THE CENTRE FOR SEXUAL HEALTH AND HIV AIDS RESEARCH ZIMBABWE (CESHHAR ZIMBABWE) v GWIZO and OTHERS (26 of 2026) [2026] ZWLC 26 (30 January 2026)

**IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE** **JUDGMENT NO LC/H/27/26** **HARARE,****20 JANUARY, 2026****AND** **30 JANUARY 2026** **CASE NO LC/H/1063/24** **THE CENTRE FOR SEXUAL HEALTH AND APPELLANT** **HIV AIDS RESEARCH ZIMBABWE** **(CESHHAR ZIMBABWE)** **UPENYU GWIZO AND 8 OTHERS****RESPONDENT** Before the Honourable G. Musariri, Judge: For Applicant \- T. Chagudumba, Attorney For Respondents - T. G. Nenzou, Attorney **MUSARIRI, J:** On the 24 September 2025 at Marondera, Arbitrator T. Chamisa issued an award ordering appellant to pay respondents an amount of **USD$ 28686.08** in respect of outstanding wages. Appellant then appealed the award to this Court in terms of **section 98 (10)** of the**Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]**. Respondents opposed the appeal. At the onset of oral argument it emerged that 4th (Tangai) and 5th (Msiza) respondents had settled their claims with appellant. Accordingly the Court removed them from the matter so that the respondents are now “Upenyu Gwizo and 8 Others.” The grounds of appeal were quartet thus, “ _1\. The Arbitrator erred in making contradictory findings that the Appellant engaged all its employees, including the Respondents, via the Workers Committee and then holding that the agreement reached via the Workers Committee was not binding on the Respondents._ _2\. The Arbitrator fundamentally erred in failing to hold that the Respondents waived their rights since the parties had agreed to mutually terminate their contracts and began negotiations for a terminal package. It follows that since the focus was on the termination package, the Respondents were barred from claiming arrear salaries._ _3\. The Arbitrator erred on a point of law in holding that the principle of no work and no pay was not applicable despite the fact that the Respondents accepted that there were no services to render due to a supervening impossibility._ _4\. The Arbitrator grossly erred on the facts by awarding the Respondents thumb suck figures that were not supported by documentary evidence presented in the form of pay slips.”_ Appellant prayed that the arbitral award be set aside. 1st Respondent’s opposing affidavit countered that _“Ad Ground Number 1_ _3\. The Arbitrator clearly noted that there were engagements and no agreement was ever reached between the parties or workers committee. Nothing is inconsistent with such a finding. In its statement of Defence, on page 23 of the record paragraph 9, Appellant notes that we did not accept the proposed termination offer._ _Ad Ground Number 2_ _6\. Mutual termination should be in writing with each respective or individual employee. No agreement exists in that regard._ _9\. We never waived any right to remuneration and we have always been Appellant’s employees to date. The issue of unpaid salaries remained throughout the emails and zoom meetings. What was common in the mind of the parties is that remuneration remained due from Appellant._ _Ad Ground Number 3_ _14\. We never accepted that there was no work. Appellant unilaterally prevented us from reporting for duty until further notice. In terms of Clause 1.15 of the employment contract …_ _Ad Ground Number 4_ _19\. It is denied that the figures which were awarded by the Arbitrator were thumb suck. Appellant attached the payslips in respect of each Respondent as more fully appear on page 60 to 63 of the record of proceedings.”_ Respondents prayed that the appeal be dismissed. **Analysis** The appeal and response thereto raise three major issues which will be dealt with in turn. **A.**_**Whether the appellant and its workers committee reached a valid termination agreement**_ : The Arbitrator opined that, “ _By operation of Law mutual termination is a legal route allowed on termination of employment contract. In the case before us there is every indication that the respondent engaged the workers committee on mutual termination package but the evidence before myself does not show any indication that applicants were agreeable to the discussed terminal benefits package. The respondent has made very clear that the applicants have refused to accept the mutual termination package as the matter has already been referred to NEC for adjuration. There is no any evidence that applicants have waived their rights on their claim of non-payment of wages. It is my view therefore that respondent should have pursued the retrenchment route in terms of_ _**section 12C**_ _of the_ _**Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]**__after noticing that the mutual termination route has hit a brick wall.”_ The Arbitrator’s conclusion aligns with **section 12 (4a)** of the**Act** which provides that “No employer shall terminate a contract of employment on notice unless- (b) The employer and employee mutually _agree_ _in_ _writing_ to the termination of the contract;” The Arbitrator did not find a written agreement terminating respondents employment by appellant. In its Response before the Arbitrator appellant stated that, “ _9\. USAID eventually approved the termination package and committed to pay both pre termination and post termination costs on June 6, 2025. The Respondent advised the affected employees and most accepted the termination package. This speaks to a common position between the employees through the Workers Committee. Only the Claimants in the present matter have_ __refused__ _to accept the_ __termination package__ _offered since they had already referred this dispute.”_ This statement claimed an agreement with the workers committee. However it does not refer to a _written_ agreement as required by the Act. Even in its heads of argument before this Court appellant does not refer to a written agreement. The issue therefore resolves against appellant. **B.**_**Whether the termination agreement is binding upon the respondents**_ : The foregoing analysis shows that there was no valid termination agreement involving the respondents. Even appellant’s response to the arbitrator, quoted above, clearly stated that the respondents “refused to accept the termination package offered.” Nonetheless appellant argued that they waived their rights. Apparently the argument rests on the fact that the workers committee negotiated a retrenchment package on their behalf. The argument is untenable in the face of the clear statutory requirement that termination agreement/s ought to be reduced to writing. Negotiation _per se_ cannot found waiver of statutory rights. **C.**_**Whether the amounts awarded by the arbitrator were warranted**_ : No work-no pay principle: The arbitrator ruled that “ _The principle of no work no pay and unpaid leave does not hold water here since applicants reporting for duty after respondent have directed them not to do so whilst their employment contracts were still in force. Let me hasten to say that applicants were present to render their services to the respondent but it is the respondent who directed them not to do so.”_ Clearly the arbitrator correctly found that the no work no pay principle does not apply _in casu_ where the employer directed the employees not to report for duty. Thumb-suck awards: Appellant claimed that the amounts awarded to respondent by the arbitrator amount to a “thumb-suck.” On the other hand respondents stated that the award was based on the figures in their payslips. Respondents’ word is confirmed by the arbitrator where he noted that “ _Respondent stated further that applicants cannot be granted their claims as they used gross earnings instead of net earnings in their calculations. Respondent stated that it has a legal obligation to deduct and pay statutory payments to third parties as shown on the_ __attached__ __claimants__ _’_ __payslips__ _.”_ The award shows that respondents initially used their gross pay in calculating their claims. However they later reduced the claims to align with their net salaries. Accordingly the claim that the award amounts to a “thumb-suck” is baseless. **Conclusion** The aforegoing analysis resolves the relevant issues against the appellant. Therefore the appeal ought to be dismissed as devoid of merit. **Wherefore it is ordered that;** 1. **The appeal be and is hereby dismissed; and** 2. **Each party shall bear its own costs.** **G. MUSARIRI** **J-U-D-G-E** 1