Case Law[2026] KECA 264Kenya
Muthamia & another v M’ebuthania (Civil Appeal 267 of 2019) [2026] KECA 264 (KLR) (13 February 2026) (Judgment)
Court of Appeal of Kenya
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL AT
NYERI
(CORAM: (W. KARANJA, JAMILA MOHAMMED & MUCHELULE, JJ.A.)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 267 OF 2019
BETWEEN
JERUSHA NKOROI MUTHAMIA.............................1ST APPELLANT
SAMUEL KATHIA MUKINDIA………………………….……2ND
APPELLANT AND
LUCY KINYA M’EBUTHANIA..................................RESPONDENT
(An appeal against the ruling of the High Court of Kenya at
Meru (F. Gikonyo, J.) dated 28th February, 2019
in
Succession Cause No. 344 of 2005)
**************************
JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT
Background
1) This appeal arises from the ruling and orders of the High Court at
Meru (F. Gikonyo, J.) delivered on 28th February 2019 in Succession
Cause No. 344 of 2005. By the impugned ruling, the High Court
revoked a grant of letters of administration intestate previously
issued and confirmed in favour of Jerusha Nkoroi Muthamia (the
1st appellant) and issued a fresh joint grant to the 1st appellant and
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Lucy Kinya M’Ebuthania (the respondent).
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2) The 1st appellant petitioned for the grant as the widow of Julius
Muthamia Kanampiu (the deceased) who died on 9th November
1999. The Estate of the deceased comprised several parcels of land.
Following confirmation of the grant on 10th December 2008, one of
the estate properties, plot number Kangeta/5582 (the suit property)
was transferred to Samuel Kathia Mukindia (the 2nd appellant) by
way of sale.
3) On 7th October 2009, the respondent applied for revocation of the
grant issued to the 1st appellant alleging that she was a second wife
of the deceased under Meru customary law. The application was
opposed by the appellants on the ground that the respondent was a
stranger to the Estate.
4) The High Court allowed the application, finding that the respondent
was a wife of the deceased and issued consequential orders in the
following terms:
a.The grant of letters of administration intestate which
were made to Jerusha Nkoroi Muthamia on 2nd
November 2007 and confirmed on 10th December,
2008 is revoked;
b.A fresh grant of letters of administration intestate is
made to Jerusha Nkoroi Muthamia jointly with Lucy
Kinya M’Ebuthania;
c.The objector shall file and serve a Summons for
Confirmation of grant with detailed affidavit on
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proposed
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mode of distribution within the next 30 days which
failing the petitioner shall file within 14 days of the
default;
d.Upon service in (c) above, the party served with the
Summons for Confirmation of Grant shall file and
serve a detailed affidavit on the mode of distribution
of the estate of the deceased within 14 days thereof;
e.Each party shall bear own costs.
5) Being dissatisfied with that decision, the appellants lodged the
instant appeal on the grounds that the High Court erred in law and
fact in:
i. Relying solely on the respondent’s witnesses’
allegations in arriving at the finding that the
respondent was the wife of the deceased;
ii. Dismissing the appellants’ evidence without giving
any tenable reasons at all;
iii.Failing to make a finding on the issue whether the
respondent was the wife of the deceased which could
be properly determined by evidence given viva voce
and fully tested on cross-examination;
iv. Failing to consider and apply the provisions of
section 93 of the Law of Succession Act; and
v. Failing to make any finding on the claim by the 2nd
appellant;
6) The appellants prayed that the orders of the High Court dated 28th
February 2019 be set aside and that the appeal be allowed with
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costs.
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Submissions by Counsel
7) The appeal was disposed by way of written submissions which were
highlighted orally by the parties during the hearing. The appellants
were represented by Mr. Haron Gitonga while the respondent was
represented Mr. J. G. Gitonga.
8) Mr. Haron Gitonga submitted that the appeal raised two issues for
determination, that is, whether there was sufficient evidence before
the High Court to prove on a balance of probabilities that the
respondent was married to the deceased under Meru customary law
hence entitled to the estate of the deceased and whether the
transfer of the suit property by the 1st appellant to the 2nd appellant
was protected by the provisions of section 93 of the Law of
Succession. Act.
9) On the first issue, counsel submitted that the High Court erred in
relying on the witness statements of the respondent’s two witnesses
to find that the respondent was a wife of the deceased. That the
High Court failed to appreciate that the issue of marriage was
weighty and could not be based on untested witness statements as
the said witness statements were not tested in cross-examination.
Further, that the said witness statements were also not supported by
any documentary evidence. That there were no minutes of the clan
meetings which purportedly found that the respondent was married
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to the deceased.
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10) Counsel submitted further that there was no evidence to
demonstrate that all the ingredients of marriage under Meru
customary law were fulfilled by the deceased in respect of the
alleged marriage between the respondent and the deceased. That
the issue of payment of dowry was alleged by the Chairman and it
was not corroborated by either the respondent or her parents and no
other witness was called to support that claim. Further, that the High
Court dismissed the evidence of the area chief and declared him a
liar without any reasonable explanation for such finding.
11) As regards the second issue, counsel submitted that the application
for revocation of the grant was opposed by the 2nd appellant in
respect to the suit property on the ground that he bought the suit
property after a grant had been confirmed in the name of the 1st
appellant. Counsel asserted that the 2nd appellant’s position was
protected by the provisions of section 93 of the Law of
Succession Act. Counsel submitted that the transfer of the suit
property from the 1st appellant to the 2nd appellant was lawful and
the same ought to not be affected by revocation of the Grant.
Counsel further submitted that the High Court erred in failing to
make any finding on the 2nd appellant’s claim. Conclusively, counsel
urged the Court to allow the appeal.
