Lietsiso Mothala &76 Others V Director General National Security Service & 3 Others (C of A (CIV) 60/2025) [2025] LSCA 78 (7 November 2025)

# Lietsiso Mothala &76 Others V Director General National Security Service & 3 Others (C of A (CIV) 60/2025) [2025] LSCA 78 (7 November 2025) [ __](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](mailto:?subject=Take a look at this document from LesLII: Lietsiso Mothala &76 Others V Director General …&body=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07) [ Download PDF (246.3 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07/source) Report a problem __ * Share * [ Download PDF (246.3 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/78/eng@2025-11-07/source) * * * * * Report a problem __ ##### Lietsiso Mothala &76 Others V Director General National Security Service & 3 Others (C of A (CIV) 60/2025) [2025] LSCA 78 (7 November 2025) Copy citation * __Document detail * __Related documents Citation Lietsiso Mothala &76 Others V Director General National Security Service & 3 Others (C of A (CIV) 60/2025) [2025] LSCA 78 (7 November 2025) Copy Media Neutral Citation [2025] LSCA 78 Copy Hearing date 21 October 2025 Court [Court of Appeal](/judgments/LSCA/) Case number C of A (CIV) 60/2025 Judges [Dr. Mosito P](/judgments/all/?judges=Dr.%20Mosito%20P), [Damaseb AJA](/judgments/all/?judges=Damaseb%20AJA), [Van der Westhuizen AJA](/judgments/all/?judges=Van%20der%20Westhuizen%20AJA) Judgment date 7 November 2025 Language English ##### __Collections * [Case indexes](/taxonomy/case-indexes) * [Commercial](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial) * [Administrative Law](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-administrative-law) * [Administrative Action](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-administrative-law-administrative-action) * [Administrative Review](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-administrative-law-administrative-review) * [Government Contracting](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-administrative-law-government-contracting) * [Public Service](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-administrative-law-public-service) Summary ###### Flynote Administrative law – National Security Service – Lawful discharge – Principle against self-help – Collateral challenge – Jurisdiction of High Court – Rule of law and state security. Read full summary * * * Skip to document content ###### Flynote Administrative law – National Security Service – Lawful discharge – Principle against self-help – Collateral challenge – Jurisdiction of High Court – Rule of law and state security. 1 LESOTHO HELD AT MASERU C of A (CIV) 60/2025 In the matter between – LIETSISO MOTHALA AND 76 OTHERS APPELLANTS and DIRECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE 1ST RESPONDENT MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 2ND RESPONDENT PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 3RD RESPONDENT ATTORNEY GENERAL 4TH RESPONDENT CORAM: MOSITO P DAMASEB AJA VAN DER WESTHUIZEN AJA HEARD: 21 OCTOBER 2025 DELIVERED: 7 NOVEMBER 2025 2 FLYNOTE Administrative law – National Security Service – Lawful discharge – Principle against self-help – Collateral challenge – Jurisdiction of High Court – Rule of law and state security. Seventy-seven members of the National Security Service (NSS) were “discharged” by the Director-General (DG) in 2017 on the ground that their recruitment by his predecessor was irregular and unlawful. The DG did not institute review proceedings to set aside their appointments but instead took it upon himself to terminate them. The High Court (Moahloli J) dismissed the members’ application challenging their discharge, holding that the terminations were effected in compliance with the National Security Service [Act 11 of 1998](/akn/ls/act/1998/11) and that the matter was essentially a “quintessential labour dispute”. On appeal— Held, that the DG acted unlawfully by resorting to self-help rather than applying to a court to review and set aside the appointments of the appellants. In public law, neither a public official nor an administrative body may unilaterally nullify acts of its predecessor, even if considered irregular, without recourse to judicial review (Oudekraal Estates, Kirkland, Merafong City, EFF v Speaker followed). Held, further, that the discharge of the appellants was procedurally defective, as no enquiry was conducted in the manner prescribed by s 11(3) of the Act and Regulations 34 and 35 of Legal Notice 4 of 2000. The High Court erred in disregarding these mandatory procedures and in mischaracterising the dispute as a labour matter. Held, further, that the Minister and Prime Minister had no lawful role in the discharge process under s 11 of the Act, which vests that power in the DG and provides for an appeal to the Minister. Their interference was contrary to the statute and to constitutional principles of legality and separation of powers. 