Case Law[2026] KEHC 1278Kenya
Okusa & another v Ombati (Civil Appeal E204 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 1278 (KLR) (12 February 2026) (Ruling)
High Court of Kenya
Judgment
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KISUMU
HCCA NO. E204 OF 2025
OUKO OKUSA ….................................................................… 1ST APPELLANT
NATION MEDIA GROUP PLC ............................................. 2ND APPELLANT
- VERSUS -
CALEB OMBIRO OMBATI …….………………..............……RESPONDENT
R U L I N G
1. Before me is a Motion on Notice dated 24/9/2025 by the appellants. The
same was brought under sections 1A, 1B, 3A & 75 of the Civil Procedure
Act & Order 42 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010. It sought stay of
execution of the decree in Kisumu CMCC No. 599 of 2017 pending the
hearing and determination of the instant appeal.
2. The grounds upon which the application was brought were set out in the
body thereof and in the supporting affidavit of Sekou Owino sworn on
24/9/2025. These were that the appellants were aggrieved by the ruling
delivered by the trial court on the 17/9/2025 and preferred an appeal vide a
Memorandum of Appeal dated 23/9/2025.
3. That they stand to suffer substantial loss if stay is not granted as the
respondent may move to execute the ex-parte judgment having already
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extracted warrants of attachment over their property and this will render the
appeal nugatory. That they are willing to furnish a bank guarantee as
security in due performance of the decree.
4. The application was disposed off by way of submissions that were
highlighted in court on the 8/12/2025. It was submitted for the appellants
that no appeal had been lodged against the Judgment Debtor but that the
instant appeal was against the refusal by the trial court to set aside the
judgment. That sections 1A, 3 & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act gives the
court inherent jurisdiction to preserve the subject matter pending appeal so
that the appeal is not rendered nugatory. That the property attached is used
to run the appellants’ business.
5. That the respondent’s means are unknown as he has not filed anything in
court to demonstrate that he can refund the sums whereas they have offered
up security by way of guarantee for the judgment debt amount.
6. For the respondent, it was submitted that an application for stay of execution
under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules was against a decree or
order appealed from. That the stay sought by the appellants was of a
judgment not subject of an appeal. That the appellants main ground of
appeal is that they were not served with summons which is purely an
academic exercise as there is a copy of summons on record.
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7. That the execution should not be unlawfully stopped and further that the
respondent is a Medical Doctor of 7 years and therefore can repay the
decretal amount. That in any case, means cannot be a basis to deny one the
fruits of his judgment and the money ought to be deposited in court. That the
application for stay should therefore be dismissed.
8. In rejoinder, it was submitted for the appellants that the issue of service of
summons raised by the respondent is an issue for determination at the appeal
level.
9. I have considered the record. The only issue for determination is whether the
appellants merit grant of orders of stay of execution.
10. Stay of Execution pending appeal is governed by Order 42, Rule 6 of
the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provides as follows: -
“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of
execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed
from except appeal case of in so far as the Court appealed
from may order but, the Court Appealed from may for
sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or
order, and whether the application for such stay shall have
been granted or refused by the Court appealed from, the
Court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on
application being made, to consider such application and to
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make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any
person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the Court from
whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the
appellate Court to have such order set aside.
(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule
(1) unless—
(a) the Court is satisfied that substantial loss may
result to the applicant unless the order is made and that
the application has been made without unreasonable
delay; and
(b) such security as the Court orders for the due
performance of such decree or order as may ultimately
be binding on him has been given by the applicant.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subrule (2), the Court
shall have power, without formal application made, to order
upon such terms as it may deem fit a stay of execution
pending the hearing of a formal application.”
11. The power of a court to grant stay of execution is discretionary as correctly
submitted by the respondents. This discretionary power must not be
exercised capriciously or whimsically but judiciously. It must be exercised
to ensure that it does not prevent a party from pursuing its appeal so that the
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same is not rendered nugatory should the appeal overturn the trial court’s
decision or that the successful party is not defeated from enjoying the fruits
of his judgment. (see Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] KECA 22
(KLR)).
