Case LawGhana
Mohammed v Ashalle and Others (TRS/E1/HCKO/175/2024) [2025] GHAHC 154 (21 February 2025)
High Court of Ghana
21 February 2025
Judgment
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (COURT “2”), HELD AT KASOA-OFAAKOR
ON THURSDAY THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP
JUSTICE EDWARD TWUM J, JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT
SUIT NO. TRS/E1/HCKO/175/2024
ALHAJI TAHIRU MOHAMMED … PLAINTIFF
VS.
1. NII ACQUAYE ASHALLE (SUBST. BY ALEX DONKOR)
2. KING DAVID ACQUAH (NII YEDU)
3. OFORI ABUBAKAR
4. ISAAC ARYEE a.k.a SOBODJOR DEFENDANTS
5. FAISEL
6. ISAAC NII BARNOR
7. DANIEL ADUQUAYE
8. ABU ABDALA
PARTIES
Plaintiff - Present
Defendants - Absent
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Nicholas Egyin Boadu for the Plaintiff/Applicant – Present
Edmund Oppong for 1st and 2nd Defendants – Present
Other Defendants not represented
RULING
Introduction
1. This is a ruling on an application christened by the Applicant/Plaintiff (hereinafter
“Plaintiff”) as “variation” praying this court for an order “varying” the injunction
application which was dismissed by this court.
Background
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2. The Plaintiff sued the Defendants for the following reliefs:
i) A declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land situate lying and being at
Kasoa Oduponkpehe Residential Area in the Awutu-Efutu-Senya District of the
Central Region of Ghana described as ALL THAT piece or parcel of land containing
an approximate area of 0.50 Acre known as Sector 15 Block “A” Plot Nos. 361 & 363
Residential Area layout in the Kasoa-Oduponkpehe in the Awutu-Efutu-Senya
District in the Central Region of the Republic of Ghana bounded on the North by
proposed road of 60 feet measuring 95 feet more or less on the North-East by a link
measuring 30 feet more or less on the East by proposed road of 40 feet measuring
180 feet on the South by Plot No. 359 measuring 110 feet more or less on the West by
Plot Nos. 360 & 362 measuring 205 feet more or less which piece or parcel of land is
more particularly delineated on the plan attached thereto and thereon shown edged
pink.
ii) Recovery of possession of portions of the Plaintiff’s aforementioned land which the
Defendants have trespassed upon and are wrongfully laying false claim to.
iii) Damages for trespass committed by the Defendants to portions of the
Plaintiff’s land.
iv) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by
themselves, their agents, servants, assigns etc. from entering upon, occupying,
constructing or carrying out any building activities thereon and interfering in any
way with the Plaintiff’s ownership and possession of the aforementioned land.
v) Cost including legal costs for prosecuting this suit.
Application for Interlocutory Injunction
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3. The Plaintiff filed an application for interlocutory injunction against the Defendants on
the 19 July, 2023 but same was dismissed by this court in its ruling of 19 December,
2024.
Instant Application
4. The Plaintiff brings the instant application filed on the 3 January, 2025 praying this
court to vary its order for interlocutory injunction declined on 19 December, 2024.
5. The case of the Plaintiff is that this court on the 19 December, 2024 refused his
interlocutory injunction application on the ground that Plaintiff failed to attach a site
plan to indicate that the disputed land is the same land being claimed by the
Defendants. Another grounds for the refusal of this court to grant the said interlocutory
was that the Plaintiff failed to exhibit any photographs to indicate the activities of the
Defendants which could be considered as encroachment on the disputed land and
indicated that the hearing of the interlocutory injunction application, this court did not
advert its mind to the supplementary affidavit the Plaintiff filed on the 10 April, 2024
exhibiting photographs depicting the trespassory activities of the Defendants on the
disputed land.
6. The Plaintiff therefore prayed this court to vary the order and restrain the Defendants
or all the parties until the rights of the parties are fully determined in the substantive
suit.
Case of the 1st and 2nd Defendants
7. The 1st and 2nd Defendants (Defendants) opposed the application. According to the
Defendants, the instant application is incompetent and alien to our civil jurisprudence
because per the rules of court, variation can only be sought when there is an existing
court order. The Defendants said the Plaintiff has clothed a repeat application as an
application for variation. The Defendants prayed this court to dismiss the instant
application.
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The Law and this Application
8. In its ruling of 19 December, 2024, this court discussed the law and various authorities
on the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction in relation to that application and
came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has not made enough case for this court to aid
him by granting him interlocutory injunction against the Defendants.
9. In reaching that conclusion, this court stated in paragraphs 27 and 28 at pages 9-10 of
the Ruling as follows:
‚27. Alternatively, the Plaintiff should have exhibited photographs of activities or
constructions being undertaken on the encroached land, supposedly by the Defendants,
to assist this court to relate the Plaintiff’s case to those activities or constructions going
on at the moment on the disputed land. Plaintiff could also not establish any hardship
that will be occasioned to him if the said application is not granted. Indeed, this court
did not find Plaintiff evidence very convincing enough to compel this court to come to
his aid to protect a right which is being infringed upon by the 1st and 2nd Defendants.
