Case Law[2022] ZALCC 33South Africa
Simelane v De Villiers N.O. and Others (LCC 133/2022) [2022] ZALCC 33 (28 November 2022)
Headnotes
AT RANDBURG
Judgment
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# South Africa: Land Claims Court
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## Simelane v De Villiers N.O. and Others (LCC 133/2022) [2022] ZALCC 33 (28 November 2022)
Simelane v De Villiers N.O. and Others (LCC 133/2022) [2022] ZALCC 33 (28 November 2022)
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sino date 28 November 2022
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IN THE LAND CLAIMS
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT RANDBURG
CASE NO: LCC 133/2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
REVISED.
28
November 2022
In
the matter between:
MATHEBA
KLAAS SIMELANE
Applicant
And
NICOLAAS
JOHANNES DE VILLIERS N.O
1
st
Respondent
PIERRE
DE VILLIERS
N.O
2
nd
Respondent
NJH
GENERAL DEALER
T/A
MANTSOPA ANIMAL POUND
3
rd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
COWEN
J
1.
This is a
semi-urgent application in which the applicant, Mr Matheba Klaas
Simelane, seeks the return of his 13 (thirteen) cattle,
impounded
during July 2022. Mr Simelane resides on a farm known as Farm P
[....] [....], Reitz, situated in the Magisterial District
of Reitz
(P [....] farm). The cattle were impounded by the first and second
respondents, Nicolaas and Pierre de Villiers, the trustees
of the
Pierre and Nico de Villiers Trust (the Trust),
[1]
which owns P [....] farm. The Trust conducts farming operations on P
[....] farm as well as on an adjacent farm known as Zandfontein
No
533 (Zandfontein) and are the persons in charge of these properties.
2.
The third respondent is the NJH General Dealer trading as the
Mantsopa Animal
Pound (the pound). At the present time, the
applicant’s cattle are impounded at the pound. They were
impounded there on 19
July 2022 at the instance of the Trust
purporting to act in terms of section 7(1) of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62
of 1997 (ESTA). Section 7 is entitled
‘Rights and duties of owner’ and sub-section (1)
provides:
‘
The owner or
person in charge may have a trespassing animal usually or actually in
the care of an occupier impounded and removed
to a pound in
accordance with the provisions of any applicable law, if the owner or
person in charge has given the occupier at
least 72 hours’
notice to remove the animal from the place where it is trespassing
and the occupier has failed to do so:
Provided that the owner or
person in charge may take reasonable steps to prevent the animal from
causing damage during those 72
hours.’
3.
The application was instituted urgently on 16 September 2022 in
circumstances
where the applicant’s attorney was unable to
procure a written undertaking from the pound not to auction the
cattle pending
the resolution of the dispute between the parties.
This Court issued directions that day provisionally setting the
matter down
for hearing on 17 October 2022, regulating its conduct
and directions were issued
t
o prevent any immediate auction of
the cattle. A preliminary hearing was then convened on 21 September
2022 to determine whether
interim relief should be in place pending
the hearing. The court granted interim relief. The parties then
exchanged affidavits.
The Trust opposes the application. The pound
abides the application. On 17 October 202l2, Mr Siya appeared for the
applicant and
Mr Stone appeared for the Trust, in a virtual hearing.
While the application was initially dealt with urgently, the
immediate urgency
dissipated, both because interim relief was granted
and, importantly, because of the imposition of restrictions on the
movement
of cattle in the area due to a foot and mouth outbreak,
which are apparently still in place.
4.
It is common cause that the applicant is an ESTA occupier on P [....]
farm. He
has resided there since 1987, for 35 years. In 1998, his
wife, Mantwa Esther Mokoena arrived on the farm and they then
married.
The applicant was employed by P [....]’s previous
owner and, at least for a period, by the Trust. It is also common
cause
that, at least during the applicant’s employment, he had
the right to graze cattle on P [....] farm at a specific camp,
separate
from the De Villiers’ cattle. There is a dispute about
the number of cattle: the applicant maintains that he has tacit
consent
to graze his 13 (thirteen) cattle whereas according to the
Trust, he was, during the period of his employment, entitled to graze
only 3 (three) cattle.
