Case Law[2022] ZALC 7South Africa
NUMSA obo Ezekiel Naidoo v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (1086/17) [2022] ZALC 7 (4 April 2022)
Judgment
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## NUMSA obo Ezekiel Naidoo v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (1086/17) [2022] ZALC 7 (4 April 2022)
NUMSA obo Ezekiel Naidoo v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (1086/17) [2022] ZALC 7 (4 April 2022)
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sino date 4 April 2022
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE
NO: 1086/17
In
the matter between:
NUMSA
obo EZEKIEL NAIDOO
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
CHARLES
OAKES N.O.
Second
Respondent
ALUMINIUM
SA t/a HILLSIDE ALUMINIUM
Third
Respondent
Heard:
24 November 2021
Delivered
:
Delivered: This judgment was
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email, publication
on the Labour Court’s
website and released to SAFLII. The date and time of the hand-down is
deemed to be 10h00 on 4 April
2022.
JUDGMENT
HIRALALL
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations
Act
[1]
(“the Act”)
for the review and/or setting aside of the award of the second
respondent (“the arbitrator”)
under case number MEKN6212,
dated 25 May 2017 in the arbitration proceedings between the
applicant and the third respondent. The
application is opposed by the
third respondent.
Factual Background
[2]
The applicant employee was employed by the
third respondent as a crane operator in a department known as the
carbon department.
He was tested for alcohol when he arrived at work
on 22 April 2012 and found to be over the company's alcohol limit of
0.00%. He
was charged with the offence of testing positive for
alcohol during mandatory testing. He attended a disciplinary inquiry
and was
dismissed. Following his dismissal, his case was arbitrated
by the 2nd respondent (the arbitrator) under the auspices of the
CCMA.
His dismissal was found to be substantively fair. It is this
award which the applicant seeks to review and set aside.
[3]
According to the third respondent, testing
positive for alcohol in the workplace was a dismissible offence. This
meant that any
employee found to have a blood alcohol content greater
than 0.00% would face dismissal. The third respondent viewed the use
of
alcohol or any mind-altering drugs in a very serious light because
of the nature of its operations.
[4]
The workplace was described as having areas
with carcinogenic coal dust and fumes requiring the use of
respirators to prevent inhalation,
high voltage electricity,
industrial baking furnaces with temperatures of up to 1500 degrees
Celsius, heavy moving machinery and
molten liquid steel. Cranes were
used to maneuver one-ton anodes and place them in the baking furnace,
and good hand to eye co-ordination
was required to be able to judge
the depth from high up. Thereafter, the anodes were joined with rods
using molten steel at 1500
degrees Celsius. There were also moving
conveyors in the form of metal chains in this area which made it very
dangerous. One had
to be in a sober state to work in these areas as
they all had inherent risks. There were significant dangers to other
personnel
working below the crane and for this reason employees were
not allowed to present themselves at work under the influence of
alcohol
or mind-altering drugs.
[5]
According to the third respondent’s
witnesses,
1.
The company has in place an Alcohol and
Drugs Testing Process document which all employees are inducted on at
commencement of employment.
This policy provided for random or
unannounced testing, voluntary testing and mandatory testing based on
risk.
2.
Alcohol testing in the company was done
randomly. In other words, every employee was not tested upon his
arrival at the entrance
gate. On account of the testing being
performed randomly, the risks were high that an employee could land
up working inside the
plant whilst under the influence of alcohol.
The onus was therefor on the employee to submit to voluntary testing
or to disclose
if he had consumed alcohol as by the time random
testing was done inside the premises the employee would have already
entered the
plant. If the employee then tested positive for alcohol
in a random test he would be dismissed because it would mean that the
employee
was being dishonest knowing that his results would be
positive but nonetheless entering the site.
3.
If the employee declared that he was taking
medication, and he tested positive for alcohol, he would be sent home
and not allowed
to operate any equipment. In terms of clause 5.2, the
authorized drug and alcohol testing officer would determine whether
or not
the person being tested was taking any medication and if so he
would record the name of the medication, the dosage, frequency, and
the time the medication was last taken on the form MGE0072. The
policy provided a list of medications that would give a positive
result for OPI.
4.
The policy provided for the person being
tested to have a fellow employee, or a union representative present
for the confirmatory
test. It was the employee’s responsibility
to make this arrangement and an internal telephone would be made
available for
this purpose. Where an employee had been prescribed
medication by a medical doctor, they were required to seek advice
from the
medical practitioner regarding the possible influence of the
medical condition and medication on their performance at the
workplace.
This must include among other things, the effect on
alertness, the ability to concentrate, the ability to operate
machinery, whether
the medication leads to drowsiness.
5.
According to the policy, the confirmatory
test would be conducted in the presence of the employee’s
supervisor.
