Case Law[2023] ZAKZDHC 49South Africa
FP Specialty (Pty) Ltd v Dorasamy and Others (D6694/2022) [2023] ZAKZDHC 49 (27 July 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
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## FP Specialty (Pty) Ltd v Dorasamy and Others (D6694/2022) [2023] ZAKZDHC 49 (27 July 2023)
FP Specialty (Pty) Ltd v Dorasamy and Others (D6694/2022) [2023] ZAKZDHC 49 (27 July 2023)
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sino date 27 July 2023
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Interdict –
Former
employee
– Company proceeding against respondent
for alleged scheme to defraud it – Private investigator and
police
officer getting involved – Appearing that engaged in
a shakedown of the applicant and its customers – Respondent
has her back to the wall because of the steps taken by the
applicant after it discovered her scheme – Private
investigator
and police officer were improperly prepared to assist
her in her – Applicant made out a case for a final
interdict.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
Case
no:
D6694/2022
In
the matter between:
FP
SPECIALTY (PTY) LTD APPLICANT
and
ELVINA
DORASAMY FIRST
RESPONDENT
JULIAN
KASAVALA SECOND
RESPONDENT
WARRANT
OFFICER RICKY CHETTIAR FIRST
INTERESTED PARTY
THE
CAPTAIN, WESTVILLE POLICE STATION SECOND
INTERESTED PARTY
DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, THIRD
INTERESTED
PARTY
KWAZULU-NATAL
Coram:
Mossop J
Heard:
24 July 2023
Delivered:
27 July 2023
ORDER
The
following order is granted:
1.
The
rule granted on 18 June 2022 is confirmed and the first and second
respondents are directed to pay the applicant’s costs
jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
2.
The
Registrar of this court is directed to deliver a copy of this
judgment to the Provincial Head of the South African Police Services,
KwaZulu-Natal to permit the Provincial Head to consider the conduct
of the first interested party, Warrant Officer Ricky Chettiar.
JUDGMENT
Mossop
J
:
[1]
The
first respondent in this application is a former employee of the
applicant. She left that employ somewhat under a cloud. This
happened
because it was believed by the applicant that she had devised,
constructed, and operated a scheme to defraud it. The scheme
was
constituted, inter alia, by the incorporation of four private
companies (the four companies) by the first respondent. She was
the
only director of three of those companies. The fourth company had two
directors, of which she was one. The four companies were
unable to
perform any services, had no resources to do so and operated using
fraudulent VAT numbers. Yet, it was represented by
the first
respondent to the applicant that the four companies had provided
services to the applicant when they had not, and they
were
accordingly paid by the applicant for such non-existent services at
inflated rates.
[2]
When
the first respondent’s scheme was discovered, it triggered a
whirlwind of legal action by the applicant over a relatively
concentrated period. On 24 January 2022, the applicant brought an
urgent Anton Piller type application against the first respondent
and
three of the four companies. The application was granted. The first
respondent was then directed by the applicant to appear
at a
disciplinary hearing on 17 February 2022 to answer allegations
arising out of her conduct. She chose rather to resign from
her
employment than to attend those proceedings. On 25 February 2022, the
four companies were all provisionally wound up by the
applicant. On
31 March 2022, provisional liquidators were appointed to the four
companies. On 14 April 2022, the order in the Anton
Piller type
application was confirmed against the first respondent. On 13 May
2022, the applicant instituted action proceedings
against the first
respondent and her co-director of the company in which she was not
the sole director. In those proceedings, the
applicant seeks to
recoup the losses that it suffered through the first respondent’s
conduct in the amount of approximately
R2,7 million. On 1 June 2022,
the four companies were finally wound up.
[3]
It
is against that factual backdrop that this application must be
considered. It was launched by the applicant as an urgent application
and the following relief was initially claimed in its notice of
motion:
‘
1.
