Republic vrs Ayi (D7/03/2024) [2024] GHACC 425 (16 December 2024)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT ‘5’ HELD IN ACCRA ON MONDAY THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024 BEFORE HER HONOUR MRS. CHRISTINA CANN CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE SUIT NO: D7/03/2024 THE REPUBLIC VRS PRISCILLA AYI JUDGMENT FACTS “Complainant Adelaide Afe-Agoda is a Hair Beautician while Accused Person, Priscilla Ayi is a Shoe Maker and both reside at Shukura and Korle-Bu respectively. On 02/09/23 at about 10:00 p.m., the complainant visited her boyfriend at Town Counsel Line. While the two were indoors, accused person suddenly barged into the room and without any form of provocation, started insulting the complainant and her boyfriend. The complainant began walking out of the room quietly. Accused person followed her with the insults and then threatened her with words to wit: “I will surely stab you with a pair of scissors anywhere I meet you, I will come to your shop and stab you.” The complainant left the scene and reported the case to the Shukura Police. Accused then went into hiding but the Police called her on phone and invited her to report at the said Police station. Accused person told the police officer who made the call that she will never comply. On 04/09/23 at about 8:00 a.m., accused person concealed a shoe maker’s pair of scissors in her dress and attacked the complainant at her shop at Tesano. Accused person stabbed the forehead of the complainant with the said tool and also inflicted wounds on her left middle ring and little fingers with the same tool. The complainant shouted for help and she was rescued by a passer-by. The said pair of scissors was dispossessed from the accused person and handed over to the Police as an exhibit. Accused person was later arrested and she admitted the offences in her investigation caution statement. After 1 investigations, accused person was charged with the offences and arraigned before this honourable court.” It is based on the above facts as recounted by the prosecution that the accused person, Priscilla Ayi was arraigned before this court on the 6th of December, 2023 and charged with two (2) offences namely: i. Threat of harm contrary to section 74 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). ii. Causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). THE CHARGES The statements and the particulars of the charges that were preferred against the accused person read as follows: “COUNT ONE STATEMENT OF OFFENCE Threat of Harm contrary to section 74 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE Priscilla Ayi, aged 31, Shoe Maker: For that you on 31/08/2023 at about 10:00 p.m. at “Town Council Line in the Greater Accra Region and within the jurisdiction of this court, you threatened one Adelaide Afe-Agoda with words to wit: “I will surely stab you with a pair of scissors anywhere I meet you, I will come to your shop and stab you” with intent to put the said Adelaide Afe-Agoda into fear of harm. “COUNT TWO STATEMENT OF OFFENCE Causing harm: contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act 1960 (Act 29). PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE 2 Priscilla Ayi, aged 31, Shoe Maker: For that you on 04/09/2023 at about 6:50 p.m. at Tesano in the Greater Accra Region and within the jurisdiction of this court, you intentionally and unlawfully caused harm to one Adelaide Afe-Agoda by stabbing her forehead with shoe maker’s pair of scissors and also inflicted wounds on three of her left fingers with the same tool.” THE PLEA It is instructive to note that the legally represented accused person pleaded guilty simpliciter to count one which is threat of harm contrary to section 74 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and she was convicted according. However, the accused person pleaded not guilty to the charge of causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). Therefore, the prosecution assumed the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person in respect of the second count, that is causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). BURDEN ON THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENCE Before I proceed to evaluate the evidence led in this case, I will endeavour to set out the burden that the prosecution bears in this trial. In our criminal jurisprudence, it has always been the duty and obligation of the prosecution, from the outset of the trial, to prove and substantiate the charge levelled against the accused person to the satisfaction of the Court unless in a few exceptions. Under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), the burden of proof is divided into two parts: burden of persuasion or the legal burden and the evidential burden or the burden to produce evidence. The burden of persuasion is provided for under Section 10 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) as follows: “10 (1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court”. 