REPUBLIC VRS YIN (UW/WA/HC/F22/26/2023) [2024] GHAHC 345 (18 July 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD AT WA ON 18TH JULY, 2024 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE A. YUSIF ASIBEY HIGH COURT JUDGE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SUIT NUMBER: UW/WA/HC/F22/26/2023 THE REPUBLIC APPELLANT VRS NICHOLAS YIN RESPONDENT JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION This is an appeal against the ruling on submission of no case delivered by the Circuit Court, Wa presided over by His Honour Jonathan Avogo on 20th February 2023 wherein the learned trial judge acquitted the respondent on charges of stealing and defrauding by false pretence contrary to sections 124(1) and 131(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) respectively and struck out the charge of money laundering against the Respondent FACTS; The facts of the case are as follows; The complainant, Dominic Delle is a businessman and a contractor and lives in Wa. The Respondent Nicholas Yin is a civil engineer and the Managing Director of Messrs. Yin Engineering and Trading Co. Ltd. and lives at Nkoransa in the Bono East Region. Sometime in the year 2019, the complainant contacted the Respondent and requested for his license to bid for a contract at the Dr. Hilla Liman Technical University, Wa. Complainant and Respondent agreed to open an account to 1 | P a ge which the complainant would be the sole signatory. A Power of Attorney was executed by the Respondent to enable the Complainant bid for the contract. Having obtained the Power of Attorney, the Respondent left with the Power of Attorney and promised to bring other documents to enable the Complainant open the account but he failed to fulfil this promise. Complainant however went ahead to execute the contract in the name of the Respondent’s company at Complainant’s expense. On 17th January, 2022 an amount of GHS1,054,554.40 was paid into the Respondent’s company account with National Investment Bank, Tamale Branch by government for the contract won by the Complainant. Complainant notified the Police and an order was obtained from the High Court, Wa restraining the Respondent from withdrawing money from the account into which the money was paid. Respondent was arrested on 30th January, 2022 and brought to Wa to assist with investigation. In his investigation cautioned statement, the Respondent person admitted that the money had been paid into his company’s account but claimed ownership of the money on the basis that his company won the contract and he appointed the Complainant as a caretaker. On 31st January, 2022 a statement of account was obtained from National Investment Bank which showed that an amount of GHS, 975,000.00 had been withdrawn from the company account of the Respondent person leaving an amount of GHS79,554.40 in the account. Further investigation revealed that in spite of a pending order of the High Court restraining him from withdrawing or transferring money from the account and while still in police custody, the Respondent person managed to transfer the colossal sum of GHS, 975,000.00 from the company’s NIB account to his personal CBG account. It is based on these facts that the Respondent was arraigned before the Circuit Court Wa for Stealing contrary to Section 124(1) of Act 29; Defrauding by False Pretence contrary to Section 131(1) of Act 29; and Money Laundering contrary to Section 1(2)(A) (I) of the Anti- Money Laundering Act 2020 (Act 1044) 2 | P a ge DUTY OF THE COURT In the case of Kwesi v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 448 at pp. 451-452, the court laid down the principle that should guide an appellate court as follows: “On first appeal from a conviction by a circuit judge or magistrate in a summary trial, the appellant is entitled to have the appellate court’s own consideration and views of the evidence as a whole and its own decision thereon. The appellate court has the duty to re-hear the case and re- consider the materials before the circuit judge or magistrate with such other materials as it may have decided to admit. The appellate court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from, but carefully weighing and considering it. Section 30 of Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) also stipulates; Subject to the provisions of this Sub-Part, an appellate court may in a criminal case— (a) on an appeal from a conviction or acquittal— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit and discharge or convict the accused as the case may be or order him to be retried by a court of competent jurisdiction, or commit him for trial; or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence or with or without altering the finding, reduce or increase the sentence; or (iii) with or without such reduction or increase and with or without altering the finding alter the nature of the sentence; or (iv) annul the conviction and substitute a special finding to the effect that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged but was criminally insane so as not to be responsible for his action at the time when he did the act or made the omission and order the accused to be confined as a criminally order insane person in a mental hospital, prison or other suitable place of safe custody; 3 | P a ge (v) annul or vary any order of imprisonment or other punishment imposed on the person convicted; (vi) annul or vary any order for payment of compensation or of expenses of the prosecution or for the restoration of property to any person whether or not the conviction is quashed; The Court also takes note of its power under Section 330(2) of Act 30; ‘After perusing the record and hearing the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, if the counsel appears, and the respondent or the respondent’s counsel, if the counsel appears, the Court may determine the appeal in accordance with law.’ GROUNDS OF APPEAL In the petition for appeal filed on behalf of the Appellant, the following grounds were raised; 1. That the trial judge erred when he held that the Complainant was not the owner of the road contract and by extension owner of GHS 1,054,554.40 paid by the Ministry of Roads and Highways; 2. That the judge misdirected himself on the definition of ‘unlawful activity’ under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044) when he held that stealing did not constitute unlawful activity; 3. The trial judge erred when he struck out the charge of money laundering as though it were a civil trial; and 4. That the ruling was against the weight of evidence. On 30th June 2023, the Appellant filed two additional grounds of appeal namely: 5. The learned trial judge misdirected himself when he held that prosecution was required to prove the Respondent by false representation caused his victims to part with ‘money’ to constitute the offence of defrauding by false pretence; and 6. The judgment cannot be supported having recourse to the evidence on record. 4 | P a ge The Court is mindful of its duty at this stage of a trial as stated in Daniel Kwasi Abodakpi v the Republic CA; Criminal Appeal No. H2/6/07 dated 20th June 2008 in the following manner: ‘I have to emphasize, however, that the yardstick that is used in determining whether the prosecution has established a prima facie case or not is not the same as the one used in determining whether the prosecution has established its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. They are two different things. In deciding either to call on an accused person to open a defence or not, the trial court is not supposed to make findings of fact. Findings of fact are made when the trial court is considering the guilt or otherwise of an accused person at the close of the case for the prosecution and the defence. The same court that comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has established a prima facie case can also come to the conclusion that the prosecution could not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt when it comes to the consideration of the totality of the evidence before the court.’ GROUND 1: THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE HELD THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT THE OWNER OF THE ROAD CONTRACT AND BY EXTENSION OWNER OF GHS 1,054,554.40 PAID BY THE MINISTRY OF ROADS AND HIGHWAYS The accused person was charged stealing contrary to Section 124(1) of the Criminal Offences Act 1960 (Act 29) which states, ‘Whoever steals shall be guilty of a second degree felony.’ Section 125 of Act 29 defines stealing as follows; ‘A person steals if he dishonestly appropriates a thing of which he is not the owner.’ That said, appellant’s duty at the trial was to demonstrate that the respondent herein appropriated money belonging to PW1; The respondent appropriated the sum dishonestly; and that the Respondent is not the owner of the money. The evidence on record shows that there was an oral agreement between PW1 and the Respondent for the use of Respondent’s license. A precondition for the use of the said 5 | P a ge license was the payment of tax and other obligations of the Respondent by Complainant. (Please see record of proceedings of 16th June, 2022 at pages 6, 7 and 9), Q. To say that you have used his documents to bid, what do you mean especially when he signed the contract at the contract signing event. A. I approached him to use his company documents and so I bought the bid documents and got the other documents required like certificate of incorporation, certificate to commence business, road contracting license, SSNIT clearance, GRA Tax clearance, fire audits and others. Accused by our arrangement allowed me to use his documents to secure the project. As the owner of the project, he was to make these available to me and he did so after which I paid him for allowing me to use those documents. Q. I put it to you that the contract was that of Yin Engineering Ltd and not yours when you refer to ‘I’ ‘I’ as if you are Yin Engineering A. I used the company Yin Engineering and won the contract. (Page 9 of the Record of Proceedings) In his analysis, the trial judge opined that to prove the Respondent was not the owner of the funds lodged into the account meant the Respondent was not the owner of the company that won the bid. The court reasoned that the funds were lodged into Yin Engineering & Trading Co. Ltd. account to