That both the First Respondent and Second Respondent are hereby
interdicted and restrained
from:
1.1
contacting
the Applicant’s customers either in person or by email or other
means of communication and from engaging with the
Applicant, its
directors or staff in any way;
1.2
defaming
or impairing the reputation of the Applicant and/or seeking to impair
its reputation either verbally and/or in written
communication to its
staff, customers or any third party;
1.3
harassing
and/or intimidating the Applicant’s directors, staff and/or
personnel;
1.4
trespassing
at and/or entering the Applicant’s premises unless authorised
by Court Order, warrant or subpoena; and/or
1.5
committing
any act of extortion either directly or through the agency of others.
1.6
that
the first and second respondents are directed to pay the of (sic) the
costs of this application.
2.
That the orders referred to in paragraph 1.1 to 1.5 above operate as
interim
relief with immediate effect.’
[4]
The
application initially came before Henriques J on 18 July 2022. The
learned judge made some minor changes to the order, changed
it to a
rule nisi, and then granted it. The learned judge also noted the
following:
‘
It
is recorded that the First Respondent has given undertakings in terms
of paragraphs 1.1 to 1.5 of the Notice of Motion dated
1 July 2022
without any admission of liability and/or fact and with questions of
costs reserved.’
What is thus before me is
the extended return date of the rule nisi granted by Henriques J.
[5]
When
the matter was called, Mr Shapiro SC appeared for the applicant and
Ms Moodley appeared for the second respondent. There was
no
appearance for the first
respondent. Both counsel
are thanked for their most able arguments.
[6]
The
application has two respondents and three parties who have been cited
as ‘interested parties’. Nothing further need
be said
about the first respondent. The second respondent describes himself
as being a ‘forensic investigator’,
[1]
and states that he was hired in that capacity by the first
respondent. The first respondent confirms in her answering affidavit
that she had engaged the services of the second respondent:
‘…
to whom I reported
certain matters that I had brought to his attention and in turn to
the South African Police Services for their
investigations.’
The first interested
party cited is a member of the SAPS who is allegedly the
investigating officer appointed to investigate the
complaint made by
the first respondent to the SAPS. The first interested party has not
opposed the application but has delivered
a confirmatory affidavit in
support of the version advanced by the second respondent. The second
interested party is the captain
of Westville SAPS. He has not
participated in this application. The third interested party is the
Director of Public Prosecutions
for KwaZulu-Natal. She has,
understandably, also not participated in this application, and has
delivered no papers.
[7]
I
shall refer to the parties in the capacity in which they are cited
and not by name.
[8]
What
has precipitated the bringing of this application is that on 26 April
2022, at the height of the applicant’s legal proceedings
against the first respondent, the second respondent visited the
applicant’s business premises which are situated in Jacobs,
Durban. On the applicant’s version he was alone, on the second
respondent’s version he was accompanied by the first
interested
party. Whichever version is correct, and for the purposes of argument
Mr Shapiro accepted the second respondent’s
version, by the
time that visit occurred, the first respondent was aware that the
applicant had uncovered her scheme and she had
already left its
employ. Allegedly without permission, the second respondent entered
the applicant’s business premises and
met the applicant’s
representative, a Mr Joel Mutero (Mr Mutero), who is the applicant’s
general manager. He was granted
a hearing by Mr Mutero and was later
allowed to access the applicant’s premises where he took
several photographs. He informed
Mr Mutero that he was working with
the first interested party:
‘…
to
obtain access to confidential information about the Applicant’s
business.’
There is no evidence that
he informed Mr Mutero that he was employed by the first respondent.
The second respondent then explained
that:
‘…
the charges he was
investigating pertained to allegations that the Applicant was
importing certain goods illegally by not following
the correct
procedure at customs.’
[9]
While
he may not explicitly have mentioned his employment by the first
respondent, it may have been apparent to Mr Mutero that this
was the
case by virtue of what the second respondent next apparently
demanded. The second respondent demanded of Mr Mutero that
the
applicant drop all the legal suits that it had preferred against the
first respondent, and all the claims for costs against
her, and then
went further and stated that the applicant would have to pay
something to the first respondent for her to drop the
case against
the applicant that she had reported to the SAPS. He apparently also
threatened that he would contact the applicant’s
customers if
the applicant did not agree to comply with his demands.