3 The burden of producing evidence is also provided under section 11(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) thus: “11 (1). For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him in the issue”. Again, in criminal proceedings, what constitutes the facts in issue depends on any relevant presumption and the allegation involved. In the present case for example where the accused is charged with causing harm, the allegation may be that the accused intentionally and unlawfully caused harm to the complainant. The ingredients of such charge are that, the accused person caused harm to the complainant, that the harm was caused to the complainant intentionally and the harm caused to the complainant was also unlawful. Since the prosecution is asserting these facts constituting the ingredients of the offence, it is incumbent on it to establish that belief of the accused person’s guilt in the mind of this Court to the requisite degree prescribed by law. In other words, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion to establish the guilt of the accused person. When the prosecution had adduced the evidence to establish the essential ingredients which will cumulatively prove the guilt of the accused of the charge of causing harm preferred against her, the court at the end of the case of the prosecution will have to decide whether the prosecution has discharged the obligation on it to establish the requisite degree of belief in the mind of the court that the accused in fact and indeed is guilty of causing harm. Except in few instances, the measuring rod or the standard of proof for determining that the evidence adduced by the prosecution has attained the requisite degree is provided under sections 10 (2) and 22 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 232). Sections 10 (2) and 22 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provide as follows: 4 “10 (2). The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establishes the existence or non-existence of a fact by the preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond reasonable doubt”. “22. In a criminal action a presumption operates against the accused as to a fact which is essential to guilt only if the existence of the basic facts that give rise to the presumption are found or otherwise established beyond a reasonable doubt, and thereupon, in the case of a rebuttable presumption, the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact”. If this Court decides that the prosecution has failed to prove each essential ingredient of the offence of causing harm beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the prosecution’s case, the accused will have to be acquitted for she will be deemed to have “no case to answer”. But if this Court decides that each essential ingredient has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, then the accused will have to be called upon to put up her defence, because there will be an established presumption of guilt (a prima facie case) which she must rebut, if she does not want the presumption to stay, thus rendering her liable for a conviction. To use the language of section 11 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), the accused will have on her the burden of introducing sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against her that she is guilty of the offence charged. In other words, she has the burden of producing evidence. The apex court in the case of Asante No (1) vrs The Republic [2017-2020] I SCGLR 143-144 explained the burden on the prosecution as follows: “Our law is that when a person is charged with a criminal offence it shall be the duty of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, meaning the prosecution has the burden to lead sufficient admissible evidence such that on an assessment of the totality of the evidence adduced in court, including that led by the accused person, the court would believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed and that it is the accused who committed it. Apart from specific cases of strict liability offences, the general rule is that 5 throughout a criminal trial the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person remains with the prosecution. Therefore, though the accused person may testify and call witnesses to explain his side of the case where at the close of the case of the prosecution a prima facie case is made against him, he is generally not required by the law to prove anything. He is only to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the commission of the offence and his complicity in it except where he relies on a statutory or special defence. See Sections 11(2) 13(1), 15(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) and COP v Antwi [1961] GLR 408.” However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt as was stated by Lord Denning in the case of Miller vs. Minister of Pensions (1974) 2 ALL ER 372 AT 373 thus: “It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice.” This dictum emphasizes that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every shadow of doubt or proof beyond every possibility. Lord Justice of the King’s Bench from 1822-1841, Charles Kendal Bushe also explained reasonable doubt thus: “…the doubt must not be light or capricious, such as timidity or passion prompts, and weakness or corruption readily adopts. It must be such a doubt as upon a calm view of all the whole evidence a rational understanding will suggest to an honest heart the conscientious hesitation of minds that are not influenced by party; preoccupied by prejudice or subdued by fear.” See also: Osei vs. The Republic [2002] 24 MLRG 203, CA. Abodakpi vs. The Republic [2008]2 GMJ33. 