Boatey v Boateng (C5/01/2021) [2025] GHAHC 156 (30 July 2025)

INTHE SUPERIORCOURT OF JUDICATURE IN THEHIGH COURT OF JUSTICEHELDATAKIM ODA ON WEDNESDAYTHE30TH DAY OF JULY2025BEFORE HERLADYSHIP JUSTICEOLIVIAOBENG OWUSU (MRS) HIGH COURT JUDGE SUIT NO. C5/01/2021 ESTHERBOATEY PETITIONER OFH/NO. CEDAR 5 JAMAICA,AKIMODA. VERSUS KOFI OBENGAMPOFOBOATENG RESPONDENT OFH/NO. EG-252-2723 AKWAMU-ADOAGYIRE/NSAWAM JUDGMENT This is awife’spetitionfor divorce ontheground thatthe marriage hasbrokendown beyondreconciliation. The partieswere married under the Marriage Ordinance Cap127 atthe District MagistrateCourtAkim Oda and the marriage solemnized at Christ Apostolic ChurchNewTown Akim Odaon9thApril 2016. Fromthe processes filed the petitioner is atraderwhilst the respondent isself- employed. There are noissues ofthemarriage. The petitioner citing unreasonable behaviourseeks thefollowing reliefs: “a)That the marriage celebrated betweenthe Petitionerand theRespondent be dissolved since same hasbrokendownbeyond reconciliation. b)An orderforequalshare ofH/No. EG-252-2723 Akwamu-Adoagyire /Nsawam orjudicialsale ofthe said jointly acquired building. 1 c)Eighty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHC80,000.00) asalimony.” The pithofthe petitioner’scase is asfollows: She gotmarried to therespondent under theMarriage Ordinance Cap127atthe District MagistrateCourtAkim Oda andthe marriage solemnized at the Christ Apostolic ChurchNew TownAkim Oda on9thApril 2016.Afterthe marriage theycohabited at herhouse atJamaica Akim Oda till they completed their own building at Akwamu -Adoagyire/Nsawam and moved tostay in it. Thereaftertheywere blessed withasonwho died threeweeksafterhe was born. After thedeathoftheir child the respondent begantomaltreather byhaving sex with numerouswomen ontheir matrimonialbed. He evenproved his adulterousact by showing her therecorded sexvideo he hadwithladies ontheir matrimonial bed inher absence. The respondent also oftensubjectedher toseverebeatings. He slapped her and drove herout oftheir room. She thereforehad topass thenight at afriend’s house orguest house. According tothe Petitioner she reportedthe respondent’s conduct to herfather and family. Herfather invited the respondentto come toAkimOda to resolvethe issue amicably but the respondentinsulted him. Continuing thepetitioner indicated that anytime she preparedameal for the respondenthe did noteatit. Rather,he sent hertobuy foodfor him inAccra. She said that asaresult ofhis attitude she wasnearly involved in anaccident. Shemade thepoint thatsince theylosttheir sonshe has not beenable toconceive again and thatwhen she suggested totherespondent to accompany her tothe hospitalhe refused todo that.She complained thatthe conduct ofthe respondent hasaffected her healthand maintained thatit is possible thatshe may nothave achild ifthe marriage contractedbetweenthemis notdissolved. 2 The petitioner also asserted part-ownershipofathree-bedroomself -contained house numberedEG -252-2723 located at Akwamu-Adoagyire /Nsawam onthe basis that she contributedtothe constructionofthat building. Itwas also her case that themarriage has brokendownbeyond reconciliation. Explaining why this was so she pointed out thatthey havebeenseparated. That whilst she resides at Akim Oda therespondent resides at Akwamu-Adoagyire/Nsawam. She added that theRespondent hasover the years behaved insuchaway thatshe cannot be reasonably expectedtolive withhim. That his behaviour has caused her so much anxiety, distressand embarrassment. Shegavethe particularsofthe respondent’s conduct as follows: “a)That the respondenthas refusedto have sexual intercoursewith the petitionerfor the past oneyear. b)Thatthe respondentinformedher that he wants an open marriage which means he was atliberty to take concubines and shecould alsotake any man of her choice. c) The petitioner told her that he has 8concubines and was not willingto leave any of them. d) That the respondentwarned her not togo back tothe matrimonial home at Akwamu - Adoagyire/Nsawam. e) That there has been atotal breakdown of communication, the parties hardly talk. She is often disgracedby the respondentand they have virtuallynoknowledge about other’s personal lives. f) That whenshe complainsthe respondenttells her that he willnever divorceher and that he willmaltreat her insucha way that she will causethe dissolutionof the marriage.” According tothePetitioner alleffortsmade by her family members toreconcile the partieshave proved futile. 