The Republic v Osei and Another (CC2/016/2023) [2025] GHAHC 208 (9 July 2025)

1 INTHE SUPERIORCOURTOF JUDICATURE,HIGH COURT OF JUSTICESITTINGATSUNYANI ONWEDNESDAY,THE 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2025BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE NATHANP.YARNEYESQ SUIT NO: CC2/016/2023 THE REPUBLIC VRS: 1. OSEIKWASIJEFTER@PASSWORD 2. SAMUELSEKYERE @S.K. JUDGMENT Through a plea bargain reached between the Accused Persons and the Prosecution, and announced to the Court on 4th June, 2025, theAccused Persons, throughCounsel, have pleaded guilty to the offence of Manslaughter under S. 46 of the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960, Act 29. Upon that, this Court, on the said day, convicted theaccused persons, andadjourned to consider its sentences. Lawyers for the Accused Persons have been heard on mitigation for their clients. Both counsel made identical prayers to the Court. They were unanimous on the 2 reliance on the ages of their clients at the time of their arrest. They were juveniles. They were first-time offenders. Both, since arrest, have been on remand in prison custody for around 3 years. Counsel urge the court to consider the need to help the Accused Persons reform and rejoin society. They also urge on the Court that the conduct of the accused persons, since arrest and prosecution, have not caused any problems, and since they cannot be held responsible for the delay in the earlier truncated trial, the Court should take all those circumstances into consideration in reachingits sentences. The Court acknowledges that the plea of guilty to the charge of Manslaughter represents some responsibility for the death caused. A prolonged trial is now to be avoided by this. Indeed, by law, as juveniles at the time of their arrest, the Accused Persons were entitled to some diminished responsibility for their actions. Had they remained juveniles as at today, their sentences would have been a maximum of 3 years, which they would have been deemed to have served by time on remand (see: Bosso vs. Republic ]2009] SCGLR 420). They were however, not prosecuted under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2003, Act 653, but under the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960, Act 30. An initial trial was truncated due to a juror becoming disqualified for reaching or passing the age of 60. At the time of truncation, it had been reasonably revealed in cross-examination of the Investigator that, at least, the 1st Accused Person was a juvenile at the time of arrest and arraignment. The fact revealed that the Investigator knew or is supposed to have known from evidence 3 which he concealed that the 1st Accused Person was a juvenile at the time of arrest and arraignment is very disturbing, considering the significant man-hours deployed so far and wasted asaresult. All pleas and addresses by the Prosecution and Counsel have duly been considered, and the Court also is obliged to rely on the guidance addressed in the cases of Apaloo vs. Republic [1975] 1GLR 156, Kwashie vs. Republic [1971] 1 GLR 488; and Ignatius Howe vs. Republic; Criminal Appeal No. J3/3/2013 – Judgment dated 22nd May,2014 initssentencing decision. Primarily, the facts still remain quite disturbing. Two juveniles set out to rob someone of a tricycle. In doing so, they are said to have lured the deceased to a secluded area and stabbed him several times. That unfortunate life is lost forever, to family, loved ones, and to society. The Accused Persons have pleaded guilty to Manslaughter.The entrails ofthe facts will not be opened for contest and assessment. They have admitted responsibility for the loss of life – these young men, with their livesahead ofthem. In particular, the lawyer for the 1stAccused Person has in his address made reference to possible weak parenting to have contributed to the present circumstances of his client. Indeed, when parenting is insufficient it can result in imbalance in an individual, but it is not wholly responsible for deviancy. The facts as presented suggest a very imperative need for rehabilitation of the accused persons, something that can only be assured them by their continued incarceration, since there does not 4 immediately exist any facility into which they could be remitted for reorientation, reform, and rehabilitation. These can only be obtained at present, somehow, in prisoncustody. In reaching its decision this Court also has to take into consideration the bereaved family. They have not appeared to be heard, but, the Court cannot pretend not to hear the painful beatings oftheir wearyheartsand the distress caused tothem by the conduct of the Accused Persons (see: Kamil vs. Republic [2011] 1 SCGLR 300). The period of almost 3 years that the Accused Persons have been in custody is also withinthe mind oftheCourtin reaching its sentencing decision. This Court therefore sentences each of the Accused Persons to 2 years imprisonment IHL. (SGD) NATHANP.YARNEY (JUSTICE OFTHE HIGH COURT)