6 Republic vs. Uyanwune [2001-2002] SCGLR 854. Dexter Johnson vs. The Republic [2011] 2 SCGLR 601. Frimpong A.K.A. Iboman vs. Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297. The guilt of the accused person is sufficiently proved if the tribunal of fact is convinced that she committed the offence though there remains a lingering possibility that she is not guilty. The above is the general law on burden of proof on the prosecution as provided for in the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). When the prosecution has established a prima facie case against the accused person, the accused person assumes the burden of producing evidence. This burden as indicated is different from the burden of proving the issue, which is on the prosecution. The difference between the burden on the prosecution and the burden on the accused is mainly in the standard of proof. Whereas the prosecution has to prove the essentials of the crime to a standard beyond reasonable doubt, the accused only has the burden of adducing evidence to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court regarding the prosecution’s case which is deemed prima facie to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Once this doubt had been created, the accused will be considered as having discharged his burden of producing evidence to the appropriate standard of proof. Having established the requisite burden that the prosecution ought to discharge and the burden on the accused person, it is very important to note that one fundamental legal principle pertaining to criminal trials in our jurisdiction as contained in Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution is that: “19 (2) A person charged with a criminal offence shall- (c) be presumed to be innocent until he is proven or has pleaded guilty.” 7 The Supreme Court also held on the presumption of innocence in the case of Okeke vs The Republic (2012) 2 SCGLR 1105 at 1122 per Akuffo JSC as follows: “…the citizen too is entitled to protection against the state and our law is that a person accused of a crime is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt as distinct from fanciful doubt.’’ An accused person therefore in a criminal trial or action, is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. Again, it must be emphasized that the proof by the prosecution can be direct or indirect. It is direct when the accused person is caught in the act or has confessed to the commission of the crime. Thus, where an accused was not seen committing the offence, her guilt can still be proved by inference from surrounding circumstances that indeed the accused committed the said offence. See: Logan vs Lavericke [2007-2008] SCGLR 76 Head note 4. Dexter Johnson vs The Republic [2011] 2 SCGLR 601 AT 605. State vs Anani Fiadzo (1961) GLR 416 SC. Kamil vs The Republic (2010) 30 GMJ 1 CA. Tamakloe vs The Republic (2000) SCGLR 1 SC. Bosso vs. The Republic (2009) SCGLR 470. ANALYSIS OF THE OFFENCE OF CAUSING HARM Under section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29): “A person who intentionally and unlawfully causes harm to any other person commits a second degree.” 8 Part 1 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 Act 29 also defines harm as follows: “harm” means a bodily hurt, disease, or disorder whether permanent or temporary; To succeed in their case, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt each of the following three (3) essential elements: 1. That the accused person caused harm to PW2. 2. That the harm caused to PW2 was intentional. 3. That the harm caused to PW2 was unlawful. See: Brobbey & Ors v The Republic [1982-83] GLR 608. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGE OF CAUSING HARM The prosecution in its bid to discharge the burden placed upon it called two (2) witnesses. The case for the prosecution was presented mainly by Adelaide Afi- Agoda the complainant and the victim in this case as the second prosecution witness (PW2) and supported largely by Detective Inspector Simon Anaatakang stationed at the Shukura Police Station who investigated the case as the first prosecution witness (PW1). The prosecution also tendered in evidence various exhibits namely: the cautioned statement of the accused person as Exhibit “A”, the charged statement of the accused person as Exhibit “B”, photographs of the injuries sustained by the complainant as Exhibits “C”, “C1” “”C2” and “C3”, medical report on the complainant as Exhibit “D”, photograph of the scissors used in causing the harm as Exhibit “E”, photograph of the complainant’s blood stained white shirt as Exhibit “F” and statement given by the complainant to the police on the 4th September, 2023 as Exhibit “G” respectively. The accused person also testified under oath but neither did she call any witness nor tender in evidence any exhibit. 