[10]
The
second respondent then allegedly made good on his threat and on 9 May
2022, he telephonically contacted a customer of the applicant
called
Pefco. To the representative of Pefco, he advised that he was acting
as a forensic investigator for the SAPS. When faced
with certain
demands for information from the second respondent, the
representative of Pefco requested that he formulate his questions
in
writing and requested that he also explain his legal standing
entitling him to make such demands of Pefco. To this the second
respondent acceded and directed an email to Pefco the same day. That
email had as a heading the words:
‘
Westville
CAS 35/04/2022’.
It is, however, not an
email on a SAPS letterhead, but it bears the second respondent’s
name as the sole author of the email.
In it, the second respondent
informed Pefco that:
‘
It
is alleged, amongst others, that the company does not state all the
products that they import from India on the import documents.
It is further alleged that they import
flammable and hazardous materials and do not advise/notify/mark the
containers.’
The reference to ‘the
company’ is a reference to the applicant. The email concludes
with the following words:
‘
We
require all documentation for the products that you purchased from FP
Specialty (Pty) Ltd for the past one (1) year.’
[11]
It
coincidently happened that Pefco and the applicant make use of the
services of the same firm of attorneys. Those attorneys came
to know
of these events and responded to the second respondent’s email
in a letter dated 11 May 2022 on behalf of Pefco.
In essence, the
attorney’s letter pointed out that the second respondent’s
email of 9 May 2022 created the impression
that Pefco was obliged to
respond to his demands and to provide the requested information.
However, the attorneys requested the
second respondent to explain
what the legal basis was for him contacting Pefco and for making such
a demand.
[12]
The
second respondent responded the same day in a further email. He
stated that when he had telephonically contacted Pefco, he and
the
first interested party ‘were together’ and added that:
‘
For
the record, we have been mandated by the complainant, Ms E Dorasamy,
to work with the police in this matter.’
The second respondent
goes on to state that:
‘
I
have since forwarded your letter to DWO Chettiar and he will make the
request directly from the police.’
DWO Chettiar is the first
interested party. The second respondent allegedly likewise also
contacted four other customers of the
applicant and made similar
demands of them. The applicant submits that the second respondent
would not have independently known
of the identity of these customers
and can only have been given their names by the first respondent.
[13]
In
his answering affidavit, the second respondent explains what he was
employed to do by the first respondent:
‘…
I was approached on
or about 21
st
February 2022 by the First Respondent who instructed me to do certain
investigations regarding various illegalities including crimes
allegedly perpetrated by the Applicant.’
[14]
What
those illegalities or crimes amount to are never disclosed by the
second respondent in his answering affidavit. He explains
why:
‘
I
do not intend disclosing the confidential information obtained by me
which are (sic) sensitive in nature and which I have shared
with the
SAPS. In any event the information and evidence received thus far are
(sic) privileged as it constitutes part of an ongoing
investigation
conducted by the SAPS.’
[15]
The
applicant objects to the first and second respondents’ conduct.
It claims that the SAPS are tasked with investigating
crimes that are
prosecuted by the State, when established. The first respondent has
no business as a private individual in involving
himself in those
investigations, so the applicant says, or in passing himself off as
being associated with any SAPS investigative
activities. Mr Shapiro
forcefully submitted that had the second respondent disclosed his
association and employment by the first
respondent to Mr Mutero up
front, he would never have been granted a hearing by him. It appears
to me that this is likely, given
the first respondent’s history
with the applicant.
[16]
As
a private member of the public, the second respondent had no right to
demand information from the applicant or its customers.
The
information demanded was private and confidential to the applicant
and its customers.
The
first respondent had no personal knowledge of what he asked for
because it was not publicly known information. It seems to me
that
private information are facts that are not within the knowledge of
outsiders and are accordingly not known by such outsiders.
The right
to privacy in its most basic form is ‘simply the right of a
person [or a juristic entity] to be left alone, to
be free from
unwarranted publicity and to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters with which the public
is not necessarily
concerned’.
