BETA Group (PTY) LTD V Lehlohonolo Khafiso (CCT/0331/2024) [2025] LSHC 239 (11 September 2025)

# BETA Group (PTY) LTD V Lehlohonolo Khafiso (CCT/0331/2024) [2025] LSHC 239 (11 September 2025) [ __](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11) [ __](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11) [ __](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11) [ __](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11) [ __](mailto:?subject=Take a look at this document from LesLII: BETA Group \(PTY\) LTD V Lehlohonolo Khafiso …&body=https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11) [ Download PDF (276.6 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11/source) Report a problem __ * Share * [ Download PDF (276.6 KB) ](/akn/ls/judgment/lshc/2025/239/eng@2025-09-11/source) * * * * * Report a problem __ ##### BETA Group (PTY) LTD V Lehlohonolo Khafiso (CCT/0331/2024) [2025] LSHC 239 (11 September 2025) Copy citation * __Document detail * __Related documents Citation BETA Group (PTY) LTD V Lehlohonolo Khafiso (CCT/0331/2024) [2025] LSHC 239 (11 September 2025) Copy Media Neutral Citation [2025] LSHC 239 Copy Hearing date 14 August 2025 Court [High Court](/judgments/LSHC/) Court registry [Commercial Division](/judgments/LSHC/LSHC-commercial-division/) Case number CCT/0331/2024 Judges [Mokhesi J](/judgments/all/?judges=Mokhesi%20J) Judgment date 11 September 2025 Language English ##### __Collections * [Case indexes](/taxonomy/case-indexes) * [Commercial](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial) * [Civil Procedure](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-civil-procedure) * [Actions and applications](/taxonomy/case-indexes/case-indexes-commercial-civil-procedure-actions-and-applications) Summary Read full summary * * * Skip to document content **_IN THE HIGH COURT OF LESOTHO_** **(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)** **HELD AT MASERU CCT/0331/2024** **In the matter between:** **BETA GROUP (PTY) LTD PLAINTIFF** **AND** **LEHLOHONOLO VICTOR KHAFISO DEFENDANT** **_Neutral Citation_** : BETA Group (Pty) Ltd v Lehlohonolo Victor Khafiso [2025] LSHC 239 Comm. (11 SEPTEMBER 2025) **CORAM: MOKHESI J** **HEARD: 14 AUGUST 2025** **DELIVERED: 11 SEPTEMBER 2025** **_SUMMARY_** **CIVIL PRACTICE:**_An interlocutory application for anti-dissipation interdict against the defendant- The plaintiff alleging that the defendant is likely to sell his property to render the order it might secure in the pending litigation between the parties, empty, as he relocated his whole family to South Africa- The court having established that the defendant is more likely to sell his property, acceded to the order sought by the plaintiff._ **ANNOTATIONS:** **CASES** **LESOTHO** _Teboho Molumo v Lesotho Police Staff Association & 4 Others [2023] LSHC Comm._ **SOUTH AFRICA** _Bassani Mining (Pty) Ltd v Sebosat (Pty) Ltd and Others (835/2020)[[2021] ZASCA 126](/akn/za/judgment/zasca/2021/126)_ _Gool v Minister of Justice and Another 1955 (2) SA 682_ _Knox D’Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others 1996 (4) SA 348_ _KSL v AL 2024 (6) SA 410 (SCA)_ _Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984(3) SA 623_ _Webser v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W)_ **_JUDGMENT_** [1] **Introduction** This is an interlocutory application for anti-dissipation interdict sought by the plaintiff against the defendant. The parties are already locked in a pending case no. CCT/0331/2024. They will be referred to as they are in that case. The plaintiff is seeking an interdict against the defendant to refrain from disposing of or encumbering his immovable properties in the form of registered plot numbers 07454-006 and 07454-007 situated at Mafeteng pending finalization of the matter referred to in the preceding sentence. [2] **Background** In the main case the plaintiff is claiming an amount of M355,519.88 from the defendant arising out of a business venture which went awry. The current matter was lodged on urgent basis, but it is important that I sketch a short factual background to the case. The parties had an agreement to buy a truck for trading with it for their benefit. It was to be bought through bank financing. Disputes erupted between the parties whose resolution resulted in the agreement that it be given to the defendant to own it and for him to reimburse the plaintiff the truck’s purchase price. Failure to pay the purchase price as agreed resulted in the plaintiff instituting summons against the defendant claiming the said purchase price and other ancillary reliefs. During the pendency of that matter the plaintiff lodged the present application on urgent basis seeking the reliefs outlined in the introductory part of this judgment. [3] **Respective parties’ cases** **Plaintiff** It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant has uprooted his entire family and relocated to the Republic of South Africa, and that his only property in the country are the two plots referred to above, situated at Ha-Ramohapi Mafeteng. Acting on the information he received from third parties, he sent one Tello