5.
It can be
noted that these proceedings arise against the background of a
pending eviction application, which the Trust has instituted
in the
Magistrates Court against the applicant and others occupying P
[....]. It is not infrequent that disputes about cattle and
grazing
arise in such contexts. This Court recently held in
Moladora
Trust
[2]
that the termination of consent of an ESTA occupier residing on land
to graze cattle is subject to section 8 of ESTA
[3]
and that, ‘if
an
occupier is deprived, against his or her will, of the right to use
grazing linked to such right of residence, it will amount
to an
eviction’ and is subject to section 9 of ESTA.
That
does not mean that owners or owners in charge do not have rights or
interests protected by law. Indeed, section 7(1) of ESTA
protects
such rights and interests. However, the rule of law must prevail.
[4]
6.
The events giving rise to the application occurred in July 2022. On 7
July 2022,
the applicant left P [....] farm and travelled to
Bohlokong, where his wife, who was ill, was receiving medical care.
He returned
on 14 July 2022, a week later. According to the
applicant, on his return that day, he received complaints from the
Trust that his
cattle had strayed onto their corn plantation: He was
informed that the Trust had impounded his 13 cattle on Zandfontein,
where
they had allegedly strayed and caused damage. The applicant
contends that the impoundment was without good reason as he had left
the cattle in their designated camp which was locked and he had not
received any complaint about the cattle while away. The applicant
explains that he received a document that purports to be a notice in
terms of section 7(1) of ESTA but only on 15 July 2022 after
the
first respondent had impounded his cattle on Zandfontein.
7.
According to the Trust, on 7 July 2022, one of its workers, a Mr
Mokoena, informed
Mr Nicolaas de Villiers that unmarked cattle were
roaming unattended on the maize fields on Zandfontein. Mr de Villiers
explains
that the cattle were trespassing on the maize fields and
causing damage by trampling and eating the crop still to be
harvested.
Mr Mokoena has confirmed the evidence on affidavit. Mr de
Villiers tried to call the applicant on his cell number but the
applicant
did not answer the phone, which did not allow for a
voicemail. He also searched for the applicant to no avail. In these
circumstances,
Mr de Villiers says he had no choice but to remove the
cattle to avoid further damage. He considered moving the cattle back
to
their designated camp but he says the fences were in a state of
disrepair and the camp was overgrazed. He was also concerned about
stock theft. He then took the cattle to a separate camp of the Trust
on Zandfontein, secured them and fed them with fodder from
the
Trust’s stocks. He tried to call the applicant again on 8 July
2022. On 14 July 2022, Mr de Villiers saw the applicant
walking to
his homestead and approached him advising that the cattle had strayed
to Zandfontein and caused damage. He explained
that he had incurred
costs feeding and watering them and insisted on being compensated
before he released them. He would moreover
provide the necessary
notice under section 7(1) of ESTA before proceeding to impound the
cattle.
8.
It is
common cause that on 15 July 2022, Mr de Villiers delivered a notice
purportedly in terms of section 7(1). The notice, attached
to the
answering affidavit, refers to the cattle as two mix breed bulls,
five mix breed cows and six calves. It states that they
were found
without permission on P [....]. It proceeds:
[5]
‘
You must remove
the animals within 72 (seventy two) hours of receiving this notice
and after payment of the amount of R10 988.00
(ten thousand nine
hundred and eighty eight) … the cost incurred by the person in
charge to feed the cattle that were found
trespassing [from 7 to 15
July 2022] from [P [....]]. If you do not do so, it / they may be
impounded in accordance with applicable
pound ordinances or
regulations. The costs of impounding the animals will be charged to
you.’
9.
The expenditure is sought to be justified on the basis of a cost of
13
cattle over 9 days at a cost of R94.00 per head per day. This is
said to be the same as the cost levied by a pound which, the Trust
contends, represents a minimum reasonable remuneration for the
services rendered.
10.
