Case Law[2023] ZALCC 19South Africa
Daniels and Others v M and Y Tombstone Granite Works (Pty) Ltd and Others (LCC161/2022) [2023] ZALCC 19 (23 March 2023)
Land Claims Court of South Africa
23 March 2023
Headnotes
AT RANDBURG
Judgment
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# South Africa: Land Claims Court
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## Daniels and Others v M and Y Tombstone Granite Works (Pty) Ltd and Others (LCC161/2022) [2023] ZALCC 19 (23 March 2023)
Daniels and Others v M and Y Tombstone Granite Works (Pty) Ltd and Others (LCC161/2022) [2023] ZALCC 19 (23 March 2023)
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sino date 23 March 2023
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE LAND CLAIMS
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT RANDBURG
CASE NO: LCC
161/2022
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
NOT REVISED
23.03.23
In
the matter between:
LORRAINE
DANIELS
First
Applicant
GAVIN
DANIELS
Second
Applicant
LINDSAY
BRITTON
Third
Applicant
LORRENTIA
DANIELS
Fourth
Applicant
(And
all those holding title under The 1
st
to 3
rd
Applicants)
Fifth
Applicant
And
M&Y
TOMBSTONE GRANITE WORKS (PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
DEPARTMENT
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REFORM
Second
Respondent
THE
CITY OF CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
NCUBE J
Introduction
[1] This is an
application for restoration of residence in terms of section 14 of
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,
Act 62 of 1997 (“the
Act”). The application is opposed. It was brought on urgent
basis. I dispensed with the rules
relating to form, service and time
lines and issued directives for filing of affidavits. In terms of the
directives, the first
respondent was supposed to file and deliver its
Notice to Oppose and the answering affidavit on or before 23 November
2022. The
answering affidavit was only filed on16 December 2022,
hence the application for condonation.
Condonation
[2]
The first respondent filed its answering affidavit 21 days late. It
was filed on 14 December 2022. In terms of the Rules,
the court may,
on sufficient cause shown, excuse the parties from compliance with
the Rules. The legal principles relating to condonation
were analysed
in
Melane
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd
[1]
:
Holmes JA said:
“
In
deciding whether sufficient cause has been shown, the basic principle
is that the court has a discretion, to be exercised judicially
upon a
consideration of all the facts, and in essence it is a matter of
fairness to both sides. Among the facts usually relevant
are the
degree of lateness, the explanation therefore, the prospects of
success, and the importance of the case. Ordinarily these
facts, are
interrelated: they are not individually decisive, for that would be a
piecemeal approach incompatible with a true discretion,
save of
course that if there are no prospects of success there would be no
point in granting condonation. Any attempt to formulate
the rule of
thumb would only serve to harden the arteries of what should be a
flexible discretion. What is needed is an objective
conspectus of all
the facts. Thus a light delay and good explanation may help to
compensate prospects which are not strong. Or
the importance of the
issue and strong prospects of success may tend to compensate for a
long delay. And the respondent’s
interests in finality must not
be overlooked.”
[3] In
casu
,
the first respondent avers that the delay was caused by the fact that
the first respondent first attempted a settlement agreement
with the
applicants. The applicants rejected the agreement. Secondly, the
first respondent assisted, the applicants to find alternative
accommodation; which accommodation was also rejected by the
applicants. The representatives of the first respondent Beverley
Janine
Naidoo (“Ms Naidoo”) avers firstly that the first
respondent, as a church and a grave yard, is extremely busy with
burials and exhumations and did not have time to consult with her
legal representative. This is not acceptable explanation. It is
proof
that Ms Naidoo does not take this court seriously.
[4] There was not
even a need for her to engage into negotiations with the applicants
before she could respond to court directives.
It seems Ms Naidoo’s
funerals and exhumations were more important than this court. The
rule of law requires citizens to respect
the authority of the courts.
This condonation application is opposed by the applicants and rightly
so and it should be dismissed.
However, as I want to deal with the
merits of this application once and for all, I shall exercise my
discretion and condone the
late filing.
Factual Background
[5] The second
applicant (“Mr Daniels”) was employed by the first
respondent in 2018 as a grave digger and for
the manufacturing of
tombstones. Mr Daniels was given consent to reside on the premises
described as Farm 821 Erf 821 Portion 3,
Williston Road, a Division
of Cape Road, Cape Town. He moved into the premises with members of
his family being the first, third,
fourth and fifth applicants. The
first respondent subsequently became aware of the fact that Mr
Daniels was then staying with his
family members on the property. Mr
Daniels’ initial employment period was for six (6) months.