Kapeso to Ha-Ramohapi to confirm the information that the defendant sold the two properties and was in the process of effecting a transfer. Kapeso returned with the report that he found a caretaker to the property who told him that the house was sold to a person who resided in Maseru but was never transferred due to his passing and that talks were underway with his daughter to accept transfer or to cancel the sale. The plaintiff went to check the file status of the plots at Land Administration Authority. It discovered through its director Seema Pitso that the two sites have not been transferred but that the defendant applied for consent on 03 December 2024, which was never pursued to finality. The plaintiff claims based on this scenario that it fears that the defendant will sell the properties and leave this jurisdiction for good. Kapeso filed supporting affidavit. [4] **Defendant’s case** The defendant does not deny that the properties in question are his. He argues that he moved to South Africa after he secured employment and has no intention of secreting the assets to defeat the claims against him. The fact of him and his family moving to South Africa was well known to the director of the plaintiff and her husband even before the institution of the main case. He avers that he is involved in transportation of goods and that his children attend school in South Africa. He has no intention of disposing of the properties. He averred that in 2023 he was in the process of selling the properties to pay off the debt he owes to the defendant, however, that did not succeed. He avers that recently he has not made any attempt to sell the properties. In 2023 when he attempted to sell the properties, he made the directors of the plaintiff aware that that was the course he was opting to take to settle the debt. He, however, denies that he applied for consent to dispose of the properties. He argues that there was no malice in him and his family moving to South Africa. [5] **Issues to be determined** ****(I) Whether the court should grant anti-dissipation interdict. [6] **The law on anti-dissipation interdicts.** This is an interlocutory interim interdict. The question, to which I turn to determine is whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of this interdict. As stated in **KSL v AL 2024 (6) SA 410 (SCA)****** at para.15 the court stated that anti-dissipation interdict may be sought and granted: _“Where a respondent is believed to be deliberately arranging his affairs in such a way so to ensure that by the time the applicant is in a position to execute judgment, he will be without assets or sufficient assets on which the applicant expects to execute. Its purpose is to preserve the asset which is in issue between the parties. The onus is on the applicant for such an interdict to establish the necessary requirements for the grant of the interdict.”_ [7] The requirements for granting an interim interdict are well-known, namely, (a) a _prima facie_ right, even though open to some doubt, (b) injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; (c) the balance of convenience; (d) the absence of similar protection through an alternative remedy. [8] The plaintiff needs to show that the defendant is getting rid of the assets or is likely to do so with the intention of defeating his creditors’ claims – the showing of this state of mind is essential as was stated in **Knox D’Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others 1996 (4) SA 348****AD** at 372 F-I: _“The question which arises from this approach is whether an applicant need show a particular state of mind on the part of the respondent, ie that he is getting rid of the funds, or is likely to do so, with the intention of defeating the claims of creditors. Having regard to the purpose of this type of interdict, the answer must be, I consider, yes, except possibly in exceptional cases. As I have said, the effect of the interdict is to prevent the respondent from freely dealing with his own property to which the applicant lays no claim. Justice may require this restriction in cases where the respondent is shown to be acting mala fide with the intent of preventing execution in respect of the applicant's claim. However, there would not normally be any justification to compel a respondent to regulate his bona fide expenditure so as to retain funds in his patrimony for the payment of claims (particularly disputed ones) against him. I am not, of course, Copyright Juta & Company at the moment dealing with special situations which might arise, for instance, by contract or under the law of insolvency.”