which the Respondent was managing director and could draw monies from. Therefore no wrong had been committed. The court further stated that the Respondent reneging on the agreement to open a separate account into which the projects funds would be paid into was a case of a breach of trust and not stealing. (Please see page 7 of the ruling). The Court however finds from the record that this cannot be so. This is because PW2 testified that he contacted the Respondent for license to be used by PW1. Right from the 6 | P a ge day the Respondent was contacted by PW2, he was aware that PW2 needed his licence for his friend PW1 to bid for a contract. When asked during cross-examination PW2 said: Q. in your paragraph 3 you said you contacted him for his A3, B3 Certificate to bid for a contract A. Yes but I told him I needed it for a friend to bid for a contract Q. when you contacted him for the certificate what was his response A. He agreed to release the certificate because of our relationship (please see page 22 of the record of proceedings) PW1 in his cross-examination also said: Q. After you got to know the accused what communication went on between you two A. His brother who is my friend engaged him first and gave me his contact to call him thereafter Q. What specifically did you discuss? A. The substance of the discussion was to allow me use his document to bid for the contract and he said that his brother had earlier informed him about it. (Page 6 of the record of proceedings) PW1 and PW2 on the fact of engaging the Respondent for his license were never discredited during cross-examination. Counsel for the Respondent during trial did not refute the claims of PW 1 and PW2 that they contacted the Respondent for his licence to bid for the road contract. That is why counsel for the Respondent during cross- examination of PW1 asked the following: Q. Accused company could have bid for the contract in its own right. 7 | P a ge A. he could but did not, I did. (Page 19 of the Record of proceedings) As part of the arrangement, the parties agreed to execute a Power of Attorney to enable the complainant open a bank account to which the complainant was going to be the sole signatory. The Record of proceedings shows that PW1 testified that the Power of Attorney was indeed prepared but the Respondent failed to give him a copy (please see page 10 of the Record). Also, PW4, the Investigator revealed during cross-examination that he visited the High Court, Wa and was informed the Respondent used his letterhead to draft the Power of Attorney and left with it after endorsement. (Please see page 32 of the Record of Proceedings) This Court has seen the evidence of PW2 on an industry practice and as follows; Q. As a contractor if you use a company’s name to bid for a contract and win who owns the contract Is it the owner of the company or the owner who is not the owner of the company? A. As a contractor I may take a friend’s document to bid and if that company wins it is in the name of the company used to bid. But I need the friend to produce one with a power of attorney to enable me open an account in the same company name so that I will be a sole signatory to that project. This will enable me have access to the funds to finance the project. Q. You have said if the company submits a bid and it is successful, the contract will be awarded to the company A. The answer is yes but because I have taken your documents it goes to buy that the award will be made to the company meaning I who sought the documents will have to work on the project not the owner of the documents. (Please see page 22 of the Record of Proceedings) 8 | P a ge Juxtaposing the above explanation to the facts of this instant appeal, what this meant was that per industry practice, although the contract bore the name Yin Engineering & Trading Co. Ltd, the contract was owned by the Complainant as he procured the documents from the Respondent for such purpose and not the Respondent herein. Based on the above evidence, it is the opinion of this court that PW1 is the owner of the sum of GHS1,054,554.00 that was paid into the account of the Respondent’s company for the contract. The evidence of PW1 and PW4 confirms that being aware of this oral agreement, the respondent knew that he was not entitled to the sum of GHS1,054,554.40 but PW1 was. The evidence of PW1 which was corroborated by all witnesses called at the trial is that PW1 personally funded/ financed the project for which the sum of GHS1,054,554.40 was paid into the account of respondent’s company. The evidence on record further shows that the said sum only got in to the account of the accused person because he surreptitiously provided an account for receipt of the contract sum which he very well knew he was not entitled to. (Please see record of proceedings of 13th July, 2022 at page 11). The Court therefore finds that the trial judge erred when he held that the complainant was not the owner of the road contract and by extension owner of GHS 1,054,554.40 paid by the Ministry of Roads and Highways. The Court will now proceed to consider grounds 2 and 3 together. GROUND 2: THAT THE JUDGE MISDIRECTED HIMSELF ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY’ UNDER THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2020 (ACT 1044) WHEN HE HELD THAT STEALING DID NOT CONSTITUTE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY. GROUND 3: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE STRUCK OUT THE CHARGE OF MONEY LAUNDERING AS THOUGH IT WERE A CIVIL TRIAL 9 | P a ge The Respondent was charged with money laundering contrary to section 1(2)(a)(i) of the Anti-Money laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044). as follows: A person commits an offence of money laundering if the person knows or ought to have known that a property is, or forms part of, the proceeds of unlawful activity and the person (a) Converts, conceals, disguises or transfers the property for the purpose of (i) Concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property to evade the legal consequences of the unlawful activity. In defining what constituted unlawful activity, the learned trial judge relied on section 1(2) of the Anti- Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2014 (Act 874) and held that unlawful activity had been classified as any conduct which constituted serious offences, financing or terrorism, financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other organised crime which occurs in Ghana or elsewhere. This court agrees with the Appellant that Act 874 which the court relied on has been expressly repealed by Section 64(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044). Therefore, the provisions of Act 874 ceased to have any effect. Instead, the definition of unlawful activity which should have guided the court is under Section 63 of the Anti- Money Laundering Act 2020 (Act 1044) which states; ‘unlawful activity’ includes a. A serious offence; b. Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering; c. Terrorism and terrorist financing; d. Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; 10 | P a ge e. Sexual exploitation and sexual exploitation of children; f. Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; g. Illicit trafficking in arms; h. Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; i. Corruption and bribery; j. Fraud; k. Counterfeiting currency; l. Counterfeiting and piracy of products; m. Environmental crime; n. Murder, grievous bodily injury; o. Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; p. Robbery or theft; q. Smuggling; r. Tax offences; s. Extortion; t. Forgery; u. Piracy; v. Insider trading and market manipulation; w. Any other similar offence or related prohibited activity punishable with imprisonment for a period of not less that twelve months; 11 | P a ge x. Any activity that occurred in another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted an unlawful activity had it occurred in the Republic of Ghana; and y. A contravention of a law in relation to a matter referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) which occurs in the country or elsewhere From the above definition, this court is convinced that ‘stealing’ can be situated within the meaning of ‘unlawful activity’ under Act 1044. That said, under section 1(2)(a)(i) of the Anti-Money laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044), it was incumbent on the Appellant to prove the following elements: • that the respondent had in his possession money which was the proceed of unlawful activity; and that • the respondent converted, concealed, disguised or transferred the property for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property, to evade the legal consequence of the unlawful activity. In view of the above the Court finds that, having adduced evidence consistent with stealing at the trial, the charge of money laundering was not only premised on the mere transfer of funds from one account to the other, but also on the fact that the funds were proceeds of an unlawful activity i.e. stealing and further that there was a court order barring such transfer. The learned trial judge thus did err when he relied on repealed law and made a finding under same. In his ruling the learned trial judge struck out the charge of money laundering (page 25 of the ruling). The judge opined that prosecution led no evidence to substantiate the charge and furthermore that the particulars of the offence did not support the charge of money laundering. 12 | P a ge The Court however finds that the crux of the Appellant’s claim during trial was that the Respondent knew the amount of GHS1,054,554.40 did not belong to him but PW1. Thus when the Respondent surreptitiously took possession of the money, he intended to deprive the true owner, PW1, of use of same, satisfying the elements of the charge of stealing. To restrict the Respondent’s access to the funds, the Appellant herein on 19 January 2022 obtained an order from this Court freezing the account of the Respondent which contained the money. Despite this order, the Respondent again transferred part of the funds into his personal account lodged with Consolidated Bank in a bid to circumvent same. The Appellant through PW4 tendered the order of the court (Exhibit C) and the bank statement of the Respondent (Exhibit D). Although these documents are not on the Record of