9 At this juncture, I will deal with the issue of whether or not the accused person caused harm to PW2. It is the evidence of PW2 that on the 31st day of August 2023 at about 10:00 p.m., she was with her boyfriend in his room at Town Council Line- Shukura when the accused person suddenly entered the room looking very agitated. According to PW2, without any provocation, the accused person started using abusive words and threats to wit: “I will surly stab you with a pair of scissors anywhere I meet you, I will come to your shop and stab you.” However, she (PW2) did not utter a word. Therefore the accused person left and she proceeded to lodge a formal complaint with the Shukura Police and the Police subsequently reached out to the accused inviting her for interrogation but the accused person told the police that she was not going to honour their invitation. It is further the evidence of PW2 that on the 4th September, 2023 at about 8:00 a.m., the accused person disguised herself in a facemask, concealed a pair of scissors in her dress and purported to be her friend and looking for her. The accused person was directed to her workplace and she came and attacked her with a pair of scissors and stabbed her severally on the forehead and also inflicted wounds on her left middle and ring finger and mouth. She shouted for help and she was rescued by passers-by who dispossessed the accused person of the pair of scissors. PW2 stated further that with blood oozing all over her body, she rushed to the Police station and lodged a complaint and she was issued with a police medical form to seek medical assistance. The first prosecution witness (PW1) was Detective Inspector Simon Anaatakang stationed at Shukura Police station. It is his evidence that on the 2nd of September, 2023, PW2 in the company of two others, called at the station and reported that on the 31st August, 2023 at about 10:00 p.m., the accused person came to her house and threatened her and the case was referred to him for investigations. On the 4th September 2023, at about 6: 50 p.m., PW2 came to the Police station and further reported that the accused person who earlier on threatened her came to her workplace, armed with a pair of scissors, stabbed her severally on the left finger, 10 forehead and the mouth. He issued a police medical form to PW2 to seek medical attention and PW2 returned the medical form fully endorsed. On the same day 4th September 2023, PW2 was called to report at the police station. She complied and a statement was obtained from her. All attempts to get the accused person including a phone call to her workplace proved futile. On the 6th September 2023 at about 4:30 p.m., one Mr. Brako who was also the accused person’s boss, brought the accused person and handed her over to the Police. Accused person was subsequently re- arrested and investigation cautioned statement was obtained from her and she was detained for further interrogation. His investigations revealed that the accused person is the “baby mama” of PW2’s boyfriend but they are no longer together. And that anytime the accused person hears or sees PW2 around her former boyfriend she becomes agitated and issues threatening words like: “I will stab you with a pair of scissors anywhere I meet you.” His investigations further revealed that the accused person true to her words carried out the threat ferociously without care and fear of the consequences. After investigations, the accused person was formally charged with the offences as stated on the charge sheet and a charged statement was obtained from her. In this case, after the court had ruled that, a prima facie case has been made against the accused person, she exercised her option to open her defence. Indeed, the accused person had the burden of producing evidence, sufficient enough in the light of the totality of the evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether she was the one who intentionally and unlawfully caused harm to PW2 on the 4th September, 2023. See: sections 10 (1), 11 (2) and 3 of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323. See also: Ali Yusif (No.2) v The Republic [2003-2004] SCGLR 174 holding (2). It is the defence of the accused person that on the day in question, she went to her husband’s place at Town Council, Latebiokorshie and she asked PW2 what she was 11 doing there. According to the accused person, her husband had already told her that PW2 was his ex-girlfriend. In the process of enquiring from PW2 her mission at her husband’s house, a misunderstanding ensued between them and PW2 left. She was at home when her husband called her to come to the Shukura Police station and that she was needed there. When her husband told her that the police were looking her, she did not believe him and she asked him that if the police were indeed looking for her why didn’t they call her. After sometime, she went to PW2’s place of work with a pair of scissors and during a struggle, PW2 got injured. The prosecution in its bid to prove that the accused person caused harm to PW2 tendered in evidence as Exhibit “D”, the medical report of PW2. The relevant portions of the medical report, Exhibit ‘D’, read as follows: “HPC: Patient reported to the hospital in a white shirt with blood stains was stabbed on the head with a scissor by a lady who accused her of dating her baby’s dad. Patient alleges that in an attempt to prevent the said attack on the face, the scissors injured 2 of her fingers… Status localis: Has abrasions on the forehead, lip and 3 of the left fingers, currently not bleeding. 