'Mamohale Matsoso V The Principal Secretary- Ministry of Public Service (C of A (CIV) 53/2025) [2025] LSCA 80 (7 November 2025)

# 'Mamohale Matsoso V The Principal Secretary- Ministry of Public Service (C of A (CIV) 53/2025) [2025] LSCA 80 (7 November 2025) [ __](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07) [ __](mailto:?subject=Take a look at this document from LesLII: 'Mamohale Matsoso V The Principal Secretary- Ministry …&body=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07) [ Download PDF (245.3 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07/source) Report a problem __ * Share * [ Download PDF (245.3 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2025/80/eng@2025-11-07/source) * * * * * Report a problem __ ##### 'Mamohale Matsoso V The Principal Secretary- Ministry of Public Service (C of A (CIV) 53/2025) [2025] LSCA 80 (7 November 2025) Copy citation * __Document detail * __Related documents * __Citations 1 / - Citation 'Mamohale Matsoso V The Principal Secretary- Ministry of Public Service (C of A (CIV) 53/2025) [2025] LSCA 80 (7 November 2025) Copy Media Neutral Citation [2025] LSCA 80 Copy Hearing date 16 October 2025 Court [Court of Appeal](/judgments/LSCA/) Case number C of A (CIV) 53/2025 Judges [Dr. Mosito P](/judgments/all/?judges=Dr.%20Mosito%20P), [Damaseb AJA](/judgments/all/?judges=Damaseb%20AJA), [Van der Westhuizen AJA](/judgments/all/?judges=Van%20der%20Westhuizen%20AJA) Judgment date 7 November 2025 Language English ##### __Collections * [Case indexes](/taxonomy/case-indexes) * [Commercial](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial) * [Labour and Employment Law](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-labour-and-employment-law) Summary ###### Flynote Labour law — Jurisdiction — Public officer — Transfer — Review — Whether High Court retains jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution after enactment of Labour Act, 2024 — Construction of sections 50(2)(j) and 51(1) of Labour Act, 2024 — Meaning of “any other labour law” — Whether Public Service Act 2005, Public Service Regulations 2008 and Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011 fall within the scope of Labour Court’s exclusive review jurisdiction — Distinction between illegality and unfair labour practice — Effect of section 5(e) of the Labour Act on concurrent remedies. Read full summary * * * Skip to document content ###### Flynote Labour law — Jurisdiction — Public officer — Transfer — Review — Whether High Court retains jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution after enactment of Labour Act, 2024 — Construction of sections 50(2)(j) and 51(1) of Labour Act, 2024 — Meaning of “any other labour law” — Whether Public Service Act 2005, Public Service Regulations 2008 and Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011 fall within the scope of Labour Court’s exclusive review jurisdiction — Distinction between illegality and unfair labour practice — Effect of section 5(e) of the Labour Act on concurrent remedies. LESOTHO IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO HELD AT MASERU C OF A (CIV) NO. 53/2025 CIV/APN/0052/2025 In the matter between: ‘MAMOHALE MATSOSO APPELLANT AND THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY – MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE 1ST RESPONDENT THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE 2ND RESPONDENT THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 3RD RESPONDENT THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT 4THRESPONDENT THE MINISTER OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT 5TH RESPONDENT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6TH RESPONDENT CORAM: MOSITO P DAMASEB AJA VAN DER WESTHUIZEN AJA HEARD: 16 OCTOBER 2025 DELIVERED: 07 NOVEMBER 2025 2 FLYNOTE Labour law — Jurisdiction — Public officer — Transfer — Review — Whether High Court retains jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution after enactment of Labour Act, 2024 — Construction of sections 50(2)(j) and 51(1) of Labour Act, 2024 — Meaning of “any other labour law” — Whether Public Service Act 2005, Public Service Regulations 2008 and Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011 fall within the scope of Labour Court’s exclusive review jurisdiction — Distinction between illegality and unfair labour practice — Effect of section 5(e) of the Labour Act on concurrent remedies. The appellant challenged her transfer from the Ministry of Labour and Employment to the Ministry of Energy as Director of Legal Affairs, contending that the decision was unlawful and ultra vires the Public Service Act 2005. The High Court declined to assume jurisdiction, holding that the dispute fell within the exclusive competence of the Labour Court under sections 50 and 51 of the Labour Act 2024. Held, dismissing the appeal, that jurisdiction is a matter of statute and not of pleading; that the Labour Act 2024 unifies private and public sector employment relations and vests exclusive civil and review jurisdiction in the Labour Court over all employment matters, including