[2]
[17]
Obviously,
the SAPS have the power to officially investigate crime. But the
second respondent may not blur the line between his
chosen method of
earning a living, which does not come with the power to make demands
for information from the subject of the investigation,
and the SAPS’s
obligation to investigate allegations of criminal activity.
[18]
During
argument, Ms Moodley referred me to
S
v Burger
.
[3]
However, it appears to me that rather than assist the second
respondent, that matter seems to support the applicant’s
position.
At paragraphs 40 and 41 of that judgment, Navsa JA states
as follows:
‘
[40]
The second issue concerns the undesirable fusion of private and
police investigations. It appears from
the evidence referred to
earlier that AIN commanded the resources of the SAPS when it saw fit.
The police officials involved readily
complied. The SAPS is not up
for privatisation, nor for direction by parties such as AIN. This too
is a matter that should be dealt
with by the relevant authorities.
[41]
Lastly, it is not only that the lines between the AIN and police
investigations became blurred,
but, as set out above, police
officials acted in two capacities, even going to the extent of doing
AIN work whilst on police “sick
leave”. This is untenable
and should be investigated by the relevant ministry.’
[19]
The
second respondent claims that whatever he is alleged to have done, he
acted in conjunction with the first interested party and
under his
authority. The first interested party has confirmed this in a
confirmatory affidavit. The applicant, however, has noted
that the
first interested party would not ordinarily have the jurisdiction to
be involved in the matter. The first interested party
acknowledges
that he is stationed at SAPS Westville which, as its name suggests,
is in the western suburbs of Durban. The applicant’s
business
is not located in Westville or its surrounding areas. It states in
its founding affidavit that it has its business premises
in Jacobs,
which is part of the southern suburbs of the city. How the first
interested party became involved in the matter is accordingly
not
clear to the applicant. The applicant invited the first interested
party to disclose how this has happened, but he resisted
that
invitation. His confirmatory affidavit is brief, terse and unadorned
with any facts.
[20]
Mr
Shapiro submitted that while the first respondent may have been
provided with a case number after reporting her complaint to
the
SAPS, what the second respondent is involved with is not, in truth, a
proper and official SAPS investigation. Several reasons
were advanced
for this submission:
(a)
Firstly,
the second respondent stated in his answer to Pefco’s
attorney’s letter that the first interested party would
write
to Pefco and formally request the information that he had sought in
his first email. This was never done. It is difficult
to understand
why this was not done if this was an official investigation and the
information sought was genuinely required by
the SAPS to advance a
legitimate investigation.
(b)
Secondly,
it appears that the first interested party never personally did
anything. The second respondent, who had no real power
of his own,
appears to have taken the lead in virtually all contact with the
applicant and its customers. The first interested
party is referenced
by the second respondent but appears to have adopted a totally supine
attitude to the investigations admittedly
conducted by the second
respondent. Why this should be the case is not immediately apparent
but this modus operandi could support
the inference that the second
respondent was permitted by the first interested party to do as he
wished and to subsequently justify
his conduct by reference to the
first interested party.
(c)
Thirdly,
since the launching of this application, it appears that no further
investigations into the applicant have been undertaken
by the SAPS,
as no further overtures have been made to the applicant and it has
never been charged with any offence. While the
second respondent
could not continue with his investigation by virtue of the interim
order granted by Henriques J, there was no
reason for the SAPS to
stop its investigations if there was anything legitimate in the
complaint made to it by the first respondent.
But the investigation
came to a sudden grinding halt consequent upon the interim order
granted by Henriques J. The first respondent
nonetheless claims that
this application is:
‘…
an abuse of process
and ill conceived (sic) as it attempts to prevent or discourage,
directly or indirectly the South African Police
Services, from
conducting a full and proper investigation into the business affairs
of the Applicant.’
There is no merit in that
submission. The relief claimed by the applicant does not impact upon
the SAPS at all: it prevents the
first and second respondents,
neither of whom are employees of the SAPS, from acting unlawfully.