1.- Abrasions 2. Alleged physical assault Plan 1. Managed according.” With regard to proof of first element which is whether or not the accused person caused harm to PW2, the evidence on this point is so overwhelming. In the opinion of this court, the evidence of PW2 that the accused person caused harm to her was materially corroborated by Exhibit “D”, authored by Dr. Jeny Mawuli who examined PW2 and made an impression of abrasions on the forehead, lip and three fingers of PW2. 12 The fact that PW2 presented at the hospital with a white shirt stained with blood and abrasions on the forehead, lip and three fingers confirms that a bodily injury had been caused. The effect of this is that harm has been caused to PW2 and that is not in doubt. The prosecution also in its bid to prove that the accused person caused harm to PW2 also tendered in evidence as Exhibits “C”, “C1” “C2” and “C3” photographs of cuts on PW2’s three fingers, blood oozing from PW2’s lip and forehead which confirm that indeed, harm has been caused to PW2 and which also by themselves beyond reasonable doubt discharged the burden of proof required from the prosecution. The totality of the evidence adduced by prosecution witnesses and the defence at this trial together with Exhibits C”, “C1” “C2”, “C3, ‘D’, and “F” point to one and only one fact that harm has been caused to PW2. This court is therefore convinced that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the 4th September, 2023 the accused person caused harm to PW2 by cutting her forehead and three fingers with a pair of scissors. I will now examine the issue of whether or not the accused person intentionally caused harm to PW2. The accused person alleged that whilst at PW2’s workplace holding a pair of scissors, a struggle ensued between them and in the process PW2 got injured, meaning that she did not intentionally cause harm to PW2. I am further enjoined by holding (3) in the case of Lutterodt v the Commissioner of Police [1964] 2 GLR 429 SC at 480 to examine the defence of the accused person as follows: “Where the determination of a case depends upon facts and the court forms the opinion that a prima facie case has been made, the court should proceed to examine the case for the defence in three stages: 13 (1) Firstly, it should consider whether the explanation of the defence is acceptable, if it is, that provides complete answer, and the court should acquit the defendant; (2) If the court should find itself unable to accept, or if it should consider the explanation to be not true, it should then proceed to consider whether the explanation is nevertheless reasonably probable, if it should find it to be, the court should acquit the defendant; and (3) Finally, quite apart from the defendant's explanation or the defence taken by itself, the court should consider the defence such as it is together with the whole case, i.e., prosecution and defence together, and be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt before it should convict, if not, it should acquit.” The learned author P.K. Twumasi in his book Criminal Law in Ghana at page 77 stated: “The general principle of our law is that intention, like many other states of mind, is incapable of direct proof; it is always inferred from proven facts. This is a principle of English common law which has been accepted as an important principle of our criminal law.” In analyzing this second issue, I will point out some contradictions between the accused person’s evidence-in-chief, cautioned statement (Exhibit “A)” given to the police on the 5th September, 2023 that is a day after the incident when the matter was fresh in her mind and answers given under cross-examination. First, the accused person in Exhibit “A” admitted that on the 4th September, 2023 she went to PW2’s workplace at Tesano and used the scissors to cut her body but she does not know which part of PW2’s body she used the scissors to cut. She admitted further that she saw PW2 bleeding and some of her blood even stained part of her left hand after which a struggle ensued between herself and PW2 which led to some men rescuing PW2. Interestingly in her evidence-in-chief, she sought to create the impression that a struggle ensued between them and the scissors she was holding 14 injured PW2 and further denied causing harm to PW2 and seeing blood oozing from PW2’s face whilst answering questions. Excerpts from Exhibit “A” are as follows: “ … ON 