6.
A third test was not required but it was
done to ensure that it was safe for the employee to go back home.
7.
The third respondent’s previous
policy of random testing was based on an expectation of voluntary
testing, that is if the
employee was honest that he had been
consuming alcohol he would go and have himself tested to see whether
he was positive or negative
before entering the plant. The policy
placed the onus on the employee to be trustworthy and therefore the
sanction was very harsh
if a person was shown to have entered the
plant where they positive test for alcohol. The sanction for a first
offence was dismissal.
If they submitted to voluntary testing and
tested positive there would be no disciplinary consequences. The new
policy required
that everyone who entered, whether they were
employees, visitors or contractors, was tested for alcohol. It stated
that:
a.
‘
Non-negative is taken as alcohol,
the following detection levels are deemed positive. Employees,
contractors and visitors are not
allowed to enter the premises if
they are non-negative for alcohol and/ or other drugs, a blood
alcohol level which exceeds 0.002.’.
That was why the sanction
changed from dismissal on the first offense to a final written
warning. This was because the risk to
the company was reduced because
nobody could enter the plant with any alcohol in their blood.
8.
Although the limit was indicated as 0.002,
the practice was that you would have to be 0.00%
before
entering the plant
. The change in the
policy came about after lengthy discussions with the unions and
management, and particularly with the unions
where they requested the
company to review and evaluate the policy to ensure that the
employees had a chance and at the same time
to mitigate the risks to
the company. The applicant trade union, NUMSA, supported the
introduction of the new policy. There were
other awards in alcohol
related matters where the change in the policy was not seen as
inconsistency in the application of the
rule.
[6]
The third respondent’s Alcohol and
Drug Policy, the purpose of which is to define the principles
applicable to persons who
use, process, trade, test positive for, or
are under the influence of alcohol and/ or drugs when entering or
exiting the company
premises or when conducting company related
activities off site. Clause 5.8 thereof provides as follows:
‘
Medication
If an employee/
contractor is taking medication, it is their responsibility to
declare this before taking a test. The list of medications
as well as
the volume/ number of tablets and approximate time taken must be
documented on FMGE 0072.
Where an
employee/contractor has been prescribed medication by a medical
practitioner they must seek advice from the medical practitioner
regarding the possible influence of their medical condition and
medication on the performance in the workplace.
·
This must include inter alia the effect on
alertness, ability to concentrate, ability to operate machinery,
whether medication may
lead to drowsiness, or other at risk side
effects.
·
It is the employee/ contractor’s
responsibility to convey this information to their line manager
before commencing work. A
decision regarding the employee/
contractor’s ability to work safely will be taken by the line
manager in consultation with
the Occupational Health or Medical
Practitioner.’
[7]
The third respondent’s Alcohol and
Drug Testing Process document, the purpose of which was to provide a
procedure for conducting
alcohol and/ or drug tests provided a list
of medication at clause 9.1 which gave a positive result on the OPI
test:
‘
9.1
Medication giving positive result for OPI
Medication giving a
positive result on the OPI test is generally analgesic (painkiller).
Ordinary painkillers such as Aspirin, Paracetemol
or Brufen (e.g.
Compral, Anadin, Grandpa’s, Disprin, Nurofen) do not give a
positive result. However, Nurofen plus, Disprin
plus, etc contain
Codeine and will cause drowsiness and give a positive result.
…
9.3 Traditional medicine
There have been reported
incidents of traditional medicine containing dagga, and other drugs.
Since there is no legislation regulating
the supply or reporting of
ingredients in traditional medicine, users must exercise extreme
caution to avoid exposing themselves
to the effect of prohibited
substances. Note that cannabis can remain in the body and cause an
adverse effect on performance for
up to five weeks.’
[8]
Mr Majola, a specialist security officer,
who performed the tests on the employee confirmed the testing
procedures and testified
that he performed the test on the employee
in accordance with the prescribed procedures. He said that there was
no reason why he
would not have recorded that the employee said that
he was taking medication if he had said so. He stated as follows in
relation
to random testing:
‘ …
Now,
not all employees were tested in the time that the applicant was
there, because the testing process relied on a random sampling
process. So, you can imagine that there were instances - there could
have been or there is a probability that an employee who was
not
tested on a random sampling test could be inside the plant under the
influence. So that is why then the onus was on the employee
to be
honest with the procedures. Now, if the employee could be found by
this process of random testing that he was in a state
- or tested
positive, then he would be dismissed, because remember the testing
happens as you try to enter the plant, so which
means it was taken as
being dishonest, that knowing that your results would be positive but
you are entering the site, then if
you are tested you will be
dismissed. Remember, if you are not tested, which means you go
through to the plant and then work under
these high risks.’
[9]
Dr Chandika, employed by the third
respondent as the occupational Medical Practitioner, testified in
relation to the Schweden Bitter
which the employee said he had
consumed. The bottle indicated that it contained 43% alcohol.
According to Dr Chandika, the volume
of alcohol in the Schweden
Bitter preparation approximated to that contained in a standard
bottle of whiskey, brandy or even white
spirits that is commercially
available. It was highly improbable that the volume which the
employee said he consumed would have
resulted in the concentrations
found in the alcohol test. The concentration of alcohol in a single
of spirits that is consumed
within an hour of testing would more
likely approximate to the results which he found. As alcohol is
metabolised in the body in
a certain way, it was more likely that
this reflected alcohol that had been consumed hours before.
Approximately 25 mls of spirits
needs to be consumed, that is 25 mls
of a 43% alcohol must be consumed by the average person who weighs
around 80 kg to approximate
to the result that was found.
Approximately 25 mls of a 43% spirits has to be consumed to give you
a result of 0.02 which was close
to 0.018. In other words, if a
person drank 5 mls they would only show up with a result of 0.004
which was 1/5 of the calculation.
The Schweden Bitter bottle directed
a dosage of 5 mls up to four times a day and the employee stated that
he had consumed approximately
5 mls. The employee would have had to
consume five times that amount to obtain the reading that was
actually obtained which was
why his version was improbable. The
employee had at no stage previously disclosed to him that he was
taking this medication. He
said that if this bottle had been declared
to him he would not have recommended that it be taken prior to
arriving at work as it
would have been a breach of the company
policy.
[10]
According to the employee, Ezekiel Naidoo,
the third respondent had in place at the time of his employment a
system of testing which
provided for daily mandatory testing for
every employee who entered the third respondent's premises, a random
testing where the
employee could be selected for random testing when
he swiped his card at the turnstile, and a voluntary testing where an
employee
could have himself tested if he suspected that there was
alcohol in his blood. He did not undertake the voluntary testing
since
he did not believe that he had alcohol in his blood. He tested
positive for alcohol in the mandatory first test, and was required
to
go to the clinic for the second test. The results of the first and
second tests where 0.018 and 0.010 respectively. He requested
a third
test which was because he was going to drive home himself. This was10
minutes after the second test. The result for this
test was 0.00. The
employee stated that he had consumed alcohol the previous night until
12pm but none on the day in question which
was why he did not submit
to voluntary testing. He had gone home at about 1 or 2 am. He
consumed the herbal medicine before going
into work so that it would
assist him with a back pain and his kidneys since he was working long
hours on the crane. He believed
that it was perhaps his previous
night's alcohol that could have raised the alcohol in his blood after
his consumption of the herbal
medication. He took this medication or
supplement while he was still at home just before he drove to work.
He been using the medication
since 18 April. He believed that he
should have been allowed to work after he tested 0.00 for alcohol. He
believed that the sanction
of dismissal was harsh because he was not
under the influence of alcohol at the time and was ready to take on
his shift. He believed
that the policy of zero alcohol in the blood
was unreasonable because it did not give employees a chance at all,
and there was
no policy which said that one could not consume alcohol
after hours at all.
[11]
The applicant’s grounds of review are
detailed inter alia as follows:
1.
The second respondent dismissed the
applicant’s case without properly applying his mind to material
evidence which justified
a different outcome.
2.
The second respondent failed to apply his
mind properly to material facts and documents before him when he
found the third respondent
had a rule completely banning employees
reporting to work with alcohol in their body system. The second
respondent failed to appreciate
that the third respondent had
mechanisms in place preventing employees with alcohol in their
bloodstream from entering the working
area. The employees were not
banned from reporting to work with alcohol but were not allowed in
the working area which is beyond
the security checking area. This was
so because employees who voluntarily tested positive to alcohol were
afforded a grace period
to wait until alcohol levels in their
bloodstreams was 0.00%. This could not be so if employees were
completely banned from reporting
for work with alcohol in their
bloodstreams. The second respondent therefore committed gross
irregularity and or exceeded his powers
when making this finding.
3.
The second respondent further committed
gross irregularity in finding that the applicant acted irresponsibly
in not voluntarily
testing prior to entering the workplace. The
second respondent fails to appreciate that the testing area is at the
security checking
area which is where voluntary testing could have
taken place which was also the place where the applicant was tested.
The applicant
did not enter the workplace. The second respondent
further failed to appreciate the evidence of the applicant that he
did not suspect
that he had any alcohol in the bloodstream which
could have triggered voluntary testing.
4.
