THE REPUBLIC VRS. HIGH COURT (GENERAL JURISDICTION 8), ACCRA EX PARTE DANIEL OFORI (J5/85/2024) [2025] GHASC 4 (22 January 2025)

INTHE SUPERIOR COURTOFJUDICATURE IN THESUPREMECOURT ACCRA–AD.2025 CORAM: LOVELACE–JOHNSON(MS) JSC(PRESIDING) ASIEDUJSC GAEWU JSC DARKOASARE JSC ADJEI-FRIMPONGJSC CIVILMOTION NO:J5/85/2024 ND 22 JANUARY,2025 THEREPUBLIC VRS. HIGHCOURT (GENERALJURISDICTION 8),ACCRA EXPARTE DANIELOFORI … APPLICANT ECOBANKGHANALIMITED … INTERESTEDPARTY ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ RULING Page 1of 24 MAJORITYOPINION DARKOASARE JSC: INTRODUCTION My Lords, this is an application seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this court by way of judicial review for an order of certiorari directed at the High Court, General Jurisdiction 8, to bring up into this Court for purposes of being quashed and quashing the ruling of the court dated the 2nd day of May 2024; a declaration that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain execution of a judgment of the Supreme Court; and an order of prohibition prohibiting the High Court (General Jurisdiction 8] from entertaining any proceedings and/or application(s) to restrain the execution proceedings commenced in the suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021)as orderedby theSupreme Court. GROUNDSFOR APPLICATION Thegrounds forthe applicationare setout by the Applicantas follows:- i. The High Court has no jurisdiction to grant an order of interlocutory injunction to stay execution pending appeal in respect of the garnishee proceedings in Suit No. CM/MISC/0829 when there is no appeal pending in respect ofthose proceedings. Page 2of 24 ii. By its decision of 2nd May 2024, the High Court wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to entertain an application [for injunction pending appeal] by the Interested Party to restrain the execution of a final judgment of the Supreme Court in the suit intituled Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. Daniel Ofori v. CM/MISC/0829/2021). Particulars. a. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any process whatsoever to suspend the execution of a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court which the Supreme Court expressly directed the High Court to execute for thebenefit of the Applicant. b.The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order of interlocutory injunction under the provisions of Order 25 rule 1 after a final judgment,evenof the HighCourt. c.The High Court has no jurisdiction, under the provisions of Order 43 rule 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, to entertain an application to stay execution of judgments of the Supreme Court which it is required by the SupremeCourt toexecute. Page 3of 24 d. By the principle of estoppel per rem judicatam the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings to reopen for determination the very mattersdetermined bythe Supreme Court against theInterested Party. iii. The High Court has no jurisdiction to determine de novo a point of law already determinedby the Supreme Court: a. The High Court, by virtue of article 129(3) of the Constitution, ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court which held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter to question any judgment of a court higherinthe hierarchy thanthe HighCourt. b. The High Court ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court all of which Supreme Court decisions held that the Interested Party is not entitled to astayof execution of the judgmentof theSupreme Court. BACKGROUND To provide context and clarity, this analysis will commence with a concise summary of thesalient eventsleading up tothe decisionunder attack. Following a judgment entered in favour of the Applicant, the Supreme Court directed that the said judgment be enforced by the High Court. The Applicant initiated Page 4of 24 garnishee proceedings, while the Interested Party filed a new suit to set aside the Supreme Court's judgment, citing fraud. The High Court dismissed this suit, and the Interested Party appealed. The Interested Party then applied for an injunction to prevent the Applicant from enforcing the Supreme Court's judgment, pending the hearing of the appeal. The Applicant raised a preliminary objection by motion and argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this application. However, the High Court dismissed this objection, ruling that it had jurisdiction since the execution process was pending before it. This decision has led to an application for judicial review, with the Applicant arguing that the High Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of the Supreme Court's judgment, especially since no appeal is pending. The Applicant also claims that the High Court wrongfully assumed jurisdiction and should not have determined a point of law already decided by the SupremeCourt Atits core, the present applicationfor judicial reviewrests on the fundamental assertion that the High Court lacked the requisite jurisdictional competence to entertain, let alone adjudicate, the merits of the injunction