04/09/2023, I TOOK BIG SCISSORS AND WENT TO HER WORKPLACE AT TESANO TO HER SHOP AND USED THE SCISSORS ON HER BODY BUT I DID NOT KNOW WHICH PART OF HER BODY I USED THE SCISSORS ON. “I SAW HER BLEEDING AND SOME OF HER BLOOD STAINS ON MY PART OF MY LEFT HAND I ONLY USED THE SCISSORS AND AFTER THAT, THERE WAS A STRUGGLE AND SOME MEN CAME TO RESCUE THE COMPLAINANT.” The accused person in her evidence-in-chief stated in part: “After that, sometime later, I went to the complainant’s place of work and there I was holding a scissors and during a struggle the complainant got injured.” The following dialogue ensued between the prosecutor and the accused person: “Q. I put it to you that you carried the pair of scissors to the complainant’s workplace only to enable you carry out your threat of harm? A. No my lord. Q. In Exhibit “A”, that is your cautioned statement you gave to the police, you stated that on the 4th September 2023, you took a big scissors and went to the complainant’s workplace at Tesano and used it on her body but you did not know which part of her body you used the scissors on. That you saw the complainant bleeding and some of the blood stained your left hand. And that you only used the scissors and after that there was a struggle and some two men came to rescue the complainant? A. No my lord. Q. Are you by this answer suggesting that you did not use the scissors to cause harm to the complainant? A. No my lord. Q. And by your answer, you did not see blood oozing all over the complainant’s body? A. No my lord. 15 Q. I put it to you that you had the intention of causing harm to the complainant by going to her workplace and you succeeded in carrying it out? A. No my lord. Q. And all these are evidence in your Cautioned Statement (Exhibit “A”) before this court? A. No my lord. Q. And that you gave this Exhibit “A” when the matter was fresh in your mind? I put it to you? A. No my lord.” It is obvious from the above dialogue that the accused person has contradicted her sworn evidence as against her unsworn statement in Exhibit “A” and the law is that, where a case boils down to facts and credibility of witnesses, if the court takes the view that one side or the other is the truth then the accounts are mutually exclusive of each other. Once the court decides to believe with one side of the story it means the other side is a fabrication. See: Ansah-Sasraku v. The State (1966) GLR 294 at 298 SC. In the case of Kuo Den alias Sobti vrs The Republic (1989-90) GLR 203 at 213 it was held by the Supreme Court that material inconsistencies in defence put up by the accused person have been held to provide sufficient justification for the defence to be rejected. The law is also that a witness whose evidence on oath was contradictory of a previous statement made but him, whether sworn or unsworn was not worthy of credit unless he gave a reasonable explanation. See: section 76 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). Yaro vrs The Republic [1979] GLR 10 where it was stated by the court thus: 16 “A previous statement which was in distinct conflict with the evidence on oath was always admissible to discredit or contradict him and it would be presumed that the evidence on oath was false unless he gave a satisfactory explanation of his prior inconsistent statement. A witness could not avoid the effect of a prior inconsistent statement by the simple expedient of denial.” See: Bour v The Republic [1965] GLR 1 SC. Gyabaah vrs The Republic [1984-86] 2 GLR 461 CA. State vrs Otchere (supra). In the case of Poku vrs The State [1966] GLR 262, the Supreme Court stated that: “The principle in the must cited case R v Harris [1927] 20 Cr. App. R, 144, is strict but not absolute. In this country it would expose the administration of criminal justice to ridicule if the testimony of the witness on oath were rejected outright because he is alleged to have made a previous unsworn statement which is in conflict with his evidence without carefully considering his account of the circumstances under which any such statement was made.” The court stated further that: “Since the witness in this case was not cross examined by the prosecution to explain why the two statements differed, his sworn statement should not have been ignored, but should have been accepted.” It is instructive to note that the accused person was cross-examined on the contradictions between her evidence-in-chief, answer given under cross-examination and caution statement (Exhibit “A”) yet, she could not give this court any satisfactory explanation. In one breath, she went to PW2’s workplace at Tesano and used the scissors to cut her body but she does not know which part of PW2’s body she used the scissors on. In another breath, a struggle ensued between them and the scissors she was holding injured PW2. In one vein, she saw PW2 bleeding and some 17 of her blood even stained part of her left hand after she cut PW2 with the scissors. In another vein, she did not see blood oozing from PW2’s face. The accused person’s assertions that a struggle ensued between PW2 and her and the scissors she was holding accidentally injured