[21]
The
interplay of these factors creates the disturbing impression that
what the second respondent and the first interested party
were
engaged in, was what could be classified as a ‘shakedown’
[4]
of the applicant and its customers. Indeed, Mr Mutero reports that
the second respondent tried to extort both information and money
from
the applicant when he visited its business premises. If the
investigation allegedly headed by the first interested party was
genuine and officially sanctioned and if the SAPS had officially
engaged the services of the second respondent, it would surely
have
been confirmed by the captain in charge of the Westville SAPS, who is
a party to these proceedings. He has, however, remained
silent and
the first interested party has put up no proof of the official
involvement of the second respondent in a legitimate
SAPS
investigation.
[22]
After
the granting of the interim order by Henriques J, it appears that the
second respondent changed his attitude to the proceedings.
This
change is summed up by his attorneys in a letter sent to the
applicant’s attorneys on 20 July 2022 in which they state:
‘
(i)
The First Respondent gave you an undertaking which was recorded in
Court. Our client’s
employment by First Respondent terminated
well before your Application papers were prepared;
(ii)
An interim order was granted against our client;
(iii)
Our client has not, since sending the emails to the three (3)
customers, been involved
in any investigations in the matter, nor
with the police and undertakes not to do so in the future;
(iv)
Our client has not and will not act in any manner complained of by
your client and/or covered
by the terms of the interim order or the
final interdict sought;
(v)
In the circumstances, the need for the interdict has fallen away and
we respectfully suggest
that the Rule be discharged on the next
occasion with the Applicant and Second Respondent bearing their own
costs.’
[5]
[23]
The
applicant’s attorneys responded to this letter in a letter of
their own and stated that it had no knowledge of when, or
if, the
employment of the second respondent was terminated by the first
respondent. No proof of the date of the termination of
that
employment has been put up by either the first or second respondents.
Ms Moodley submitted that the termination of the employment
of the
second respondent by the first respondent indicates that the issue of
the second respondent’s involvement in the SAPS
investigation
has become moot, as he is no longer employed by the first respondent
and there can be no question of him again involving
himself in the
fashion of which complaint is made. I do not agree with this
submission.
[24]
The
general principle is that a matter is moot when a court’s
judgment will have ‘no practical effect on the parties’.
[6]
It is accepted that courts should not make rulings on matters that
are properly moot, as its decision will amount simply to an
advisory
opinion on the identified legal questions, which are abstract,
academic or hypothetical.
[7]
In
President
of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance
,
[8]
the Constitutional Court stated that:
‘
.
. . courts should be loath to fulfil an advisory role, particularly
for the benefit of those who have dependable advice abundantly
available to them and in circumstances where no actual purpose would
be served by that decision now’.
[25]
This
general principle is, however, not an absolute bar to the
determination of matters that are recognised to be moot. Such matters
may still be considered by a court if they involve issues of public
importance that may have some future e
ffect
on similar matters and on which the adjudication of a court is
required.
[9]
In my view, the
matter is not moot. It is not impossible that the second respondent
could again be employed by the first respondent
in the future. The
word of the first respondent that she has, in fact, terminated the
services of the second respondent and will
not again instruct him is
not accepted by the applicant. In my view, it has good reason to
doubt the bona fides of the first respondent.
[26]
Despite
being the source of the allegations of alleged criminal conduct on
the part of the applicant, the first respondent has not
put up a
detailed rebuttal of the applicant’s allegations. Indeed, her
answering affidavit is rather threadbare. She does
not explain why
she regarded it to be necessary to instruct the second respondent. If
she had evidence of criminal wrongdoing by
the applicant, why did she
need his services? Why not simply report the matter to the SAPS and
allow them to investigate the matter?
Why incur the expense of the
second respondent, when on her own version, she declined to incur the
expense of rebutting the damning
allegations made against her in the
Anton Piller type application and the liquidation of the four
companies, which abound with
allegations concerning her
perfidiousness and dishonesty? None of this is explained by her.