administrative actions taken under “any other labour law.” The expression encompasses the Public Service Act, its Regulations, and related instruments governing conditions of service in the public sector. The High Court’s review power under section 119(1) of the Constitution remains available only for matters that are truly constitutional or public in character, not for disputes arising within an employment relationship. The contention that the Labour Court’s competence is limited to unfair labour practices was rejected as misconceived; an unlawful or arbitrary act within the employment relationship is by its nature an unfair labour practice. Section 5(e) of the Labour Act preserves additional substantive remedies, not concurrent 3 forums. The statutory scheme reflects a legislative intent to create a single, specialised forum for the adjudication of all employment-related disputes. Accordingly, the High Court correctly declined jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed with costs. MOSITO P Introduction [1] This appeal concerns the delicate boundary between the High Court’s constitutional review jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution and the exclusive statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the Labour Court by sections 50 and 51 of the Labour [Act No. 3 of 2024](/akn/ls/act/2024/3). [2] The appellant impugns her transfer from the Ministry of Labour and Employment to the Ministry of Energy as Director of Legal Affairs. She contends that the decision was arbitrary and unlawful, taken under the Public Service Act 2005 rather than within the compass of labour law. The learned Chief Justice declined to assume jurisdiction, holding that the matter lay within the exclusive province of the Labour Court. From that ruling, the present appeal is brought. The facts [3] The facts giving rise to this appeal are straightforward and largely undisputed. The appellant, Mrs ‘Mamohale Matsoso, is a senior public officer serving in the Ministry of Labour and Employment, where she held the substantive position of Labour 4 Commissioner. On 22 May 2024, she received a letter from the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Public Service notifying her of a decision to transfer her to the Ministry of Energy, where she was to assume duties as Director of Legal Affairs. The letter stated no reasons for the transfer beyond the assertion that it was made in the interests of the service. [4] Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court seeking to review and set aside the decision on the ground that it was unlawful, arbitrary, and actuated by irrelevant considerations. She contended that her transfer was effected under the Public Service Act 2005 and the Public Service Regulations 2008, both of which regulate the movement of officers within the public service. On that basis, she argued that the decision constituted an exercise of administrative power and was therefore subject to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution. She further asserted that her application did not raise a labour dispute but rather a question of legality, falling outside the exclusive competence of the Labour Court. [5] The respondents opposed the application. They raised a preliminary objection that the High Court lacked jurisdiction, contending that the dispute concerned an employment matter and therefore fell squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court under sections 50 and 51 of the Labour [Act No. 3 of 2024](/akn/ls/act/2024/3). It was argued that the 2024 Act had repealed the former Labour Code Order and extended its reach to all employment relationships, including those in the public service. The respondents maintained that any challenge to an employer’s 5 decision affecting conditions of service, including transfers, must now be brought before the Labour Court. [6] After hearing the argument, the learned Chief Justice upheld the preliminary objection. He reasoned that the Labour Act 2024 had introduced a unified framework for both public and private employment, vesting in the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine and review all disputes arising from employment relationships. He found that a transfer constituted a condition of service within the employment relationship and therefore fell within the scope of the Labour Court’s authority. Consequently, he dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction, with costs. [7] It is against that ruling that the appellant now appeals to this Court, insisting that the High Court erred in holding that its jurisdiction was entirely ousted, and maintaining that her case, being grounded in administrative legality under the Public Service Act, properly belonged to the High Court’s constitutional review jurisdiction. Issues for determination [8] The central issue for determination in this appeal is whether the High Court retains jurisdiction, under section 119(1) of the Constitution, to review administrative decisions made within the framework of an employment relationship in the public service, notwithstanding the