Mwenya Chimfwembe v Investrust Bank Zambia Plc (APPEAL NO. 169/2023; CAZ/08/093/2023) (17 December 2024) – ZambiaLII

INTHECOURTOFAPPEALOFZAMBIA ' APPEALNO.169/2023 HOLDEN AT NDOLA CAZ/ 08/ 093/2023 ( Civil Jurisdiction) ~Uc•.r:,'") ( (~-. r~ BETWEEN: -~Udhf OF,, 1 7 DEC 2025 . MWENYA CHIMFWEMBE , APPELLANT AND INVESTRUST BANK ZAMBIA PLC RESPONDENT BEFORE: KONDOLO SC, PATEL SC, AND CHEMBE JJA On 13th November, 2025 and 17th December, 2025. For the Appellant: Not in Attendance For the Respondent: Not in Attendance JUDGMENT KONDOLO SC JA, delivered the Judgment of the Court. Cases referred to: 1. Zambia Breweries Limited v Whisky Kawisha 1993-1994 ZR 32 (SC) J 2 of 31 2. Jaqueline Chipasha Mutale v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited Appeal No. 189/2016 3. Bank of Zambia v Kasonde (1995-1997) Z.R. 238 (S.C.) 4. Chilanga Cement v Kasote Singogo SCZ Appeal No. 13 of 5. Abdul Rahman Sidek v Forest Plantation Development Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 ILR 378 6. William Jacks & Co Sdn Bhd v S. Balasingham ( 1993) 2 ILR 527 7. Aluminum Company of Malaysia Bhd v Jaspal Singh [1987] 2 ILR 558 8. Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited v Boyd Chomba Mutambo and Others, SCZ Appeal No. 75 of 2014 9. Zesco Ltd v Patricia Kabwe Lungu SCZ/236/2013 10. Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited v Boyd Chomba Mutambo and Others, SCZ Appeal No. 75 of 2014 Statutes referred to: 1. Lady Justice Dr. Winnie Sithole Mwenda and Chanda Chungu in A Comprehensive Guide to Employment Law in Zambia (UNZA Press, 2021) at page 313 J 3 of 31 2. Employment Code Act No. 3 of 2019 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1. This is an Appeal against the Judgment of Judge S.M. Wanjelani delivered on 27th January, 2023 in which she dismissed the Appellant's claims in favor of the Respondent. ' 1.2. The Appellant was the Plaintiff in the lower Court and the Respondent was the Defendant. In this Judgment, we shall refer to the parties as Appellant and Respondent. 2.0 BACKGROUND 2.1 The Appellant commenced an action by Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim seeking the following: 1. Damages for victimisation; 2. An Order of reinstatement in the position of Branch Manager or its equivalent following the purported redundancy of the Appellant's role; 3. In the alternative, order for damages for a. unfair dismissal or termination b. unlawful dismissal or termination c. wrongful dismissal 4. Damages for constructive dismissal; J 4 of 31 5. Punitive and exemplary damages for the Respondents blatant disregard of the provisions of the Constitution and the Employment Code Act of 2019; 6. Damages for defamation or embarrassment; 7. Further relief apparent from the pleadings; 8. Interest on the said damages; and 9. costs 2.3 According to the Appellant, she was employed by the Respondent on 7th July, 2013 and worked in various capacities. Whilst she was serving as Branch Manager in Choma, the Respondent informed its employees by an internal memorandum dated 8th October 2020, that it had concluded an organisational restructuring programme to be implemented between October and December 2020. 2.4 The Appellant subsequently received a notice of redundancy dated 14th January 2021, notifying her that her last working day would be 14th February 2021. She was placed in an Employment Pool and asked to apply for vacant jobs that would be advertised and warned that failure to secure another position would lead to redundancy. J 5 of 31 2.5 The Appellant did not apply for another job and was declared redundant. She claims that her previous job of Branch Manager Chingola was offered to an external candidate. That she was discriminated against as other Branch Managers in similar positions had retained their employment. That the Respondent's conduct amounted to constructive dismissal. 2.6 She further averred that she had been victimised when Kl00,000.00 went missing from the Ndola branch after she had already left the branch. That she was the only person reported to and interrogated by the police, a process which was part of a witch hunt aimed at forcing her to resign and that the decision to declare her position redundant was in bad faith. That the Respondent's actions were in breach of the Employment Code Act No. 3 of 2019 and the employees' conditions of service. 