The second respondent committed gross
irregularity and or failed to apply his mind to material evidence
when he found that the rule
was appropriate and in line with testing
procedures available especially in the absence of mandatory testing
procedures at the
time. The second respondent fails to appreciate the
evidence that mandatory testing was in place and in fact the
applicant tested
positive to alcohol during mandatory testing. The
policy of the employer included in the bundle of documents clearly
showed that
mandatory testing was in place. At the time of the
testing of the applicant there were mandatory testing, random testing
as well
as voluntary testing. Mandatory testing was in place to
mitigate the risk of employees entering the workplace with alcohol in
their
bloodstream. The second respondent in making this finding
disregarded the charge that was laid against the applicant which
clearly
stated that the applicant was charged with testing positive
for alcohol during mandatory testing and not random testing.
5.
The second respondent failed to take into
account common cause facts that employees who now test positive to
alcohol do not get
dismissed but get a final written warning. This
fact demonstrated that the old rule was not connected to the safety
measures but
were extreme and unreasonable.
6.
The second respondent failed to apply his
mind and misconstrued the rule because it did not speak of employees
voluntarily testing
if they consumed alcohol the night before. It
simply said that employees must voluntarily test if they had a
suspicion of alcohol
in their blood stream.
7.
The second respondent failed to have regard
to material evidence properly before him when he found that mandatory
testing was introduced
in the new policy whereas it was always
existing in the old policy. The only thing introduced by the new
policy was the relaxation
of the rule with regard to positive
testing. It was relaxed from 0.00% to 0.002% according to the expert
witness.
8.
The second respondent committed gross
irregularity in relation to his duties and or did not apply his mind
to the facts when he
found that the rule that employees should have a
reading of 0.00% during testing is not unreasonable and
scientifically impossible
to maintain. These rules simply prevented
employees from using alcohol outside working hours, all in fear of
testing positive.
The rule did not only encroach into workers
personal rights to consume alcohol but also did not aim at ensuring
safety in the workplace.
The rule would have been reasonable if it
regulated the use of alcohol to be in line with what has been
scientifically proven not
to impair the decision making ability of
the employee. But in a company that employs more than 1500 adult
employees ‘it is
bound to have drinking employees’. This
is supported by the fact that the third respondent relaxed the rule
after the dismissal
of the applicant and allowed some level of
alcohol in the workplace and also changed the sanction for testing
above the new limit
from dismissal to final written warning. This
evidence can only suggest that the third respondent acknowledged the
difficulty of
ensuring that all employees test 0.00% to alcohol thus
rendering the old rule unreasonable. The second respondent despite
this
evidence still believed that the old rule was reasonable to
justify the dismissal of the applicant. The rule that seeks to
enforce
discipline on an employee for merely testing positive for
alcohol is not a reasonable rule.
9.
The second respondent committed gross
irregularity in finding that the applicant's challenge was that
positive alcohol testing was
not caused by alcohol but was caused by
medication. The applicant clearly testified that he was not aware
what caused the positive
alcohol testing between alcohol consumption
or taking of medication. The employee stated that the use of
medication could have
triggered the alcohol consumed the previous day
since the medication also had this alcohol. This was also confirmed
by the expert
witness who said this was possible. The second
respondent therefore misdirected himself and or misconstrued the
nature of the inquiry.
10.
The second respondent committed gross
irregularity and/ or did not apply his mind and or exceeded his
powers with regard to the
inquiry and evidence before him when he
found that in the 25 minutes in which the applicant's alcohol reached
zero he could have
entered the workplace and caused serious injuries
to fellow workers. Besides this being an unjustified exaggeration by
the second
respondent he fails to appreciate the fact that the
applicant was not charged and dismissed for being under the influence
of alcohol
but he was dismissed for merely testing positive. He
further failed to take into account the evidence of the medical
expert who
clearly said that the alcohol level in the bloodstream of
the applicant was low and could not have impaired the decision-making
ability of the applicant. The second respondent in his finding is
simply assuming the worst without supporting evidence, in fact
with
evidence suggesting the contrary.
11.
The second respondent committed gross
irregularity and or failed to apply his mind in finding that the
applicant’s dismissal
was appropriate without considering the
evidence. It was always the case of the applicant that dismissal was
not an appropriate
sanction. The only response to this question from
the third respondent was that dismissal was appropriate because the
rules said
so at that time. There was no evidence or other factors
that could justify dismissal as a sanction.
12.
The second respondent correctly quotes six
considerations that must be taken into account in deciding whether
dismissal was an appropriate
sanction. In his finding the
commissioner considers only two of the six considerations. He
considered the importance of the rule
as well as the reasons the
employer imposed the sanction of dismissal. In his finding the second
responded incorrectly and wrongly
found that the employer's reason
for the sanction was justified taking into account that the new rules
with regard to alcohol testing
are distinguishable by the absence of
mandatory testing from the old rules. This finding is therefore based
on incorrect facts.