exclusive civil jurisdiction now conferred upon the Labour Court by sections 50 and 51 of the Labour Act, 2024. The question goes to the heart of the division of judicial 6 power between the ordinary courts and the specialist labour tribunal created by statute. [9] Flowing from this broad enquiry are several subsidiary questions. The first is whether this Court’s earlier decision in Mokotjo v Kennedy & Others1 remains authoritative for the proposition that the High Court’s jurisdiction is entirely ousted in labour and employment matters, or whether later decisions such as Matela v Lesotho Communications Authority & Others2 and Ministry of Trade and Industry v Seleke3 have refined or altered that position. The second concerns the proper construction of sections 50(2)(j) and 51(1) of the Labour Act, 2024—whether those provisions expand the Labour Court’s reach beyond that previously established under sections 24 and 25 of the repealed Labour Code Order 1992, or whether they simply reproduce it. [10] A third aspect of the enquiry is whether the appellant’s complaint, being a challenge to the legality of her transfer under the Public Service Act and its Regulations, falls outside the concept of “unfair labour practice” as contemplated in section 7 of the Labour Act, and thus remains within the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. A related question is whether section 5(e) of the Labour Act, which provides that remedies under other statutes are “in addition to and not in place of” those provided under the Act, preserves concurrent jurisdiction between the two courts. Finally, the Court must determine whether the expression “any other labour law” in section 50(2)(j) encompasses the Public Service Act 1 Mokotjo v Miles Kennedy Chairman of the /Board (C of A (CIV)19OF 2020 [2021]. 2 Matela v Lesotho Telecommunications Authority (C of A (CIV) 46/2022), 3 Ministry of Trade and Industry v Seleke (C of A No. 41/2021). 7 2005, the Public Service Regulations 2008, and the Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011, thereby bringing disputes concerning the exercise of powers under those instruments within the exclusive review jurisdiction of the Labour Court. [11] In essence, therefore, the appeal turns on the proper demarcation of jurisdiction between the High Court and the Labour Court under the new statutory regime, and on whether the appellant’s grievance—couched as a review of administrative illegality—is, in substance, a labour dispute governed exclusively by the Labour Act, 2024. The Law [12] The resolution of this appeal turns on several well-established principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation, as well as on the proper understanding of the structure of Lesotho’s judicial system in relation to specialised tribunals such as the Labour Court. [13] The first principle is that jurisdiction is a creature of statute. A court’s competence to hear and determine a matter derives from the law that creates or regulates it. The High Court’s general jurisdiction is set out in section 119(1) of the Constitution, which grants it unlimited original jurisdiction and the power to review administrative action. However, that jurisdiction is not absolute. Parliament may, by clear and express language, confer exclusive jurisdiction upon another court or tribunal in respect of particular subject-matter. When such an intention is manifest, the High 8 Court must defer to the specialised forum. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed, most notably in Mokotjo v Kennedy & Others (supra), where this Court held that the legislature had expressed an unmistakable intention to vest all labour and employment disputes in the Labour Court, excluding the High Court’s civil jurisdiction in such matters. [14] The second principle is that the determination of jurisdiction is guided by the pleadings, not by the ultimate merits of the dispute. A court must look at the cause of action as pleaded to ascertain whether it falls within the ambit of its statutory powers. Suppose the substance of the claim arises from or concerns an employment relationship. In that case, the matter is, by its nature, a labour dispute, even if the applicant frames it as a question of administrative law or legality. As this Court observed in Kompi v Government of Lesotho4, litigants cannot, by their formulation of pleadings, confer jurisdiction on a court where statute has removed it. [15] A third principle is that legislative intention is paramount in interpreting jurisdictional provisions. The court must give effect to the purpose discernible from the statute. The Labour Act was enacted specifically to bridge the historical divide between private and public-sector employment relations and to establish a single, coherent regime for labour justice. Its preamble declares that it “addresses the labour relations dichotomy between the public and private sectors.” Sections 50 and 51 confer “exclusive civil jurisdiction” on the Labour Court over all matters provided for 4 Kompi v Government of Lesotho (C of A No. 43B/2021) [2022]. 