Mr Siya submitted,
inter alia,
that on the evidence, the Trust
had impounded the cattle when it removed them to the camp on
Zandfontein. Because that was done
without notice the impoundment was
unlawful. The conduct that then followed was all tainted by this
unlawful impoundment. He submitted
that the Trust had failed to
establish that the cattle had trespassed on Zandfontein or caused any
damage giving rise to any entitlement
to take reasonable steps to
prevent damage. In any event, he submitted, it was not reasonable for
the Trust to incur such expenditure:
the cattle should have been
returned to their designated camp. There is no cognisable evidence,
Mr Siya submitted, warranting a
conclusion that the designated camp
could not hold the cattle pending the applicant’s return.
11.
On behalf
of the Trust, Mr Stone submitted,
inter
alia,
that applying the principles in
Plascon
Evans
and
Wightman,
[6]
the evidence on affidavit establishes both that the cattle trespassed
onto Zandfontein on 7 July 2022 and were causing damage.
What then
transpired between 7 and 15 July was not an act of impoundment as
contemplated by section 7(1) but the taking of reasonable
steps to
prevent further damage, which section 7(1) authorises. In doing so,
the Trust acted as
negotiorum
gestor
and was then entitled both to be reimbursed for necessary and useful
expenditure and exercise a lien in respect of the cattle.
In the
absence of payment following the passage of 72 hours, the argument
continued, Trust was entitled to impound the cattle in
terms of
section 7(1) under the applicable by-law.
12.
The Trust’s evidence is not wholly satisfactory and there are
features
that generate doubt in my mind as to its veracity. However,
I accept, applying
Plascon Evans
and
Wightman
, that on
7 July 2022, the applicant’s cattle were trespassing on
Zandfontein and causing damage. Moreover, I assume in favour
of the
Trust that the steps it then took were taken in good faith.
Nevertheless, the Trust’s conduct in dealing with the
situation
did not comply with section 7(1) for at least two reasons.
13.
First, on
the facts of this case, it was not, in my view, reasonable for the
Trust to secure the cattle in a Trust camp on Zandfontein
and then
incur significant cost feeding and keeping them pending the
applicant’s return. Even if I accept that Mr De Villiers’
acted in good faith in this regard to protect the applicant’s
cattle, as he contends, the Trust has failed to establish that
it
could not have returned the cattle to their own enclosure and thereby
prevent further damage being caused and avoid the incurrence
of
significance costs. The Trust has supplied several photographs to
substantiate the contention that the fence was in such a state
of
disrepair that the cattle would have broken out of it again and cause
further damage. However, the photographs do not establish
this. To
the extent that one of the photographs depict one detached line of
wire on one portion of a four wire fence, it is not
explained why the
detached wire could not have been re-attached nor is it self-evident
that cattle would have escaped through the
remaining three wires. Mr
de Villiers’ remaining objects in securing the cattle in
Zandfontein are allegedly to protect the
cattle from stock theft and
to ensure that they were adequately fed in circumstances where their
camp was overgrazed. These concerns
are not, however, with damage to
the Trust and are, rather, allegedly benevolent concerns about damage
to the applicant himself,
specifically his cattle. But even assuming
these concerns relate to damage cognisable under section 7(1), I am
not persuaded that
they reasonably justified the course adopted which
entails the incurrence of significant costs that, unsurprisingly, the
applicant
resisted. First, there is insufficient evidence for this
Court to conclude that there was any imminent threat of livestock
theft
or insufficient grazing available in the designated camp to see
the cattle through. Second, it is common cause that the applicant
had
his telephone with him, no short message was sent and Mr De Villiers
did not know when the applicant would return. Third, it
cannot be
gainsaid that Mr De Villiers was at least also concerned with whether
the applicant was keeping cattle in excess of the
agreed number or
complying with the grazing capacity requirements of the Conservation
of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983
(CARA). He says so himself.
But while those concerns can, in an appropriate case, ground
relief,
[7]
they do not entitle a
person to take the law into their own hands by removing cattle: the
Court must be approached.
14.