2.7 In response, the Respondent denied liability and maintained that the Appellant's separation was lawful and procedurally compliant with redundancy provisions. It stated that the Appellant's position as Branch Manager was not abolished, but J 6 of 31 restructured, as part of a legitimate organizational review of which the Appellant had been informed in writing. 2.8 The Respondent asserted that all affected employees were notified and encouraged to apply for newly created positions commensurate with their qualifications and experience. That the Appellant did not apply and was therefore declared redundant after the expiration of the employment pool period. 2.9 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT 2.10 The Appellant testified at trial, basically reiterating her pleadings. 2 .11 She admitted being aware of the restructuring, being informed that she would be placed in the employment pool, being encouraged to apply for new positions and being aware, that that other colleagues in similar positions were also affected by the restructuring. That she did not apply because she believed that her existing position was still available. 2.12 Under cross-examination, she acknowledged that the restructuring affected several roles and that she had seen the internal and public job advertisements, which included three J 7 of 31 Branch Manager positions. She admitted knowing that failure to secure another position would result in redundancy. 2.13 On the allegations of victimisation, she admitted that four other employees were dismissed in connection with alleged theft of money at the Ndola branch. 2.14 The Respondent called two witnesses. DWI Ms. Paxina Musukwa, the Respondent's Human Resource Practitioner and DW2 Mr. Geoffrey Ndaba, the Head of Retail and Business Banking, who adopted their witness statements. 2.15 They stated that in compliance with the Employment Code Act, the Labour Commissioner was notified of the intended redundancies and the Appellants contract of service provided for redundancy. 2.16 That the Appellant was placed in the employment pool and encouraged to apply for advertised positions, but did not do so. The witnesses denied wrongdoing even though the Branch ! J 8 of 31 continued operating after the restructuring and the Appellant's successor was recruited externally. 2.17 The allegation of discrimination was denied because the Appellant was not the only Manager placed in the employment pool. 2 .18 The claim for victimisation was denied on the basis that 3 other employees were convicted over the theft of Kl00,000.00 from the Ndola Branch. 2.19 In cross-examination, it was admitted that the Appellant held the required qualifications, including a Master's Degree, and could have qualified for the Branch Manager position had she applied. 2.20 It was conceded that the Appellant's successor was recruited externally but denied that there was any discriminatory intent. 2.21 The Respondent further conceded that the Appellant was only paid one month's notice, contrary to the three-months stipulated in the Conditions of Service, but the discrepancy J 9 of 31 was rectified through discussions with the Labour Commissioner. 2.22 Both parties filed submissions. 3.0 DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT 3.1 Having perused the pleadings, evidence, and submissions, the Court distilled three principal issues for determination: 1. Whether the Plaintiff was properly declared redundant or whether the redundancy was a disguise for dismissal. 2. Whether reinstatement or damages for unfair, unlawful, wrongful, or constructive dismissal were warranted. 3. Whether the Plaintiff was victimised or discriminated against in relation to similarly circumstanced colleagues. 3.2 After considering the process undertaken by the Respondent, the Court concluded that there was no redundancy under Section 55 ( 1) and (b) of the Act. 3.3 That one months' notice of redundancy set out in the Act superseded the 3 months' notice set out in the contract of employment but noted that the Respondent had attempted to J 10 of 31 extend the one month's notice given to the Appellant by two months but the Appellant declined. 3. 4 Relying inter alia on the case of Zambia Breweries Limited v Whisky Kawisha 111 the lower Court dismissed the claim for reinstatement, as the Appellant had not shown any exceptional or compelling circumstances to be granted such a rare relief. 