9 under the Act, including the power to “review any administrative action taken in the performance of any function in terms of this Act or any other labour law.” Those provisions evince a legislative design to create a comprehensive system of labour adjudication, displacing concurrent jurisdiction and ensuring uniformity. [16] The fourth principle is that specialised tribunals are intended to be the primary forums for disputes within their designated field. This reflects the doctrine of institutional competence: where Parliament has established a court or body with expertise, general courts should refrain from usurping its functions. As the Constitutional Court of South Africa stated in Baloyi v Public Protector and in Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau5 pointed out, the existence of exclusive jurisdiction in a specialist tribunal serves to promote efficiency, coherence, and expertise in the resolution of sector-specific disputes. [17] The fifth principle is that the High Court retains its constitutional review power only in exceptional circumstances, notably where the impugned act is not merely an employment matter but implicates broader constitutional rights or falls outside the scope of the specialist court’s competence. The High Court retains jurisdiction where the impugned act (a) transcends the employment relationship, or (b) implicates the structure or legality of public administration itself. However, where the decision under challenge—such as a transfer, suspension, or dismissal—arises 5 Baloyi v Public Protector and Others 2021 (2) BCLR 101 (CC). 10 from the employment relationship and is governed by labour legislation, the Labour Court remains the proper forum. [18] A sixth principle of interpretation concerns the phrase “any other labour law” in section 50(2)(j) of the Labour Act. That expression must be read in its ordinary and purposive sense. It encompasses not only the Labour Act itself but also all statutes and regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment in the public service, such as the Public Service Act 2005, the Public Service Regulations 2008, and the Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011. To exclude these instruments would defeat the very aim of the 2024 Act to unify labour relations under one legal regime. [19] Finally, there is the principle that courts must avoid parallel or conflicting jurisdictions. The law abhors a multiplicity of fora addressing the same subject-matter. Once Parliament has provided a specialised remedy, that remedy must be exhausted in the designated court before recourse can be had elsewhere. Section 5(e) of the Labour Act, which provides that remedies under other laws are “in addition to and not in place of” those under the Act, cannot be read to authorise concurrent forums; rather, it allows for complementary substantive remedies to be granted within the Labour Court itself. [20] When these principles are applied collectively, they lead inexorably to the conclusion that the Labour Court possesses exclusive authority to review administrative decisions arising within employment relationships, whether in the private or public 11 sector. The High Court’s jurisdiction under section 119(1) of the Constitution remains intact for matters that are truly public or constitutional in nature, but not for those that are, in substance, labour disputes. The appellant’s challenge to her transfer—an act of management within the public service—accordingly falls squarely within the domain of the Labour Court. Consideration of the Appeal [21] The proper point of departure is the constitutional architecture itself. Section 119(1) of the Constitution entrusts the High Court with unlimited original jurisdiction and with the authority to review the decisions and proceedings of all tribunals, boards, or officers performing public administrative functions. That jurisdiction, though extensive, is not beyond legislative structuring. Parliament, by clear and express enactment, may assign exclusive competence to a specialised court in defined fields. Yet such allocation must always operate within the bounds of the constitutional principle of legality, enshrined in section 2, which insists that every exercise of public power be lawful, rational, and open to judicial scrutiny. Section 119(1) secures that safeguard at the constitutional level. The establishment of specialised courts under section 118(1) does not curtail or amend that guarantee; it merely redistributes its exercise to more expert forums for reasons of efficiency and coherence. What the Constitution forbids is not specialisation, but exclusion: judicial review cannot be extinguished altogether. So long as the Labour Court retains the competence to test administrative action for legality and fairness, statutory exclusivity operates harmoniously 12 with constitutional supremacy. Should that competence ever prove deficient, the High Court’s residual authority under section 119(1) would, by virtue of the rule of law itself, revive to ensure that no act of public power escapes the discipline of legality. The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial system of distributed competence, not hierarchical privilege. The High Court’s power of review is part of the judicial function safeguarded by section 118(1), which permits Parliament to establish courts of specialised jurisdiction. Such distribution enhances, rather than diminishes, constitutional supremacy by ensuring that legality is secured through expertise, coherence, and accessibility. The essence of the rule of law is not that every matter be heard by one court, but that every exercise of public power remains justiciable somewhere within the judicial system. [22] Under the repealed Labour Code Order 1992, sections 24–25 endowed the Labour Court with extensive but not comprehensive civil powers. The jurisprudence—CGM Industrial (Pty) Ltd v LECAWU6; Attorney-General v Lesotho Teachers Trade Union7 —treated that jurisdiction as exclusive in respect of labour disputes properly so called. Nevertheless, a line of authority (for example, Vice-Chancellor of National University of Lesotho v Lana8; Tlali v Attorney-General9 recognised that where a litigant alleged illegality or constitutional infringement, the High Court could intervene. That dualism persisted until Mokotjo v Kennedy (supra). 6 CGM Industrial (Pty) Ltd v LECAWU LAC (1995-1999) 79. 7 Attorney-General v Lesotho Teachers Trade Union LAC (1995-1999) 119. 8 Vice-Chancellor of National University of Lesotho v LanaLAC (2000-2004) 527. 9 Tlali v Attorney-General LAC (2000-2004) 510. 13 [23] In Mokotjo (supra), this Court declared in categorical terms that “the legislature has clearly expressed its intention to give exclusive jurisdiction in labour matters to one institution, namely the Labour Court.” That pronouncement rested upon the statutory text then in force. The appellant contends that it was subsequently diluted by the trilogy of Matela decisions and Seleke. [24] The submission cannot be accepted. The Labour Act 2024 constitutes a comprehensive reconstruction of Lesotho’s labour regime. Its preamble expressly states that the Act “addresses the labour relations dichotomy between the public and private sectors.” Section 3(1) extends its reach to “any employment relationship in the private and public service.” Sections 50 and 51 reproduce, with amplification, the earlier exclusivity provisions and now explicitly empower the Labour Court to “review any administrative action taken in the performance of any function in terms of this Act or any other labour law.” [25] Those words—“any other labour law”—are of decisive importance. They denote not only enactments made under the Labour Act but the entire corpus of public-service employment legislation, including the Public Service Act 2005, the Public Service Regulations 2008, and the Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011. Each regulates an employment relationship within the public service; each is therefore a “labour law” within the statutory sense. To construe “labour law” narrowly, as excluding these instruments, would defeat the evident purpose of the 2024 reform—namely, to bring all employment within a unified jurisdictional fold. 14 [26] The appellant’s principal contention was that the impugned transfer decision, being an exercise of statutory power under the Public Service Act, is administrative in character and hence reviewable under section 119(1). That proposition would have held force under the pre-2024 dispensation. It does not survive the new statutory scheme. As this Court observed in Revenue Services Lesotho v Thabang Jack and Others10, “where Parliament has designated a specialist court with competence to review administrative action within its field, the ordinary courts must yield to that legislative allocation.” [27] Section 51(1) of the 2024 Act declares the Labour Court’s jurisdiction “exclusive.” That is the language of total displacement. The Constitution’s conferral of original jurisdiction on the High Court remains plenary but subject to lawful derogation by statute; there is no inconsistency in a Parliament allocating specialised review powers to a different forum, provided constitutional rights remain justiciable.11 [28] It was argued that the Labour Court’s review competence is limited to cases of unfair labour practice as defined in section 7, whereas the present complaint concerns unlawfulness. The distinction is artificial. The definition of unfair practice in section 7(1) embraces “any unfair act or omission by an employer towards a worker.” An act that is unlawful—because taken ultra vires or arbitrarily—is by parity of reasoning unfair. To excise illegality from unfairness would emasculate the very concept of fairness in 10 Revenue Services Lesotho v Thabang Jack and Others C of A (CIV) 89/2023 . 11 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) para 11. 