application. As learned Counsel for the Applicantforcefullyargues inhis Statement of Case:- “…. the High Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain any process to suspend or stay the enforcement of a final judgment, order or decree of the Supreme Court. This point is quite trite. It is entirely in the province of every courttoenforce itsjudgments, orders and/or decrees.” Page 5of 24 Learned Counsel for the Applicant further submitted that when directed by the Supreme Court to execute any judgment emanating from the Court, a High Court cannot go beyond that directive to impose any terms or conditions on its own such as a stay of execution. Referring to Rule 28 of CI 16, and the case of Ex Parte Kumoji [2000] SCGLR211,Applicant's Counselsubmits asfollows: - “This provision makes clear what the High Court was to do based on the Supreme Court Order requiring execution of its judgment to be undertaken by the High Court. The High Court is obliged to enforce the judgment in terms of the Court's directive. The High Court cannot go beyond the confines of the direction and impose any terms or conditions on its own such as a stay of execution of the judgment the Court has directed the High Court to execute. This is the also the import of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Republic vHighCourt, Accra:Ex parteKumoji.” The question then is whether the Applicant was rightin contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction at first instance to even entertain let alone adjudicate the injunction application, and that by merely deciding to entertain the said application for purposes ofrefusing orgranting it, theHighCourt had acted inexcessof jurisdiction. Page 6of 24 To properly contextualize this inquiry, it may perhaps be necessary to briefly recount the basic legal principles that inform the exercise of this Court's judicial review jurisdiction underRule 61ofCI 16. APPLICABLELAW The principles governing the grant of an application for judicial review under the provisions of Article 132 of the Constitution and Rule 61 of CI 16 are now so well entrenched asnotto requireany detailedre-statement here. Suffice to say that certiorari is a discretionary remedy granted on grounds of jurisdictional excess ordeficiency, breachof natural justice,orpatent error on the record rendering the decision a nullity Save in clear cases of jurisdictional defect or egregious breach of natural justice, certiorari will only succeed if the error of law is manifestly apparent on the face of the record Certiorari is not concerned with the merits but is a complaintabout jurisdiction orsomeprocedural irregularity. The above statement of the law has been re-affirmed in a plethora of judicial decisions like Republic v Court of Appeal, Accra, Ex-parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612 at 619 Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex-parte Ghana Medical Association (Arcman- Akumey — Interested Party) [2012] 2 SCGLR; The Republic v High Court, Accra Ex- parte Attorney-General (Ohene Agyapong Interested Party) [2012] 2 SCGLR 1204; as wellas Republic vHighCourt, Accra;Ex-parteTetteh Apain[2007-2008] SCGLR72 Page 7of 24 The following passage by this Court in the case of Republic v High Court (Commercial Division) Ex Parte The Trust Bank (Ampomah Photo Lab and 3 ors, Interested Parties) [2009] SCGLR 164, (at p.169-171), provides perhaps the most pristine roadmap regulating the parameters for the exercise by the Supreme Court of its supervisory jurisdiction overinferiorcourts: - "The current law on when the prerogative writs will be available from the Supreme Court to supervise the superior courts in respect of their errors of law was restated and then fine-tuned in the Republic v High Court Accra, Ex Parte CHRAJ [2003-2004] SCGLR 1 and Republic v Court of Appeal, Ex Parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612, respectively. In my view, the combined effect of these two authorities results in a statement of the law which is desirable and should be re-affirmed. This Court should endeavour not to backslide into excessive supervisory intervention over the High Court in relation to its errors of law. Appeals are better suited for resolving errors of law. In the Ex Parte CHRAJ case, this Court, speaking through me, sought to reset the clock on this aspectof the law(as stated atpages 345-346) asfollows: "The Ruling of this Court in this case, it is hoped, provides a response to the above invitation to restate the law on this matter. The restatement of the law may be summarised as follows: where the High Court (or for that matter the Court of Appeal) makes a non-jurisdictional error of law which Page 8of 24 is not patent on the face of the record (within the meaning already discussed), theavenue forredress open to anaggrieved party is anappeal, not judicial review. In this regard, an error of law made by the High Court or the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as taking the judge outside the court's jurisdiction, unless the court has acted ultra vires the Constitution or an express statutory restriction validly imposed on it. To the extent that this restatement of the law is inconsistent with any previous decision of this Supreme Court, this Court should be regarded as departing from its previous decision or decisions concerned, pursuant to Article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution. Any previous decisions of other courts inconsistentwith thisrestatement areoverruled." The fundamental principle gleaned from the authorities is that the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction, albeit expansive, does not extend to scrutinizing non- jurisdictional errors better suited for resolution through the appellate process. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction should only be invoked in the most exceptional and manifest cases, lest it devolves into a forum for indiscriminate challengesto lowercourt decisions. Now, does this present case involve an error that can be scrutinized and remedied throughtheexercise of thisCourt’s judicialreviewpowers? Page 9of 24 CONSIDERATION In dismissing the Applicant’s preliminary objection against the assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the Interested Party’s application for interlocutory injunction, theHigh Courthad delivered itselfas follows:- “This case commenced in the High Court and has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court and the execution of the apex Court's judgment is being levied in this Court as directed by the Supreme Court so this Court can entertain applications. The garnishee proceeding is taking place in this court and thus, gives the court the right to entertain applications that are brought before it until execution is completely levied. Secondly, since the execution process is pending in this Court even though the judgment is that of the Supreme Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with it as execution is being levied here. I do not find the process filed by the Defendant as irregular as injunction applications under Order 25 Rule 2 of C. I. 47 can be brought even after the trial of the case or matter whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in the Party's Writ, Counterclaim or Third-Party notice. Accordingly, the instant application is refused”. My Lords, the task confronting this Court is to critically examine the arguments of the Applicant against the decision of the High Court and satisfy ourselves, as to whether the High Court properly exercised jurisdiction to entertain the Interested Party’s Page 10of 24 injunction application for purposes of refusing or granting it, and if so whether the decision wasamenable tothe supervisory jurisdiction of thisCourt. A bare perusal of the materials on record in this application reflects that the objection raised against the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction applicationandadjudicate upon it,isnot rootedin any statutoryproscriptions. Admittedly, the Applicant asserts that the enforcement proceedings were initiated pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28 of CI 16, which according to Applicant’s Counsel, explicitly precludes the High Court from going beyond the strict directives to enforce thejudgment inquestion. Rule28states asfollows: - 28.Execution ofjudgment by courtbelow “Where the Court directs any judgment or order to be enforced by any other court, certificate in the Form 12 set out in Part I of the Schedule to these Rules under the seal, of the Court and the hand of the presiding justice setting out the judgment or order shall be transmitted by the Registrar to that other court, and thelatter shall enforce the judgementororderin the termsof the certificate.” We have reviewed the record in the light of Rule 28 of CI 16, and apart from the fact that this provision does not contemplate situations where the Supreme Court judgment Page 11of 24 to be enforced is itself the target of fraud-based impeachment proceedings, we find nothing in the language used in that provision which commends itself to the interpretation urged on this Court by learned Counsel for the Applicant. The well- established position of the law is that where the intention of the legislature is to oust the original jurisdiction of the High Court from determining any particular question or matter, it must do so in express, clear and unambiguous language in giving effect to them. Even so, such clauses are construed narrowly. This principle has been a cornerstone of this Court's jurisprudence, shaping our interpretation of various Rules of Court on multiple occasions. See for instance Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex Parte: Magna International Transport Ltd (Ghana Telecommunications Co Ltd-Interested Party) [2017-2018] 2 SCLRG (Adaare) 1024, and The Republic v High Court (Criminal Division9), Accra,Ex Parte:EcobankGhana Limited& Ors Civil MotionNo J5/10/2022; th 18 January 2022. See as well Republic vrs. Military Tribunal Ex Parte Ofosu – Amaah [1973]GLR227. The view of the law we have held above also aligns with the long-standing legal position that the circumstances under which the High Court would