[6] When the period
of six months expired and the employment terminated, Mr Daniels and
family continued residing on the property
as occupiers. This was with
the consent of Ms Naidoo who gave them the additional period of ten
(10) months. In October 2021, the
first respondent commenced
proceeding in this court for the eviction of Mr Daniels and his
family members. The eviction application
is opposed and it still
pending, in this court.
[7] On 23 October
2022, the applicants were threatened at gunpoint by certain people
and forced to leave the property. Realizing
that their lives were in
danger, the first applicant (“Mrs Daniels”) requested Mr
Daniels to try and seek alternative
accommodation for the family the
following day. On the following day, the same people returned at
night and informed the applicants
that it was the last warning and
they had to leave the property. On 25 October 2022 the applicants
left the property. They went
to a friend’s (“Mr Peter”)
place in Mannenburg where Mr Peter provided them with a one room
accommodation. On
26 October 2022 the first respondent demolished the
house which had been occupied by the applicants, leaving the
applicants with
no shelter over their heads.
[8] On 15 November
2022, the applicants issued a Notice of Motion in this court, seeking
restoration of residence pending
outcome of the pending eviction
application. The application was brought on urgent basis. I condoned
non-compliance with the rules
relating to form, service and time
lines. I issued directives with regard to the filing of affidavits
and other documents. I ordered
the first respondent to find
alternative accommodation for the applicants in the meantime. The
first respondent secured a shack
at the informal settlement as
alternative accommodation for the applicants. The applicants rejected
the shack as it did not constitute
suitable alternative
accommodation.
Issues
[9] The main issue
to be decided is whether the first respondent evicted the applicants
from the property and demolished the
building they were occupying
without a court order. Ms Naidoo, person in charge of first
respondent, deposed to an answering affidavit
and denied that the
applicants were evicted without a court order. She also denied that
the house was demolished whilst the applicants
were still in
occupation. According to Ms Naidoo, the applicants, on several
occasions approached her asking for money for relocation
or they
voluntarily left the property after they had been threatened by
certain people. According to Ms Naidoo, the house was demolished
because it was then vacant and being used by criminals for their
criminal activities.
Discussion
[10]
This is just another example of the plight of landless people of
South Africa. In terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution
of the
Republic of South Africa Act
[2]
everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing. In terms of
section 26(3), no one may be evicted from their home or have
their
home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all
the relevant circumstances and no legislation may permit
arbitrary
eviction. It is the State which is enjoined to take legislative and
other measures to achieve progressive realization
of the right to
housing
[3]
, but within its
available resources.
[11]
In realization of a right to adequate housing, parliament enacted the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act
[4]
(“ESTA”). The long title to ESTA describes the purpose of
ESTA as:
“
to
provide for measures with State assistance to facilitate long-term
security of land tenure, to regulate the condition of residence
on
certain land; to regulate conditions on and circumstances under which
the right of persons to reside on land may be terminated;
and to
regulate the conditions and circumstances under which persons, whose
right to residence has been terminated, may be evicted
from land; and
to provide for matters connected therewith.”
[12]
In
Department
of Land Affairs and Others v Goedgededen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd
[5]
the
Constitutional Court held that ESTA is remedial legislation, which is
umbilically linked to the Constitution. What is most relevant
is that
the Constitution prohibits the demolition of a person’s home
without a court order, which is granted after considering
all the
relevant circumstances. To that end, no one is mandated to take the
law into his or her own hands, not even the owner of
the land on
which the occupier resides. The applicants were resident on the
property with consent of the person in charge, Ms Naidoo.
Therefore,
the applicants enjoyed protection under ESTA.
[13] Section 14 of
ESTA provides:
“
14
Restoration of residence and use of land and payment of damages-
(1)
A person who has been evicted contrary to the provisions of this Act
may institute proceedings in a court for an order in terms
of
subsection (3).
(2) A person who-
(a) would have had a
right to reside on land in terms of section 6 if the provisions of
this Act had been in force on 4 February
1997; and
(b) was evicted for any
reason or by any process between 4 February 1997 and the commencement
of this Act, may institute proceedings
in a court for an order in
terms of subsection (3).
(3) In proceedings in
terms of subsection (1) or (2) the court may, subject to the
conditions that it may impose, make an order-
(a) for the restoration
of residence on and use of land by the person concerned, on such
terms as it deems just;
(b) for the repair,
reconstruction or replacement of any building, structure,
installation or thing that was peacefully occupied
or used by the
person immediately prior to his or her eviction, in so far as it was
damaged, demolished or destroyed during or
after such eviction;
(c) for the restoration
of any services to which the person had a right in terms of section
6;
(d) for the payment of
compensation contemplated in section 13;
(e) for the payment of
damages, including but not limited to damages for suffering or
inconvenience caused by the eviction; and
(f) for costs.