12) In opposing the appeal, learned counsel, Mr. J. G. Gitonga submitted
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that the main issue for determination in the appeal was whether the
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High Court’s finding that the respondent was a wife of the deceased
was based on evidence and the law. Counsel submitted that the High
Court relied on the evidence of Ntonja Maburu and Zakaria
M’Inya (Chairman and Secretary of Athimba Clan respectively) to
correctly find that the respondent was a wife of the deceased.
13)Counsel cited the case of Ephantus Mwangi & another v Duncan
Wambugu (1984) eKLR where it was held that:
“A Court of Appeal will not normally interfere with a
finding of fact by the trial court, unless it is based on
no evidence or on a misapprehension of the
evidence, or the judge is shown, demonstrably, to
have acted on wrong principles in reaching the
findings he did.”
14) Counsel submitted further that the findings of the High Court that
the respondent was a wife of the deceased was based on evidence
and there was no misapprehension of the evidence. Counsel further
submitted that the case was determined on the basis of affidavit
evidence and witness statements which was a direction made by the
High Court on application by the appellants. Counsel asserted that
the appellants should not therefore complain that the issue of
whether the respondent was a wife of the deceased or not ought to
be determined by viva voce evidence tested on cross-examination.
Counsel further asserted that there was evidence that the father of
the deceased paid dowry on behalf of the deceased to the
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respondent’s family.
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15) As regards the claim by the 2nd appellant that he had purchased the
suit property from the 1st appellant, counsel submitted that the said
claim was not relevant to the respondent’s application for revocation
of the grant. To sum it all, counsel urged the Court to dismiss the
appeal with costs and uphold the finding of the High Court.
Determination
16) This Court is called upon to exercise its duty as a first appellate
court by reassessing the evidence produced during trial, evaluate it
and arrive at its own independent findings taking account that the
Court neither
heard nor saw the witnesses as they testified. See Rule 31 (1) of
the
Court of Appeal Rules 2022 and this Court’s decision in
Gitobu
Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney Genera l [2016] eKLR . See also
Selle
& Another vs Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others (1968)
EA
123.
17) Further, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, this Court is guided
by the decision of its predecessor, the Court of Appeal for East Africa
in Peters vs Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA page 424 that:
“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ
from the finding, on a question of fact, of the judge
who tried the case, and who has had the advantage
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of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate
court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence
in order to determine whether the conclusion
originally reached upon that evidence should stand.
But this is a jurisdiction which
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should be exercised with caution; it is not enough
that the appellate court might itself have come to a
different conclusion.”
18) We have considered the record, the submissions by counsel, the
authorities cited and the law. The issues that arise for determination
are:
a) Whether the respondent proved a marriage to the
deceased under Meru customary law; and
b) Whether the High Court erred in failing to determine the
2nd appellant’s claim under section 93 of the Law of
Succession Act.
19)This Court in the case of Joash Ochieng Ougo & another v
Virginia
Edith Wambui Otieno [1987] KECA 71 (KLR) determined the
issue of
proof of customary law in the following terms:
“The question that lies at the heart of this matter is
whether or not the deceased is subject to the Luo
customary law. On the pleadings a dispute of primary
fact emerged, making it necessary for evidence to be
adduced to prove the relevant customary law as a
matter of fact. There was no evidence before the
judge on the disputed issue and therefore it was a
misdirection for the learned judge to find that it is
hard to envisage the deceased as subject to the
particular customary law.”
20)Further, this Court in Geoffrey Mugamb i & 2 other v David
K.
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M’Mugambi & 3 others [1992] KECA 59 (KLR) stated as follows:
“The former Court of Appeal for East Africa in the case of
Kimani V Gikanga [1965] EA 735, held that where African
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customary law is neither notorious nor documented it
must be established for the Court’s guidance by the
party intending to rely on it and also that as a matter
of practice and convenience in civil cases the
relevant customary law, if it is capable of being
judicially noticed, should be proved by evidence or
expert opinions adduced by the parties.”
21) The record before us shows that the High Court relied solely on
affidavits and witness statements without the benefit of viva voce
evidence to establish the alleged elements of a Meru customary
marriage. While a court may, in appropriate cases, determine
matters on affidavit evidence, the question of customary marriage
being a weighty and contested factual issue ordinarily requires oral
evidence capable of being tested through cross-examination.
22)An appellate court will generally not interfere with findings of fact
by a trial court unless such findings are based on no evidence, a
misapprehension of evidence, or wrong principles. See: Ephantus
Mwangi & Another v Duncan Wambugu [1984] eKLR.
23) In the circumstances of this appeal, the absence of proof of
customary law amounts to an error of principle warranting appellate
intervention.
24) We further observe that the High Court failed to address the claim
of the 2nd appellant who asserted that he purchased one of the
estate properties (the suit property) after confirmation of the grant.
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Section 93 of the Law of Succession Act protects bona fide
purchasers for value
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who acquire interests from personal representatives after
confirmation of the grant in the name of the 1st appellant. With
respect, the omission by the High Court to make any finding on this
issue constituted a further error.
25)For the foregoing reasons, we find that the appeal has merit. The
ruling of the High Court dated 28th February 2019 is hereby set
aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for hearing and
determination before a Judge of the High Court other than F.
Gikonyo, J.
26) Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal.
27) It is so ordered.
Dated and delivered at Nyeri this 13th day of February, 2026
W. KARANJA
……………………………….
JUDGE OF APPEAL
JAMILA MOHAMMED
……………………………….
JUDGE OF APPEAL
A. O. MUCHELULE
…………………….………….
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is
a true copy of the
original
Signed
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DEPUTY REGISTRAR
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