[27]
It
appears probable to me that in instructing the second respondent, the
first respondent was engaged in a stratagem that had the
goal of
extricating her from the obvious difficulties that she found herself
in at the hands of the applicant. In stating that
this application
has been brought to thwart a
‘…
full
and proper investigation into the business affairs of the Applicant’,
the first respondent, perhaps unintentionally,
reveals something of
what motivates her. The impression created by that statement is not
that she has discrete, precise knowledge
of any alleged wrongdoing on
the part of the applicant: to the contrary, it appears that she
requires an investigation of all that
the applicant does to determine
whether it has done anything criminal.
[28]
Ms
Moodley stated that there was nothing prohibiting the second
respondent from investigating the applicant if he was instructed
to
do so by the first respondent. She was correct in making that
submission. But the second respondent and the first interested
party
may not purport to be conducting official SAPS business when they are
not and try to extort a benefit for the first respondent
from the
applicant and its customers by claiming an entitlement to information
and a corresponding obligation for those parties
to co-operate and
comply with their demands.
[29]
The
first respondent obviously has a motive to dig up something,
anything, that reflects badly upon the applicant and it appears
to me
that she will do whatever needs to be done to improve her position.
She has her back to the wall because of the steps taken
by the
applicant after it discovered her scheme. The second respondent and
the first interested party were improperly prepared
to assist her in
her endeavours.
[30]
The
applicant has made out a case for a final interdict and there is no
reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the
result.
[31]
I
am consequently satisfied that the following order should issue:
1.
The
rule granted on 18 June 2022 is confirmed and the first and second
respondents are directed to pay the applicant’s costs
jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
2.
The
registrar of this court is directed to deliver a copy of this
judgment to the Provincial Head of the South African Police Services,
KwaZulu-Natal to permit the Provincial Head to consider the conduct
of the first interested party, Warrant Officer Ricky Chettiar.
_______________________
MOSSOP J
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the
applicants
Mr W N Shapiro SC
Instructed by:
MacGregor
Erasmus
Bond Square
1
st
Floor, 12 Browns Road
The Point
Durban
Counsel for the
first respondent
No appearance
Instructed by
N
G Pillay and Company
86
Silverglen
Chatsworth
Counsel for the
second respondent
Ms C J Moodley
Instructed by
Attorneys
Anand- Nepaul
9
th
Floor, Royal Tower
30 Dorothy Nyembe
(Gardiner) Street
Durban
Date
of argument
: 24 July
2023
Date
of Judgment
:
27 July
2023
[1]
He
was also previously a member of the South African Police Services.
## [2]Smuts
and another v Botha[2022] ZASCA 3; 2022 (2) SA 425 (SCA) para 23.
[2]
Smuts
and another v Botha
[2022] ZASCA 3; 2022 (2) SA 425 (SCA) para 23.
[3]
S
v Burger and others
[2010]
ZASCA 12; 2010 (2) SACR 1 (SCA).
[4]
This is defined as ‘e
xtortion,
as by blackmail or threats of violence
’
(
www.collinsdictionary.com
/dictionary/english/shakedown).
[5]
While
it may be considered that what was contained in the letter quoted
was privileged, any privilege was waived when the second
respondent
attached it to his supplementary
answering
affidavit.
[6]
AB and
another v Pridwin Preparatory School and others
[2020]
ZACC 12; 2020 (5) SA 327 (CC); 2020 (9) BCLR 1029 (CC).
[7]
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and others v Minister of Home
Affairs and others
[1999] ZACC 17
;
2000
(2) SA 1
(CC);
2000 (1) BCLR 39
(CC) para 21 fn 18.
[8]
President
of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance and others
[2019]
ZACC 35
;
2020 (1) SA 428
(CC);
2019 (11) BCLR 1403
(CC) para 35.
[9]
Centre
for Child Law v Hoërskool Fochville and another
[2015]
ZASCA 155
;
2016 (2) SA 121
(SCA);
[2015] 4 All SA 571
(SCA) para 14.
See also
MEC
for Education, KwaZulu- Natal, and others v Pillay
[2007]
ZACC 21
;
2008 (1) SA 474
(CC);
2008 (2) BCLR 99
(CC) para 32.
sino noindex
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