I have stated above that mandatory testing was
always in place. He found that in terms of the old testing rules only
random testing
and voluntary testing were in place. He fails to
consider the evidence of the applicant with regard to the procedure
for random
testing that it was carried out through parading of an
access card and that the applicant's access card was not paraded: in
fact
he made no finding on this.
13.
The second respondent further committed
gross irregularity in that he failed to consider whether there was
any harm caused by the
applicants conduct. Had he made such a
consideration he would have come to a conclusion that no harm was
caused by the conduct
of the applicant more especially where it was
common cause that the applicants alcohol testing results were 0.00%
in a space of
25 minutes. As well as the evidence of the doctor which
stated that the applicant was not under the influence of alcohol.
14.
The second respondent failed to consider
whether additional training and instruction may have resulted in the
applicant not repeating
the misconduct. If the second respondent
considered this he would have concluded that repeating of the offence
would not have occurred
more especially now that the employee
voluntarily requested the third alcohol testing after 20 minutes of
the first test in order
to demonstrate that he was not a danger in
the workplace.
15.
The second respondent failed to take into
account the effect of dismissal on the applicant. It is commonly
known that the steel
industry in the country is experiencing massive
retrenchments as a result it would be difficult to find alternative
employment
having been dismissed for testing positive for alcohol
just because the rule says he must be dismissed.
16.
The second respondent failed to consider
the service record of the applicant. He had 13 years’ service,
and dismissal for
testing positive for alcohol and negative within 25
minutes was grossly unfair.
17.
The second respondent failed to apply his
mind and misconstrued the rule because it did not speak of employees
voluntarily testing
if they consumed alcohol the night before. It
simply said that employees must voluntarily test if they had a
suspicion of alcohol
in their blood stream.
18.
The second respondent failed to have regard
to material evidence properly before him when he found that mandatory
testing was introduced
in the new policy whereas it was always
existing in the old policy. The only thing introduced by the new
policy was the relaxation
of the rule with regard to positive
testing. It was relaxed from 0.00% to 0.002% according to the expert
witness.
19.
The second respondent’s award was not
one that a reasonable decision maker could make.
Legal principles
[12]
Section 145 of the Act provides that any
party to a dispute alleging a defect in any arbitration proceedings
may apply to the Labour
Court for an order setting aside the
arbitration award, and ‘defect’ is given the following
meaning:
(a)
that the arbitrator
(i)
committed misconduct in relation to the
duties of the arbitrator as an arbitrator;
(ii)
committed a gross irregularity in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings; or
(iii)
exceeded the arbitrator’s powers; or
(b)
that an award has been improperly obtained.
[13]
It
is now trite that the requirements for the review of an award under
the Act are stringent and that the applicable test in reviews
is that
of reasonableness: an award of an arbitrator of the CCMA or a
Bargaining Council is reviewable if the decision reached
by the
arbitrator was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not
reach.
[2]
[14]
In
Herholdt
v Nedbank Limited
[3]
,
the
Supreme Court of Appeal stated as follows:
‘
[25]
… Material errors of fact, as well as weight and relevance to
be attached to particular facts, are not in and of themselves
sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of any
consequence if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.’
[15]
In
Gold
Fields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others
[4]
,
it was stated that ‘in short, a reviewing court must ascertain
whether the arbitrator considered the principal issue before
him/her;
evaluated the facts presented at the hearing and came to a conclusion
that is reasonable.’ The Labour Appeal Court
went on to state
per Waglay JP as follows:
‘
[20]
The
questions to ask are these: (i) In terms of his or her duty to deal
with the matter with the minimum of legal formalities, did
the
process that the arbitrator employed give the parties a full
opportunity to have their say in respect of the dispute? (ii)
Did the
arbitrator identify the dispute he was required to arbitrate (this
may in certain cases only become clear after both parties
have led
their evidence)? (iii) Did the arbitrator understand the nature of
the dispute he or she was required to arbitrate? (iv)
Did he or she
deal with the substantial merits of the dispute? and (v) Is the
arbitrator’s decision one that another decision-maker
could
reasonably have arrived at based on the evidence?’
[16]
More
recently, in Delmas Coal (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others
[5]
, the Labour Court, having regard to
Gold
Fields Mining SA
[6]
and
Department
of Education v Mofokeng & others
[7]
,
summed
up the position as follows:
‘
[10] What this
analysis requires is that the review court determine first whether
the arbitrator perpetrated any ‘defect’
or irregularity
contemplated by s 145 (2). Secondly, the court must have regard to
the distorting effect that the error may have
had on the outcome of
the arbitrator’s award. Thirdly, if it is reasonably clear that
but for the identified error relied
upon the award would have been
different or cannot stand on its own reasoning, then the award is
prima facie
an unreasonable award. Finally, the court must
have regard to the issues and the evidence as a whole to determine
whether or not
the outcome is nevertheless capable of being sustained
on the
Sidumo
test. Put more plainly, the review court must
ask whether but for the defect, a reasonable decision-maker could
have come to the
conclusion reached in the award on the same
material.