3 The respondent filed ananswer and cross-petitioned forthe following reliefs: “a)The marriage between theparties be dissolved. b) That thevehicle bearing registrationNo GG 165020be declared joint marital propertyand shared assuch. c) That thepetitioner be ordered torepaythe GHC60,000.00 she tookfrom respondent’sdrawer without his consent d) Adeclaration thatH/No. EG -252-2723 Akwamu isthe personalproperty of therespondent which was acquired before themarriage. e) That thepetitioner is ordered toreturnto the respondentthedocuments coveringH/No. EG -252-2723 Akwamu. f) Anyotherordersthe HonourableCourtdeems fit.” Inhis answer the respondentdenied allthe allegations made by the petitioner.Ina nutshellhis case was asfollows: They resided togetherat arentedapartment at Adoagyiribefore theygotmarried. Beforethey got married in2016they losttheir child five daysafterhe was born.It wastherefore afterthe deathoftheir child in 2015 and in anefforttoconsole the petitioner that they gotmarried on9thJanuary 2016 and the petitioner given GHC 5,000torenovate andopenaprovision store. According totheRespondent afterlosing their child thepetitioner refused tocontinue livingin therented apartment.He thus renovated herfather’s chamber andhallat AkimOda and moved the petitionerthere. Heindicated thatthe petitioner was not working untilhe opened astore forher. Inresponse tothepetitioner’sallegations ofmaltreatment the respondent denied maltreating heror taking anywoman tothe matrimonial home.He maintained that any video watched by the petitioner wasdesigned withthe sole aim toimprovetheir sex life. He denied slapping orbeating the petitioner.He maintained thatto his 4 knowledgeshe neverslept in aguest house orafriend’s house. According tothe Respondent he hasthe utmost respectfor the petitioner’sfather and denied insulting him. He explained thatthe petitionerwas asked tobuy foodfromAccra when she did notfeellike cooking orreturned home late. Infurtheranswer tothepetition he stated that he accompanied the petitioner tothe hospitaltosee doctorsabout her inability to conceive and thatit was the petitionerwho refused totakethe medicationgiven toher. The respondent maintained thathe acquired the house numberedEG -252-2723 before he gotmarried tothe Petitioner in2016.The petitioner,he contendedtherefore did not contributetowardsthe constructionofthis house. He also indicated thathe purchased vehicle withregistrationNo. GG1650 20in July 2020tobe used for their benefit. Lastlythe respondent maintained that beforethe petitioner abandoned the matrimonial home she went throughhis belongings andwithout his consent removed anamount of GHC60,000.00 whichshe knewbelonged tohis business partner. Itwas his contention thateventhoughthe Petitioner admitted taking the moneyshe hasrefused to returnit. The respondent also admittedthat themarriage has brokendown beyondreconciliation. In reply to the cross-petition of the respondent the petitioner indicated that they lost their child due to the treatment which the respondent meted out to her. She added that she was working before she met the respondent and that she purchased the vehicle in dispute fromher resources. Itismy consideredthat the issues, whichemerge fordeterminationby the courtare as follows: 1.Whetherthe marriage betweenthe respondent and thepetitioner hasbroken down beyondreconciliation. 2.Whetherthe Petitioner is entitled toAlimony orlump sumpayment. 5 3.Whetherthe parties jointly acquired the house numbered EG-252-2723 located at Akwamu-Adoagyire /Nsawam andvehicle with RegistrationNo. GG165020. 