legally assume its original jurisdiction in any matter are as a general proposition of the law, governed by procedural rules established by statute, and any challenge to its jurisdiction must be viewed withskepticism absentclear statutoryprescriptions. This is the same view of the law expressed by Kpegah JSC in the case of Republic v Adu-Boahenand Another[1993-94] 2GLR 324atpage 339:- Page 12of 24 “…the circumstances under which any adjudicating body could assume jurisdiction in any matter and determine same are regulated by rules of procedure established by statue. This is what Lord Blackburn referred to in Re Green (supra)as the "ordinaryprocedure" of thetribunalor court.” The analysis above reveals that the Applicant's jurisdictional challenge, which contests the High Court's original jurisdiction to entertain the injunction application particularly in the specific context of impeachment proceedings premised on allegations of fraud, is fatally flawed due to the lack of statutory foundation, thereby depriving the grounds forjudicial reviewinthispresent case, of anymerit. Apart from the lack of statutory or procedural basis for the jurisdictional challenges, it is also doubtful whether the plethora of judicial authorities relied upon by the Applicant articulate a discernible principle of law that strips the High Court of its jurisdiction to entertain applications arising from enforcement proceedings, especially in circumstances where the judgment being enforced is concurrently subject to impeachment proceedingsgrounded on allegationsof fraud. Despite the impressive array of authorities cited by learned Counsel for the Applicant, we have been unable to identify any direct precedent supporting the contention that the High Court, as a Constitutionally established superior court, vested with original jurisdiction in all matters, lacked the authority to entertain the Interested Party’s injunction application, even if only for the limited purpose of refusing or granting it. Page 13of 24 Indeed, a careful review of the cited authorities has yielded no direct precedent supporting the proposition that a High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain interim applications relatedto aSupremeCourt judgment beingimpeached forfraud. It is well settled that fraud vitiates even the most solemn act. De Grey, C.J., in Rex Vs. Duchess of Kingston [ 2 Smith L.C. 687] observed that 'Fraud' is an intrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical and temporal". In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, it is statedthat "in applying this rule, it matters not whether the judgment impugned has been pronounced by an inferior or by the highest Court of judicature in the realm, but in all cases alike it is competent for every Court, whether superior or inferior, to treatas anullityany judgmentwhich canbe clearlyshown tohave beenobtained by manifestfraud." (emphasis) The long-settled practice of the Court is that the proper method of impeaching a completed judgment on the ground of fraud is by action, and in the context of fraud- based impeachment proceedings, a court is entitled to exercise appropriate jurisdiction, toensurein allcases that asuccessful Party,does notend upwithapyrrhic victoryafter judgment is delivered. See for instance the views of Benin JSC in the case of The Republic v High Court Commercial Division, Accra, Ex Parte: Ivory Finance Company Ltd, Interested Parties: Ital Construct International Ltd & 3 Ors Civil Motion No Page 14of 24 th J5/20/2016; 19 May 2016,where clear pronouncements were made by this Court to the effect that in appropriate cases, a stay of execution may be granted in fraud based impeachmentsproceedings, ifthe interests of justiceso dictate. In the landmark decision of Joseph v. Jebeile and Another [1963] 1 GLR 387, the Supreme Court many years ago underscored the long-standing policy of the law to view favourably, applications for stay execution of judgments involving considerable financial amounts. This guiding principle assumes heightened significance in proceedings to impeach a judgment for fraud, where the court's inherent jurisdiction may be exercised to prevent a successful party from being deprived of the tangible benefits of its judgment, particularly in cases involving large financial stakes, such as thepresent one. In this regard, it must be made clear that the exercise of the court's jurisdiction is not vitiated merely because its underlying reasoning may be erroneous. In our considered opinion, the basis for the court's decision is immaterial, provided it acts within its jurisdiction. Consequently, any error in the court's decision would be characterized as an error within jurisdiction, rather than a jurisdictional excess. It follows therefore that the Applicant's contention that the High Court Judge exceeded her jurisdiction by entertaining theinjunctionapplication on the basisof anon-existentappeal,is flawed. Page 15of 24 In this instant case, it is significant to draw attention to the fact that the High Court Judge was aware of the duty she was called upon to discharge. In