3 Held, further, that the respondents’ collateral challenge—that the appellants were never lawfully appointed and thus could not be discharged—was inconsistent with their own pleadings and conduct; it therefore failed. Held, that the invocation of “security” cannot justify disregard for the rule of law or statutorily prescribed procedure. Appeal upheld with costs. High Court order set aside and replaced with one upholding the application with costs. Per Van der Westhuizen AJA (Mosito P and Damaseb AJA concurring) JUDGMENT VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, AJA: Introduction [1] More than seven and a half years ago, no fewer than 77 members of the National Security Service (“the NSS”) were allegedly unlawfully discharged. According to the Director General (“the DG”) of the NSS, their discharge was not unlawful. However, the DG also submits that the 77 were not “discharged”, because they had never even been properly and lawfully appointed! [2] These events culminated in this appeal, by the members, against the High Court judgment of Moahloli J. 4 Condonation [3] Condonation was granted for the late filing of the appellants’ Notice and Grounds of Appeal. The same applies to the late filing of the respondents’ Heads of Argument. Facts [4] The High Court judgment provides a useful summary of the factual background of this matter. The appellants were appointed as Intelligence Officers four (I.0 4) at the NSS in or around December 2016.Fifty of the posts had been advertised on 4 February 2016 by the Ministry of Defence and National Security. The appointments were made by the then Director General, Colonel Tumo Lekhoa. [5] In August and December 2017, the new Director General of the NSS (“the DG”), Mr Pheelo J Ralenkoane, instructed the applicants to show cause why their irregular and illegal employment by his predecessor should not be terminated. His reasons ranged from the allegation that the members did not meet the qualifications stipulated in the advertisement and that the Staff Board did not recommend the recruitment in terms of the National Security Services [Act 11 of 1998](/akn/ls/act/1998/11) (“the Act”), to that the selection panel was not properly constituted as per the NSS Recruitment Policy of 2021. [6] Through their legal representative the appellants jointly disputed the legality of the ultimatum of the DG’s show cause letter and asked him not to pursue the contemplated dismissals. On 24 5 August 2017 the DG responded that all irregularities surrounding the appellants’ employment would be remedied according to law. On 28 December 2017 and 15 January 2018, he sent the appellants letters discharging them from the NSS with effect from 1 January 2018. Litigation history [7] The litigation history of this matter is neither short nor simple. In his Heads of Argument, counsel for the respondents stated that “this case seems to bear the autonomy of a cat bearing multiple lives. The conclusion of this matter will either serve to extinguish the cat or to dispose of one of its many lives”. [8] The appellants approached the High Court. On 21 May 2019 the Court, in a judgment by Peete J, decided in their favour. It upheld the application, with costs. A counter application from the side of the respondents was dismissed with costs. [9] The respondents appealed to this Court. On 1 November 2019, the appeal was upheld, without a costs order. The matter was remitted to the High Court for hearing by a different judge. [10] It was then heard by Moahloli J. During the hearing, counsel for the respondents notified the Court that the respondents had resolved not to file any counter application. They would rather stage a collateral challenge, based on the pleadings and heads of argument already filed. [11] The Court dismissed the appellants’ case, on account of a lack of jurisdiction. 6 [12] This Court overturned the High Court judgment and order regarding jurisdiction. It directed Moahloli J to hand down judgment on the merits of the application within a reasonable time, without further argument. High Court [13] After hearing the matter on 7 November 2023, the High Court gave an ex temporary judgment on 13 August 2024 and provided reasons on 22 August 2024. [14] The Notice of Motion sought the following relief: “That a rule nisi be issued … calling upon respondents to show cause … why the following orders shall not be made absolute: INTERIM RELIEF 2.1 … 2.2 The respondents shall not be directed to produce a record of proceedings, if any, pursuant to which a decision to terminate applicants’ appointments in (the Service) was reached … for review. FINAL RELIEF 3\. The decision(s) to terminate applicants’ appointment … be set aside as null and void of no force or affect. 4\. The decision(s) to terminate applicants’ appointment … be declared null and void of no force or effect. 5\. Reinstating the applicants in their former positions … 7 6\. Directing the respondents to pay applicants’ salary from the purported date of termination to the date of reinstatement. 7\. Directing respondents to pay costs of this application …” [15] The High Court analysed the parties’ arguments and applicable legislation, as well as court decisions in several countries. It concluded: “For the above reasons, I find that the Respondents discharged the Applicants in substantial compliance with the prescripts of the provisions of the National Security Service Act. I have no legal basis for gainsaying their claim that their withdrawal of the Applicants’ security clearance was based on the intelligence report they had. Applicants never seriously took issue with this.” [16] The Court dismissed the application, with costs. The appellants approached this Court on appeal. Grounds of Appeal [17] They filed the following Grounds for Appeal: “(1) The court a quo erred and misdirected itself in finding that the first respondent was not bound by the principle of administrative law, which states that he could not engage in self-help, and dismissed the appellants without a court order in self-review proceedings, in circumstances where he did not follow the prescribed procedure for termination of appellants’ employment. (2) The court erred in finding that where the public official was purporting to dismiss the public employees relying on statute, he was not bound by the principles of administrative law. 8 (3) The court a quo erred in finding that the employment relationship of the appellant and NSS could be terminated at the discretion and whim of the employer. (4) The court erred in not finding that to the extent that the first respondent did not follow the statutory procedure for termination of appellants’ employment by holding an enquiry in terms of Section 11(3) of the NSS Act, he acted ultra vires his powers. (5) The court erred in finding that the version of the respondent had to be preferred on whether the appellants were a security risk, that it was for the appellant to have asked for oral evidence on the matter. There was no need for oral evidence in that by statute the enquiry of whether the appellants posed a security risk had to be decided by the enquiry in terms of section 11(3) of the NSS Act. The court’s findings in that regard, assuming the correctness of the alleged risk, is an indirect condonation of ultra vires conduct on the part of first respondent. (6) The principle of deference did not apply where the facts alleged by the first respondent were not disclosed in a proper enquiry ultra vires the statute and the Board had not made any findings to which the court could defer. (7) The court a quo erred in dismissing the appellants’ application in the circumstances.” Were the appellants discharged lawfully or unlawfully? Submissions and analysis 9 [18] The appellants argue that they were appointed by the previous DG. If the appointments were irregular and unlawful, the new DG should have approached a court of law to review and set aside the appointments. Instead, he decided by himself about the regularity and lawfulness and thus resorted to self-help. (The question whether it was indeed the DG who decided is addressed below.) [19] According to the respondents, all applicable legal procedures were complied with, especially in view of the fact that the appellants had not been lawfully appointed. [20] The question is: Why did the DG not approach a court of law to review and set aside the allegedly irregular and unlawful appointments? [21] In his Heads of Argument the respondents’ counsel “… strongly urge(s) this Honourable Court to endeavour to break new ground on this subject …”. He then relies on and quotes, at length, from a statement by Jafta J in the South African Constitutional Court (MEC for Health Eastern Cape and Another v Kirkland Investments (Pty) Ltd1. Amongst other things, the judge mentioned that the Supreme Court of Appeal had held that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside decisions because they had never been taken on review. According to Jafta J, “the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted an unduly narrow approach to the matter”. [22] The respondents’ counsel then duly points out, in his Heads, that the remarks by Jafta J were made in a minority judgment. 1 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC) 10 [23] In a reasoned majority judgment Cameron J disagreed. A review by a court of law was required. [24] In his Heads counsel for the appellants submits that it is now universally accepted and settled as a principle of public law that an administrative body or official cannot set aside acts performed by it or its predecessor merely because they are perceived not to have been lawfully done. In support of this submission, five cases – including Kirland on which the respondents rely and the well-known and often quoted Oudekraal Estates (Pty) LTD v City of Cape Town2 – are referred to in the Heads. [25] Additionally, counsel refers to the words of Cameron J in Merafong City v Anglo Gold Ashanti LTD3. On behalf of the majority of the Constitutional Court the judge stated: “The underlying principle is that the courts’ role in determining legality is preeminent and exclusive; government officials, or anyone else for that matter, may not usurp that role by themselves pronouncing on whether decisions are unlawful, and then ignoring them; and, set aside, a decision erroneously taken ….” [26] Cameron J then refers to the words of Mogoeng CJ, referring to Kirland, in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker National Assembly and Others4 (2016 (3) SA 580 (CC)): “No decision grounded in the Constitution or law may be disregarded without recourse to a court of law. To do otherwise would ‘amount to a license to self-help’. Whether a public protector’s 2 2004 (6) SA 481 (CC) 3 2017 (2) SA 2011 (CC) 4 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) 11 decisions amount to administrative action or not, the disregard for remedial action by those adversely affected by it, amounts to taking the law into their own hands and is illegal. No binding and constitutionally or statutorily sourced decision may be disregarded willy-nilly. It has legal consequences and must be complied with or acted upon. To achieve the opposite outcome lawfully, an order of court would have to be obtained.” [27] Respectfully, I agree with the above dicta of Cameron J and Mogoeng CJ. Furthermore, in my view they are applicable in Lesotho and to this case. The same reasoning and conclusions were reached in the locally and indeed binding judgments in Mothobi and Another v The Crown5 and Masupha v Masupha6. [28] The High Court’s response to the above is that they do not apply to “quintessential labour disputes, such as the present one, which are solely concerned with employment and dismissal of employees in the public sector.” (sic) [29] In any event, the legally prescribed procedures were not followed by the DG, so the appellants submit. [30] The respondents relied on section 11 of the Act: Under the heading Security screening and discharge of members, section 11(3) states: “If the Director General obtains information that there is a possibility that a person who is a member is a security risk or that he may act in a way prejudicial to security interests of the state he shall discharge the member from the Service if after an enquiry, in the 5 (LAC) (2009 – 2010) 405 6 (LAC) (2015 – 2016) 389 12 prescribed manner, as to whether the possibility exists the Director General is of the opinion that the possibility does exist.” [31] On behalf of the appellants it was argued that this provision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The jurisdictional requirements set out in it are not present. [32] Section 11(3) clearly states that the DG is tasked with the discharge of the member. This aspect is discussed below. Linked to the above, section 11(4) states: “A member who has been discharged from the Service under Subsection (3) may, in writing and within 14 days from the date of his discharge, appeal to the Minister who may set aside or confirm the discharge .[33] Counsel for the appellants pointed to the “prescribed manner” of the enquiry in the National Security Regulation Legal Notice 4 of 2000. In Part VI the Regulations stipulates an elaborate procedure. Some of the steps are highlighted here. [34] In terms of Regulation 34(2) “the Staff Board shall conduct an administrative hearing in accordance with this regulation”. Regulation 35(2) requires the Staff Board to “provide with a charge against him, in writing and in sufficient detail to enable that member to submit, within 7 working days and not more than 10 working days after the written response from the member has been received by the Staff Board”. The Staff Board may subpoena witnesses, according to 35(3). [35] The member may be represented by legal counsel at her or his own expense, so stipulates 35(6). The member may furthermore 13 “testify and present relevant and material documents”. Importantly, 35(9) allows for the cross-examination of a witness. [36] According to counsel for the appellants, these procedures were not invoked by the respondents, the reason being that the DG merely treated the appellants’ employment as a nullity. This belief of counsel he grounds on quotations from the DG’s answering affidavit. [37] It is not for this Court to speculate about the motivation of the DG. The fact is that the enquiry was never instituted. Respondents’ counsel’s response is that the High Court exercised it its inherent jurisdiction by interrogating the merits itself. The Board of Enquiry was – in effect – redundant. [38] A strong emphasis was placed on state security by the respondents. So, for that matter, did the High Court. [39] The Court referred to Section 11(3) and (4) of the Act. In its judgment it is stated:”In the modern world it is not uncommon for employees of certain government departments, who are exposed to sensitive information in the course of their employment, to be required to undergo a process of security vetting before security clearing.” So far so good. However, then it ignored the detailed procedure prescribed in Regulations 34 and 35, giving effect to Section 11. [40] Instead, it referred to decisions of the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights. These emphasized the high degree of sensitivity of secure information. In the High Court 14 quoted from the UK decision in Home Office v Tariq7 that the court “underscored the level of judicial deference adopted with regard to matters of security clearance and vetting …”, according to the High Court. However, the English Court also stated: “Issues of employment and discrimination law