonic cancellation of the agreement
is common cause. The fact
that the transfer documents were signed by
both parties, and that these documents reflect the common intention
or the meeting of
the minds of both parties, is common cause. The
fact that the property was in fact registered in the name of Madikane
is common
cause. The fact that Qoko allegedly signed the deed of sale
fraudulently is a fact that does, however, not affect the validity of
the sale.
[38] In
my view, there is no dispute of fact on the papers in respect of the
material issues and even if there
was, Madikane’s version is
not “
palpably implausible, far-fetched or so clearly
untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the
papers”.
[39]
The presence of fraud in the sale transaction ousts the provisions of
s28(2)
which was designed to rectify transactions which does not
comply with the provisions of
s2(1).
It is trite that a fraudulent
contract cannot be rectified and, as a result, the transaction would
be void
ab initio
. This is not the case in
casu.
[40] My
findings that the alleged fraud by Qoko did not affect the validity
of the real agreements between the
parties, is in no way an
indication that this court condones fraud. The enthusiasm with which
he had the Deed of Sale finalized,
even by alleged fraudulent means,
is regrettable. This court finds this behaviour unacceptable and Zatu
is advised to take the
necessary steps by lodging a complaint with
the Estate Agent’s Board. A copy of this judgment will also be
forwarded to this
Board.
[41]
In
Absa
Bank Ltd v Moore
[11]
,
the following was said in relation to the effect of fraud, and in
particular the maxim:
“
fraud
unravel all”.
“ …
The
maxim is not a flame-thrower, withering all within reach. Fraud
unravels all directly within its compass, but only between
victim and
perpetrator, at the instance of the victim.”
[42] As
stated above, the alleged fraud committed by Qoko does not affect the
sale, but only affects the agreement
between the victim (Zatu) and
the perpetrator (Qoko).
[43] I
am in agreement with Madikane’s submission that
section 2(1)
of
the Act does not require witnesses to sign an agreement. The absence
of witness signatures did also therefore not affect the
validity of
the agreement.
[44]
I disagree with the applicant that this deed of sale should be set
aside on the basis that it is against
public policy. I am in
agreement with Ndita J’s sentiments in
Burger
and Another v Edenglo Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others
[12]
on the fact that “…
courts
are empowered to declare contracts, or contractual terms, entered
into freely and voluntarily, unenforceable if they are
found to be
against public policy. …”
In
casu
,
the intention of the parties is clear. There is no allegation that
any of the parties did not get what they wanted from the transaction,
e.g. the purchase price in the deed of sale is the same as in the
transfer documents, and the parties are the same in the transfer
documents as they are reflected in the deed of sale. I cannot find
any sign of the agreement being
contra
bones mores
.
[45]
It is common cause that Madikane was never in possession of
the property. It is for this reason that she instituted eviction
proceedings
against the occupants of the property. Any claim by the
applicant based on the
re vindicatio
is therefore without any
merit.
[46]
Zatu’s reasons for cancelling the sale was, firstly, because
the cancellation of the existing bond
became difficult. In her
replying affidavit, however, this reason changed to the fact that her
children needed the property as
a place to stay while they were
studying and working in Cape Town. Ignoring, for now, the fact that
her version changed between
her founding affidavit and her replying
affidavit, not one of these grounds is sufficient for a valid
cancellation of the agreement.
The law, as it stands currently, is
that when the ownership of transfer is registered, the transaction
cannot be reversed unless
certain limited circumstances are present.
In
casu
, I cannot find any of these circumstances present. In
this regard, refer to
s28(2)
of the Act, which states that such an
agreement is “valid
ad initio
”.
G.
CONCLUSION
[47]
Whatever the reason why Zatu does no longer want to sell her house to
Madikane, the fact of the matter is
that our law provides her with
the opportunity to retract from the agreement if it was never her
intention to enter into that specific
agreement and, in particular,
before the registration of transfer was completed. None of these
factors is present here.
[48]
The only fraud alleged in her papers is the signature of her agent,
Qoko. In my view, this does not vitiate
the real agreement. No fraud
by Madikane is alleged. In terms of
s28(2)
of the Act, the real
agreement accordingly remains valid and of legal effect.
H.
ORDER
[49]
In
the circumstances, the application is dismissed with costs.
FORTUIN, J
Date of
hearing:
6 October 2021
Date of
judgment:
9 February 2022
Counsel
for applicant:
Adv
M Titus
Instructed
by:
Nonoza
Potelwa Inc, Cape Town
Counsel
for 1
st
respondent:
A
H Beviss-Challinor
Instructed
by:
BL
Attorneys
[1]
2010
(1) SA 49 (SCA).
[2]
1913
AD 135
at 144.
[3]
2010
(1) SA 35 (SCA).
[4]
See
para [25] above.
[5]
(6544/18)
[2018] ZAWCHC 141
(14 October 2018).
[6]
2008
(4) SA 106 (SCA).
[7]
(498/08)
[2009] ZASCA 102
;
2010 (2) SA 400
(SCA);
[2010] 1 All SA 291
(SCA)
(18 September 2009).
[8]
1984
(3) SA 623 (A).
[9]
Plascon-Evans
,
supra.
[10]
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009
(2) SA 277
(SCA) at para 26
[11]
2017
(1) SA 255
(CC) para 39.
[12]
Supra
.
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