_ [9] In short, the plaintiff has to establish: (a) that it has a claim against the defendant, and (b) that the defendant is concealing or dissipating assets with the sole intention of defeating its claim **(Knox D’Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others**(above) at p. 372**A-C; Bassani Mining (Pty) Ltd v Sebosat (Pty) Ltd and Others (835/2020) [2021] ZASCA 126**(29 September 2021) at para.1). [10] This being an interim interdict pendente lite, factual finding on whether “ _prima facie”_ right though open to some doubt, has been established has to follow the approach in **Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) 1189 to 1190** as follows: _“In the grant of a temporary interdict, apart from prejudice involved, the first question for the Court in my view is whether, if interim protection is given, the applicant could ever obtain the rights he seeks to protect. Prima facie that has to be shown. The use of the phrase “prima facie established though open to some doubt” indicates I think that more is required than merely to look at the allegations of the applicant, but something short of a weighing up of the probabilities of conflicting versions is required. The proper manner of approach I consider is to take the facts as set out by the applicant, together with any facts set out by the respondent which the applicant cannot dispute, and to consider whether, having regard to the inherent probabilities, the applicants could on those facts obtain final relief at a trial. The facts set up in contradiction by the respondent should then be considered. If serious doubt is thrown on the case of the applicant he could not succeed in obtaining temporary relief, for his right, prima facie established, may only be open to “some doubt.”_ [11]**** The above test was refined in**Gool v Minister of Justice and Another 1955 (2) SA 682****(C)** at 688 D-E where the court said: _“With the greatest respect, I am of the opinion that the criterion prescribed in this statement for the first branch of the inquiry thus outlined is somewhat too favourably expressed towards the applicant for an interdict. In my view the criterion on an applicant’s own averred or admitted facts is: should (not could) the applicant on those facts obtain final relief at the trial. Subject to that qualification I respectfully agree that the approach outlined in Webster v Mitchell, supra, is the correct approach for ordinary interdict application.”_ __ [11] There is therefore no room for application of the approach to fact finding as espoused in the well-known case of **Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984(3) SA 623****(A)**(see **Teboho Molumo v Lesotho Police Staff Association & 4 Others [2023] LSHC Comm. ****(14 September 2023)** at para. 15). [12] In the present case it is common cause that the parties were business partners. They bought a truck for business purposes which was financed through the bank at the cost of M250,000. The relationship between the parties soured and they had to split. The defendant kept the truck. The plaintiff repaid the bank an amount of M355,519.88 inclusive of interest. The parties then concluded an agreement which they termed _“Acknowledgment of Debt Agreement”_ in terms of which the defendant agreed that: he is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of M355,519.88 and the agreement goes on to state: _“ -2-_ _The Principal Debt arose around year 2015 in respect of a loan granted by Standard Lesotho Bank and its interest, amounting to Three Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand Five Hundred and Nineteen Maloti Eighty-eight Cents only (355,519.88) payable with monthly instalments of Twelve Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty-Three Maloti Thirty Three cents only (12,653.33) including tax, within a period of thirty six months (36). I the debtor pledged my immovable property situated at Ha-Ramohapi Mafeteng, as the loan surety._ _-3-_ _It transpired that upon arrival of the truck which was bought from the loan for the creditor company, the creditor and I the Debtor, had a crucial disagreement on terms and conditions of our gentleman’s contract. Whereupon we, the parties finally agreed that, I the Debtor and surety of the granted loan, keep the truck and keep up with the bank’s monthly premiums as above-mentioned, which I dismally failed to. To protect my pledged immovable property, is it common course that the creditor alone, stood in for me be setting the full amount of the loan on my behalf, giving rise to the principal debt and subject matter of this agreement._ _-4-_ _Thus, I am fully indebted to the creditor for the principal debt, which is due and payable from February 2024. Immediately upon signature of this agreement, I, the Debtor enter into a commitment of intention to pay a premium and consistent monthly instalments of Twenty Thousand Maloti only (20,000.00) beginning end of February 2024 until full settlement of the indebted amount…”_ [13] The defendant on the other hand contends that the truck in question was impounded for five years with the result that it never generated any income “… _a fact which the Applicant is well aware of prior to its resorting to tactics of intimidation and forcing me into signing off on a contract it knew was well above my earnings hence the defence I had presented in opposition to the granting of summary judgment against me.”