PW2 is an afterthought calculated to throw dust into the eyes of this court and to avoid the wrath of justice upon her and same is rejected by this court. The accused person on the 4th September, 2023 goes to her “baby dada’s” house and finds PW2 there. She becomes agitated, insults PW2 and threatens to harm her anywhere that she meets her. PW2 does not respond and leaves the accused person’s “baby dada’s” house to hers. The accused person subsequently goes to PW2’s workplace at Tesano on the 4th September, 2023 welding a pair of scissors and attacks her with same injuring her forehead and three fingers. The fact that the accused person went to the work place of PW2 with a scissors clearly shows that she had the intention to cause harm to PW2. One would have thought that the accused person would have let sleeping dogs lie after PW2 left her (the accused person’s) “baby dada’s” house on the 2nd September, 2023 for peace to reign. Surprisingly, the accused person went to the workplace of PW2 with a scissors concealed on her and cuts PW2’s forehead, and fingers thereby causing harm to PW2 knowing very well that, that was not the prudent thing to do considering that her temper was already high. I do not believe the defence of the accused person that a struggle ensued between herself and PW2 and the scissors she was holding at the time accidentally injured PW2. This assertion of the accused person is unconvincing, wishy washy and lacked substance and merit. It is infantile and inconsistent with normal acceptable behaviour and conduct and same is rejected. Under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), section 80 (2), the court is entitled to consider statements or conducts consistent or inconsistent with the testimony of the witness at the trial to prove the credibility of witnesses. The accused person’s 18 evidence is unworthy of credit; much weight will not be attached to it and it is also negligible. See: In State v Otchere [1963]2 GLR 463. Bour v The State [1965] GLR 1 Egbetorwokpor v The Republic [1975] 1 GLR 585, CA. The accused person’s evidence is therefore not credit worthy to be relied on and therefore she is not a credible witness of belief. The accused person’s defence is not satisfactory and not reasonable probable. The conduct of the accused person in going to the workplace of PW2 two days after they had the misunderstanding to look for PW2 with a scissors concealed on her shows her intent to cause serious injury to PW2. From the foregoing, this court finds as a fact that the intention of the accused in going to PW2’s workplace to look for her was to cause serious injuries to PW2 as a show of force and also to put the fear of God into her from further flirting with her “baby dada”. It can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the accused was to cause harm to PW2 and this court holds same. This court therefore finds as a fact that the harm caused by the accused person to PW2 was intentional and it holds same. This Court is therefore convinced by the evidence led by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person intentionally caused harm to PW2. I will now deal with the issue of whether or not the harm caused to PW2 by the accused person was unlawful. Can the justification for the use of force under section 31 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) avail the accused person? Now, to the instant case before me, the accused person alleged that a struggle ensued between herself and PW2 and a pair of scissors that she was holding at the 19 time injured PW2 thereby putting forward a justification for the harm that she caused to PW2. Section 31 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) provides the grounds for the justification for the use of force as follows: “31. Force may be justified in the case and in the manner, and subject to the conditions, provided for in this Chapter, on the grounds (a) of express authority given by an enactment; or (b) of authority to execute the lawful sentence or order of a Court; or (c) of the authority of an officer to keep the peace or of a Court to preserve order; or (d) of an authority to arrest and detain for felony; or (e) of an authority to arrest, detain, or search a person otherwise than for felony; or (f) of a necessity for the prevention of or defence against a criminal offence; or (g) of a necessity for defence of property or possession or for overcoming the obstruction to the exercise of lawful rights; or (h) of a necessity for preserving order on board a vessel; or (i) of an authority to correct a child, servant, or other similar person, for misconduct; or (j) of the consent of the person against whom the force is used.” The general position of the law is that where force is used as a justification caused harm to a person, it shall be used within the limits prescribed by law. Where the force used extends beyond the amount and kind of force reasonably necessary for the purpose for which force is permitted to be used, it cannot be justified anymore. 20 See: Section 32 (a) (b) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) See also Yeboah v The State [1967] GLR 512 In the case of Sabbah v The Republic [2009] SCGLR 728, the apex court of the land stated that what is reasonably necessary in the circumstances to justify the use of force is determined by the facts of the case and that it is the duty of the court to consider whether the force used or harm caused to the victim by the accused person was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Granted without admitting that a struggle even ensued between the accused person and PW2, there was no need for the accused person to be wielding a pair of scissors because there was no evidence on the record to prove that PW2 did attempt to attack the accused person with any offensive weapon to necessitate the accused person allegedly wielding a pair of scissors. The force used by the accused person was excessive considering the circumstances. The accused therefore failed the test of reasonableness and necessity. I therefore consider the purported act of defence invoked by the accused person as an afterthought cleverly designed to avoid the axe of justice upon her. The accused person’s defence is therefore not satisfactory and not reasonable probable. I therefore hold that the harm on PW2 by the accused person was unlawful and further hold that the justification for the use of force cannot avail the accused person. The force used by the accused person was not commensurate with the nature of the force allegedly used by PW2 when they had the misunderstanding. This court is therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution established that the accused person unlawfully caused harm to PW2. This Court has considered the evidence adduced by both the prosecution witnesses and the defence, the exhibits and the applicable laws and it is satisfied that the prosecution per the evidence led proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960, (Act 29) 21 against the accused person. This Court therefore finds the accused person guilty of the offence of causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and convicts her. It is instructive to note that the accused person also confessed to the commission of the offence on the 5th September, 2023 in her caution statement (Exhibit “A”) given to the police when the matter was still fresh in her mind. The accused person in her caution statement (Exhibit “A”) stated in part: “ … ON 04/09/2023, I TOOK BIG SCISSORS AND WENT TO HER WORKPLACE AT TESANO TO HER SHOP AND USED THE SCISSORS ON HER BODY BUT I DID NOT KNOW WHICH PART OF HER BODY I USED THE SCISSORS ON. “I SAW HER BLEEDING AND SOME OF HER BLOOD STAINS ON MY PART OF MY LEFT HAND I ONLY USD THE SCISSORS AND AFTER THAT, THERE WAS A STRUGGLE AND SOME MEN CAME TO RESCUE THE COMPLAINANT.” The excerpt from Exhibit ‘A’ is a confession statement admissible against the accused person because it was voluntary, direct, positive and satisfactorily proved and it suffices to warrant a conviction without corroborative evidence. From the above, the accused person confessed to the commission of the offence in her caution statement (Exhibit “A”) given to the police. And the law is that, once the said confession was voluntarily made, direct, positive and satisfactorily proved, it is sufficient to warrant conviction without corroborative evidence See: Ayobi vs The Republic (1992 -93) PT 2GBR 769 CA Billah Moshie vs The Republic (1972) 2 GLR 318 CA Ofori vs The Republic (1963) 2 GLR 452 SC. On the totality of the evidence on record together and on a full and careful consideration of the charge, the facts, the exhibits, the applicable laws and the above analysis, this court therefore finds as a fact that the accused person intentionally and unlawfully caused harm to PW2 on the 4th September, 2023. 22 Consequently, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the offence of causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) against the accused person. On a thorough perusal of the evidence on record together and on a full and careful consideration of the charge, the facts, the exhibits the applicable laws, and the above analysis, this Court finds the accused person guilty of the offence of causing harm contrary to section 69 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) accordingly convicts her. The accused person was pregnant at the time the court convicted her, therefore per section 313 (A) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) which provides as follows: “(1) Where a woman is convicted of a non-capital, offence, the Court shall order that the woman be tested for pregnancy unless the Court has reasonable grounds to believe that the woman is post-menopausal. (2) Where the woman tests positive for pregnancy, The Court shall pass on her a non- custodial sentence or may suspend the sentence for a period that it may determine.”, her sentence was suspended until she delivers and recovers fully. CHIEF INSPECTOR DANIEL DANKU FOR THE REPUBLIC PRESENT SAMUEL TSATSU TAMAKLOE FOR THE ACCUSED PERSON ACCUSED PERSON PRESENT (SGD) H/H CHRISTINA EYIAH-DONKOR CANN (MRS.) (CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) 23