12. The purpose of stay of execution is to preserve the subject matter in dispute
while balancing the interests of the parties and considering the
circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeal in RWW v EKW (2019)
eKLR addressed itself on this as hereunder: -
“The purpose of an application for stay of execution pending an
appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the rights
of the appellant who is exercising the undoubted right of appeal are
safeguarded and the appeal if successful, is not rendered nugatory.
However, in doing so, the Court should weigh this right against the
success of a litigant who should not be deprived of the fruits of
his/her judgment. The Court is also called upon to ensure that no
party suffers prejudice that cannot be compensated by an award of
costs.
Indeed to grant or refuse an application for stay of execution
pending appeal is discretionary. The Court when granting the stay
however, must balance the interests of the Appellant with those of
the Respondent.”
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13. In Vishram Ravji Halai v Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No.
Nairobi 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365, the Court of Appeal outlined the
requirements for granting stay of execution pending appeal. It held that: -
“Whereas the Court of Appeal’s power to grant a stay pending
appeal is unfettered, the High Court’s jurisdiction to do so under
Order 41 rule 6 (as it then was) of the Civil Procedure Rules is
fettered by three conditions namely, establishment of a sufficient
cause, satisfaction of substantial loss and the furnishing of
security”.
14. The first requirement is that the intended appeal must be arguable. A cursory
look at the Memorandum of Appeal reveals that the appeal revolves around
the issue of Service of Summons. This court opines that this is an arguable
issue.
15. The second aspect is to consider whether the application was filed without
undue delay. From the record, vide an application dated 9/5/2025, the
appellant sought to set aside the impugned judgment and decree entered on
the 6/6/2018. The said application was dismissed. The Order sought to be
stayed was issued on 6/6/2018 and while the present application is dated
24/9/2025, 7 years and 3 months later. Clearly, there was an inordinate
delay.
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16. Thirdly, this Court must determine whether or not granting the order will
occasion substantial loss to the applicant. Substantial loss was explained in
the case of James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012]
eKLR, that: -
“No doubt, in law, the fact that the process of execution has been
put in motion, or is likely to be put in motion, by itself, does not
amount to substantial loss. Even when execution has been levied
and completed, that is to say, the attached properties have been sold,
as is the case here, does not in itself amount to substantial loss
under Order 42 Rule 6 of the CPR. This is so because execution is a
lawful process. The applicant must establish other factors which
show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will
irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the applicant
as the successful party in the appeal ... the issue of substantial loss is
the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to
be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would
render the appeal nugatory.”
17. The appellants have filed an appeal which is waiting a determination and has
submitted that they stand to suffer substantial loss if the stay is not granted
as the respondent has already attached their tools of trade in satisfaction of
the decree.
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18. On the other hand, the respondent states that he has the right to enjoy the
fruits of the judgment since the case was determined on merit and in his
favor. However, he did not provide the means of refund if the appeal is
successful. Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that the aspect of substantial
loss was proved by the applicant.
19. The last consideration is security. In Focin Motorcycle Co. Limited v Ann
Wambui Wangui & Another (2018) eKLR, the court stated that: -
“Where the applicant proposes to provide security as the applicant
has done, it is a mark of good faith that the application for stay is
not just meant to deny the respondent the fruits of judgment. My
view is that it is sufficient for the applicant to state that he is ready
to provide security or to propose the kind of security but it is the
discretion of the court to determine the security. The applicant has
offered to provide security and has therefore satisfied this ground.”
20. Security is discretionary and it is upon the court to determine the same. In
this case, the appellants have offered up to provide a guarantee covering the
decretal sum of Kshs. 13,016,925/- as security. On the other hand, the
respondent states he is a medical doctor of 7 years standing and is therefore
a man of means.
21. Considering all relevant factors and in order not to render the intended
appeal illusory, and since, based on the grounds of appeal, the same raises
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triable issues, I do grant a stay of execution of the decree herein on condition
that;
a) The appellant does deposit the entire decretal sum as security for
the performance of the decree in a joint interest earning account
in the names of the Advocates of the parties in this matter within
30days of this ruling.
b) In default, the application shall be deemed to have been dismissed
with costs and the respondent and execution to issue forthwith.
c) The costs of this application will be in the appeal.
d) Mention on 09/03/2026 for directions on the hearing of the appeal.
It is so ordered.
DATED and DELIVERED at Kisumu this 12th day of February, 2026.
A. MABEYA, FCI Arb
JUDGE
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