Case Law[2024] ZAKZDHC 35South Africa
Pillay and Another v Moonsamy and Another (D6707/21) [2024] ZAKZDHC 35 (5 June 2024)
Headnotes
a mandatory interdict is available to a neighbour to compel the removal of an encroachment. This derives from the common law duty which a landowner owes to his adjoining landowner. The court described this duty as an obligation not to deprive a neighbour of possession or wrongfully to exclude him from the possession of what belongs to him. In recent years the question whether a court should, in the exercise of its discretion, order compensation instead of demolition. This is an issue to consider in the context of matters such as the present.[2]
Judgment
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# South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
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## Pillay and Another v Moonsamy and Another (D6707/21) [2024] ZAKZDHC 35 (5 June 2024)
Pillay and Another v Moonsamy and Another (D6707/21) [2024] ZAKZDHC 35 (5 June 2024)
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sino date 5 June 2024
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE NO: D6707/21
In
the matter between:
VIVENDRAN
PILLAY
FIRST APPLICANT
INDRANI
PILLAY
SECOND APPLICANT
and
JONATHAN
MOONSAMY
FIRST RESPONDENT
MELANIE
MOONSAMY
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ORDER
The
following order is issued:
1.
The application for the removal of the structure which
encroaches onto
the applicants’ property:
Erf 7[...] C[...], Registration Division FU, KwaZulu-Natal (also
known as 8[...] A[...] Road Sunford,
Phoenix) from the respondents’
next-door property, Erf 7[...] C[...], also known as 8[...] A[...]
Road, Sunford, Phoenix,
is granted.
2.
The first and second respondents are ordered to remove the
encroachment within 60 days of the date of service of this order.
3.
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs
of this
application, jointly and severally, the one to pay the other to be
absolved at scale A.
JUDGEMENT
DAVIS
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The applicants and the respondents are neighbours.
The applicants are
the registered
owners of Erf 7[...] C[...], Registration Division FU, KwaZulu-Natal
(also known as 8[...] A[...] Road Sunford, Phoenix).
The respondents
are the registered owners of the next-door property, Erf 7[...]
C[...], also known as 8[...] A[...] Road, Sunford,
Phoenix.
[2]
This is an application for an order at the request of the
applicants’ declaring that the respondents’ boundary roof
between the parties’ erven is encroaching upon the applicants’
property, if granted the removal of such encroachment
within 30 days
of the date of this order and that the respondents tender costs for
this application.
[3]
In
Mbane
v Gxenya
[1]
it was held that a mandatory interdict is available to a neighbour to
compel the removal of an encroachment. This derives
from the
common law duty which a landowner owes to his adjoining landowner.
The court described this duty as an obligation not
to deprive a
neighbour of possession or wrongfully to exclude him from the
possession of what belongs to him. In recent years
the question
whether a court should, in the exercise of its discretion, order
compensation instead of demolition. This is an issue
to consider in
the context of matters such as the present.
[2]
[4]
The respondents oppose the application.
Applicants
submissions
[5]
The applicants maintain that the respondents’ roof encroaches
onto his property,
the resulting nuisance has impacted upon the use
and enjoyment of his property. When they became aware that the roof
encroached
upon their property they were advised by the municipality
that their remedy lay in civil law.
[3]
.
[6]
Consequently the applicants appointed a professional land- surveyor
to inspect the
property and it was confirmed that the
respondents’ property, did indeed encroach onto the applicants’
property.
[4]
Although the
applicants’ allege that, in addition to the roof the
respondents’ boundary wall contributes to two
further
encroachments on their property , however, at this stage in the
hearing this assertion is no longer relevant. Instead the
issue that
remains to be determined by this court is that of the alleged
encroaching roof of the respondents’ property and,
should such
be proven, to compel the removal of such encroachment.