But even assuming the Trust took reasonable steps to prevent damage
as contemplated
by section 7(1), there is another fundamental
difficulty with the Trust’s approach. Section 7(1) contemplates
a notice ‘to
remove the animal from the place where it is
trespassing’. In this case, the notice given both demanded the
removal of the
cattle within 72 hours and simultaneously asserted a
lien. In my view, even assuming the Trust was entitled to assert a
lien, which
I need not decide, those legal processes cannot ensue
simultaneously as they are inherently in conflict with one another. A
notice
to remove under section 7(1) within three days must in fact
afford that opportunity. The demand for payment through the exercise
of a lien serves a different purpose: it allows a creditor to retain
possession as security for payment. Accordingly, when the
Trust
demanded payment in the section 7(1) notice as a prerequisite for the
release of the cattle, it thereby defeated the very
purpose of that
section. In the result, the notice given cannot be said to be a
notice in terms of section 7(1) and the impoundment
to the pound was
unlawful.
15.
The above conclusions obviate the need to decide whether the Trust
impounded
the cattle without notice when it placed the cattle in the
Zandfontein camp.
16.
Mr Stone submitted that if the Court concludes the impoundment was
unlawful,
it should in any event not order the cattle’s return.
This is because, on the respondents’ version, their return
would
entail return of livestock in excess of the agreed number,
being 3 (three). It would also be in breach of CARA’s
restrictions.
In my view, both of these matters should, at the least,
have been raised by way of a counter-claim. That would have enabled
the
issues to be duly and fairly ventilated with due consideration
given to whether the unlawful removal of the cattle precludes, or
otherwise impacts upon the grant of any appropriate relief.
17.
In the result, the applicant is entitled to relief to secure the
return of his
cattle which the Trust unlawfully impounded. In the
nature of the things, that will entail that the costs of their
restoration,
including those of the pound, must be borne by the
Trust. This Court has not been told if there are any ongoing
restrictions on
the movement of cattle due to the foot and mouth
outbreak. I make provision for this in my order.
18.
This Court
only orders costs in special circumstances. One consideration is the
costs of an application of the Trust to strike out
certain paragraphs
of the founding affidavit which contain privileged information
including the content of settlement negotiations.
The applicant
opposed the application, submitting that the material should be
admitted exceptionally as it reveals a threat or
other matter that
would be contrary to public policy to protect.
[8]
Specifically, the material suggests that the cattle were being held
to secure the applicant’s agreement to vacate the property.
The
removal of cattle amounting to constructive eviction is a serious
matter. However, it has not been necessary for me to have
regard to
this material to decide the application and accordingly I do not
decide the application to strike. For costs purposes,
I am of the
view that there should be no special costs order. The opposition is
not unreasonable and constructive eviction is a
serious matter
affecting vulnerable rural people with insecure tenure.
19.
I make the following order:
19.1. Non-compliance with
the forms and notice periods prescribed by the Court’s Rules is
condoned and the application is
heard as one of urgency.
19.2. The First and
Second Respondents’ conduct of removing and impounding 13 of
the applicant’s cattle from Farm P
[....] [....], Reitz, Free
State Province, held under title deed [....], is declared unlawful.
19.3. The First and
Second Respondents are directed forthwith to take such steps as are
necessary to restore the Applicant’s
possession of his 13
cattle within 5 (five) days of this Court order, subject to any
restrictions imposed by law.
19.4. There is no order
as to costs.
S
J COWEN
JUDGE,
LAND CLAIMS COURT
Appearances:
Applicant:
Mr Siya
instructed by Tshitso Thuntsi Inc Attorneys
Respondent:
Mr Stone instructed by JP Niemann Attorneys Inc
[1]
IT
1158/2013.
[2]
Moladora Trust v Mereki and Others [2022] ZALCC 32.
[3]
Supra
n 2 at para 21.
[4]
See
Ramahloki
and others v Raiden (Pty) Ltd and others
[2020]
ZALCC 31
.
[5]
Obvious
typographical errors corrected.
[6]
Plascon
Evans Paints v Van Riebeeck Paints
1984(3)
623 (A) at 634H-635C (
Plascon
Evans
);
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and another
2008(3) SA 371 (SCA) (
Wightman
)
at para 13.
[7]
See,
in respect of CARA,
Adendorffs
Boerdery v Shabala and others
[2017] ZASCA 37.
[8]
Relying
on
Naidoo
v Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd
1978(3)
SA 666 (A) at 681B.
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