(4) ….
(a) ….
(b) ….
(i) ….
(ii)
….”
[14] It is evident
that there are at least three disputes of fact in this matter but
they are not material. Those disputes
relate to the reason for the
applicants to vacate the property, whether the applicants requested
Ms Naidoo for financial assistance
to leave and lastly, whether the
applicants were still in occupation of the house when it was
demolished. The fact of the matter
is that the applicants’
accommodation was demolished without a Court Order. Ms Naidoo knew
very well that there was a pending
eviction application. Ms Naidoo
was supposed to contact her attorney and report that the applicants
were asking for money and ask
for advice. Even if it is true that the
applicants had vacated the house, Ms Naidoo was not supposed to
demolish the house without
first seeking legal advice from her
attorney.
[15]
On the question of suitable alternative accommodation, there is
evidence that the parties tried to get alternative accommodation.
The
applicants rejected the accommodation. From the photographs attached
to the papers, there is no doubt that the accommodation
which was
identified as suitable alternatives accommodation was not suitable at
all. The said accommodation was in the informal
settlement, which is
different from the property where the applicant was resident before.
The demolished house was built of bricks
compared to a shack at the
informal settlement.
[16]
ESTA defines “suitable alternative accommodation” thus:
“
Suitable
alternative accommodation
means alternative
accommodation which is safe overall not less favourable than the
occupiers’ previous situation, having regard
to the residential
accommodation and land for agricultural use available to them prior
to eviction, and suitable having regards
to-
(a)
the reasonable needs and requirements of all of
the occupiers in the household in question for residential
accommodation, land for
agricultural use, and services;
(b)
their joint earning abilities; and
(c)
the need to reside in proximity to opportunities
for employment or other economic activities if they intend to be
economically active.”
[17] From the above
definition, it is crystal clear that the so called alternative
accommodation was definitely not suitable.
Amongst the occupiers
there were school going children and sick people who need chronic
medication. There is no indication that
there were schools and
clinics in the nearby vicinity. In the ordinary course of events, the
first respondent should be ordered
to rebuild the demolished house on
the same property where it was. However, parties agree that
rebuilding is not an option because
of criminals. Crime is rife in
the area. The boundary wall is destroyed. Criminals have free access
to the property and they steal
building material. The only valuable
option, is to build or secure alternative accommodation for the
applicants somewhere.
Costs
[18]
The practice in this court is not to make costs awards unless there
are exceptional circumstance justifying an award of costs.
In the
present case, there are no such exceptional circumstances.
Order
[19] In the result,
I make the following order:
1.
Noncompliance with the Rules relating to form,
service and timelines is condoned and the application is dealt with
as one of urgency.
2.
The application is granted.
3.
Pending the finalization of the application in
case number LCC193/2021, the first respondent is ordered to provide
suitable alternative
accommodation to the applicants, which
accommodation must be of the same size and standard as the
accommodation that was occupied
by the applicants prior to the
demolition of that house which was situated at Portion 3 of farm 82;
Williston Road, a division
of Cape Road, Cape Town.
4.
The Second respondent is ordered to approve the
alternative, accommodation secured by the first respondent in the
event of the applicants
and the first respondent disagree on the
standard of the accommodation.
5.
In the event of the first respondent failing to
secure suitable alternative accommodation, the first respondent is
hereby ordered
to pay financial compensation to the applicants. The
amount of such compensation shall be sufficient to cover the costs of
building
a house of the size of the house which was previously
occupied by the applicants before demolition.
6.
The amount of financial compensation shall be
determined by the second respondent after assessing the building plan
of the demolished
house.
7.
The first respondent is ordered to show the
building plan of the demolished house to the second respondent.
8.
In case the building plan is not available the
second respondent shall determine the amount of compensation in
accordance with the
market value of the houses of the same size as
the house which was occupied by the applicants prior to demolition.
9.
There is no order as to costs.
M T Ncube
Judge:
Land Claims Court of South Africa
Date of hearing: 23
January 2023
Judgment delivered: 23
March 2023
Appearances
For
First to Fifth Applicants:
Makua,
C
Instructed
by:
Legal
Aid South Africa
Wynberg
For
the First Respondent:
Reid,
R
Instructed
by:
Reid
Attorneys
Cape
Town
For
Second & Third Respondents:
No
appearance
[1]
1962
(4) SA 531 (A)
[2]
Act
108 of 1996.
[3]
Section
26 (2).
[4]
Act
No 62 of 1997.
[5]
[2007] ZACC 12
;
2007
(6) SA 199
(CC)
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