Appeal, same emanated from and/or have been put before this court. The court thus takes judicial notice of same under Section 9 of NRCD 323. These exhibits were tendered without objection and admitted in evidence. The Court notes from the record that throughout the trial, the Counsel for Respondent did not challenge these exhibits and facts during cross examination. The implication of his failure to cross-examine was explained by Benin J in TIDURI V THE REPUBLIC [1991] 1 GLR 209, Benin J at page 216 thus: ‘It must be pointed out that in giving evidence, witnesses talk only of major events they saw. Matters of minor details are spoken of by the witnesses depending on their personal disposition to those events. For there to be a conflict therefore, the witnesses must be subjected to cross- examination to accept or deny the fact sought to be impeached. If the first witness is not cross- examined on a particular point, the point is deemed to have been admitted by the party against whom it is led; hence, failure by the next witness to testify on the same point will not be construed as a conflict especially where this second witness was not given that chance to contradict or admit same in cross-examination.’ 13 | P a ge In spite of this evidence, the trial judge proceeded to strike out the charge of money laundering, a procedure unknown to the criminal jurisdiction of the trial court. The duty of the court was to make pronouncements on the charge after evidence had been tendered to prove the case of the Appellant rather and not to strike out the charge. The court thus erred when it struck out the charge on money laundering when same is not supported by law. GROUND 4: THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE MISDIRECTED HIMSELF WHEN HE HELD THAT PROSECUTION WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE THE RESPONDENT BY FALSE REPRESENTATION CAUSED HIS VICTIMS TO PART WITH ‘MONEY’ TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENCE OF DEFRAUDING BY FALSE PRETENSE At page 11 of the ruling, the trial judge held as follows: “Therefore, in the instant case, for prosecution to sustain conviction, it is its legal duty to call the requisite amount of evidence to establish that first of all, the accused person caused his victims who is the complainant to part with or transfer various sums of monies by means of certain representations made to him which he knew not to be true” On that score the trial judge ruled that the particulars of the offence was at variance with the ingredients of the offence and thus the elements of the offence were not proven. The offence of defrauding by false pretence is provided for under Section 131(1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). Under Section 132, a person defrauds by false pretences, if, by means of a false pretence, or by personation that person obtains the consent of another person to part with or transfer the ownership of a thing. The law does not restrict the definition to a victim parting with ‘money’. The section makes use of the term ‘thing’ and not money. Thus, the appellant need not prove that the complainant parted with money to prove a charge of defrauding. In ASIEDU V THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 1, the appellant was found guilty of defrauding by false pretence 14 | P a ge after he represented to another that he was an agent of another for the purpose of collecting clothing that his principal had ordered. Furthermore, it is provided under Section 123(1) (c) of Act 29 that the offence of defrauding can be committed in respect of a thing whether the value of the thing is intrinsic or for the purpose of evidence, or is of value only for a particular purpose or to a particular person. Section 123(2) of Act 29 further states that a document is of value whether it is complete or incomplete and whether or not it is satisfied, exhausted or cancelled. This goes to show that the law recognizes documents as things that could be the subject matter of a defrauding charge. The testimony of PW1 showed that as agreed between the parties for a separate bank account to be opened, the Respondent prepared a Power of Attorney but failed to give him a copy. This fact was corroborated by PW4 during cross-examination as follows: Q. I put it to you that there was no such contract A. there is a verbal agreement between them that led to the application for a Power of Attorney Q. How did you come by this information? A In the course of the investigation I visited the High Court to see if I could get a copy of the Power of Attorney but I was told accused used his letterhead to draft the document but only came for endorsement and the Court did not keep a copy so he took it away. I further asked the Accused and he was clear that there was a Power of Attorney but it was added to the contract documents. Accused went away promising to add other documents before bringing all to the complainant as sole signatory but he went and never returned. (Page 31-32 of ROP) Appellant submits that this Power of Attorney, a document, was valuable for the purpose of opening a separate bank account for the project and by extension valuable to the 15 | P a ge Complainant because