A.G. Leventis Nigeria PLC v Chief Christian Akpu (S.C. 140/2002) [2007] NGSC 103 (14 June 2007)

**In The Supreme Court of Nigeria** On Friday, the 15th day of June 2007 **Before Their Lordships** | Sylvester UmaruOnu | ...... | Justice, Supreme Court ---|---|--- DahiruMusdapher | ...... | Justice, Supreme Court Sunday AkinolaAkintan | ...... | Justice, Supreme Court Mahmud Mohammed | ...... | Justice, Supreme Court Ikechi Francis Ogbuagu | ...... | Justice, Supreme Court **S.C. 140/2002** **Between** A.G. Leventis Nigeria PLC | ....... | Appellants ---|---|--- **And** Chief Christian Akpu | ....... | Respondent ---|---|--- **Judgment of the Court** delivered by Ikechi Francis Ogbuagu J.S.C This is an appeal against the decision of the court of appeal, Enugu division (hereinafter called "the court below") delivered on3rd July, 2001 allowing in part, the decision of the trial High Court, Onitsha in Onitsha judicial division presided over by Nwankwo, J., delivered on the 18th May, 1998 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the appellant has further appealed to this court on four (4) grounds of appeal. Without their particulars, they read as follows: Ground one "The learned Justices of the court of appeal erred in law in failing to consider or adjudicate upon a ground of appealand issue for determination raised by the: defendant/appellant, viz that the plaintiff/respondent failed to plead particulars of negligence and thatconsequent upon this failure any evidence of negligencewent to no issue." Ground two "The learned justices of the court of appeal erred in law when after striking out the major piece of evidence upon which the learned trial judge depended upon for his finding of negligence, they proceeded to re-evaluate the evidence before the court of trial without considering or evaluating any of the evidence proffered at the court of trial by the defendant /appellant.” Ground three "The learned justices of the court of appeal erred in law in proceeding to evaluate the evidence of the parties before the trial court by themselves after striking out the piece of evidence upon which the trial court based her finding of negligence on." Ground four "The learned justices of the court of appeal erred in law and on the facts in awarding the sum of ~~N~~ 2.0m to the respondent as damages that will restore the respondent "monetarily to the position he would have been if the breach of contract had not occurred", when the trial Judge disbelievedthat this ~~N~~ 2.0m actually represents what will restore the respondent monetarily to the position he was in before the alleged breach of contract.” I note that grounds two and three are substantially, the same although differently couched. When this appeal came up for hearing on 20th March, 2007, the appellant and his counsel, were absent although there was evidence of sending of hearing notice on counsel. Pursuant to the appeal, was deemed argued. The facts of this case leading to this appeal briefly stated are that the respondent as plaintiff, at the high court, Onitsha, took out a writ of summons against the appellant, claiming as follows: "(a) Two million ~~N~~ 2, 000.000.00 being the cost of replacement of the engine of the plaintiff's said 500 SEL Mercedes Benz car destroyed by the defendant. (b) Five hundred naira (~~N~~ 500) per day from 28th January, 1993 till the date of judgment being the cost of chartering vehicle for hismovement/business. (c) One Million naira (~~N~~ 1, 000.000.00) being generaldamages for emotional distress, financial and social disability caused the plaintiff since the said 28th January, 1993." Inote that the above claims are the same as those claimed by the respondent in paragraph 18 of his statement of claim at page 8 of the records. The plaintiffs/respondent's case is that on 19th October, 1992, he took his Mercedes Benz 500 SEL car to the appellant's workshop at Onitsha "with the ordinary complaint of replacing the car's exhaust manifold gasket" -See paragraph 4 of the statement of claim. I note that in the respondent's brief both in the court below and in this court, he stated or described it as "for a minor repair". A job card was opened - exhibit E - which I note detailed other faults/repairs including "tapping noise from engine". It is the respondent's case that this "ordinary" job, took the appellant some weeks and when the car was returned to the respondent, "it developed more faults and became worse than the ordinary problem of exhaust manifold gasket". That he complained bitterly about the state of the car to the appellant who collected back the car, That he was later told by the appellant about other problems or faults that it had detected from the car. He was later told that the engine had been taken to Lagos from where, at the instance of the appellant, he towed away the body of the car to avoid its being vandalized. After about one year, the Respondent initiated the said action in the said High Court. The respondent testified and called one (1) witness in support of his case. On its part, the appellant's case is that in good faith, it embarked on the repairs but on further investigation of the source of the tapping noise, the engine of the car, was dismantled and it was then, it was discovered that the short blocks of the engine, were worn-out. It had pleaded in paragraph 5 of its statement of defence that the respondent did not bring the said car for the change of the exhaust manifold gasket, but for several faults and/or repairs twelve (12) in number (a) to (1). The appellant called two (2) witnesses in support of its defence. At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge, found in favour of the respondent. He relied heavily on exhibit CA 57. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the appellant, appealed to the court below, which expunged from the records, exhibit CA 57 and allowed the appeal in part, by awarding two million Naira (~~N~~ 2 m) for his "first head of the claim" and twenty five thousand, five hundred naira (~~N~~ 25,500.00) "for his 2ndhead of claim." Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has further appealed to this court. There is no cross-appeal by the respondent. The appellant, has formulated three (3) issues for determination, namely, “1. Whether the court of appeal adjudicated upon the issue for determination complaining about the respondents (sic) failure to plead particulars of negligence and if not, whether this honourable court should effectively determine this case by pronouncing upon the failure to plead particulars of negligence by the respondent and its effect? 2\. Whether the court of appeal ought to have re-evaluated the evidence before the trial court and whether in re-evaluation, any weight ought to have been given to the evidence in rebuttal of negligence lead (sic) (meaning led) by the appellant's witnesses? 3\. Whether in the absence of a cross-appeal, the court of appeal ought to have increasedthe award of damages reflecting the value of the engine of the respondent's car from ~~N~~ 1.5m to ~~N~~ 2.0m?” On his part, the respondent has formulated also three (3) issues for determination, namely: "3.01 Whether the omission, if any, by the courtbelow to pronounce on the issue of pleading the particulars of negligence occasions a miscarriage of justice ,so as to warrant the reversal of the lower court's decision. 3.02 Whether there was any counter evidence towarrant the court of appeal disturbance of the trial court's finding that the appellant was negligent (sic). 3.03 Whether the court of appeal is justified in its decision that the evidence of PWl and PW2 were uncontroversial, and if so, whether the upward review of the value of the respondent's car is justified in law." In my respectful view, the issues of the parties are substantially, the same although differently worded/couched. I will therefore, deal with them in that regard. Issue 1 of the appellant and Issue 3.01 of the respondent I note that in the notice and grounds of appeal filed by the appellant in the court below, in ground three (3) thereof, the appellant, complained about the respondent's failure, to plead the particulars of negligence, thus: "The learned trial judge erred in law and on the facts when he held that the plaintiff was not bound to plead particulars of negligence. Issue 3 for determination in the appellant's brief in that court at page 129 of the records, reads as follows: "Whether the learned trial judge was correct when he held that the plaintiff/respondent was not bound to plead particulars of negligence andthat merely indicating what your case is all about suffice as particulars of negligence?" Issue 3 of the respondent at page 149 of the records for determination in the court below, read as follows: "Whether the facts and various acts of omission and commission as contained in the plaintiffs statement of claim particularly paragraphs 5,7,8,9, 13, 15 and 17 constitute particulars of negligence on the part of the defendant". I note that paragraph 15 of the respondent's statement of claim at page 7 of the records, read thus: "The plaintiff will at hearing adduce evidence to prove that, ordinarily the change of exhaust gasket has nothing to do with the stiffness of the engine is due to the defendant’s recklessness, gross negligence and incompetence." I am aware that most of the decided authorities on this issue, relate to road or motor accident or electric wiring cases. However, it is firmly established that a party who alleges negligence, should not only plead the act or acts of negligence, but should also give specific particulars. See the case of _AkuNmecha Transport Services (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Atoloye (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.298) 233 __@ 248 C.A._ Again settled, is that where there is failure to furnish further and better particulars, no evidence, will be led on the facts of which further particulars, is required. See the case of _Chief AlienC.Nwachukwu &anor, _v. _Chief EmekaEneogwo & 2 Ors. (1999) 4 NWLR (pt.600) 529@635 CA_ As rightly submitted in the appellant's brief, if is not only in cases in which the allegation of negligence, is based on tort, that particulars are required as appears to be the decision of the learned trial Judge at pages 105 and 106 of the records. See the case of _Seismograph Services (Nig.) Ltd, v. Mark (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.304) 203_ @.... _-_ per Uwaifo-, J.C.A (as he then was) also cited and relied on in the said brief. As a matter of fact, in Bullen &Leake Precedents of Pleadings 11th edition, page 533, also reproduced in the brief, the following appear, inter alia: “It is not enough for the plaintiff in his statement of claim to allege merely that the defendant acted negligently and thereby caused him damages, he must also set out facts which show that the alleged negligence was a breach of duty, which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. The statement of claim "ought to state the facts upon which the supposed duty is founded and the duty to the plaintiff with the breach of which the defendant is charged" per __Willes J. in Gautret v. Egeraon_(1867) LR. 2 C P 31_. _Then should follow an allegation of_ t _he precise breach of that duty of which the plaintiff complains; in what respect the defendant was negligent;_ and lastly the details of the damage sustained”. (the underlining his) This statement I note, relates to road accident cases. So also die case of _Adeoshun v. Adisa (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.40) 255 (@), 236-237_ C.A. - per Maidaa, J.C.A, also cited and relied on in the appellant's brief. The appellant has therefore, submitted that the justice of this case, demands that the respondent's case be dismissed for failure to plead the particulars of negligence. With respect, I do not quite agree. This is because, the complaint in this issue, is not the failure of the respondent to supply the particulars of negligence, but because of the failure of the court below to pronounce on it. So, I am obliged to deal with this specific complaint. Now, it is firmly settled that it is the duty of all lower courts, to consider all issues placed before it except in the clearest cases. In the case of _Owodunni_ v. _Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ & 3 ors. (2000) 6 SCNJ, 299 @ 426-427, _this court - per Ogundare, J.S.C (of blessed memory) stated that this court has frowned, in a number of cases, at the failure of lower courts, to intermediate court, should endeavour to resolve all issues put before it. His lordship referred to the cases of _Odunayo v. The State (1972) 8-9 S.C. 290(@t) 296 -_ per Sowemimo, J.S.C (as he then was and of blessed of memory) and _Ifeanyi-Chukwu (Osondu) Ltd, v. Saleh Boneh Ltd. (2005) 5 NWLR 322 (a), 351_ which is also reported in _(2000) 3 SCNJ. 18._ The learned counsel for the respondent, has admirably, conceded in paragraph 4.02 of their brief, of this fact or settled principle. He even cited/referred to the case of _AlhajiOlowolagbai &ors. V Bakare&ors. (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.543) 528 _@ _534; (1998) 3 SCNJ. 75._ But he describes it as "the general rule". I note that the appellant or his learned counsel has not stated in their brief, or in oral submission, what prejudice or embarrassment, that the appellant has suffered or what miscarriage of justice, the omission, has occasioned to it. As rightly submitted in the respondent's brief citing and relying on the case of _Ejelikwu v. The State (1993)7NWLR (Pt, 307) 554 (a) 583_(it is also reported in _(1993) 9 SCNJ. 152.) -_ per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C, for a condition to nullify a judicial proceeding, it must be a substantial provision, which affects the jurisdiction or competence of the court, or a procedural defect in a miscarriage of justice. I also ask does the omission to supply the particulars of negligence and or the failure of the court below to pronounce on the issue as I have hereinabove stated, affect the jurisdiction or competence of the court below, or is there any procedural defect in the proceedings which had resulted in any miscarriage of justice? Certainly, I think not. I am not going into what a miscarriage of justice means. But you can read the definition in _Black's Law Chambers Dictionary 7 th Edition page 1013_ and the cases of _Total (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Wilfred Nweke&anor. (1978) _5 _S.C. 1_ @ _14; (1978) 5 S.C._(Reprint); _Nnajiofor v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.36) 505 (a), 516-517_ cited and relied on in the respondent's brief and _Aidokov.SuleAnyegwu (2003) FWLR (Pt.49) 1439 (a), 1446._ My answer to the respective issue of the parties, is that although I agree with the complaint of the appellant that the court below, failed or neglected to pronounce on the failure of the respondent to plead the particulars of