raised by people appointed to those posts may require access to the way the process has been carried out.” The legally prescribed processes are not simply wiped out by the sensitivity of the security issue, or by mere allegations to that effect. [41] The High Court referred to the statement in the DG’s answering affidavit that he had come to his conclusion that the appellants were security risks on the basis of an intelligence report which he was prepared to furnish in camera. The appellants’ counsel did not take him up on his offer. In their replying affidavit the appellants just referred to the fact that no enquiry had ever been conducted. They referred to the DG’s intelligence report as a “smoke screen”. [42] Whether anything was a smoke screen, I do not pronounce on. The fact is, though, that no enquiry as prescribed by Section 11(3) and (4) and Regulations 34 and 35 had taken place. [43] In conclusion, the High Court relied on the “trite law in this jurisdiction that in application proceedings, where there are real disputes of fact, then the version set up by the respondent prevails unless one of the litigants has requested the court to refer the matter for oral evidence.” The Court then concluded that “the version of the NSS must be assumed to be the correct one … I have no legal 7 [2011] UKSC 35 at [75] 15 basis for gainsaying their claim that their withdrawal of the Applicants’ security clearance was based on the intelligence report they had.” [44] There was no factual dispute on the security risk though. The appellants neither saw the report, nor disputed its factual content! The respondents’ “claim” was not a fact, but their opinion. [45] A (perhaps random) warning word may be apposite at this point: The danger for the rule of law and fundamental human rights of using “security” as a code word to trump concrete legally prescribed procedures is clear from the apartheid era in South Africa. [46] After a lengthy debate on the above question, counsel for the respondents conceded – in response to a question from the Bench – that the discharge of the appellants had happened in a procedurally incorrect way. Thus, it was unlawful. The concession was justified. [47] The DG did not approach a court of law, but took the law into his own hands. This fact alone may well determine the outcome of this part of the enquiry. [48] A further crucial point is the statement in a supporting affidavit by Minister Sentje Leonard Lebona: “I strongly aver that I am privy to sensitive information of state security which implicates the former DIRECTOR GENERAL of THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE in a trail of felonies, including but not limited to offences against the state. I aver that the decision to terminate his engagement was a product of deliberations by the 16 executive and clearly sanctioned by THE PRIME MINISTER and myself and on the same note, the decision to disengage all the 77 APPLICANTS in the instant case was evenly sanctioned by us after being given information already aptly stated in the answering affidavit of THE DIRECTOR GENERAL.” [49] One question raised by this statement is what the relevance is of the former DG’s alleged trail of felonies that go wider than offences against the state for the appellants and their salaried employment. Can the purported criminal history of their former boss justify the dismissal of all 77 appellants, especially in the manner it happened? [50] At the heart of the Minister’s “strong” averment, though, is the emphatic indication that he and the Prime Minister were deeply involved in the “disengagement” or discharge of all 77 the appellants. Even section 11(3) of the Act, on which the respondents rely, clearly states that the DG is to discharge, not the Minister or Prime Minister. In fact, section 11(4) provides for an appeal to the Minister! The Act cannot conceivably provide that the Minister can hear appeals against his own decisions! Furthermore, the procedure prescribed in Regulations 34 and 35 makes it clear that the DG is the appropriate actor. Conclusion on the question of the lawful or unlawful discharge of the appellants [51] The appellants were not lawfully discharged. Their allegedly irregular and illegal appointment should have been taken on review to a court of law. Furthermore, the Minister and Prime 17 Minister had no business interfering in and indeed dictating decisions that should have been taken by the DG. Can someone who was never appointed be discharged? [52] After conceding that the discharge of the appellants had been irregular, counsel for the respondents took up the collateral challenge. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the appellants had never been lawfully recruited and appointed in the first place. Therefore, they could not be “discharged”. [53] The collateral challenge is intertwined with the procedural enquiry, though. [54] Some facts are telling: The respondents’ counsel stated that the appellants had never received letters of appointment. However, they had been in their positions in the civil service for longer than a year when they were discharged. They received salaries. They furthermore received training in, amongst other things, self-defence and firearms (whether, ex post facto, the training was appropriate or not). The fairness or unfairness of their dismissal (raised from the Bench), on the grounds that they were never appointed lawfully, so long after their appointment, is a cause of concern. [55] The respondents appear to be sitting on two chairs at the same time: The appellants were never lawfully appointed, so they did not even have to be discharged; yet they were lawfully discharged. The terminology used by the respondents appears confusing and contradictory. As indicated in [5] and [6] above, the DG mentioned that they were being “terminated” and that “irregularities (were 18 being) remedied”. The Minister’s affidavit (quoted in [47] above) talks about “the decision to disengage” all the appellants. [56] In paragraph 4 of the Founding Affidavit by first appellant Lietsiso Mothala it is stated: “My co-applicants and I have at all material times to this application been employed and been earning salaries in the (NNS) and a large number of us received appropriate intelligence gathering training … to avoid burdening this affidavit with annexures we do not annex the pay slips but will do so in the event that there is a denial by the respondents …”. [57] To this paragraph the DG, Mr Phello Ralenkoane, responds in his answering affidavit: “I agree with the founding affidavit only to the extent they were employed by the agency and were earning salaries prior to their discharge.” [58] The words “employed” and “their discharge” are noteworthy. This raises the question, mentioned as an observation from the Bench, whether the respondents’ main defence (that the appellants were lawfully “discharged” or “terminated”) can live together with the collateral challenge based on the submission that they were never even properly appointed. [59] Much of what is stated above about the need for judicial review and self-help, as well as procedural irregularities, also applies to the collateral challenge. It must fail. Conclusion 19 [60] In summary, some of the outstanding points include that, if the appointments by his predecessor were irregular and unlawful, the DG should have approached a court of laws to review and set them aside. This was not done. [61] Furthermore the Minister stated that the decision taken was by him and the Prime Minister. It should have been by the DG, following the procedures prescribed by law. [62] By conceding that the discharge of the appellants had been procedurally incorrect and changing course to the collateral challenge, the respondents’ counsel put all his proverbial eggs into one basket. The basket fell to the ground. The eggs broke. [64] The collateral challenge must fail. In so far as the procedural enquiry was a different basket, it met the same fate. [65] The High Court erred and misdirected itself in a number of ways. These appear from the above discussion. In short, the Court mischaracterised the issue as “quintessentially” a labour dispute. The appellants neither pleaded any labour law issues, nor approached the Labour Court. The respondents did not dispute the jurisdiction of the High Court.[66] This resulted in the failure of the High Court to view the decisions of the DG and his predecessor as the conduct of senior officials in the administration of Lesotho. The stated involvement of not only the Minister but even the Prime Minister, brought the government itself into the picture. Thus, the Court failed to see that a court of law should have been approached to review and set aside the appointment of the appellants by the former DG. This is what the appellants did 20 by going to the High Court with regard to the conduct of the present DG. [66] The High Court over-emphasized the security aspect. It cannot summarily trump the rule of law. [67] The appeal must succeed. Counsel for the respondents’ proverbial cat (referred to in [7] above) seems to be either “extinguished”, or its multiple lives seem to be “disposed of”. What counsel had in mind by referring to “one of its many lives” – and whether there are still lives to be brought to courts – is not clear. [68] In their original Notice of Motion the appellants asked the High Court to reinstate them in their positions in the NNS. More than seven years have since passed. The appellants’ counsel agreed that this is no longer a viable option. Thus, the conduct of the DG should be set side, but implications of this judgment and order are left to the parties. Costs [69] Costs must follow the result, in this Court as well as the High Court Order [70] (a) The appeal is upheld, with costs. (b) The order of the High Court is set aside and replaced by the following: The application is upheld, with costs. 21 __________________________ J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN ACTING JUSTICE OF APPEAL I concur: __________________________________ KE MOSITO PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL I concur: ___________________________ PT DAMASEB ACTING JUSTICE OF APPEAL FOR THE APPELLANTS: ADV ME TEELE KC FOR THE RESPONDENT: ADV MS RASEKOAI #### __Related documents ▲ To the top >