_ The defendant contends that when the truck was finally released, he incurred expenses to service it and to get it running again as it had deteriorated due to elements. [14] I turn to determine whether the plaintiff has established a _prima facie_ right to the money it is claiming from the defendant. The defendant had collateralised the debt with his immovable property. When he kept the truck, he was expected to continue repaying the loan which was secured to buy it, but he failed. The plaintiff, in order to protect the immovable property of the defendant, cleared the debt, so that the latter would be indebted to it. In terms of this new arrangement the defendant was obliged to repay the plaintiff in equal months instalments of M20,000.00 from February 2024 but he failed to do so. These are common cause facts. In my considered view when the facts as set out by the plaintiff are considered with those which have been admitted by the defendant, the plaintiff should on these facts at the trial obtain a final relief – it has established a _prima facie_ right, though open to some doubt, to the money it is claiming from the defendant. [15] **Injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended and balance of convenience** **** It is the plaintiff’s contention that the properties in question are the only property which the defendant owns in the country and that if he sells them the plaintiff will be left with nothing to execute judgment if it succeeds in its claim against him. The defendant has not denied that these properties are his only assets in the country. Although he disputes that he attempted to sell the properties in 2024 he however, revealed that he attempted to do so in 2023 in vain. In my judgment if the defendant was willing to dispose of his property in 2023 to pay off the debt in question, I do not see what can prevent him from doing so faced with the prospect of judgment in favour of the plaintiff. If that were to eventuate the plaintiff will be greatly prejudiced if it ends up being successful in the claims against the defendant. In my view the balance of convenience also favours granting the interim interdict. [16] **Absence of similar protection through alternative remedy** **** In the application for anti-dissipation interdict, the question of a claim for damages being an alternative to it does not arise, because as was stated in **Knox D’Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson (above)** at p. 373 B-E: _“It is often said that an interdict will 1996 (4) SA p373 E M GROSSKOPF JA not be granted if there is another satisfactory remedy available to the applicant. In that context a claim for damages is often contrasted with a claim for an interdict. The question is asked: should the respondent be interdicted from committing the unlawful conduct complained of, or should he be permitted to continue with such conduct, leaving the applicant to recover any damages he may suffer? That is not the question which arises here. In the present circumstances there is no question of a claim for damages being an alternative to an interdict. The only claim which the petitioners have is one for damages. There is no suggestion that it could be replaced by a claim for an interdict. The purpose of the interdict is not to be a substitute for the claim for damages but to reinforce it - to render it more effective. And the question whether the claim is a satisfactory remedy in the absence of an interdict would normally answer itself.”_ [17] **Is the defendant getting rid of his assets or likely to do so with the intention of defeating the plaintiff’s claim against it?** In the present matter the defendant disputes that he is selling his immovable properties. He avers that he only attempted to do so in 2024 when he wanted to clear his indebtedness to the plaintiff, but the sale did not materialise. It is evident that the plaintiff’s version that the defendant is selling the properties is merely an embellishment of facts meant only to move the court to come to its rescue. There is no evidence that the defendant is selling the properties. Despite this conclusion I do not think this should be the end of the matter as the prove of the defendant’s state of mind is two-faceted. On the other facet to which I turn, the question is whether on the facts the plaintiff has proved that the defendant is likely to sell off his immovable properties to defeat its claims. Perhaps at the risk of being repetitious, it is common cause that the defendant and his family stay in South Africa where he works. It is further common cause that he attempted to sell the properties as recently as 2023, as already stated, in order to settle his debt with the plaintiff albeit unsuccessfully. This scenario, where the defendant and his family are not resident in the country and where he even attempted to sell his only immovable property especially in the circumstances where he acknowledges indebtedness to the plaintiff makes it likely that he will sell the properties to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. [18] In the result the following order is made: 1. The application for anti-dissipation interdict succeeds in terms prayed for in the notice of motion, with costs. __________________________ **MOKHESI J** **For the Plaintiff: Advocate L. R Malefane** **For the Defendant: Ms T. P Chabana** #### __Related documents ▲ To the top >