4.Whetherthe respondentis entitled torecover anamount of GHC 60,000.00fromthe Petitioner. The law onthe burdenofproofwas well statedby the Supreme Court in thecase of MARTINVRS BARCLAYS BANK (GH) LIMITED[2017–2018] 1SCLRG800.The Courtheld thatthe standard ofproofin civil mattersrequiresthe personwho assumed theburden ofproducing evidence tolead suchevidence astoenable the Courtto determine that he hasestablished his case onapreponderance ofprobabilities. Preponderance ofprobabilities is defined bySection 12(2)ofthe Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD323) as“that degree of certainty of beliefin the mind of the tribunalof factor the Court by which itis convincedthat the existence of afactis more probable than its non-existence. The first issue, which must be resolved, is whether themarriage betweenthe respondentand thepetitioner hasbroken downbeyond reconciliation. The Matrimonial Causes Act,1971(Act 367)requiresthat forthe purpose ofshowing that themarriage hasbroken downbeyond reconciliationthe petitionermust satisfy thecourt ofoneor moreofcertain givenfacts. Section2(3) ofAct367provides that“Althoughthe court finds theexistence ofone or moreofthe factsspecified in subsection(1), the courtshall notgrantapetitionfor divorce unless it issatisfied onallthe evidence, thatthe marriage has brokendown beyondreconciliation." The petitioner is obliged tocomply withSection 2(1) ofAct367whichrequires her to establish at leastone ofthe groundsset out in that section. Forthe purpose ofshowing thatthe marriage hasbroken downbeyond reconciliationthe petitioner shallsatisfy the courtofone ormoreofthe following facts: - 6 “2 (1)(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and that by reason of such adulterythe petitionerfinds it intolerabletolive withthe respondent; or 2(1)(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot be reasonablyexpected tolive withthe respondent;or 2(1)(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least twoyearsimmediately preceding thepresentationofthe petition; or 2(1)(d) thatthe parties tothe marriage havenot lived as manandwife for acontinuous period ofatleast twoyearsimmediately preceding the presentationofthe petitionand therespondent consents tothegrantof decree ofdivorce; provided thatsuch consent shall notbe unreasonably withheld and where the courtis satisfied thatit hasbeen so withheld thecourt maygrantapetition fordivorce … 2(1)(e) thatthe parties tothemarriage have notlived as manand wife foracontinuous period ofatleast five yearsimmediately preceding thepresentationofthe petition; or 2(1)(f) that theparties afterdiligent effortbeen unable to reconcile their differences”. In order to succeed the parties must therefore bring themselves within at least one of the six grounds laid in Section 2 (1) of Act 367. Considering the nature of the petition and cross- petition Section 2 (1) (b) and (f) of the said Act must be proved. These sectionsread: "2. (1) For the purpose of showing that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation the petitioner shallsatisfy the courtof one or more of the following facts: (b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expectedto livewith the respondent." 7 (f) that the parties after diligenteffortbeen unableto reconcile their differences”. The respondent is not challenging the issue ofdivorce. The question, whicharises, is whetherthe courtin considering the evidence must accept thestand ofthe parties. The positionofthe law is that eventhoughtheparties want dissolutionofthe marriage the courtmust examine the evidence in orderto find out whetherthere exist such differences betweenthemtodemand dissolutionofthe marriage. Section2(2) ofAct367imposes onthe courtthe dutyto inquire, so faras is reasonable, intothe facts allegedby the parties. The court canthusstill refuse tograntadecree even whenone ormoreofthe facts set outin Section2(1)ofAct 367have beenestablished. Inthecase ofDANQUAHV DANQUAH(1979) GLR371the position