Respondents
submissions
[7]
The respondents’ land surveyor had noted that the survey
instruments used by
the applicants’ land surveyors had what she
referred to as a ‘source of error’ which led to a
possible incorrect
measurement that might then not constitute an
encroachment. However this allegation was not supported by any
measurements taken
by the respondents’ land surveyor proving
otherwise
[5]
[8]
The respondents’ land surveyor indicates that the survey
instruments have
what she refers to as ‘sources of error’
and then based on these assumptions of error concludes that the
encroachment
of centimetres, cannot, without ambiguity, be considered
an encroachment
[6]
. This is an
opinion based on an assumption of possible error in the survey
equipment of the applicants’ surveyor. It not
backed up by any
measurements taken by the respondents’ surveyor.
[9]
The supplementary report provided by the applicants’ land
surveyor reflects
the roof encroachment measures 78cm
[7]
With their being no proper challenge to the report of the surveyor of
the applicants, the applicants’ argue that there is
no real
bona-fide dispute of fact.
[10]
The applicants’ aver and maintain that they have a right to the
use and enjoyment of the
property without the inconvenience caused by
the encroachment of the respondents’ roof. They should be
entitled to
use and enjoy their property without unreasonable
limitations. The land surveyor re-surveyed the property and confirmed
that the
roof encroachment spans 78cm and definitely constitutes, in
law, an encroachment.
[11]
The respondents’ did not respond to the supplementary report
and maintain that there is
no encroachment. Instead their argument is
that there is a dispute of fact pertaining to the existence of
an encroachment.
Therefore the matter needed to resolved by referring
the matter for oral evidence to be led.
Dispute
of Fact
[12]
In
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[8]
it
is confirmed that the rule pertaining to a dispute of fact may
be dealt with in application proceedings without hearing
oral
evidence to resolve the dispute. In motion proceedings, a final order
may be granted if the facts stated by the respondents,
together with
admitted facts in the applicants’ affidavits, justify the
order.
[13]
In general, the rule is that in proceedings where
disputes of fact have arisen on affidavits, a final order,
whether an
interdict or some other form of relief, maybe granted if the facts
averred in the Applicant’s affidavits, which
have been admitted
by the Respondent together with facts alleged by the Respondent,
justify such an order.
[9]
[14]
In
Wightman
t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
,
[10]
the court held as follows:
‘
A
real, genuine and
bona
fide
dispute
of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that the party
who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and
unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed. There will of
course be instances where a bare denial meets
the requirement because
there is no other way open to the disputing party and nothing more
can therefore be expected of him. But
even that may not be sufficient
if the fact averred lies purely within the knowledge of the averring
party and no basis is laid
for disputing the veracity or accuracy of
the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing
party must necessarily
possess knowledge of them and be able to
provide an answer (or countervailing evidence) if they be not true or
accurate but, instead
of doing so, rests his case on a bare or
ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in finding
that the test is
satisfied. I say ‘generally’ because
factual averments seldom stand apart from a broader matrix of
circumstances all
of which needs to be borne in mind when arriving at
a decision. A litigant may not necessarily recognise or understand
the nuances
of a bare or general denial as against a real attempt to
grapple with all relevant factual allegations made by the other
party.
But when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself
to its contents, inadequate as they may be, and will only in
exceptional
circumstances be permitted to disavow them. There is thus
a serious duty imposed upon a legal adviser who settles an answering
affidavit to ascertain and engage with facts which his client
disputes and to reflect such disputes fully and accurately in the
answering affidavit. If that does not happen it should come as no
surprise that the court takes a robust view of the matter.’
[11]
[15]
While the first respondent alleges that
there is a dispute of fact in existence, the Applicants’
correctly so, submits that the First Respondent has not raised a
real, genuine, or
bona fide
dispute. Only one expert
report actually dealt first hand with the issue of whether or not
there was an actual encroachment.
[16]
On a proper application of the test, pursuant to the
Plascon-Evans
rule,
[12]
I am satisfied that
there is no
bona
fide
dispute of fact; there is in my view, no doubt that the
measured encroachment of the roof is 78 square centimetres.
The
denial of the respondents does not engage with the underlying factual
background of the opinion of the applicants’
land
surveyor and does not engage with the issue in dispute meaningfully.
On this aspect, I am satisfied on a proper application
of the rule
that there is no factual dispute. There is a roof encroachment of 78
square centimetres..