[11] When conducting this
analysis, the review court must avoid falling into the trap of what
the Labour Appeal Court in
Gold Fields
referred to as a
‘piecemeal analysis’ of each of the arbitrator’s
findings. The question to be answered ultimately
is whether on the
totality of the evidence, a relationship of reasonableness exists
between that evidence and the result reached
by the arbitrator have
committed.’
[17]
Ultimately, the applicant in this case is
required to establish that the award was one that could not have been
made by a reasonable
decision-maker on the evidence presented.
Evaluation
[18]
At the commencement of his analysis of the
evidence, the arbitrator reminded himself that he was required to
consider whether
a.
there was a rule in place at the workplace;
b.
whether the rule was known to the employee;
c.
whether the rule was reasonable;
d.
whether the rule was breached; and
e.
whether the sanction applied was
appropriate.
[19]
He then set out to deal with each in turn.
[20]
The applicant submitted that the arbitrator
dismissed the applicant’s case without properly applying his
mind to material
evidence which justified a different outcome. The
applicant set out 17 grounds of review which are recorded above.
[21]
With regard to the question whether there
was a rule in the workplace and whether it was a reasonable rule, the
arbitrator recorded
the following in his award:
‘
112.
I now consider whether there is a rule in place at the workplace. It
is not disputed and was not contested that at the time
the applicant
was employed, there was in place at the workplace a 0.00% alcohol
limit. It is also common cause that the respondent
had in place a
system of disclosure where employees were prescribed medication. They
had to disclose this to the company's medical
practitioner and to the
testing officer.
113. The next question
then is, is the rule reasonable. Mr Sibeko lead evidence that where
the applicant works are bake furnaces,
vehicles, machinery and
forklifts moving around. More appropriate to the present dispute he
testified that where the applicant
works are cranes overhead which
maneuver large one ton anodes below and which are placed in bake
furnaces to harden in the process
of making aluminium.
114. In line with this I
would be amiss if I did not emphasize the importance of having a rule
completely banning employees reporting
to work with alcohol in their
body system. It is also reasonable to hold employees accountable for
not volunteering where they
know they had something to drink the
night before especially in the case of the applicant who consumed
alcohol at 12:00 am, the
early hours of the day of the incident. It
is also reasonable to have in place a rule obliging employees to
disclose any medication
they may be taking as this could inhibit the
ability of employees and cause risk and danger to other employees and
equipment of
the respondent. The inherent dangers associated with the
applicant's job emphasized the need to have such a rule in place at
the
workplace.
115. It is not disputed
that the applicant was aware of the rule against reporting for duty
with more than 0.00% alcohol in his
system. The rule is accordingly
reasonable as the rationale behind the rule is sound as it is
designed to provide a safe environment
for employees.’
[22]
The evidence presented at the arbitration
hearing has been deliberately detailed with a view to understanding
the issues raised
by the applicant.
[23]
It is clear from the evidence that the
third respondent’s workplace was not a safe environment unless
there were strict rules
in place in terms of safety, and its
employees were aware of the rules. The third respondent's policies
and procedures as presented
by Mr Sibeko were not disputed. It was
also not in dispute that the applicant was aware of the third
respondent’s policies
and procedures relating to the
consumption of alcohol and alcohol testing. The policy provided for
·
random or unannounced testing,
·
voluntary testing, and
·
mandatory testing based on risk.
[24]
It was also clear from Mr Majola’s
evidence that the third respondent relied only on random testing at
the time. The risks
were great and emphasis was placed on the
employees making their own assessments as to whether they were free
of alcohol or drugs
when they commenced duties. The rule was clearly
based on trust. To this end, the employees had an opportunity to
undertake a voluntary
test before they entered the company premises
if they suspected they might not pass a random test. Once they had
passed the turnstiles,
and if they were selected for random testing,
they had to obtain a 0.00% result to enter the plant.
[25]
It was therefor surprising that the
employee presented a version that there was a daily mandatory testing
system which is simply
not supported by the evidence as a whole,
including the documentary evidence. If there was already a mandatory
testing system in
place, there would have been no need to introduce
the new procedures in February 2014. I will revert to the issue of
the new procedures
later. It is clear the word ‘mandatory’
in the charge refers to mandatory testing once the employee is
selected for
random testing. It is then that the testing becomes
mandatory.