negligence, I also agree with the respondent, that this failure, did not occasion any miscarriage of justice that will warrant the dismissal of the suit on this ground. Issue 2 of the appellant and Issue 3.02 of the respondent It is contended at paragraph 4.01 in the appellant's brief that the court below erred in law in proceeding to re-evaluate the evidence before it from the printed record. That the court below, after expunging exhibit CA 57 stated severally that the said exhibit, was the basis of the decision by the trial court. Now, it is settled that an appeal is in the nature of re-hearing in respect of all issues raised in respect of the case. See the ease of _Sabrue Motors Nig.Ltd._ v. _Rajab Enterprises Nig.Ltd. (2002) 4 SCN.J. 370@382._ In doing so, it is also settled that the duty of an appellate court, is to inquire into ways the trial court, tried and settled the dispute and not to re-open and re-try cases. See the cases of _Oroke v. Ede (1964) NNLR 119 - 120; Ajadi v. Okenihun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 484 (a), 492_ cited and relied on in the respondent's brief; This is why it is also settled that what an appellate court has to decide, is whether the decision of the trial court was/is right and not the reasons for the decision. Thus, if a judgment of a trial court is -correct, it will not be liable to reversal, merely because it was anchored on a wrong reason. See the cases of _Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 WACA 45@46; Ayeni &ors. v. Williams Sowemimo (1982) 5 S.C. 6@73-74; Odukari v, Ogunbiyii (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt.561) 3_39 350 and recently, _Jikantoro &6ors. v. Dantoro& 6ors. (2004) 5 SCNJ. 152 @178 _just to mention but a few. In respect of this issue, the court below - per M. D. Muhammad, J.C.A at pages 187 and 188 (not Page 184 as erroneously stated in the appellant's brief), stated inter alia, as follows: “It is true that the court had, (see page. 100 - 103 of the record) _largely based its finding of negligence on the part of the appellant on exhibit CA57, which has been expunged_. It is still my considered view that in the light ofthe evidence given both by _PW1 and PW2 which evidence had remaineduncontradicted, the same conclusion of negligence would have been arried (sic) (meaning arrived)at without necessarily drawing from the expunged document_. In particular PW1, the expert that he was, had testified to the fact thatappellant's diagnosis of the faults in the respondents (sic) (respondent’s) vehicle was wrong. So where are the repairs conducted. In sum, the appellant _by the uncontradicted testimony of PW1 and PW2_ had been shown to have displayed, in the discharged (sic) of its obligation to the respondent a deficient skill. The trial court's **reason** for finding that appellant was negligent _might therefore be wrong_ but not the finding self (sic) (meaning itself). The court was bound to use evidence that had _remained unshaken and uncontradicted_ see __Oyetayo__ __v. Mosojo (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 526) 627; Dimlong v. Dimlong (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt.538) 381__ _CA and _IfeanyiChukwuOsondu v, Akhigbe (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 625) 1 S.C.”__ (the underlining mine) His lordship, continued thus, " Undoubtedly, _the court had erred when it based its decision largely on a document that has been adjudged inadmissible and or of little or no probative value._ This error by itself in view of the subsisting credible evidence given by PW1 and PW2 _cannot lead to a reversal, of the decision appealed against._ The finding has not been shown to be perverse. See _Okokji (sic) (meaning Okonji) v._Njokanma_ (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt.628) 250 S.C. _The finding has remained unaffected by our holding that Exhibit 'CA57' is inadmissible. By virtue of _S.I 6 of the Court of Appeal Act_ , the lower court's reasons for its findings are hereby retailored to reflect our foregoing observations ............." (the underlining mine) It is now firmly established that where the findings of a trial court, are perverse or use made of a document, goes beyond its evidential value particularly in respect of documentary evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court, to re-consider, re-assess the evidence and apply it if the justice of the case so requires. See the cases _of Adeleke v. lyande (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.729)1 (a), 20; (2001) 6 SCNJ. 101:_ and _Tsokwa Oil Marketing Co. Nig_. _Ltd, v. Bank of the North Ltd. (2002)_ 5 _SCNJ. 176_ @ _200._ This is why, there is the need for a trial and an appellate court, to consider, all relevant evidence before them. This is exactly what the court below did. It gave its reasons for expunging exhibit CA57 from its records at pages 181 to 183. Some of them include that Exhibit CA57, was not specifically pleaded; that it had not been made part