ofthe law was echoed by OseiHwere Jasfollows: “Indivorce proceedingsthe courtsareunder statutoryand positive duty toinquire so faras it reasonablycan intothe chargesand counter-chargesalleged; and that duty cannot be performed by the courtwithout the assistance ofthe parties and their solicitors”. Againin the case ofMARIAM PARTEYV WILLIAM PARTEY(CIVIL APPEALSUIT NOH1/183/2013 24OCTOBER2013) the CourtofAppealheld thatthe courtmust examine the evidence in orderto find out whetherthere existssuch substantial differences betweenthe parties todemand orimpel dissolutionofthe marriage. The petitioner set outtoestablish that theparties to themarriage have, afterdiligent effort,beenunable toreconcile their differences asprovided inSection 2(1)(f) ofthe Act 367.Asalreadyindicated under Section2(1) (f) ofAct 367thepetitioner shall satisfy thecourt thatthe parties afterdiligent effortbeenunable toreconcile their differences. 8 There is uncontradicted evidence tothe effect that prior totheinstitutionofthis action thefamilies ofthe parties met overtheir differences and thattheyfailed toreconcile them. Itis wellestablished thatwhere an adversaryhas admitted afact advantageous tothe cause ofaparty,the partydoesnotneed toofferfurther evidence toestablish that fact. SeeFORI VAYIREBI [1966]GLR 627. The petitioner thereforeestablished tothe satisfaction ofthecourt thatthe partieshave, afterdiligent effort,beenunable to reconcile their differences. This isanelement, which Iconsider asproofthat themarriage has brokendownbeyond reconciliation. The dissolutionofthe marriage onthis ground thereforesucceeds. Inmy view no useful purpose wouldbe served byaconsideration ofground (b). Onthe evidence Iam satisfied that the marriage betweenthe petitionerand the respondent has brokendown beyondreconciliation. Ontheissue ofAlimony the petitionerasked forGHC 80,000asfinancial settlement.If onehas togoto the lawforguidance onthis issue, it is toSection 20(1)ofAct 367that onemust look.Section20(1) Act 367givesthe courtthe widest possible discretionwith respect tofinancial provisions and propertysettlements. This wasthe holding ofthe courtinthe case ofSANDRA AGYEPONGV EMMANUELBRANTUOKYEREH (2011)35GMJ 134. Section20(1) ofAct367is inthe following terms: ‘(1) the courtmay ordereither partytothe marriage topayto theotherpartytothe marriage such sum ofmoneyorconvey totheotherpartysuch movableorimmovable propertyassettlement ofproperty rightsorin lieu thereofaspartoffinancialprovision asthe courtthinksjust and equitable. (2)Payments and conveyancesunder this section maybe orderedtobe made in gross or by instalment” 9 The case ofRIBEIROV RIBEIRO [1989-90] 2GLR109laid downquite clearly that under section20(1)ofAct 367the courthas powerto grant financial provisionand that thebasic considerationis the requirement forthe courttoexamine theneedsofthe parties. Seealso the case ofOBENG V OBENG[2017-2020] 2SCGLR 281. Itisimportantto statethat thepetitioner failed toprovethe respondent’smeans althoughthe onuswas onher todo this. Inorderto succeed it wasnecessaryfor her tohaveled evidence in proofofwhat she claimed. Asaguide there was noevidence fromher toassist thecourt. Onthe evidence she thus failed todischargethe burden ofproof, which lay onher onthe issue. Iam thusdisabled fromassessing any quantum basedonthe evidence. I aminthe circumstances unable toaward heranything. This leadsme to theissue ofwhether the parties jointly acquired the house numbered EG-252-2723 atAkwamu-Adoagyire /Nsawam and vehicle withregistrationNo. GG 165020. The petitioner assertedpart-ownership ofthehouse numbered EG-252-2723 Akwamu- Adoagyire /Nsawam onthe basis thatshe contributed towardsthe construction ofthat house. Her claim forrelief was based ontwo grounds, namely, that she not only supervised the construction ofthis building but also contributed financially towards itsconstruction. Sherecounted thatprior tothe marriage she was with therespondent inarentedchamber and hall whenthey bothagreed topurchase aplot oftheir own