Case Law[2026] KECA 35Kenya
Wamutitu v Wamutitu (Civil Application E171 of 2025) [2026] KECA 35 (KLR) (23 January 2026) (Ruling)
Court of Appeal of Kenya
Judgment
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL AT
NYERI
(CORAM: ALI-ARONI, J.A. (IN
CHAMBERS) CIVIL APPLICATION NO.
E171 OF 2025 BETWEEN
JAMES GICHOHI WAMUTITU................................APPLICANT
AND
GEOFREY GICHUKI WAMUTITU........................RESPONDENT
(Being an application for extension of time to file an appeal out of
time against the Ruling of the High Court at Nyeri (K. Magare, J.)
delivered on 17th October, 2024
in
Succession Cause No. 76 of 1995)
****************************
RULING
1. Before the Court is an application by way of a notice of
motion dated 12th November 2025, brought under Article
10, 27, 40, 47, 50, 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, rules
5(2)(b), 43 & 44 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2022 (‘the
Rules’), seeking for an extension of time to file an appeal out
of time.
2. The application is predicated on the grounds on the face of
the application, rehashed in the supporting affidavit sworn
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by the applicant on 12th November 2025, where he deposes
that the deceased herein is his biological father; the
impugned ruling
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was delivered on 17th October 2024; he resides on Land
Parcel Aguthi/Gaki/650 and not Land Parcel Aguthi/Gaki/464;
relocating to Land Parcel Aguthi/Gaki/464 will be very costly
and expensive; the deceased had shown him his portion in
Land Parcel Aguthi/Gaki/650; being aggrieved by the ruling
he lodged a notice of appeal on 31st October 2024; he
applied for certified copies of proceedings and judgment
which were ready for collection on 3rd December 2024; the
delay in filing the appeal was not as a result of the
applicant’s actions as the events were beyond his control, as
he filed an application for revocation of Grant dated 23rd
March 2025, which was dismissed vide a ruling dated 14th
October 2025.
3. The applicant further avers that the right of appeal is an
essential element of the justice system and should not be
curtailed without justifiable reasons; he sought leave from
the High Court to appeal to this Court, which was declined
and he was referred to this Court; the delay occasioned is
not so inordinate and is excusable, and the same has been
explained; the respondent is unlikely to suffer any prejudice,
rather it is the applicant, due to the developments that he
has made in Aguthi/Gaki/650 since 1982.
4. In opposing the application, the respondent has filed a
replying affidavit sworn on 22nd December 2025. He deposes
that, if the applicant collected the certified copies of the
proceedings on 3rd December 2024, he would have been
within time to file a memorandum of appeal, but he did
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not; he filed the instant
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application almost one (1) year later. Further, he contends
that the applicant has not explained the reason for the
grossly inordinate delay. He states that from 17th October
2024, when his application was dismissed, the applicant has
been very active in filing at least three applications in the
High Court as if the applicant was not interested in filing the
intended appeal.
5. He states further that the application filed on 2nd August
2023 which was dismissed on 17th October 2024, was
seeking to review or set aside the orders confirming the
grant, it was not seeking revocation of grant; the grant was
confirmed after an objection was heard by way of viva voce
and the parties opted the manner of distribution, the
applicant was not a party; that after the grant was confirmed
more than 20 years ago nobody expressed dissatisfaction by
ether appealing or filing a review.
6. He avers that after the grant was confirmed, the respondent
has moved on because the transmission is complete; the
respondent has sub-divided both parcels of land and the
applicant has been part of the process. In compliance with
the consented certificate of confirmation of grant, the
applicant's land is in LR. Aguthi/Gaki/464; the intended
appeal is not arguable and has no chances of success, it is
based on a misconceived application that sought to review
and set aside a consent judgment entered by parties who
are long deceased and that the application should be
dismissed with costs.
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7. Learned counsel for the applicant has filed submissions, a
case digest and list of authorities all dated 5th January 2026.
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Counsel relies on rule 4 of the Rules, which grants the Court
discretionary power to extend time limits. He submits that a
notice of appeal was originally lodged on 31st October 2024,
shortly after the initial judgment. Delays occurred due to
subsequent legal action, including a dismissed summons for
revocation of grant in October 2025, and a failed application
for leave to appeal in the High Court, in which the applicant
was directed to seek relief from this Court. In support of his
contention counsel relies on Leo Sila Mutiso vs. Rose
Hellen Wangari Mwangi [1999] 2 EA p231, where the
Court set out the principles to be applied in the exercise of
its discretion in the determination of an application under
rule 4.
8. Counsel asserts the delay was not deliberate or negligent
but resulted from efforts to obtain certified proceedings and
circumstances beyond the applicant’s control. To support
this point, he relies on Andrew Kiplagat Chemaringo vs.
Paul Kipkorir Kibet (Civil Application No. 91 of 2017)
[2018] KECA 701 (KLR), where the Court allowed an
extension of time because the applicants offered sufficient
reasons for the delay. Counsel also cited the Supreme Court
decision of Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs. IEBC
[2014] eKLR, where the Court provided the foundational
principles for granting an extension of time.
9. Counsel further relies on John Mwita Murimi & 2 Others
vs. Mwikabe Chacha Mwita & Another [2019] KECA
422 (KLR) where this Court held that under the Law of
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Succession Act,
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there is no express automatic right of appeal to the Court of
Appeal and submits that given the intended appeal
emanates from a Succession Cause, therein lies the reason
for filing the instant application.