it would have given him access to the project funds had he been able to create the account. Therefore, under Section 131(1), an offence of defrauding could lie since the Respondent under the guise of getting further documents obtained the consent of the complainant to part with the duly executed Power of Attorney. This conduct of the Respondent is consistent with his intent to defraud since he at all times material wanted to lay claim to the project funds and had no interest in providing the complainant with the means to open the bank account. GROUND 5: THE JUDGMENT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED HAVING RECOURSE TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD Appellant submits that the conclusions of the trial judge were not supported by evidence on record. Appellant has argued that prosecution witnesses established that there was an agreement for PW1 to use the license of the Respondent to bid for a road contract in Wa; It was also established that the Respondent agreed to the request; As a result, PW1 satisfied the preconditions for the use of said license being the payment of tax and other obligations. Appellant says that these facts were not refuted at trial. Appellant says that none of the witnesses testified on any interaction between the Respondent and the Complainant on how the project was going to be executed and this is because per industry practice, the contract was to be performed by the person who used the license to bid. Thus, although the contract still bore the name of the Respondent’s company, it was the complainant who was rightfully entitled to the money. Appellant says that the evidence is clear it was rather the Complainant who executed the contract. Thus the Respondent cannot hide under the cloak of being Managing Director of the Company to reap benefits he had not worked for. Appellant further invites the court to further consider how the money reached the account of the Respondent. The evidence showed that despite the agreement to execute 16 | P a ge a Power of Attorney to enable the Complainant open a separate bank account to which he was going to be the sole signatory, he held on to the said Power of Attorney and rather surreptitiously provided an account for the receipt of the contract sum. Once this was detected and a freezing order was obtained, the Respondent again moved the money into his personal account all to deprive the Complainant from accessing monies for the contract. Appellant further submits the conduct of the Respondent was nothing short of the offences with which he was charged and therefore he must be called upon to open his defense. This Court takes note of Counsel for Respondent’s submission on the separate legal entity principle. The Court is however guided by the decision in the case of Morkor v Kuma No 1 [1999-2000] 1GLR 721 wherein it was held that, ‘The corporate barrier between a company and the persons who constitute or run it may be breached only under certain circumstances. These circumstances may be generally characterised as those situations where, in the light of the evidence, the dictates of justice, public policy or Act 179 itself so require. It is impossible to formulate an exhaustive list of the circumstances that would justify the lifting of the corporate veil. However, the authorities indicate that such circumstances include where it is shown that the company was established to further fraudulent activities or to avoid contractual liability. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed), Vol 7(1), at para 90, it is stated as follows: “Notwithstanding the effect of a company’s incorporation, in some cases the court will ‘pierce the corporate veil’ in order to enable it to do justice by treating a particular company, for the purpose of the litigation before it, as identical with the person or persons who control it. This will be done not only where there is fraud or improper conduct, but in all cases where the character of the company, or the nature of the persons who control it, is a relevant feature. In such cases the court will go behind the mere status of the company as a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders, and will consider who are the persons, as shareholders or even as agents, directing and controlling the activities of the company.’ 17 | P a ge It is however this court’s view that in the light of the evidence adduced, the veil of incorporation is insufficient to cover the actions of the respondent, particularly where evidence of fraud has been adduced at trial. In view of the evidence adduced so far at the trial, and from the analysis above it is the opinion of this court that, the Appellant has established a prima facie case against the Respondent and he must be called upon to answer per Section 174 of the Criminal and Other Offences Procedure Act 1960 (Act 30) CONCLUSION The appeal against the ruling of the trial Circuit Court dated 20th February, 2023 succeeds. Trial to resume before the Circuit Court, Wa. JUSTICE YUSIF ASIBEY JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT COUNSEL Frances Acquaye – Assistant State Attorney for the Appellant Bennette A. Nakaar Esq. for Respondent 18 | P a ge