her Ruling dated the nd 2 of May 2024,sheveryclearly stated theduty she wasto dischargeas follows: “…. since the execution process is pending in this Court even though the judgment is that of the Supreme Court, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with it as execution is being levied here. I do not find the process filed by the Defendant as irregular as injunction applications under Order 25 Rule 2 of C. I. 47 can be brought even after the trial of the case or matter whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in the Party's Writ, Counterclaim or Third-Party notice ….” Evidently, the High Court Judge felt obliged to examine the application which had been placed before her on its merits, unconstrained by any statutory procedural rules that specifically ousted her jurisdiction from doing so. Given the peculiar circumstances of the injunction application, which was premised on an action to impeach a judgment for fraud pending before the same High Court and targeted at the same Supreme Court judgment sought to be enforced, the High Court Judge was compelled to assume jurisdiction and did not consider herself bound by the principles enunciated in Ex Parte Kumoji (supra) which decision instructively, was not even related to an action to impeach a judgment for fraud. The High Court Judge considered herself duty-bound to assume jurisdiction under the High Court Rules of Procedure to grant necessary reliefs Page 16of 24 in respect of pending proceedings, as a refusal to do so would have effectively denied theInterested Partyamerits-based hearing, andoccasioned manifestinjustice. Learned Counsel for the Applicant castigates the High Court Judge for entertaining an injunction application brought on the back of a non-existing appeal. That complaint, even if warranted, may be one that goes to a wrongful exercise of discretion based on extraneous considerations, rather than a complaint of jurisdictional overreach. It finds nofavour withthisCourt. Upon a thorough examination of the record and careful consideration of the submissions urged on this Court by learned Counsel, we are satisfied that the High Court Judge was well within her jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the injunctionapplication,rendering the jurisdictional challenge,unfounded. In the end, we are satisfied that any error allegedly committed by the High Court Judge was a jurisdictional error, that is to say one that was committed within the scope of her jurisdiction, rather than outside it. In the circumstances we think that this is an appropriate case where our discretion ought to be exercised against the grant of the instantapplicationforjudicial review. This Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the discretionary character of the remedy of certiorari. For instance, in Republic v High Court, Denu; ex parte Agbesi Page 17of 24 Awusu II (No. 2) (Nyonyo Agboada (Sri III) Interested Party) [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 907, Atuguba JSCexplained (at p. 914)that: "It is well-known that certiorari is a discretionary remedy and therefore it does not follow that when the technical grounds upon which certiorari lies are established, itwill bepro tanto granted." As to the claim for prohibition, our view is that apart from the fact that there is nothing in the processes filed by the Applicant which in our estimation, meets the necessary threshold for establishing the grounds and scope required for the discretionary order of prohibition, as established by our courts in such cases as Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (Addo Interested Party) [2003-2004] SCGLR 312, the record shows that the claim for prohibition is now moot, as the High Court has rendered a final ruling on the Interested Party's injunction application,rendering any prohibitoryorder futile. Given the cumulative effect of the considerations outlined above, the conclusion is inescapable that this Court's judicial review jurisdiction under Rule 61 of CI 16 has not been properly invoked, and the instant application for certiorari and prohibition should fail.The applicationforcertiorari andprohibitionis accordinglydismissed. Page 18of 24 (SGD.) Y. DARKOASARE (JUSTICE OFTHE SUPREMECOURT) (SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON(MS) (JUSTICEOF THESUPREMECOURT) (SGD.) S.K. A.ASIEDU (JUSTICE OFTHE SUPREMECOURT) (SGD.) E.Y. GAEWU (JUSTICE OFTHE SUPREMECOURT) DISSENTING OPINION ADJEI-FRIMPONGJSC; This application and the application in Suit No. J5/93/2024 (bearing the same title) for which this Court has just delivered its ruling, arise from the same factual background. Both applications also sought to achieve the same purpose; to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to strike at the decision of the High Court (General Jurisdiction 8),Accratoinjunctor suspendthe executionof the final judgmentof thisCourt. Page 19of 24 The distinction between the two applications however is that, the ruling of the High nd Court against which this application was brought, was delivered first in time, on 2 May 2024. My understanding from the