Acheampong v Republic (CC16/069/2024) [2025] GHAHC 190 (3 July 2025)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, SITTING AT SUNYANI, COURT ‘2’ ON THURSDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF JULY 2025 BEFORE HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE WINNIE AMOATEY-OWUSU, JUSTICEOF THE HIGHCOURT CASE NO: CC16/069/2024 PRINCE ACHEAMPONG VRS. THEREPUBLIC JUDGMENT This appeal hinges on the decision of the Circuit Court, Goaso in the Ahafo Region. The Appellant was arraigned before the trial court on 8th November 2022 on one count of robbery contrary to Section 149(1) of the Page1of11 Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). He pleaded guilty and was convicted on his own plea and sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment in hard labour. Being aggrieved by the sentence, the Appellant filed the instant Petition of Appeal pursuant to leave granted by this Court on 31st May 2024 on the sole ground that the sentence is harsh and excessive having regard to the circumstances ofthe case and seeksof the Courtreduction or mitigation of thesentence, oracquittalofthe Appellant. A summary of the prosecution’s facts accompanying the Charge Sheet presented at the trial court is that the complainant, Efua Yamoah is a student nurse of theGoaso Nursing and Midwifery Training Schoolwhilst the accused, a labourer, is resident at Krofrom-Goaso. On 7th November 2022 at about 8:00 a.m., the complainant closed from work and was walking through the Goaso Presbyterian School premises whiles receiving calls on her phone. The accused who had laid ambush saw the complainant on phone, approached her and forcibly demanded the phone Page2of11 to be given to him. The complainant resisted and the accused began to struggle with her and finally pushed her on the ground. The accused pounced on the complainant, forcibly took her handbag and Infinix mobile phone and ran away. The complainant raised alarm which attracted people around to get the accused arrested and brought to the Police Station. The accused was charged with the offence and put before thetrial courtwhile investigationcontinued. Itis provided inArticle 19(2)(c) ofthe1992Constitution that anaccused is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty or he pleads guilty. The law is also settled that an appeal is by way of rehearing. See Amankwah v. The Republic (J3/04/2019) (2021) GHASC 27 dated 21st July 2021 (unreported). Be that the Appellant was convicted on his own plea , it is my foremost duty to evaluate the entire evidence on record to determine based on the facts and law, if the prosecution’s facts support the charge, and if found that the facts support the charge, then I shall proceed to consider the appropriateness ofthe sentence imposed. Page3of11 Section 149 (1) of Act 29 as amended by the Criminal Offences (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act 646) states that a person who commits robbery is guilty of an offence and shall be liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, and where the offence is committed by the use of an offensive weapon or offensive missile, to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years. Section 150 states that a person who steals a thing commits robbery if in, and for the purpose of stealing the thing, he uses any force or causes any harm to any person, or if he uses any threat or criminal assault or harm to any person, with intent to prevent or overcome the resistance of that person to the stealing ofthe thing. The offence ofstealing is created under Section124 (1) of Act 29. Under Section 125 of Act 29, a person steals when he dishonestly appropriates a thing of which he is not the owner. A thing is not stolen unless taken without the consent of the owner or his duly authorised agent. See Salifu v. The Republic [1974] 2 GLR 291; Ampah v. The Republic [1977] 2 GLR 171. To successfully prove the charge of robbery,the prosecution must lead sufficient evidence toprove that: i. The accused stole athing; Page4of11 ii. In stealing the thing, the accused used force or threat or criminal assault orharmonthevictim; and iii. The force or threat or criminal assault or harm used was with the intent to prevent or overcome the resistance of the victim or any otherpersontothe stealing ofthe thing. See The Republic v. Aaron Mfarfo [2011] DLHC 7952; Kwabena Mensah v. The Republic [2021] DLCA 10047; Behome v. The Republic [1979] GLR112 Upon consideration of the prosecution’s facts presented before the trial court as contained in the Charge Sheet, I am satisfied the said facts support the charge and that the trial judge’s conviction of the Appellant onhis ownguilty pleacannot be faulted in anyway. Counsel for the Appellant submits that decisions such as Quarshie v. R (1971) 1 GLR 488 @ 493, Kamil v. R (2001) 30 GNJ1SC and Frimpong @ Iboman v. R (2012) 45 GMGSC indicate that in imposing sentence, the court ought to consider (a) the intrinsic seriousness of the offence, (b) the degree Page5of11 of revulsion felt by law abiding citizens of the society for a particular crime, (c) the premeditationwithwhich thecriminal plan was executed,(d) the prevalence of the crime within the particular locality the offence took place or in the country generally, (e) the sudden increase in the incidence of the particular crime, and (f) the mitigating or aggravating circumstances such as extreme youth, good character and the violent manner in which the crime was committed. Counsel urges the Court to consider these mitigating factors in favour of the Appellant: his being a first offender, young age, absence of previous conviction, the fact that no offensive weapon was used and the further fact that the Appellant did not use violence on the complainant. He cited in support Frimpong @ Iboman v. R (2012) 1 SCGLR 297; Tortor v. R (1971) 1 GLR 342 @ 347; Dabla & Ors v. R (1980)GLR 500-520 @519;Darkurugu v.R(1989-90) 1GLR 308@321. While conceding that sentencing is within the discretion of the trial judge and that the trial judge took into consideration the aforementioned mitigation factors and passed a sentence within the statutory limits, counsel submits the mitigating factors are not exhaustive and prays the Page6of11 Court to show mercy towardsthe Appellant for the further reason that the phone which was the subject of the robbery was retrieved and the Appellant did not benefit from his crime. Again, that, had the Appellant known he would be sentenced for 13 years, he would have thought twice before robbing the complainant of her valuables and that the Appellant co-operated with the Police and pleaded guilty simpliciter and showed genuine remorse and regret. For the reasons advanced, counsel prays the Court to exercise its unfettered discretion by reducing the sentence of 13 yearstothe minimumof10years. Counsel for the Republic/ Respondent also concedes that sentencing is a discretionary power exercised by trial judges but which discretion must be exercised in line with legal principles taking into account relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. That, a judge is required to provide cogent reasons where a deterrent or lenient sentence is imposed. She cited Haruna v. The Republic (1980) GLR 198, per Taylor J (as he then was). Counsel concedes further that per Section 149(1) of Act 29 as amended, the trial judge was well within the confines of the law when he imposed the Page7of11 sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment on the Appellant. That, in passing sentence, the trial judge gave reasons for imposing a deterrent sentence, that is, “… However, given the fact that crimes of that nature are on the ascendency within the jurisdiction of this Court and there is the need to impose deterrent sentences to deter like-minded persons, hence the sentence is imposed.” Counsel urges on the Court that judicial precedent underscores that sentencing serves a five-fold purpose of punitive, deterrent, reformative, societal appeasement and safeguarding the community. She cited in support Kamil v. Republic (Criminal Appeal No. J3/3/2009 dated December 8, 2010),Supreme Court(unreported), per Ansah JSC. Counsel for the Republic/Respondent submits also that the mitigating factors considered by the trial judge warranted a minimum sentence of 10 years. However, the trial judge imposed the 13 years’ sentence to serve a deterrent purpose. She said the legal position is that an appellate court should not interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial court unless it is demonstrated that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. She cited in support Charles Twumasi v. The Republic [2020] Page8of11 DCLA8568 and Samuel Agoe Mills Robertson v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. J3/4/2014) dated 28th May 2014 (unreported). She concludes that in the absence of evidence suggesting the trial judge erred in principle or failed to consider relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, the Court should affirmthe sentence imposed and dismiss theappeal asunmeritorious. From the submissions of both counsel, there is no controversy that a trial judge’s duty to pass sentence following conviction involves the exercise of discretion, which must be exercised judicially and judiciously. There is further no controversy that since the prosecution’s facts show the Appellant did not employ any offensive weapon or offensive missile in the commission of the robbery, the applicable minimum sentence is 10 years’ imprisonment. See Section 149(1) of Act29asamended. In Nana Yaw Owusu v. The Republic [2020] Suit no. H2/11/16 dated 16th July 2020 (unreported), the Court of Appeal stated, “Beyond this, sentencing is an exercise of discretion by a trial Judge and as long as the Judge has kept within the confines of what the law prescribes and has also Page9of11 considered the necessary aggravating and mitigating factors before passing the sentence, an appellate court, even if it would have imposed a different sentence must be slow to substitute its own with that of the trial Judge.” See also Samuel Agoe Mills Robertson v. The Republic (CriminalAppealNo. J3/4/2014)dated 28th May2014(supra). This is what the trial judge said passing sentence on the Apellant, “Accused person is sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of 13 years in hard labour. The sentence is arrived at having taken into consideration the fact that Accused is a first time offender and relatively young, the fact that the offence was committed without any weapon and the fact that Accused readily admitted his guilt. However, given the fact that crimes of that nature are on the ascendency within the jurisdiction of this Court and there is the need to impose deterrent sentences to deter like-minded persons, hence the sentence is imposed.” I am of the considered view that the trial judge gave thoughtful consideration to all the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors in Page10of11 imposing the 13 years’ imprisonment sentence on the Appellant. Being mindful that every sentence imposed is supposed to serve a five-fold purpose, namely: to be punitive, to deter others, to reform the offender, to appease the society and to safeguard the country, I am of the considered view that the sentence imposed is neither harsh nor excessive. The appeal thereforefails. SGD. WINNIE AMOATEY-OWUSU JUSTICEOF THE HIGH COURT PARTIESAND LEGALREPRESENTATION: 1. APPELLANTPRESENT 2. ALBERTZOOGAH, ESQ., FOR THE APPELLANTABSENT 3. ELIZABETH ANYEMING (ASA) FOR THE REPUBLIC/ RESPONDENT PRESENT Page11of11