Historical
nature of the encroachment
[17]
The roof was erected in or around the end of 2007 and plans were
approved for this structure.
There were no complaints from 2007 until
2017. The roof was built in accordance with approved plans and
therefore the respondents
submit they cannot be held responsible for
the encroachment.
[18]
It is trite law
[13]
that the
registered owner of immovable property enjoys all the rights,
responsibilities and liabilities accruing to such property.
As such,
the benefit of historical improvements to the property, by its
previous owners, would accrue to its current owner. Similarly,
the
liabilities resulting from historical alterations to the property
will accrue to its current owner, regardless of who had affected
such
alterations. This position is confirmed by
Cape
Town Municipality v Fletcher
&
Cartwrights
Ltd
[14]
and
Mondoclox
(Pty) Ltd v Branch and Another,
[15]
where the successors-in-title to a property were compelled to remove
encroaching structures constructed by their predecessors-in-title.
[19]
The respondents failed to avail themselves of the invitation to file
further answering papers
in which they could have addressed this
issue or any unexpected or new information in the replying affidavit.
However, they failed
to provide any corroboration or evidence to
substantiate their claim that the boundary lines were incorrect.
I am satisfied
that on the admitted factual background that the
respondents’ roof has encroached upon the property of the
applicants
and despite the averment that it was built on approved
plans, the respondents, in terms of law, remain responsible for the
encroachment.
[20]
The respondents’ claim that no cause of action lies against
them due to the fact that the
encroachment was caused by the approved
plans construction and therefore has no merit. The applicants have
proved the existence
of a real right.
Remedy
[21]
As the registered owner they are liable to correct the encroachment
upon the applicant's property.
It is in any event clear that no
action or process against a third party would provide the applicant
with the relief necessary
to correct the encroachment. As the
registered owners, the respondents are the only party who can be
compelled to demolish the
boundary wall.
[22]
As was stated in
Fedgroup
Participation Bond Managers (Pty) Ltd v Trustee of the Capital
Property Trust
,
[16]
South African Law has always carefully protected the right of
ownership, especially of immovable property, as a most important
and
extensive right.
[23]
In
Phillips
v South African National Parks Board
[17]
the Court held:
‘
It
is indisputable that an encroachment of the nature in issue in the
instant case constitutes an interference with applicant's
property
rights such as to constitute a deprivation in terms of the provisions
of section 25 of the Constitution. It follows that,
in exercising its
discretion the court will accept, as a starting point, that the owner
is entitled to claim a demolition
order in respect of the
encroaching structure. The primary remedy is therefore an order for
removal of the structure...’
[18]
[24]
Ordinarily with encroachment, the court has a discretion to either
order the removal of the encroachment
or to award damages and
compensation.
[19]
In such
instances, the deciding factor is the disproportionality or otherwise
between the removal of the encroachment as against
the damage or
inconvenience suffered by the aggrieved landowner.
[20]
[25]
When compensation rather than demolition or removal is ordered, it is
usually done on the basis
of policy considerations such as an
unreasonable delay on the part of the landowner, or on the basis of
what might be viewed as
acquiescence, and prejudice
[21]
.
In this instance, as soon as the applicants became aware of the
encroachment they sought its removal. The respondents refused
to abide by the applicants’ request for removal and offered no
substantial offer to address the problem. No party made any
meaningful submissions that damages would be a better route.
[26]
It is clear from the contents of the
application that the respondents are indeed in breach of the
law. For the court to allow
them to keep the structures as is, would
be to perpetuate the wrongfulness of the respondents’ and
thus resulting in
a dangerous precedent in that it would
negate the very purpose of orderly urban living and building that
respect property
boundaries.
[27]
On a first reading of the papers I believed that the issue of
damages was not considered
sufficiently. On reflection, after hearing
counsel for the parties, it is clear that compensation or
damages is simply not
viable and the only way to resolve the harm
caused by the encroachment would be for its removal.
