Edith Chuulu and Anor v Monica Munalula and Anor (CAZ/08/543/2025) (11 December 2025) – ZambiaLII

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA CAZ/08/543/2025 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA Civil Jurisdiction) ( BETWEEN: EDITH CHUULU 1 APPLICANT ST ATTORNEY GENERAL ND APPLICANT AND MONICA MUNALULA 1 ST RESPONDENT KAMOCHA GLEM NDELEKI 2ND RESPONDENT Before the Honourable Lady Justice B.M. Majula, this 11th day of December, 2025. For the ]st Applicant: l-.frs. C. M. Ma.koza, Legal Aid Counsel, Legal Aid Board For 2nd Applicant No Appearance For the Respondents: Mr. I. Musungilo with Mr. J. Chileshe, both of Messrs Philsong & Parners t RULING Cases referred to: 1. Nahar Investment Limited v Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) Limited (1984) Z.R. 81 (S.C.) J D.E. Nkhuwa v Lusaka Tyre Services Ltd ( J 977) ZR 4 3 2. 3. Seventh Day Adventist Association v Nsanta. {CAZ/ 08/2S0/2 0 J 7) R2 4. Access Bank (Zambia) Limited v Attorney General (2018/CCZ/009) Legislation referred to: l. The Court of Appeal Rules (SI No. 65 o/2016) 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Before this Court is an application for leave to apply for leave to st 31st appeal out of time, filed by the 1 Applicant on October, 2025 and served on 27th November 2025, following the dismissal of her earlier attempt to obtain leave from the High Court. The application is opposed by the Respondents, who argue that the 1st Applicant has failed to show sufficient cause for the delay. 2.0 APPLICANT'S CASE 2.1 In the affidavit in support, the 1•1 Applicant, Edith Chuulu, 11th deposed that her initial notice of appeal, filed on March 2021, was dismissed as irregular, and her first application for leave to appeal out of time was also dismissed on 29th August 2025. Though advised to renew within 14 days, or seek extension within a further 21 days, she failed to act within the prescribed period, expiring October 2025, because she had 3rd R3 travelled to Monze to nurse her terminally ill mother, who passed away on 2nd October 2025. 2.3 The present application was filed 25 days after the lapse of the 21-day extension period. The Applicant argues the delay is neither excessive nor deliberate and invokes Order X Rule 2(1) and Order Xlll Rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, which permit extension for sufficient cause. Citing Nahar Investment 1 she Limited v Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) Limited, urges the Court to consider the merits of her case in the interest of justice, noting that all necessary documents are prepared and annexed. 3.0 RESPONDENT'S CASE 3.1 The 1st Respondent, Monica Munalula, opposes the application. She notes that the High Court judgment was delivered in February 2021. The Applicant's earlier notice of appeal was irregular. Her later application for leave to appeal out of time was also dismissed on 29th August 2025. The Court dismissed it for lack of sufficient cause, particularly in view of the four-year delay. 3.2 She submits that the Applicant had 14 days to renew the application and a further 21 days to seek extension, but failed to act within either period, resulting in a 64-day delay. The Applicant's explanation, nursing a terminally ill mother, is said R4 to be unsupported by evidence, such as medical records or a death certificate. 3.3 Citing Order XIII Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules (SI No. 65 of 2016}, the Respondents argue that no sufficient cause has been shown. They rely on precedents including D.E. Nkhuwa v Lusaka Tyre Services Ltd, Seventh-Day Adventist Association 3 and 1 which v Nsanta Nahar Investments Ltd v Grindlays Bank, emphasize the need for diligence and finality in litigation. 3.4 In view of the foregoing, the Respondents urged the Court to dismiss the 1st Applicant's application for leave to seek an extension of time within which to file a renewed application for leave to appeal, and to do so with costs. 4.0 HEARING OF THE APPLICATION 4.1 The matter was heard on 4th December 2025, during which Mrs Makoza, appearing for the 1st Applicant, informed the Court that the application had been filed on 31st October 2025 and was served on all parties by 27th November 2025, with the affidavit of service duly filed on the record. 4.2 She relied on 2 D.E. Nkhuwa v Lusaka Tyre Services Ltd, arguing that the Applicant provided sufficient explanation to justify the Court's discretion under Article 118(2)(e} of the Constitution. The delay, she contended, was not deliberate and arose from a bereavement, as sworn in the supporting affidavit. 4.3 For the Respondents, Mr Musungilo opposed the application, submitting that no sufficient cause was shown. He cited Nahar leave to appeal; {a) making an application, including an application for timefor- "3(1) The Court may, for sufficient reason extend the application. This Order provides as follows: lapse of statutory timelines following the dismissal of her earlier grant leave to apply for leave to appeal out of time, despite the under Order XIII Rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules to sufficient cause to justify the Court exercising its discretion matter before me is whether the 1st Applicant has shown submissions of Counsel. The issue for determination 1n the 5.1 I have meticulously considered the evidence and the 5.0 ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION evidence. under oath, should be accepted in the absence of contrary modest and justified, and that the Applicant's affidavit, being 4.4 In reply, Mrs Makoza maintained that the 25-day delay was adherence to procedural timelines. funeral claim lacked evidentiary support and urged strict enforcement of a judgment. He argued that the Applicant's prejudicial, especially given the Respondents' ongoing vacuum and that the over 63-day delay was unexplained and Limited, stressing that discretion cannot be exercised in a Investment Limited v Grindlays Bank International (Zambia) RS .. ,, R6 (b) bringing an appeal; or (c) taking any step in connection with an appeal." 5.2 It is settled law that this Court is empowered under Order XIII of the to extend time for Rule 3(1) Court of Appeal Rules sufficient reason. However, it is trite that such discretion must be exercised judiciously and only where a party demonstrates good and sufficient cause for the failure to comply with prescribed timelines. ... 5.3 In this case, the Applicant's delay, totalling at least 64 days from the High Court's dismissal, is neither trivial nor adequately explained. While the Court is not unsympathetic to claims of bereavement, no evidence has been placed on record to support the assertion that the delay was occasioned by the mother's illness or death. The Applicant's mere averment, unsupported by even a death certificate or medical note, falls short of the evidential threshold required to invoke the Court's discretion. 5.4 Moreover, the prejudice to the Respondents is not speculative. The record confirms that the judgment was delivered in 2021 and efforts have been ongoing to enforce it. To reopen the appeal process would undermine the finality of litigation and cause undue hardship. 5.5 In Seventh Day Adventist Association v Nsanta,a the Court declined to excuse a delay of over one year, reaffirming that litigants must act within set timeframes unless exceptional circumstances are shown. Similarly, in Nahar Investments, 1 the l -- R7 Supreme Court warned that parties who fail to move the Court promptly do so at their own peril. 5.6 This Court finds no special circumstance or sufficient justification that would warrant exercising discretion in the Applicant's favour. The application is accordingly devoid of merit. 5.7 Further in Access Bank v Attorney General,4 the court held that although Article 118(2)(e) calls for justice to be administered without undue regard to technicalities, that does not mean litigants are permitted to flout procedural rules with impunity. Strict compliance may still be required where rules serve a substantive purpose. 6.0 DISPOSAL 6.1 In the result, the application for leave to apply for leave to appeal out of time is dismissed with costs to the Respondents. Delivered at Lusaka, this 11th day of December, 2025. B..M�jula COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE