REPUBLIC VRS. AKWAMU TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX A KRUKRUWA II AND ANOTHERDJENA , PARTE: (D16/01/2023) [2024] GHAHC 497 (31 May 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD IN SOMANYA ON MONDAY THE 31ST DAY OF MAY, 2024, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE FREDERICK A.W.K. NAWURAH SUIT NO. D16/01/2023 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS AND IN THE MATTER OF THE REPUBLIC v. AKWAMU TRADITIONAL COUNCIL (RESPONDENT) EX PARTE: BOBBEY KINGSLEY TWUM ADJENA (APPLICANT) 1. NANA KYEI KRUKRUWA II 2. NANA OKORWAA ASIFROM III (INTERESTED PARTIES) JUDGMENT Before me is an application for judicial review in the nature of mandamus filed by one Bobbey Kingsley Twum Adjena, who claims to be Adjenahene (chief of Adjena) praying the Court to compel the Akwamu Traditional Council to, as he puts it: 1 1. Cause the Applicant to be formally introduced to the Akwamu Traditional Council as Adjenahene and as a member of the Council. 2. Facilitate and complete the necessary processes, to cause the name of the Applicant herein to be entered in the National Register of Chiefs. For ease of clarity, the proponent for judicial review shall be referred to as “the Applicant” whilst the other party shall be referred to as “the Respondent”. The Interested Parties, on the other hand, are those who stand directly to be affected by the Court’s orders, if any. Section 57(5) of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) provides as follows: “57. Definition of a chief 5) A person shall not be considered to be a chief for the performance of a function under this Act or any other enactment, unless that person has been registered for the performance of that function in the National Register of Chiefs and that person's name has been published in the Chieftaincy Bulletin.” This in effect means that no chief can perform any statutory function unless he has been registered in the National Register of Chiefs and at the same time has had his name gazetted in the Chieftaincy Bulletin. In the case of Republic v. Gbi Traditional Council; Ex Parte Abaka VII [1995-96] 1 GLR 702, Acquah, J. (as he then was) stated of the customary and statutory functions of a chief as follows: “…the functions of a chief are now divided into customary and statutory — a division which was known in the pre-colonial era. By this division the government does not bother and concern itself with the customary functions of a chief, which functions include pouring libation on the stool on important occasions, receiving customary homage and tribute from subjects, performing all religious duties incidental to chieftaincy, and serving as customary arbitrator or conciliator in inter-family 2 disputes. But for a chief to qualify to perform statutory functions, the said chief must be recognized by the government by a notice published in the Local Government Bulletin. The statutory functions connote functions set out in the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) and any other enactment. These statutory functions require a chief to take a seat at his traditional council or respective house of chiefs, and thereafter perform such function as, for example, a member of that house’s judicial committee, or represent that house on any committee which the house, is by law, required to serve as a member. Membership of a traditional council or a house of chiefs is thus a status symbol of any chief who is worth his salt.” It is obviously in pursuit of these goals that Bobbey Kingsley Twum Adjena, the Applicant herein, is praying for an order of mandamus to compel the Akwamu Traditional Council to take all necessary steps to ensure his name is added to the National Register of Chiefs. Succinctly put, the plaint of the Applicant, as can be gleaned from his affidavits in support of the application, his statement of case and the address of his Learned Counsel before Court, is that, sometime in the year 2015 the Judicial Committee of the Akwamu Traditional Council delivered a judgment in his favour and made consequential orders which included an order that the qualified principal traditional title holders of the Adjena stool should complete his installation processes to enable him ascend the vacant Oyoko Royal Stool as the Chief of Adjena. It is the case of the Applicant that he has since been sworn-in as Adjenahene in accordance with the customs and traditions of the people of Adjena. That he has also completed all processes as prescribed by the Respondent, including formally notifying the Respondent of his enstoolment, filing of his Chieftaincy Declaration Forms and payment of the requisite fees, but the Respondent has failed or refused to even dignify his application with a reply. That he even caused his lawyers to write on two separate occasions to the Respondent, first enquiring and subsequently reminding the Respondent, about his (Applicant’s) introduction to the Traditional Council but he has since not received any reply whatsoever. 3 The Applicant exhibited pictures of his installation, swearing and outdooring (Exhibit BKT8 series) and letters from his lawyers to the Respondent (Exhibits BKT 10, BKT 11 and BKT 12), amongst others, in proof of his assertions. It is the case of Counsel for the Applicant that the duty lies on the Respondent to organise a meeting setting the agenda for the Applicant to be introduced to the Traditional Council and for him to have the opportunity to complete the Chieftaincy Declaration Forms for his name to be entered in the National Register of Chiefs, but Respondent has tarried in carrying out that duty. Learned Counsel cites the cases of Republic v. Court of Appeal Ex-Parte Lands Commission, Interested Party Vanderpuye; and The Republic v. National House of Chiefs Ex-Parte Faibil III and Others [1984-1986] 731 as the authority for his proposition that mandamus will lie if the performance of a statutory duty is unreasonably delayed and bad faith shown by the conduct of the Respondent. The Respondent and the Interested Parties, per their affidavits in opposition to the application and their statements of case, maintain that the Applicant is seeking by the instant application to obtain a relief he is not entitled to. It is the case of the Respondent that the Judicial Committee of the Akwamu Traditional Council’s order that the qualified principal traditional title holders of the Adjena stool should complete the installation processes of the Applicant to enable him ascend the vacant Oyoko Royal Stool as the Chief of Adjena has not been complied with as same has not been reported back to the Traditional Council by the said principal traditional title holders of the stool. Even though the Respondent admits that the Applicant paid the requisite “introductory fees” and customary drinks to the Respondent’s Registry for the purposes of his introduction in accordance with custom and tradition, it is their case that it is not the Respondent’s duty to introduce the Applicant to itself, but that the Applicant must be introduced to the Respondent by qualified persons in accordance with the customs, practices and usages of the Akwamu Traditional Council. It is also the case of the 4 Respondent that, even if the said orders of the Judicial Committee had been complied with, it did not lie with the lawyer for the Applicant to inform the Respondent of that fact, as the proper persons to introduce a validly installed chief to the Traditional Council are the principal traditional title holders and the kingmakers of the stool. The Respondent finally maintains that the Applicant is by this instant application attempting to overreach the adjudication proceedings ongoing before the Akwamu Traditional Council and the Regional House of Chiefs relating to the same matter before this Court. The Respondent urges upon the Court the view that, as there are issues relating to the propriety and legitimacy of the Applicant's installation as the chief of Adjena which are pending and ongoing before the Akwamu Traditional Council and the Regional House of Chiefs, it will be contrary to natural justice for the Traditional Council to proceed to cause the Applicant's name to be entered in the National Register of chiefs. The interested Parties who are rival claimants to the Adjena stool, on their part, maintain in the main that that the Applicant has not been presented to the kingmakers of Adjena as validly nominated by the Queenmother for installation as a chief of Adjena and therefore he cannot hold himself out as the chief of Adjena. It is also their case that for someone to become validly elected and enstooled or installed as the chief of Adjena, the candidate so-nominated will first have to be presented to the Benkumhene who will assign his sub-chief to accompany the candidate to be presented to the Omanhene to swear the oath of allegiance to the Omanhene, but this time-honoured process for installation of the Adjena chief has not been followed by the Applicant and he therefore remains unknown to the Benkumhene and the Omanhene. The Interested Parties finally maintain that, contrary to the orders of the Judicial Committee of the Traditional Council, no attempt has been made to reconstitute members of the Oyoko Royal Family of Tafoman and Adjena as one family having one stool with common stool elders to complete the nomination process before going through selection or election of the Adjenahene, but rather, the Applicant, with the 5 support of the Queenmother, put together some non-indigenes and performed a so- called installation ceremony that did not include any member of the royal family, the kingmakers and titleholders. The Law: Section 16 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) confers on the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over “all lower courts and any lower adjudicating authority”, and mandamus is among the orders which the High Court may issue in exercise of that jurisdiction. It is issued in the form of an order from a superior court to a subordinate court, corporation or public authority or body, to do (or forbear from doing) some specific act which that body is obliged under law to do (or refrain from doing), and which is in the nature of a public duty. It is normally issued when an officer or an authority by compulsion of statute is required to perform a duty and that duty, despite demand in writing, has not been performed. The Applicant for mandamus must satisfy the Court that he has the legal right to the performance of the legal duty as distinct from mere discretion of authority. It is an equitable remedy and granting it is a matter for the discretion of the Court. The exercise of the discretion however follows well-settled principles. The other preconditions that need to exist before this application can be sought were stated in the case of In re Botwe & Mensah [1959] GLR 457 per Ollenu J (as he then was) as follows: i there must be a legal right to be enforced, the purpose of which cannot be enforced by any other legal remedy equally convenient, beneficial and appropriate; ii there must have been a distinct demand and refusal to do the act; iii the duty to be performed must be some public or quasi-public legal duty; and iv it must appear that the order would be effective. 6 For further authorities on this point, see Republic v. Chieftaincy Secretariat, Ex Parte Adanse Traditional Council (1968) GLR 736 and Republic v. The National House of Chiefs and Anor: Ex parte Osahene Katakyi Busumakura III (2006) JELR 64515 (CA). Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, 2001 Re-issue, Volume 1(1) states in paragraph 133, that: “… in modern times, the purpose of a mandatory order is to compel the performance of a public duty, whether of an inferior court or tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction, or that of an administrative body to fulfil the obligation cast upon it”. Ordinarily, Judicial Review claims are raised against decisions (or non-decisions) by public office holders or public bodies who derive their powers from statute or even the common law, in certain instances. Where the decision (or non-decision) by the public body relates to acts undertaken in pursuance of that body's statutory powers, the application for mandamus will be entertained if that act relates to the exercise (or non- exercise) of those powers further to that body's public law duties to the Applicant. In such cases, judicial review is available because the "source of power" test is satisfied. Here, the decision to act or refrain from acting, for that matter, is found to be directly linked to the carrying out of the legal duty the statute enjoins the body to perform and which duty ought to be to the benefit of the Applicant. From a reading of the authorities on judicial review, it is evident that mandamus is a writ directing the performance of obligations cast upon persons, public bodies and officers in the performance of public duties. When the source of a body’s power is a statute or subsidiary legislation, that body is usually amenable to judicial review as its duties are for the benefit of the public and not for private profit. Thus, if public officials or public bodies fail to perform any public duty with which they have been charged, a mandatory order may be made to compel them to carry it out. 7 It should also be noted that certain administrative duties are ministerial in nature and ministerial acts or duties are not insulated from the writ of mandamus. A ministerial act is one that a person or body is obliged by law to perform under given circumstances. If the law allows discretion in performance, the act is not ministerial. Indeed, in the case of Wilbur v. United States, 1929, 281 US, 206 (1930), the United States Supreme Court, per Justice Van Devanter, underscored as the chief use of mandamus, the compelling of the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty. The Court emphasized that “(w)here the duty in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command, it is regarded as being so far ministerial that its performance may be compelled by mandamus”. Also, in the case of State v. Ellis, 77 N.W. 2d 809 (1956) 163 Neb. 86, the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska explained that an official duty is a ministerial duty “when it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts”. In satisfaction of the first precondition, the question then is, is there a legal duty to be performed in the instant case? To answer this, the actual statute that gave rise to the duty complained of must be looked at in detail. Section 14(2) of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) succinctly spells out the relevant duties of the Respondent as regards reporting changes in the status of chiefs to the National House of Chiefs. It provides as follows: 14. Membership of Traditional Councils 2) As soon as practicable after a change occurs in the membership of a Traditional Council, the Council shall notify the Regional House which shall in turn notify the National House and, subject to subsection (3), the National House shall cause the Register to be altered accordingly. A careful reading of Chieftaincy Act, 2008, however, reveals that the framers did not state the intended remedy that could be claimed nor the process by means of which such a request or notice of enstoolment by a newly-enstooled or unregistered chief may 8 be made to the Traditional Council. Indeed, the law rather mandates, in clear simple terms, the Traditional Council to report such occurrence to the Regional House of Chiefs as soon as practicable. This clearly suggests that, barring any particular prerequisite customary procedures, it is the statutory duty of the Traditional Council to sou motu report such occurrences without prompt from the Applicant ostensibly for the purpose of keeping the National House and the gazette duly appraised of new developments in that sphere of national activity. Proceeding from the above, the second precondition that needs to be satisfied is that there ought to have been a demand and a coordinate refusal to act by the agency or body in question. It is a settled principle at common law that the occurrence of the event so described takes effect from the date of the communication of the refusal by the agency or body required to act on a demand. In the case of The Republic v. National House of Chiefs: Ex parte Odeneho A. Krukoko II (Osagyefo Kwamena Enimil VI, Interested Party) (No. 2) (2010) SCGLR 134, holding (4) of the headnote to that decision reads thus: “(4) ... Ordinarily, time within which to apply for mandamus should begin to run only after a demand to perform duty had been met with refusal. Where the demand made for the performance of the duty had been found to be premature, mandamus would not lie. And the mere fact of non-compliance with a duty would be sufficient ground for the award of mandamus, where the applicant had been substantially prejudiced by the respondent’s procrastination. On the facts of the instant case, the appellant had more than satisfied the demand and refusal criteria to maintain the application for mandamus. Indeed, the conduct of the respondent in delaying to comply with the demand of the appellant and failing to give a direct answer on the demand, was tantamount to a refusal. ...” Analysis: 9 From the facts of the instant case, this Applicant’s application to the Traditional Council and payment of the requisite “introductory fees” and customary drinks was made on the 7th of March, 2019. It is not clear precisely when the refusal to so act by the Respondent arose. What is obvious is the fact that the Respondent, after accepting the Applicant’s “introductory fees” and customary drinks, completely failed, for almost five years, to direct him as to the next line of action and completely ignored the letters from his lawyers regarding the issue of the Applicant’s introduction to the Traditional Council. It is a well-accepted principle of law that a refusal to act may be express or constructive as in a conduct. Thus, in the case of Ghana Railways Administration v. Ansah (1974) 1 GLR 47, where the Applicant had waited for a month for a response from the Attorney General for a fiat to be issued, Edusei J held thus: " .. .no execution could proceed against a statutory corporation under section 6A (1) of Act 232 as inserted by N.R.C.D. 120, s. 1 unless full steps had been taken to obtain the Attorney-General's fiat and the fiat had either been granted or refused. The fiat might be refused either expressly or by implication. Express refusal was where the Attorney General wrote to the applicant indicating that he had refused to issue the fiat, but where one month had passed and the Attorney-General had not issued the fiat or written to refuse it, as in the instant case, then it was presumed that he had impliedly refused it ... ". Since Section 14(2) of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008, enjoins prompt notice of the change in the status of a chief to the National House, in my opinion, three (3) months, at least, after due notice had been given and within which no reply was forthcoming is sufficient conduct to establish a refusal to act. I therefore find that there was a demand and a coordinate refusal to introduce the Applicant to the Traditional Council and, ipso facto, to transmit the notice of the Applicant’s status as a chief to the Regional House of Chiefs. 10 In the case of Republic v. Akuaku II; Ex parte Chayi II (1991) 2 GLR 163, the Court of Appeal described the responsibility of the President of the Traditional Council to forward the Chieftaincy Declaration Forms to the Regional House of Chiefs in Holding (1) of the headnotes as follows: “(1) the combined effect of sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) would seem to place on the respondent in his capacity as the president the duty of summoning members of the Ada Traditional Council (A.T.C.) to its meetings, and also notifying the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (G.A.R.H.C.) of any changes that might occur in the membership of the council. Accordingly, if the applicant was qualified to be a member of the A.T.C. it was the respondent who should set in motion the administrative procedures which would be gone through before the applicant could exercise his rights as such member. Consequently, if the applicant was without dispute duly installed as the chief and he also notified the respondent as the president of the A.T.C. of his installation as such chief of Wetsoyi of Tekperbiawe, who it was undisputed should be a member of the council, then it would be the duty of the council under the direction of its president to notify the G.A.R.H.C. of the applicant's installation in accordance with section 14(3) of Act 370. That duty was mandatory. Such a notification would set the machinery in motion to enable the National House of Chiefs amend the national register of chiefs and thus put the name of the applicant on it. Therefore if there was no dispute about the status of the applicant and the respondent had refused to set the machinery in motion, the applicant would, in those circumstances, be entitled to the court's assistance in the nature of an order of mandamus to enable him exercise his rights under Act 370.” The Court of appeal in the above case placed the responsibility to register the chief-elect on the President of the Traditional Council who has the duty to initiate the administrative process of registration by inviting the chief-elect to the Council meeting. In reality, however, the chief and his kingmakers often initiate the process of registration by obtaining the Chieftaincy Declaration Forms from the Traditional Council, 11 completing it and submitting same to the Council. The Council will then invite them to appear before the Traditional Council while it is in session and his kingmakers would present the chief-elect to the Traditional Council where he will be introduced to Council members at that session. See: Republic v Awuku; Ex parte Adiaku [1999-2000] 1 GLR 645, CA. After the Traditional Council has received and approved the Forms and their attachments, it will forward them to the Regional House of Chiefs accompanied by a covering letter and minutes of the first meeting of the Council with the chief-elect. Thus, once the Applicant returned his Chieftaincy Declaration Forms to the registry of the Traditional Council and paid the requisite introductory fees and customs, it was incumbent on the Respondent to facilitate his introduction to the Traditional Council by inviting him and his kingmakers to next session of the Council meeting where he would be introduced by his kingmakers to the Council. That was the purpose for which the Respondent charged him the “introductory fees” and customary drinks. It therefore does not lie in the Respondent’s mouth to say that the Council cannot on its own introduce and receive the chief. Quite obviously, the Respondent could not have expected the Applicant, after paying the necessary introductory fees and drinks, to call for or initiate such a meeting when he was not yet a member of the Council. Without creating the opportunity for the Applicant to be introduced by his kingmakers to the Council at its session, how would the Respondent have expected to confirm that the Applicant had been properly installed in accordance with proper custom and usages and by qualified persons? I therefore find it distasteful and rather untenable the arguments of the Respondent in their affidavit in opposition to the effect that they were not privy to the fact that the installation of the Applicant was done in accordance with all the customary practices and usages of the people of Adjena, or that they were not in a position to confirm that the people whom the Applicant claims to have installed him as chief were qualified persons and that the installation processes was complete. Such pedestrian attempts by the Respondent at justifying the failure or refusal to give audience to the Applicant, seen 12 in the light of the fact that the Respondent, after accepting the Applicant’s Chieftaincy Declaration Forms and his payment of the requisite fees and customs, completely ignored him and the letters from his lawyers for almost five years, smacks of a deliberate concerted effort to shirk their statutory duties towards him for reasons only known to them. The Respondent however argues amongst other things that there are issues relating to the propriety and legitimacy of the Applicant's installation as the chief of Adjena which are pending and ongoing before the Akwamu Traditional Council and the Regional House of Chiefs, and thus it will be contrary to natural justice for the Traditional Council to proceed to cause the Applicant's name to be entered in the National Register of chiefs. It is a well-established legal principle that mandamus is a discretionary remedy and a Court has the power to choose whether or not to grant it. The Court may decide not to grant mandamus if it finds that there was a valid reason for the public body's failure to act, even if they had a duty to do so. In other words, the Court has the discretion to deny mandamus if it determines that the public body's refusal to act was justified or reasonable. In Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General, Ex parte Dizengoff (W.A.) Ltd. (1974) 1 GLR 337, the Court at page 345 of the report held that, even if it is found that the public body had a statutory duty to perform, an application for mandamus can be refused if the public body had good cause for refusing to perform that duty. Again in Republic v. National House of Chiefs: Ex Parte Faibil III and Others [1984-86] 2 GLR 731 C.A., the Court of Appeal, per Edward Wiredu, JA. (as he then was), discussed the effect of a legal impediment on the statutory right of a chief to have his name registered as follows: "Where a person has already been enstooled as a Chief, he had a statutory right to have his name registered in the National House of Chiefs Register, unless there was some demonstrable legal impediment against its non-registration.” 13 [Emphasis mine] In Republic v. National House of Chiefs, Kumasi and Another, Ex parte Kusi-Apea (1984-86) 2 GLR 90 C.A., the Appellant had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the National House of Chiefs to add his name to the Register of Chiefs despite the fact that his status as a chief was still in question. The Court's judgment, specifically holding (4), stated inter alia that: “A recourse to mandamus when the appellant's status was so dubious and had not been judicially settled or statutorily recognised was a clearly misconceived strategy and the High Court was therefore right in refusing the remedy of an order of mandamus which was a discretionary remedy given when an applicant's entitlement was unquestionable and the only way in the circumstance of doing justice to him.” See also: Republic v. Gbi Traditional Council; Ex parte Abaka VII (1995-96) 1 GLR 702; The Republic v. National House of Chiefs, Kumasi, Ex parte Nii Larbie Mensah IV and Others (2011) JELR 106949 (SC); In re Oguaa Paramount Stool; Garbrah v. Central Regional House of Chiefs [2005-2006] SCGLR 193. From the foregoing, it is obvious that even though section 14 (3) of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 mandates the Traditional Council to take the requisite steps as soon as practicable to cause the name of a new chief to be registered in the Register of Chiefs, the Council may refuse to do so where there is a demonstrable legal impediment to such process. The question therefore is: what is the demonstrable legal impediment that the Respondent relies on for their refusal to cause the Chieftaincy Declaration Forms of the Applicant to be forwarded to the Regional House of Chiefs for registration as mandated by law? In their attempt to convince the Court of the fact of a demonstrable legal impediment, the Respondent exhibited a photocopy of a response to a search at the Respondent’s 14 registry, dated 8th August, 2018, as to the legitimacy of the Applicant as Adjenahene. They also exhibited a copy of a letter dated 14th January, 2019, from certain persons to the Applicant requesting him to desist from presenting himself as chief of Adjena. Both of these documents were authored before the Applicant submitted his Chieftaincy Declaration Forms to the Respondent’s registry on the 7th of March, 2019, yet the Respondent nevertheless accepted the Applicant’s Chieftaincy Declaration Forms as well as the “introductory fees” of the chief-elect and the customary drinks. In any case, these two documents were in no way a challenge to the legitimacy of the installation of the Applicant before the Judicial Committee of the Traditional Council such as to occasion a refusal to facilitate his introduction to the Council or to forward his name to the National House of Chiefs for registration in the National Register of Chiefs. Counsel for the Respondent, in his statement of case, also claims that before the letters from the Applicant’s lawyers could be addressed the Applicant instituted an action before the Judicial Committee of the Traditional Council against certain persons who were claiming to be qualified persons to install a chief in Adjena. He mentions the case in point as Nana Twum Barimah III & 1 Other v. Kwaku Asare & 4 Others. If such were the case, the Respondent may well have had a good cause for their refusal to forward the Applicant’s name to the National House of Chiefs, pending the resolution of that petition. It may have also been a legitimate defence to a mandamus application. The Respondent, however, completely failed to exhibit any document in proof of same. The Court is thus deprived of any information as to the veracity of this claim or the exact nature and date of the said case. The Interested Parties, on their part, per paragraph 6 of their affidavit in opposition, maintain among other things that the Applicant has not been presented to the kingmakers as validly nominated by the Queenmother for installation as chief of Adjena. They also state in paragraphs 10 and 18 of their affidavit in opposition that the stool elders are yet to complete the nomination process before going through the selection or election. 15 What is clear from the record, however, is the fact that, per the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Akwamu Traditional Council which gave rise to this whole brouhaha, the Committee ordered that the qualified principal traditional title holders of stool should complete the installation processes of the Applicant herein (2nd Defendant therein) to ascend the vacant Oyoko Royal Stool as the Chief of Adjena. The Committee stated at page 8 of their judgment thus: “We finally order that, members of the Oyoko Royal family of Tafoman and Adjena should reconstitute themselves as one family having one stool with common stool elders and kingmakers. Thereafter, the qualified principal traditional title holders of stool should complete the installation processes of the 2nd defendant herein, Brobbey Kingsley Twum to ascend the vacant Oyoko Royal Stool as the Chief of Adjena to fill the vacant position created by the abdication of Nana Appiah Barima II on 10th December 2011”. So obviously, the issue of the rightful stool occupant is not undetermined. The Committee categorically stated that the eligible candidate is the Applicant herein whose installation process was to be completed by the stool elders and kingmakers. I therefore find the Interested Parties’ claims rather untenable and a veiled attempt at disregarding the judgment of the Judicial Committee and raising challenge to the very nomination of the Applicant as Chief of Adjena. In this regard, note must be taken of the fact that these Interested Parties were rival claimants to the Oyoko Royal Stool of Adjena and had fought relentlessly with the Applicant herein over the Adjena stool even beyond the decision of the Judicial Committee. The Interested Parties also claim that the Applicant must first be presented to the Benkumhene and subsequently made to swear the oath of allegiance to the Omanhene before he can be considered as validly installed as chief of Adjena. This assertion, in my candid opinion, appears to be an attempt to stretch the orders of the Judicial Committee 16 beyond acceptable bounds so as to frustrate the processes of installing the Applicant as chief of Adjena. The law is that, once a person had been appointed a chief by his people, he is entitled to have his name entered in the National Register of Chiefs and the failure to swear the oath of allegiance to the paramount chief could not affect the validity of the position of the person as a chief. See the case of Republic v. Volta Regional House of Chiefs; Ex parte Kanya ll (1975) 1 GLR 448. Thus, once the Applicant has been nominated, elected, and installed as a chief according to customary practices, there are no further conditions or requirements that need to be met before submitting their name to the National House of Chiefs for registration in the National Register of Chiefs In my respectful opinion, in the face of compelling evidence that the Applicant has been nominated by the Queenmother and duly installed as the chief of Adjena, the mere assertion that there is a challenge to the validity of the Applicant’s nomination and installation, without more, particularly when the alleged challenge to his installation has not been substantiated in any form or manner, is not enough to constitute a demonstrable legal impediment in the way of his introduction to the Traditional Council and the registration of his name in the Register of Chiefs. The fact that the Applicant has not been made to swear the oath of allegiance to the Omanhene is not a bar to the validity of his installation. I hold that it is incumbent on the Respondent to facilitate the introduction of the Applicant as chief-elect to Traditional Council by inviting the Applicant and his kingmakers to the session of the Council where he may be introduced to Council members at session by his kingmakers. 17 In the light of the foregoing, the application for judicial review by way of mandamus is allowed. The Respondent is hereby ordered to immediately facilitate the formal introduction of the Applicant to the Akwamu Traditional Council, and to take steps to forward the Chieftaincy Declaration Forms of the Applicant to the Regional House of Chiefs. I award costs of ten thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵10,000.00) to the Applicant against the Respondent. (SGD.) H/L JUSTICE FREDERICK A.W.K. NAWURAH. (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) COUNSEL: ▪ Joan Akorfa Osei Esq. for the Applicant ▪ Nana Ama Asase Esq. for the Respondent ▪ Frank Nkansah Esq. for the Interested Parties 18