3. 5 The claim for discrimination was dismissed because the Appellant had not shown that she was treated differently from similarly circumstanced employees. 3.6 The claim for constructive dismissal was dismissed on the basis that only an employee who has resigned can claim constructive dismissal. 3.7 Having dismissed the forgoing claims, the lower Court found it unnecessary to examine the claims of wrongful, unfair, or unlawful dismissal. 3.8 The lower Court held that the Plaintiff failed to prove her case on a balance of probabilities, and the entire action was dismissed : J 11 of 31 4.0 APPEAL 4.1 Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant filed an Appeal on the following grounds: i. That the Court below erred both in law and in fact by dismissing the claim for unfair dismissal or termination despite clear evidence on record that the Appellant possessed the requisite qualifications and experience for the position of Branch Manager, and that the Appellant was not qualified for the advertised lateral and senior or higher positions. ii. That the Court below erred both in law and in fact by dismissing the claim for unlawful dismissal and holding that there was no redundancy as provided by law, despite finding as a fact that the Respondent had continued to carry on the business for which the Appellant had been engaged. iii. That the Court below erred both in law and in fact by dismissing the claim for wrongful dismissal or termination despite evidence on record, and despite finding as a fact that the Appellant was given one (1) month's notice instead of the three (3) months' notice required under the Respondent's Conditions of Service for Non Unionised Employees. iv. That the Court below erred both in law and in fact by dismissing the claim for constructive dismissal despite the fact that the Appellant was not qualified for the advertised lateral and senior or J 12 of 31 higher positions, and despite the Court's own finding that the Respondent had unilaterally altered the Appellant's conditions of service. v. That the Court below erred both in law and in fact by dismissing the claim for victimisation despite evidence on record that the Appellant was the only one interrogated by the Ndola Police in relation to the theft in issue, at a time when she had already been transferred to Choma. 4.2 The Appellant filed Heads of Arguments on 5th June, 2023 and also adopted her submissions before the High Court. It was generally submitted that the Respondent's purported redundancy did not meet the statutory criteria prescribed by Sections 52 (2) & (3) and 55 (1) (a) & (b) of the Act that redundancy exists only where the employer ceases or intends to cease operations, or where an employee's services are no longer required because business has diminished. That the purported redundancy was therefore unlawful and unfair. 4.3 Ground 1 4.4 In Ground One, it was argued that the Court erred in dismissing the claim for unfair dismissal because the evidence showed that J 13 of 31 the Appellant met the requisite qualifications for the advertised job. 4.5 That the position of Branch Manager at Choma and other branches was not abolished and the redundancy was thus a pretext for unfair dismissal. 4.6 The Appellant submitted that she had been discriminated against as other Branch Managers have continued working in their roles and positions. Reliance was placed on the cases of Jaqueline Chipasha Mutale v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited Appeal 121, and Bank of Zambia v Kasonde 131. 4.7 Ground 2 4.8 In Ground Two, it was submitted that the Respondents restructuring was a sham as the conditions for redundancy prescribed in the conditions of service were not met in that despite being declared redundant, both Choma Branch continued operating and the Appellants position was retained. 4.9 The Appellant submitted that placing the Appellant in the employment pool amounted to wrongful termination of J 14 of 31 employment and the Respondent had failed to meet the grounds for redundancy in Sections 55 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. 4.10 She prayed that this ground be allowed. 4.11 Ground 3 4.12 Ground Three, was on the conflict between the one months' and three months' notice period prescribed in the Act and the contractual terms, respectively. 