record was that when the Interested Party filed the application for injunction to suspend the execution of the judgment of this Court, the applicant herein filed an application in that Court to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction toentertaintheapplication inthe first place. nd The High Court dismissed that application by its said ruling of 2 May 2024. That ruling is the subject of the instant application. Following that ruling, the High Court then proceeded to hear the substantive application which it eventually granted by its th ruling of 5 June 2024. This second ruling resulted in the application in Suit No J5/93/2024for whichwehave alreadydelivered adecision. I recall that at the hearing of the two applications before us, I drew Counsel’s attention to the fact that by virtue of the application in Suit No J5/93/2024, which was to attack the substantive ruling of the High Court, the instant application which was merely to attack a ruling in what appeared to be a preliminary objection, had turned moot. My view at the time which I still share was that, our determination of the application in Suit No. J5/93/2024 will effectively dispose of the instant application. This Court did not pressthe matter when Counseltook acontrary viewwhich resulted in bothapplications beingheardseparately. Page 20of 24 In thisapplication,the applicant seeksthe followingreliefs: i. An order of certiorari directed at the High Court, General jurisdiction 8, to bring up into this Court for purposes of being quashed and quashing the nd ruling of Her Ladyship Justice Ellen Mireku dated 2 day of May 2024 in the case intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (numbered Suit No. GJ 0829/2021). ii. A declaration that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain execution of a judgment ofthe Supreme Court. iii. An order of prohibition prohibiting the High Court [General Jurisdiction 8] from entertaining any proceedings and/or application(s) to restrain the execution proceedings commenced in suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021) as ordered by the Supreme Court. Thegrounds on whichthe applicationwas broughtarestated asfollows: i. The High Court has no jurisdiction to grant an order of interlocutory injunction to stay execution of proceedings pending appeal in respect of the garnishee proceedings in Suit No. CM/MISC/0829 when there is no appeal pendinginrespect of those proceedings. Page 21of 24 nd ii. By its decision of 2 May 2024, the High Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction to entertain an application [for injunction pending appeal] by the Interested Party to restrain the execution of a final judgment of the Supreme Court in the suit intituled Daniel Ofori v Ecobank Ghana Limited (Suit No. CM/MISC/0829/2021. Particulars. a. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any process whatsoever to suspend the execution of a final judgment or order of the Supreme Court which the Supreme Court expressly directed the High Court to execute for thebenefit of the Applicant. b. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order of interlocutory injunction under the provisions of Order 25 rule 1 after a final judgment,evenof the HighCourt. c. The High Court has no jurisdiction under the provisions of Order 43 rule 11of the High Court [Civil Procedure] Rules, to entertainan applicationto stay execution of judgments of the Supreme Court which it is required by theSupreme Court toexecute. Page 22of 24 d. By the principle of estoppel per rem judicatam the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings to re-open for determination the very matters determined by the Supreme Court against the Interested Party. iii. The High Court has no jurisdiction to determine de novo a point of law alreadydetermined bythe Supreme Court: a. The High Court by virtue of article 129(3) of the Constitution, ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court which held that the High Court has no jurisdiction toentertain amatter to questionany judgment of thecourt higherin the hierarchythanthe HighCourt. b. The High Court ought to have applied the decisions of the Supreme Court all of which Supreme Court decisions held that the Interested Party is not entitledtoastay of execution ofthe judgment ofthe Supreme Court.” In Suit No J5/93/2024 I delivered a dissenting opinion in which I articulated reasons why I think the High Court committed errors of law on the face of the record which go to jurisdiction and render the decision a nullity by entertaining and granting the application for injunction. Given that almost the same grounds and legal arguments in that application have been set out in the present one, I come to the same decision in this application. I upholdallthe grounds forthisapplication andgrant allthe reliefssought. Page 23of 24 (SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG (JUSTICE OFTHE SUPREMECOURT) COUNSEL TSATSUTSIKATA ESQ.FOR THE APPLICANTWITHTHADDEUS SORYESQ.AND NANA BOAKYE MENSA-BONSUESQ. SEKYERE DUODUESQ FOR THE INTERESTEDPARTY WITHSAMUEL ADUAMUAHADDOESQ. Page 24of 24