and construct ahouse. According toher afterthey acquired the plotofland she hired labourerstoclear it. She tendered aphotographoftheland onwhichthe house has beenconstructed as “Exhibit E”.She was emphaticthat she wasthe one who supervised the entire building projectfromday oneto itscurrent state.It washer case 10 thereforethat notwithstanding the fact thatthe indenture (Exhibit “C”)isin the name of therespondent he was notthe sole owner ofthe propertyinquestion. The petitioner also claimed thatshe purchased the vehicle bearing registrationNo. GG 165020withher ownresourceswiththe understanding thatit would belongto her exclusively. Shetendereddocuments pertaining tothe vehicle (Exhibit “D”) tosupport this. On the contrary, the respondent maintained that he financed the construction of the house in contention from his resources and is therefore the sole owner thereof. His evidence on this property was that before he met the petitioner he had already acquired a plot of land at Akwamu Nsawam. He tendered in evidence a receipt (Exhibit “1”) in support of this. According to him he began construction of this house in 2012 and completed it in 2015. He buttressed this assertion with receipts (Exhibits “4”Series) and photographs of the house (Exhibit “5” series). The respondent also claimed to have purchased thevehicle in dispute tobe usedfor their benefit. The issue was raised as to whether the petitioner and the respondent were legally married before 2016. This is made clear, if one considers the questions which were put to the petitioner during cross-examination. Cross-examining the petitioner learned counsel forthe respondentsuggested the following: “Q:Sobetween October 2012and 2016you were notmarried. A: In the year 2015the family of the respondentcame with some drinks tomyparents to inform them that Iam staying with the respondentand promised that the following year they would perform the marriage rites. Q:Do you meanin the year 2015itwas the knocking rites? A: Yes. Q:Was this before or after you delivered your son? 11 A: The knocking was done after delivery of the child….. Q:The day you are alleging you executed the indenture were you legallymarried to the respondent? A: Nowhen we bought this land wehad cohabited for two years and both families know Iwas living with him. Q:I am putting ittoyou that it was only inFebruary 2015that the knocking was done to introducethe respondentto the family.Nobody knewyou. A: No because inthe year 2014the familyknew mebecause by then Iwas pregnant.” The evidence overwhelmingly shows that the respondent and the petitioner set up home and cohabited before getting married under the Marriage Ordinance in 2016. Although the customary marital rites had thus not been performed, the parties consented to live in the eyes of the world as man and wife. There was the acknowledgment of that state by their families and the outcome was the birth of a child for the respondent by the petitioner. The evidence of the respondent disclosed that he even renovated a chamber and hall for the petitioner in her father’s house at Akim Oda at a cost of GHC 8,000 for the petitioner. This I consider as proof that the families of the parties consented that they should live as man and wife. The decided cases indicate that consent may be implied from the conduct of the families of the man and the woman. See the case of YAOTEY V QUAYE [1961] GLR 1 & 2 GLR 573. In the case of ESSILFIE AND ANOTHER V QUARCOO [1992] 2 GLR 180 it was held that there were two forms of valid marriages known to our customary law: first, the ordinary case where a man sought the hand of the woman from her family and with their consent performed the necessary ceremonies of payment of drinks, customary fees and dowry; and secondly, where although the customary marital rites had not been performed, the parties had consented to live in the eyes of the world as man and wife and their families had consented that they should do so, and the parties actually lived as man and wife in 12 the