28. This court has no doubt that the Plaintiff may have a legal or equitable right in the
property he claims is being encroached upon by some persons in view of the documents
he has exhibited in this application. But in this application, Plaintiff has not been able
to provide any evidence to link the Defendants directly to the said encroachment.
Apart from the 1st and 2nd Defendants who deny Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff could also
not provide any evidence linking directly the 3rd to 8th Defendants’ to any purported
activities on the disputed land which has negatively affected the Plaintiff’s legal and
equitable rights. In such a situation, how could this court assist the Plaintiff to protect
a right the Plaintiff himself has failed to assert?‛
10. Before proceeding to deal with the instant application, it is important for this court to
put this suit in its historical context to understand some of the issues arising from
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herein. This suit was commenced by the Plaintiff with the issuance of writ of summons
and statement of claim at the Registry of the High Court, Agona Swedru on 26 April
2023. The Plaintiff followed this up with an interlocutory injunction application filed
on the 14 July, 2023 seeking for interlocutory injunction against the Defendants till the
determination of the substantive suit.
11. Per an order of the High Court, Agona Swedru dated 24 October, 2023, His Lordship
Kwame Polley, the presiding judge referred the docket of this suit to the Honourable
Chief Justice for an order of transfer of the suit to this court pursuant to a motion on
notice filed by the 1st and 2nd Defendants on 16 April, 2023 objecting to the jurisdiction
of High Court, Agona Swedru to hear the matter based on the location of the subject
property and for the transfer of the suit to this court.
12. Subsequently, the suit was transferred to this court. It is important to note that nearly
all the processes on the court’s docket were filed at the Registry of the High Court,
Agona Swedru before the subsequent transfer of the suit to this court.
13. At the hearing of the earlier application, this court did not have the opportunity to see
and consider the Supplementary affidavit filed by the Plaintiff on the 10 April, 2024 at
the High Court, Agona Swedru. Exhibit “B” attached to this application is proof, and
this is not challenged by the Defendants, that indeed the Plaintiff filed supplementary
affidavit exhibiting photographs of the Defendants’ trespassory activities on the
disputed land. Admittedly, from the findings of this court in its ruling of 19 December,
2024, the conclusions it reached would have been different if this court had got the
opportunity to consider Exhibit “B”.
14. The main grounds of the Defendants opposing this application is that there was no
order of this court to “review” as the injunction the Plaintiff seek to review was
dismissed, and technically speaking, there is no order of this court in existence. This
court is in total agreement with this assertion by the Defendants. However, it appears
5
to this court that the wrongful title of the Plaintiff’s application should not disentitle
the Plaintiff from asserting his rights if “new” evidence has become available to him,
and which upon review by this court, this court will come to the conclusion that if the
said evidence had been made available at the hearing of the earlier application, it
would have tilted the scales in favour of the Plaintiff, nothing stops this court from
considering the repeated application on its merit. What should be the guiding
principle to this court is to do substantial justice and make a determination as to
whether on the face of the affidavits of both parties there is the need to preserve the
status quo in order to avoid irreparable damage to the Plaintiff, provided his claim is
not frivolous or vexatious.
15. In the case of Okofoh Estates Limited v. Modern Signs Limited [1996-97] SCGLR 224
the Supreme Court stated at page 259 of the report as follows:
“The wrong heading of the application for an order of certiorari could not in any
material manner, derogate from the nature of the application itself. Since the Supreme
Court was a court of final resort, in the absence of specific prescriptions in the Supreme
Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) or any other relevant statute, what was more important
was whether the application had any substance regardless of the form in
which it has been instituted.” (Emphasis mine.)
16. In this application, what is important for this court to consider is the substance of the
application and not the form, i.e. whether or not the application has any substance
worth considering irrespective of the wrongful heading of the Plaintiff’s application.
Moreover, this court has the inherent jurisdiction to amend the heading of the
Plaintiff’s motion, and it is so amended since it is the considered view of this court that
doing so will not occasion any injustice or prejudice to the Defendants’ case since this
court is concerned with doing substantial justice to the parties in this case than any
other consideration.
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17. In the case of Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 GLR 428, the facts which are gleaned
from the headnotes are that an application by the appellant for an order for the interim
protection of property pending the final determination of the case between the parties
was dismissed by Griffiths-Randolph J. on the ground that the appellant failed to
show a reasonably fair or strong prima facie case in support of his application. A
second application by the appellant alleging that he had discovered material which
entitled him to move the court anew on the same issue was dismissed by Edusei J. on
the ground that the appellant had already brought a similar application unsuccessfully
on the same issue. On appeal to the Court of Appeal one of the grounds of appeal
which is relevant to this application was that (i) Edusei J. was wrong in dismissing the
application on the preliminary objection that he had already brought a similar
application unsuccessfully on the issue.
18. Allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that if there was a new matter which
changed the positions of the parties, a court should look at it to determine whether the
prayer in a motion for interlocutory relief ought to be granted despite the fact that a
similar motion had already been disposed of in relation to the same question. The
Court of Appeal stated that it was satisfied that the learned judge ought not to have
shut out the appellant on the preliminary objection that he had already brought a
similar application unsuccessfully on the issue, thus treating it as res judicata. The
Court held further that the appellant has raised fresh points which appeared genuine
enough and which, if true, might on a fair examination induce a court to grant him the
relief that he sought.
19. In the respectful view of this court, if Exhibit “B” had been available to this court at the
determination of the earlier application, the court would have reached a different
conclusion than it did in its ruling of 19th December, 2024. In the instant application,
the Plaintiff provided proof (Exhibit “B”) to the effect that the Defendants or persons
acting for and on their behalf are seriously developing the disputed land.
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20. Per Order 25 rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I.47) this Court
may grant an interlocutory injunction in all cases if it appears to it to be just and
convenient to do so. In determining justice and convenience, the Court ought to
consider the following:
a) Whether or not there is a serious issue to be tried or in the alternative, whether or
not the case of the Plaintiff or Applicant, as the case may be, is not frivolous, or is
relatively strong.
b) Whether damages would suffice, or alternatively, whether the status quo ante
ought to be preserved. In determining this, the question that should be answered
is whether a successful party would be presented with a fait accompli in the event
of such success.
c) The balance of convenience as held evenly on a scale between the parties.
21. Lord Diplock LC in the House of Lords case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon
Ltd. [1975] 1 All ER 504 at page 509 also explained the purpose of interlocutory
injunction and the reasons for granting it in the following terms:
‚My Lords, when an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant
from doing acts alleged to be in violation of the plaintiff’s legal right is made on
contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to
be taken at a time when ex hypothesi the existence of the right or the violation of it, or
both, is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judgment is given in the
action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before
that uncertainty could be resolved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way
of interlocutory injunction; but since the middle of the 19th century this has been made
subject to his undertaking to pay damages to the defendant for any loss sustained by
reason of the injunction if it should be held at the trial that the plaintiff had not been
entitled to restrain the defendant from doing what he was threatening to do. The
object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury
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by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in
damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his
favour at the trial; but the plaintiff’s need for such protection must be weighed
against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury
resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for
which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff’s undertaking in
damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant’s favour at the trial. The
court must weigh one need against another and determine where ‘the balance of
convenience’ lies.‛
22. The question to answer is has the Plaintiff made adequate case for the relief of
interlocutory injunction to be granted in this repeated application? His Lordship
Amissah JA in the Vanderpuye v. Nartey case (supra) stated as follows:
‚…although there was justification in seeking an end to interlocutory applications on
the same point, there was nothing preventing the presentation of a fresh motion if fresh
material on the issue became available. The applicant was, therefore, not advocating an
unrestricted right to bring any number of motions on the same subject before the
court. He recognised the limitations which the court's power to dismiss applications
for frivolity or vexatiousness imposed on the unsuccessful applicant considering a fresh
application. But he contended that this power, the dimensions of which were left to the
discretion of the court to determine, was wide enough to control the applicant who after
losing once on an application decided to importune the courts with further applications
based on the same request. Once some fresh material which could weigh with a court
in deciding the merits of the application afresh is introduced, however, the situation
was different. The applicant was entitled to re-apply even though he had lost in the
previous round. The submission seems to us to have much merit. This is not an area
where reported decisions are available. And counsel did not refer us to any. But one
practical example ought to put his case beyond dispute. Assume an applicant in a land
case bringing a motion for an interim injunction but failing to secure it on the ground
9
that the respondent has not been responsible for activities occurring on the land.
Assume subsequently there is irrefutable evidence that the respondent has been
carrying on such activities. Would the court summarily dismiss the fresh application
brought summarily on the ground that a similar application on the point had been
dealt with? If that were so parties to a case would acquire immunity from a simple
victory in an interlocutory matter, thereby obtaining a licence to act exactly as they
please on the issue, however adversely that may affect the interest of their opponents
while the substantive case is in progress. But it is well known that the situation of the
parties in relation to one another during the currency of a case may keep altering from
time to time and the courts would find themselves incapable of giving interlocutory
relief if some principle like res judicata were to be introduced into this area to fix
positions which cannot and, indeed, ought not to be so fixed.‛
23. In the circumstances of this application and in view of Exhibit “B”, it is the considered
view of this court that the Plaintiff has made enough case to convince this court to
come to his aid. In the circumstances, the prayers of the Plaintiff is hereby granted. It
is the considered view of this court that both the Plaintiff and the Defendants must be
injuncted and it is hereby ordered that the Plaintiff and the Defendants, their assigns,
servants, workmen and anyone legally claiming through the Plaintiff and the
Defendants are hereby injuncted from dealing with the disputed property in any form
or manner until the final determination of the substantive suit.
24. It is further ordered that the ruling of this court dated 19th December, 2024 in respect of
this matter is hereby set aside.
(SGD)
EDWARD TWUM J.
(JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT)
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