of the record, it was clear that DW1 through whom it was tendered, was neither the maker nor the addressee of the very document. That the maker of the document, did not testify so also the addressee and therefore, it had not been possible to cross-examine either of them; thus that there was nothing on record, to indicate that the exhibit, had been written by and received by the persons so alleged; that worse still, that the learned trial Judge, did not reproduce the content of the document nor was the court below, afforded an opportunity to physically, examine the content of the exhibit. Finally, that the document never had the probative value ascribed to it by the trial court chiefly because, its maker was neither called nor its origin and destination fully ascertained. That for the first reason, the trial court, should have discountenanced the document. Fine! There seems to be no quarrel about the court below's decision in expunging the said document or exhibit from the records. The complaint by the appellant is that having expunged the said document, the court below, ought not and should have not proceeded to re-evaluate the evidence before it. I have, with respect, rejected this contention/submission. I gave my reason for so doing. In addition and this is also settled, _Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act_ , gives it full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings, had been initiated in the court of appeal as the court of first instance and therefore, may re-hear the case as a whole or in part or may remit it, to the trial court for the purpose of rehearing or trial de novo. I will add also, that the incontestable limit, is that such first instance jurisdiction exercised by the court of Appeal, does not, include what a trial court, could not have done. See the cases of _The State v. Dr.Onagoruwa(1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33 (a), 46, 56, 58: (1992) 2 SCNJ. 1: Abbas &ors. _) v. _Solomon &ors. (2001) 7 SCNJ.546 _and _Attorney-General, Anambra State &5ors. v. Okeke&4ors.(2002)5SCN. 318@333,339,345._ It has to be borne in mind and this is also settled, that if an appellate court is of the opinion (as in the instant case reproduced by me hereinabove), that the inadmissible evidence, cannot or could not reasonably, have affected the decision, it will not interfere. But if it is of the opinion that without the inadmissible evidence, the decision must have been different, it will interfere. See the cases _of Ajayi v. Fisher (1956) 1 FSC 90 (a). 92; (1956) SCNLR 279; R. v. Thomas (1958) 3 FSC 8; Raimu_ v. _AlhajiAkintoye (1986) 5 S.C.__87_ and recently. _Chief Durosuro v. Ayorinde(2005) 3 SCNJ. 8 (a), 16-17; (2005) 3-4 S.C. 14_ citing also _Idundu v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 S.C. 227(a), 245._ There is no doubt and this also firmly established that where inadmissible evidence, has been admitted, it is the duty of the court, not to act upon it. See _Olukade v. Alade (1976) 2 S.C. 183 (a), 188-189._ This is why the court below, stated that the trial court, should have discountenanced the said exhibit or document. The problem or quarrel is the holding of the court below, that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 remained uncontradicted. I respectfully, do not agree with this view. I agree with the submission in the appellant's brief at page 7, that by stating so, the court below, in effect, sought to eliminate the entirety of the evidence ofthe DW1 and DW2. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the evidence of the PW2 (the "expert"), was merely speculative and academic and that there was no evidence from him that stated that the appellant, was negligent. That the evidence of the DW1 at pages 44 to 46 of the records were all in rebuttal of negligence. I agree: This is because, this witness - DW1, testified that he participated in dis-mantling the engine and that they discovered that the engine was damaged because two (2) out of the eight (8) cylinders, were worn out. DW2 was the witness who received the car. He testified that the vehicle, was releasing blue-white smoke from the exhaust and that the car, had a tapping noise for which the appellant, was to effect repair as necessary. He also testified that no negligence occurred. I agree with the submission in the appellant's brief, that the court below, instead of saying that there was uncontroverted evidence, but in is re-evaluation; it was in effect dealing with the credibility of the witnesses. That in the circumstances, it could have ordered a re-trial. The cases of _shell_ _B.P. v. Cole (1978) 3 S.C. 183; Okeowo v. Miglore (1979) 11 S.C. 138._ and _Ezeoke v. Nwagbo (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 616_ have been cited and relied on for this proposition. It is settled that the function of assessment of credibility of witnesses, is essentially, for the trial court and not that of an appellate court. See the cases of _Akpakpuna &ors. _v. _Nzeka &ors. (1983) 2 SCNLR I (a), 14 _and _Obodo &anor. v. Ogba&ors. (1987) 3 S.C 459 460 -61, 480-482, 485; (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.54) 1; (1987) 3 SCNJ. 82 _and recently, _Agbaje &ors. _v. _SCNJ. 64_ and many others. The trial court, in my respectful view, adequately or substantially, dealt with the evidence before it particularly at pages 102 and part of page 103 of the Records and came to its conclusion at pages 117 and 118 of the record. I will come later to its award in favour of the respondent. So, in spite of the stance of the court below in holding that the evidence of the PW1 and PW2, were uncontradicted, it is now firmly established that it is not every mistake or error in a judgment, that necessarily determines an appeal in favour of an appellant or automatically results in the appeal being allowed, It is only when the error, is so substantial, that it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, that the appellate court, is bound to interfere. There are too many decided authorities in this regard. See __Onajobi_ v. Olanipekun (1985) 4 S.C. (Pt.2) 156 @ 168; Osafile&anor. v. Odi&anor. (No.1) (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.137) 130; (1990) 5 SCNJ. 118, Anyanwu v. Mbara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.242) 386@400 Odukwe v. Mrs. Ethel N_. _Ogunbiyi (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt......) 338 (@)351; (1998) 6 SCNJ, 102 (a), 113_ and _International Bank for West Africa Ltd, v. Pavek International Co. (Nig)Ltd. (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt.663) 128; (2000) 4 SCNJ, 200_ just to mention but a few. My answer to this issue therefore, is partly, in the affirmative, but I hold that the court below, with respect, was wrong in holding that the evidence of the PW1 and PW2 remained uncontradicted. Incidentally, that was the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent as recorded by the court below, at page 180 of the records. Even if it dealt with the credibility of the witnesses, with respect, it was not entitled to do so because, the assessment of credibility of witnesses, is that of the trial court. The effect, in my respectful view, is that the trial court, having preferred the evidence of the respondent to that of the defence/appellant through its two witnesses, that finding subsists. For the avoidance of doubt, the trial court at page 112 of the Records, stated inter alia, as follows: “I had the opportunity of watching the demeanour of the plaintiff while he was in the witness box. He impressed me as an honest, prudent, innocent but unfortunate customer in the hands of a team of inexperienced and incompetent, workmen in the employment of an otherwise reputable automobile engineering company with a poorly stated branch office at Onitsha _I hold that the plaintiff has proved his case on preponderance of evidence and that the defendant company's workmen at Onitsta damaged the plaintiff’s mercedesbenz car engine while they were working on it in a most reckless, negligent and incompetent manner for which I hold the defendant company vicariously liable in damages (sic) to the_ plaintiff..........” (the underlining mine) Issue 3 of the appellant and 3.02 of the respondent I have under Issue 2 of the appellant, dealt with part of Issue 3.03 of the respondent which read as follows: "Whether the court of appeal is justified in its decision that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 were uncontroverted...........” The rest of the sentence is substantially, the same with Issue 3 of the appellant. The law is firmly settled as to the attitude or powers of an appellate court in respect of an award of damages by a trial court. An appellate court, ought not to upset an award of damages by a trial court merely because, if it had tried the matter, it might have awarded a different figure. An award of damages can only he upset or interfered with by an appellate court, if it is shown by the appellant, either that: **“(a)** the trial court acted or proceeded upon wrong principles of law, or (b) the amount awarded by the trial court, is manifestly and extremely high or low, or (c) the amount, was on an entirely erroneous estimate which no reasonable tribunal, will make.” See the cases _of F.R. A. Williams v. Daily Times of Nig. Ltd. (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt,l24) l@49; (1990) 1 SCNJ.1; Ndinma v. Igbenedion (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.705) 140_ _C.A_.; _Nzeribe v. Dave Engineering Co. Lid. (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.361) 124 @_ _140_ and recently, _The Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nig. Ltd. & 4 ors. v. Chief Tiebo VII (2005) 3-4 S.C. 137; (2005) 4 SCNJ. 39 (a), 56._ In other words, in order to justify interference with any decision of a trial judge on the amount of damages awarded, it must be convinced that the above ingredients are present. In the instant case, while the trial court in