eyes of the whole world. In my view although the customary marital rites had not been performed before 2016, the parties lived in the eyes of the world as man and wife. On the evidence I am satisfied that before 2016 the relationship between the parties was thatofhusband and wife and Iso find. The current trend ofjudicialauthorities discloses thatpropertyshould be termedas “jointlyacquired”whenit has beenshown fromthe evidence adduced during thetrial tohave beenjointly acquired irrespective ofwhetherornot there was direct pecuniary orsubstantial contribution frombothspouses in the acquisition. Inthecase ofPETERADJEIV MARGARET ADJEI CIVILAPPEALNO. J4/06/2021[2021]DLSC10156 theSupreme Court setout the parametersfordetermining whichproperties should be termed as“jointly acquired marital properties”and the criteria forthe distributionofsuchproperties. Itheld that it is notevery property acquired single handedly byany ofthe spouses during thesubsistence ofthe marriage thatcan be termed as “jointlyacquired”.Rather it is propertythathas beenshown from theevidence adduced during the trialtohave beenjointly acquired irrespective of whetheror nottherewas direct pecuniary orsubstantial contributionfrombothspouses inthe acquisition. Althoughthe petitionerwas unable toestablish the extent ofher financialcontribution towardsthe constructionofthe house indispute anexamination ofthe respondent’sevidence extracted in cross-examinationsupportsher case that she contributedtoits construction. The respondentmade thefollowing important admissionunder cross-examination: “Q:Youwere presentwhen exhibit “B”was transcribed fromthe pendrive A:I was present. Q:The transcriptionisatrue reflection ofthe audios andthe videosonthe pendrive. A:Yes 13 Q:Inone oftheaudios onexhibit Byoustated thateverything thatyouhave gained on this earthit isbecause ofthepetitioner. Isthat notso? A:I said thatbut I have anexplanationto that.By thenthe petitionerwas angry and she thoughtI willgive out the documentscovering the house to anotherwoman. I willnot dothat. Q:Forhowlong did youstaywiththe petitioner asamarried couple? A:three tofour years Q:for howlong did youcohabit before getting married? A:May be threeyears.” Besides that, in the video (Exhibit “B”) which the respondent sent to the petitioner on Whatsapp he stated in no uncertain terms that the petitioner contributed to the construction of the property in dispute. This is what he said: “ Aah Esther you should know it is a joke, I know it was not nice to say but you should know it is a joke I will not give a documentcoveringthe houseyou have laboured for to awoman”. The evidence ofthe respondentthus confirmed the petitioner’s storyonthis issue.Such confirmatoryevidence fromthe respondent in supportofthe petitioner’s version rendersthe petitioner’s’ version preferabletothat oftherespondent. Where admissions relevant tomattersinissue between parties toacase aremade by one side, supporting theother, thenthat side in whose favourthe admissions are made, is entitled tosucceed and not theother, unless thereis good reasonapparent ontherecord for holding the contraryview. See thecase ofASANTEV BOGYABI [1966] G.L.R. 232.Applying this principle to this case thereis no reasonfornotpreferring the corroboratedevidence in favourofthepetitioner onthis issue. Onthe strengthofthe respondent’sadmissionI 14 find thatthereisample basis tohold that the petitionercontributed totheacquisition of thehouse numberedEG-252-2723 Akwamu-Adoagyire/Nsawam. Accordinglyin myjudgment the petitioneris entitled toashare inthis propertywhich wasacquired during the subsistence ofthe marriage.The petitioner thereforesucceeds inherclaim thatshe is ajoint ownerof the House numbered EG-252-2723 Akwamu- Adoagyire /Nsawam. Iobservealso thatthe documents(Exhibit “D”Series ) pertaining tothe vehicle with registrationNo GG1650are in the name ofthe petitioner. This howevershould not constitute abarto therespondent’s claim. The evidence disclosesthat this vehicle was also acquired during