[28]
The encroachment does have a negative impact on the applicants’
use and enjoyment
of their property therefore, it is my view that, in
these circumstances, the application to compel the
removal of such
encroachment, resulting from the respondents’
property, should be granted. However it is believed that a 30
day timeframe
is inadequate and therefore unreasonable. Instead the
respondents’ should be afforded 60 days to remove the
encroachment
from the date of this order and should be ordered to
tender the costs of this application is too short a period for the
removal.
Order
[29]
I make the following order:
1.
The application for the removal of the structure which encroaches
onto the applicants’ property: Erf
7[...] C[...], Registration
Division FU, KwaZulu-Natal. (also known as 8[...] A[...] Road
Sunford, Phoenix) from the respondents’
next-door property, Erf
7[...] C[...], also known as 8[...] A[...] Road, Sunford, Phoenix, is
granted.
2.
The first and second respondents are ordered to remove the
encroachment within 60 days of the date of
service of this
order.
3.
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this
application, jointly and severally, the
one to pay the other to be
absolved at scale A.
DAVIS
AJ
CASE
INFORMATION
Counsel
for the Applicant :
Adv C
Jaipal
Attorneys
for the Applicant:
Nolan
Naicker & Company
Suite
G13
The
Place on Zenith
Zenith
Drive
Umhlanga
Ridge
Ref:
CN/CG/P067GW
Tel:
031 584 6640
Email:
cyndi@nolannaicker.co.za
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv D
Naidoo
Attorneys
for the Respondent:
Anisa
Khan Attorneys Inc
Suite
128, 1
st
Floor Ridgeton Towers
6
Aurora Drive
Umhlanga
Ridge
c/o
Messenger King
c/o
Neeraj Ghazi Attorneys
6
th
Floor, The Royal Towers
30
Dorothy Nyembe Street
Durban
Ref:
Mrs Khan/M10335
Tel:
031 566 1083
Fax:
031 566 4547
Email:
anisa@anisakhanattorneys.com
Date of Hearing:
23 May 2024
Date
of Judgment:
5
June 2024
[1]
[2023] ZAWCHC 91
at para.9; See also
Smith
v Basson
1979
(1) SA 559
(W)..
[2]
See,
Rand
Waterraad v Bothma
1997
(3) SA 120
(O). See also Smith v Basson ibid.
[3]
See
letter from the municipality in the applicant’s indexed bundle
at 21-22.
[4]
See
report provided by the applicants’ land surveyor, V.R
Govender, applicants’ indexed bundle at 23 and 47-51.
[5]
See
report provided by the respondents’ land surveyor, R Ginya,
respondents’ indexed bundle at 47-48.
[6]
See
report provided by the respondents’ land surveyor, R Ginya,
respondents’ indexed bundle at page 48.
[7]
See
supplementary report provided by the applicants’ land
surveyor, V.R Govender, applicants’ indexed bundle at 72-74.
[8]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
(A).
[9]
Plascon-Evans
Paints
above
fn 7 at 368.
[10]
Wightman
t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
[2008] ZASCA 6; [2008] 2 All SA 512 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).
[11]
Ibid
para 13.
[12]
Plascon-Evans
Paints
above
fn 7.
[13]
Philips
v South African National Parks Board 2
(4933/07)
ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010)
[14]
Cape
Town Municipality v Fletcher
&
Cartwrights
Ltd
1936 CPD 347
at 350
[15]
Mondoclox
(Pty) Ltd v Branch and Another
[2022] ZAECMKHC 118 at para.35.
[16]
Fedgroup
Participation Bond Managers (Pty) Ltd v Trustee of the Capital
Property Trust
[2015] ZASCA 103
;
2015 (5) SA 290
(SCA);
[2015] 3 All SA 523
(SCA).
[17]
Phillips
v South African National Parks Board
[2010]
ZAECGHC 27.
[18]
Ibid
para 24.
[19]
Thulo v
Madolo and Another
[2023] ZAFSHC 426
para
7.
[20]
Candid
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying
Syndicate (Pty) Ltd
1992
(2) SA 459 (C).
[21]
Trustees
of the Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale
(3848/02)
[2003] ZAWCHC 52
;
[2003] ALL SA 528
(C) at para.28
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