[26]
The applicant’s submission that the
commissioner failed to apply his mind to the material facts when the
commissioner made
a finding on the importance of having a rule
‘completely banning’ employees from reporting to work
with alcohol in
their system is not justified. Firstly, there was in
fact no ban on the consumption of alcohol in the employees’
private
lives as the applicant suggests. The alcohol policy did not
seek to control the lives of employees outside the workplace as the
applicant suggests. It sought to ensure that employees were free of
alcohol and drugs when they entered the workplace for the safety
of
the workplace and its employees which is a reasonable requirement,
particularly in the case of the third respondent’s
operations.
The context in which the word was used by the arbitrator clearly
refers to the third respondent’s 0.00% alcohol
policy which the
arbitrator found reasonable in the circumstances of this case.
[27]
With regard to the question whether the
rule was breached, the arbitrator stated as follows:
‘
116.
I now consider whether the rule was breached. It is common cause that
the applicant when tested recorded a reading of 0.018%
which is in
breach of the rule requiring employees to report for duty with 0.00%
alcohol in their body system.
117. What is disputed is
that the cause of the positive reading was from consuming alcohol.
The applicant testified that the cause
of the positive alcohol
reading was the medication he had taken. He testified that he was
unaware that the medication he had taken
had an alcohol content of
40% as it is labeled as herbal medication. He also did not disclose
the medication to the testing officer
Mr Majola, as he did not know
that it had alcohol in it.’
[28]
According to the applicant, the arbitrator
committed gross irregularity in finding that the applicant's
challenge was that positive
alcohol testing was not caused by alcohol
but was caused by medication. According to the applicant he clearly
testified that he
was not aware what caused the positive alcohol
testing between alcohol consumption and taking of the medication and
that he stated
that the use of medication could have triggered the
alcohol consumed the previous day since the medication also had
alcohol. In
this way, so it was contended, the arbitrator misdirected
himself and misconstrued the nature of the inquiry.
[29]
This was the applicant’s
evidence-in-chief at the arbitration hearing:
‘
Oh,
okay. So you consumed alcohol, but around that one o'clock you went
to sleep_ --- Yes, 1:00/2:00 I was at home.
…
Before you went to work
did you consume any other thing that might have raised your alcohol
level, or that might have caused your
blood to have an alcohol limit,
a level in your blood? --- No, beside, I remember I was - I slept and
I still slept through during
the day as well. And, ja, when I got up,
I got ready for work, the only thing I took was some of the Scweden
Bitter to assist me.
…
Okay, you are referring
to what? --- The medication.
…
Okay, why you did not
declare this one? --- Because according to me it was a herbal
supplement, I didn't consider it medication
at the time.
But then how does the
supplement that you are referring to applies into your case, why is
it an issue? --- You mean like taking
it?
I'm saying why are we
discussing this medication? --- Because at the time, I didn't realize
there was alcohol in this medication
and I was using it at the time
while I was - because of our situation at work, where I was working
things had changed a bit, we
weren't working according to your –
okay, the way we worked was a rotational system, two days in a
certain position and then
we change. So, I needed something to assist
me, because I was having some problems with my back, my lower back,
and I was subjected
to working on the crane for, I think at the time
it was four months straight. And I needed something else to assist me
to just
help me through that, to assist me with the back pain and
stuff. So I was using the stuff, it was mainly for my kidneys.
…
But this supplement has
anything to do with what you've tested as a result of your alcohol
test? --- You know what, it's what I've
taken and then I went in. I
don't know maybe if maybe my previous night's alcohol could have - if
this could have affected it in
any way, or if it could have
what-you-call-it, what's the word? if it could have – ja, like,
you know, …[intervention]
Could have raised the
alcohol of your blood? --- Yes, and that's what - and when I went
through the turnstile I tested positive.
And if I had known that
there was alcohol, I would have definitely have went through a
voluntary testing.
So basically you
submitted this to indicate as being the only thing that you took
before work? --- Yes
And what time did you
take the supplement? --- Just before I went to work, I took some at
home and I drove to work.’
[30]
The following is noted from the employee’s
evidence:
(a)
It is not clear how the Schweden Bitter
would have the ‘raised the alcohol’ in the employee’s
blood unless it
itself contained alcohol.
(b)
If this is so, then surely the employee’s
defence is that he unknowingly took medication that contained
alcohol?
(c)
During cross-examination the employee
stated that the pharmacist had recommended the medication to him, and
that he had not seen
the ingredients of the medication because the
label was covered with a sticker until it was removed by the
chairperson at the disciplinary
enquiry. This response provides no
explanation as to why or how he decided to declare it in his defence
of the allegation against
him.
(d)
When he was later asked when he first
became aware that the medication contained alcohol, he responded that
it was in the evening
after he was suspended from work that he
realized that this medication had alcohol in it. This response
provides no explanation
as to how he came to know that the
medication, the Schweden Bitter, contained alcohol when the sticker
covered the ingredients.