the subsistence ofthe marriage. Inthe case ofARTHUR(No1) v ARTHUR(No 1) [2013-2014] SCGLR543the courtheld that maritalpropertywas to be understoodaspropertyacquired by thespouses during themarriage irrespective of whetherthe otherspouse had made acontribution toitsacquisition. Inthe wordsofDr Date-BahJSC @page 565 “..Itshould also be emphasized that in thelight ofthe Supreme court in Mensahand Mensahit isno longeressential foraspouse toproveacontribution tothe acquisitionof maritalproperty. It is sufficient if the propertywas acquired during the subsistence of themarriage”. Applyingthe principles outlined aboveI thereforehold that the parties jointly acquired the House numberedEG-252-2723 Akwamu-Adoagyire/Nsawam and Vehicle with registrationNo. GG165020. The final issue, which must be determined, is whether the respondent is entitled to recover an amount of the GHC 60,000.00 from the petitioner. The respondent prayed the court to order the petitioner to repay an amount of the GHC 60,000.00 which according to him she took from his drawer without his consent. As the petitioner 15 denied this allegation the respondent clearly bore the evidential burden of establishing on the balance of probabilities that the petitioner took an amount of GHC 60,000.00 from his drawer without his consent. It is the respondent who made the assertion therefore he bore the burden of producing evidence in proof of this assertion. On the allocation of the burden of proof Section 17 of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323) provides asfollows: Section 17 “(1) Exceptas otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular factis on the party againstwhom a finding on that fact would be required in the absenceof further proof. (2) Exceptas otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular factis initially on the party with the burdenof persuasion as to that fact.” Allthe courthas is the bare allegationofthe respondent unsupported in any way even thoughdenied bythe petitioner. Itissufficiently clear, in the light of Section 17(1)ofNRCD323that the respondent failed todischarge this particularburden ofproofwhichlay onhim. The claim ofthe Respondent is consequently dismissed asunproved.I am unable tomake the declarationthat theHouse numbered EG -252-2723 Akwamu is the personalproperty ofthe respondent. Relief cofthe petitionandreliefs c and d ofthe cross-petition aredismissed. Inthe result Imake the following orders: 16 1.The Ordinance marriage contractedbetweenthe parties atthe District Magistrate CourtAkim Oda and solemnized at Christ Apostolic ChurchNew TownAkim Oda on 9thofApril 2016 is dissolved. 2.Imake anorderfor judicial sale ofH/No. EG-252-2723 Akwamu Adoagyire /Nsawam. Half ofthe proceedsrealized fromthe sale should be paid tothePetitioner as jointowner. 3.Iorderthat thevehicle bearing registrationNo GG165020be sold andthe proceeds distributed equally betweenthe parties. 4.The petitioner is ordered todeposit thedocuments covering H/No. EG-252-2723 AkwamuAdoagyire /Nsawam with theregistrar ofthis courtwithin 7daysofthis date. 5.Parties aretobear their owncosts oflitigation. **SGD*** H/L OLIVIAOBENGOWUSU (MRS) JUSTICEOF THE HIGH COURT PARTIES: Petitioner present Respondent present 17 Richard Offinfor thePetitioner present. AUTHORITIES: 1. DANQUAHVDANQUAH(1979) GLR 371 18 2. MARIAMPARTEY VWILLIAMPARTEY (CIVIL APPEAL SUITNO. H1/183/2013 24OCTOBER2013) 3. SANDRAAGYEPONGVEMMANUEL BRANTUOKYEREH(2011)35GMJ 134. 4. RIBEIROVRIBEIRO[1989-90] 2GLR 109, 5. OBENGVOBENG[2017-2020] 2SCGLR 285 6. YAOTEYVQUAYE [1961] GLR 1& 2GLR 573. 7. ESSILFIEANDANOTHER VQUARCOO[1992] 2GLR 180 8. PETER ADJEI VMARGARETADJEI CIVILAPPEAL NO.J4/06/2021[2021] DLSC10156 9. ARTHUR(No1) vARTHUR (No 1) [2013-2014] SCGLR 543 10.MARTINVRSBARCLAYSBANK (GH) LIMITED [2017–2018]1SCLRG800. 11.FORIVAYIREBI[1966] GLR 627. 12.ASANTEVBOGYABI [1966]G.L.R. 232. 13.THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT,1971 (ACT367) 14. THE EVIDENCE ACT1975,(NRCD323) 15.THE 1992CONSTITUTION 19 20 21