15 employment relations. That is not to say the concepts are identical in every context; some administrative acts may be unlawful in the public-law sense without constituting an unfair labour practice. But where, as here, the impugned decision arises wholly within an employment relationship, the two notions substantially coincide. [29] Reliance on section 5(e)—that a remedy under another statute is “in addition to” remedies under the Labour Act—does not assist the appellant. That clause ensures cumulative substantive remedies, not parallel jurisdictions. It prohibits double recovery, not the legislative consolidation of fora. In jurisdictional terms, Parliament has spoken unequivocally in sections 50 and 51. The interpretative principle of harmonious reading requires that section 5(e) be read subject to those provisions, not in defiance of them.12 [30] A comparative survey strengthens this conclusion. In Baloyi v Public Protector and Minister of Defence v Motau (supra), the South African Constitutional Court affirmed that when legislation vests labour-related administrative review in a specialist tribunal, recourse to the ordinary High Court lies only for constitutional challenges. So too here: absent a pleaded constitutional infringement, a complaint of irregular transfer is quintessentially a labour matter. That approach accords with the South African jurisprudence in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd13 and Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security14, where the Constitutional Court held that employment-related administrative acts fall primarily within the 12 Rennie NO v Gordon 1988 (1) SA 1 at 22D. 13 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) . 14 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 16 jurisdiction of labour tribunals, and that the High Court’s review power remains available only where constitutional rights or systemic legality are implicated. This comparative consistency affirms the constitutional legitimacy of the scheme adopted in Lesotho. [31] Locally, decisions such as Makhalane v Letseng Diamonds (Pty) Ltd15; Lesotho Revenue Authority v Dichaba16; and National University of Lesotho v Motlatsi Thabane17 confirm the steady jurisprudential trajectory towards exclusivity. None supports the appellant’s effort to reopen concurrent jurisdiction. [32] A coherent system of adjudication requires that like cases be determined by a single, expert tribunal. Fragmentation between the High Court and the Labour Court would foster uncertainty, duplication, and inconsistent outcomes—the very mischief the 2024 Act sought to cure. Judicial structure must reflect legislative design, not judicial preference. [33] The appellant’s grievance concerns a transfer, a condition of public-service employment explicitly governed by regulation 32 of the Public Service Regulations 2008 and section 11 of the Basic Conditions of Employment for Public Officers 2011. Those instruments fall squarely within “any other labour law.” The impugned act, though administrative, occurred within the employment relationship. Under section 50(2)(j) the Labour Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to review such conduct. The 15 Makhalane v Letseng Diamonds (Pty) Ltd LAC (2011-2012) 73. 16 Lesotho Revenue Authority v Dichaba (C of A (CIV) 21 of 2019). 17 National University of Lesotho v Thabane (C of A (CIV) 67 of 2019). 17 learned Chief Justice was therefore correct in declining to entertain the application. Disposition [34] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. The High Court was right to hold that it lacked jurisdiction. The development of our labour jurisprudence—from CGM Industrial through Mokotjo, Matela, and Seleke—reveals a consistent trajectory culminating in statutory exclusivity. The High Court’s constitutional review power remains intact for matters truly public in character, but not for disputes whose subject-matter is the employment relationship. The appellant must seek her remedy before the Labour Court. The demarcation now drawn by the Labour Act 2024 is constitutionally sound and institutionally coherent. It affirms the principle that judicial power may be distributed but never diminished; and that the rule of law endures not through the monopoly of one court, but through the harmony of the judicial system as a whole. [35] This judgment reaffirms the constitutional design of a unified and coherent system of judicial review, one that values both expertise and legality. By situating the Labour Court within that design, the Court gives effect to Parliament’s intention and the Constitution’s command that justice be administered efficiently, fairly, and in accordance with law. The rule of law thus finds expression not in the rigidity of the forum, but in the fidelity of every court to legality and fairness. Order 18 [36] In the result: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. The order of the High Court is affirmed. 3. The appellant shall pay the respondents’ costs. ______________________________ K.E. MOSITO PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL I agree: _____________________________ P T DAMASEB ACTING JUSTICE OF APPEAL I agree: _____________________________ J VAN DER WESTHUIZEN ACTING JUSTICE OF APPEAL FOR APPELLANT: MRS M.P. PHAFANE FOR RESPONDENTS: ADV. P.B.T.N. THAKALEKOALA with ADV T.S NTSIBOLANE #### __Related documents ▲ To the top >