(e)
The point is that it was the applicant who
presented the Schweden Bitter as a factor which, according to him,
‘raised the
alcohol of his blood’.
(f)
If it was not his contention that it was
the medication that caused the reading of 0.018, then he has not
stated as much in his
version.
(g)
His version suggests one of two things:
either that his reading would have been 0.00% if not for the Schweden
Bitter, or it might
have been something lower that 0.018 if not for
the Schweden Bitter.
[31]
The applicant’s assertion that the
arbitrator incorrectly found that his challenge was that the positive
reading was caused
by the Schweden Bitter is not justified.
[32]
Dr Chandika said that it was improbable
that the medication could have been the cause of the positive
reading.
[33]
The employee clearly attempted to obfuscate
the issues with
(a)
a version that the third respondent had a
system of mandatory testing in place whilst he was still in
employment (whereas it was
also common cause that the mandatory
system was only introduced two years later),
(b)
a contention that he had consumed Schweden
Bitter but it was not his defence that that caused the positive
reading;
(c)
his contradictory evidence about when he
realized there was alcohol in the Schweden Bitter; and
(d)
his general evasiveness which was evident
throughout the transcript of the arbitration hearing.
[34]
With regard to the issue of the sanction of
dismissal, the applicant contended essentially that the arbitrator
did not consider
all of the factors which he was required to in terms
of the Sidumo judgment.
[35]
In
Sidumo
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd
[8]
,
the Constitutional Court
listed
a number of factors (which is not a closed list) that a arbitrator
must consider when deciding on the fairness of a dismissal.
These
factors are
(i)
the importance of the rule that was
breached;
(ii)
the reason the employer imposed the sanction of
dismissal;
(iii)
the basis of the employee’s challenge to the
dismissal;
(iv)
the harm caused by the employee’s conduct;
(v)
whether additional training and instruction may
result in the employee not repeating the misconduct;
(vi)
the effect of dismissal on the employee; and
(vii)
the long-service record of the employee.
[36]
The arbitrator reiterated the importance of
the rule in the workplace. He did not address the fact that no harm
was actually caused
by the employee’s conduct, whether
additional training and instruction might have resulted in the
employee not repeating
the misconduct, the effect of dismissal on the
employee, and the employee’s service record.
[37]
It is trite that an arbitrator does not
have to list every factor that he took into account in reaching a
conclusion.
[38]
In the present case, an additional factor
was raised which was that the third respondent had since the
dismissal of the employee
introduced a new alcohol policy. The third
respondent re-called Mr Sibeko to deal with this issue which was
raised by the applicant.
He adequately explained the rationale behind
the new policy and the fact that it was implemented with the blessing
of the trade
union. The reason why an employee would not be dismissed
on the first offence is that the third respondent is now able to test
everyone who enters the premises, and the risk of an employee
entering the workplace whilst under the influence of alcohol is now
eliminated as everyone is tested. Mr Sibeko stated that although the
alcohol limit is now 0.002%, anyone detected with
any
alcohol in their system is not allowed to enter premises unless the
reading is 0.00%.
[39]
It is correct that had the incident
occurred after February 2014 under mandatory testing, the employee
might have been issued with
a final written warning. However, the
incident in question occurred in 2012, two years prior to the
implementation of the new policy.
It is pertinent in the
circumstances of the employee’s case that his commission of the
offence involved an element of dishonesty.
I am in agreement with the
arbitrator’s finding that there was no inconsistency in the
application of the rule.
[40]
The question ultimately is whether the
decision of the arbitrator is one that a reasonable decision-maker
would not make.
[41]
Having regard to the evidence in its
totality, I find that the decision of the arbitrator was one that a
reasonable decision maker
could make.
Conclusion
[42]
I find that the review application must
fail.
[43]
Since costs do not follow the results in
labour matters, I do not find that it is necessary to make a costs
award against the applicant.
Narini
Hiralall
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicant:
Ms
P. Ramlall
Instructed
by: HBR
Attorneys Inc.
For
the Respondent:
Mr
Alexander
Instructed
by: Norton
Rose Fulbright SA Inc.
[1]
Act
66 of 1995
[2]
Sidumo
& Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others, (2007)
28 ILJ 2405 (CC)
[3]
(2013)
34
ILJ
2795
(SCA)
[4]
(2014)
35
ILJ
943
(LAC)
[5]
Judgment
of the Labour Court per Van Niekerk J, dated 12 June 2018, Case no.
J440/17 at paragraph
[6]
supra
[7]
[2015] 1 BLLR 50
(LAC)
[8]
[2007] ZACC 22
;
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC);
2008 (2) BCLR 158
(CC)
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