10. The respondent did not file submissions.
11. I have considered the application, the supporting affidavit,
the replying affidavit and the submissions by the applicant’s
counsel. In his concluding paragraph, the applicant’s counsel
alludes to seeking leave to prefer the appeal. The application
contains only one prayer: ‘seeking leave to appeal out of
time’. In any event that question can only be addressed by a
full bench. The issue for determination, therefore, is whether
the applicant should be granted an extension of time to file
and serve the notice of appeal and record of appeal out of
time, and whether the notice of appeal lodged on 31st
October 2024 may be deemed to have been duly filed.
12. Rule 4 of the Rules states that; -
The Court may, on such terms as may be
just, by order, extend the time limited by
these Rules, or by any decision of the Court
or of a superior court, for the doing of any
act authorized or required by these Rules,
whether before or after the doing of the act,
and a reference in these Rules to any such
time shall be construed as a reference to
that time as extended.
13. The issue of extension has been discussed by this Court in
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many of its decisions, and the factors to be considered when
the
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question arises are well settled. The Supreme Court too has
been emphatic on those considerations. In Salat vs.
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission &
7 Others (Application 16 of 2014) [2014] KESC 12
(KLR) (Civ) (4 July 2014) (Ruling); it was of the view that
in considering an application for extension of time, the Court
would consider:
“16. Discretion to extend time was indeed
unfettered.
It was incumbent upon the applicant to
explain the reasons for delay in making
the application for extension and
whether there were any extenuating
circumstances that could enable the
court to exercise its discretion in favour
of the applicant.
17. The court ought to consider the
following principles in exercising the
discretion to extend time for filing an
appeal:
a. Extension of time was not a right of
a party. It was an equitable remedy
that was only available to a
deserving party at the discretion of
the court;
b. A party who sought extension of
time had the burden of laying a
basis for it to the satisfaction of the
court;
c. Whether the court ought to
exercise the discretion to extend
time, was a consideration to be
made on a case-by- case basis;
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d. Whether there was a reasonable
reason for the delay, which ought
to be explained to the satisfaction
of the court;
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e. Whether there would be any
prejudice suffered by the
respondents if the extension was
granted;
f. Whether the application had been
brought without undue delay; and
g. Whether in certain cases, like
election petitions, public interest
ought to be a consideration for
extending time”.
14. This Court in Abdul Azizi Ngoma vs. Mungai Mathayo
[1976] KLR 61, 62, on its part stated:
“We would like to state once again that this
court’s discretion to extend time under rule
4 only comes into existence after ‘sufficient
reason’ for extending time has been
established and it is only then that other
considerations such as the absence of any
prejudice and the prospects or otherwise of
success in the appeal can be considered.
(Emphasis added)
15. The parties are in agreement that the ruling subject of the
intended appeal was delivered on the 17th of October 2024;
the notice of appeal was lodged on 31st October 2024, and
proceedings collected on 3rd December 2024. I note that the
letter bespeaking proceedings was not copied, and therefore
the
60 days available to appeal commenced on the 31st October
2024. The applicant states that leave was denied. He has not
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sought leave before this Court; there was an attempt in the
submissions to do so, which is untenable.
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16. The applicant has two hurdles to surmount: first, leave to
appeal and secondly, filing the appeal out of time. The issue
of leave is not before me, and I shall not dwell on it;
however, it is a factor I must consider in arriving at a
decision.
17. The key question to consider is whether the applicant has
sufficiently explained the delay between the 17th of October
2024 and 12th November 2025, when the application was
filed; a delay of one (1) year. The applicant does not at all
explain the delay, save that he was pursuing an application
before the High Court for revocation of the grant. The
respondent has countered this, stating that the applicant
filed several applications before the High Court on the same
subject. The applicant has not denied.
18. The denial of leave by the High Court cannot be a basis for
this application, in any event there is no proof of an attempt
to obtain the same either in the High Court or this Court.
Secondly, the fact that the applicant was pursuing an
application or several applications is not an excuse either. It
appears that, after failing in the various applications before
the High Court, the applicant remembered one more card
and pulled it out as a last resort; the appeal to this Court.
19. The respondent has stated that this litigation has been
ongoing for over 20 years, and that since confirmation of the
grant, parties have moved on and implemented the grant
and are likely to be prejudiced.
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20. As held by the Supreme Court in the Salat case (supra), an
extension of time is not a right but an equitable remedy only
available to a deserving party, who must lay a basis for the
granting of the order, and further, the basis must be
sufficiently explained. This Court has also stated several
times that the sufficiency of the explanation is what paves
the way for the consideration of other factors, such as length
of delay, prejudice to be suffered by the opponent and
possible success of the intended appeal.
21. In my view, the applicant has failed to sufficiently explain the
delay in filing the appeal; secondly, he has not been candid
before the court, yet he seeks an equitable remedy; and
thirdly, the issue of leave has not been addressed, last this
being an old matter the respondent is likely to be prejudiced
though the applicant denies time factor is evidently a
concern.
22. For the above reasons, the application is declined. Being a
family matter, I do not make an order on costs.
Dated and delivered at Nyeri this 23rd day of January,
2026.
ALI-ARONI
………………………………….
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is
a true copy of the
original.
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Signed
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
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