4.13 It was opined that the Court below wrongly held that Section 55 (2) of the Act (which provides a 30-day minimum notice) superseded the Respondent's internal policy. It was argued in that regard that the statutory period sets a minimum threshold, and employers remain bound by supenor contractual obligations voluntarily assumed in their conditions of service. 4.14 Under this head, it was further argued that placing the Appellant 1n the employment pool contradicted the Respondent's obligation to offer the Respondent alternative employment as set out 1n clause 8.3 (d) of the Appellants conditions of service. Arguments were also advanced on clause 8.3 (b) (i) to (iv) and (d) of the contract of employment vis-a-vis J 15 of 31 last in, first out principle (LIFO). We shall not rehash the details of the two arguments as they have been rendered irrelevant for reasons that shall become clear. 4.15 It was prayed that ground three be allowed. 4.16 Ground 4 4.17 In Ground Four, the Appellant argued that the Respondent's conduct and disregard of the contractual provisions made continued employment impossible and amounted to constructive dismissal. Reliance was placed on the case of Chilanga Cement v Kasote Singogo 141_ It was submitted that, in casu, the Appellant's refusal to apply for other positions or accept an extended redundancy period, reflected coercion under intolerable circumstances and not voluntary resignation. 4.18 Ground 5 4.19 Ground Five was on the Appellants allegation that she was victimized. She pointed out that after Kl00,000.00 was stolen from the Respondent, she was the only employee interrogated despite the fact that the theft occurred after she had already transferred to Choma. J 16 of 31 4.20 The Appellant advanced arguments that with regard to the stolen Kl00,000.00 the learned trial Judge erred by taking judicial notice that the police "could not have questioned only one person [the Appellant],". It was opined that there was no evidence to support the finding and the Courts reliance on judicial notice was a serious misdirection. 4.21 It was prayed that the Appeal be allowed on all grounds. 5.0 RESPONDENT'S CASE 5.1 The Respondent filed their heads of argument on 19th July, 2023. 5.2 Ground 1 5.3 In Ground One, the Respondent submitted that the Appellant was not unfairly dismissed, as her contract of employment was lawfully terminated through redundancy in accordance with Section 55 of the Act. 5.4 The Appellant agreed with the learned trial Judge that placing the Appellant in the employment was a unilateral alteration to the Appellants conditions of service that resulted in a J 17 of 31 redundancy. It was also noted that whilst in the employment pool, the Appellant did not apply for any of the advertised jobs. 5.5 The Respondent further submitted that the restructuring was bona fide and resulted in a reduction of Branches from 28 to 19, as confirmed at pages 146-173 ROA. 5.6 The Respondent cited a number of authorities on the nature of redundancy and quoted the book by Lady Justice Dr. Winnie Sithole Mwenda and Chanda Chungu in A Comprehensive Guide to Employment Law in Zambia (UNZA Press, 2021) at page 313, where the learned authors interpret Section 55 (1) (b) of the Act as providing that redundancy may arise where an employer requires fewer employees for existing work, or there is less work of a particular kind. 5.7 It was further submitted that the cases of Abdul Rahman Sidek v Forest Plantation Development Sdn Bhdl5l, and William Jacks & Co Sdn Bhd v S. Balasingham16l, reaffirmed the principle that an employer is entitled to reorganise its business as it deems fit. J 18 of 31 5.8 That the Appellant's situation clearly fell within Section 55(1) (b) and (c) of the Act, and that her redundancy was validly effected as part of a lawful reorganisation exercise and was not an unfair dismissal. 5.9 Ground 2 5.10 In Ground Two, the Respondent submitted that although the Choma Branch continued to operate, it did so under a restructured model as confirmed by DW2 at pages 168 - 169 and 374 ROA. Aluminum Company of Malaysia Bhd v Jaspal Singh 171 , was cited where the Industrial Relations Court held that "it is the services of the employee which must be made redundant, not his position or title". 5.11 The Respondent maintained that sufficient notice was given in compliance with Section 55 (2) of the Act and that the trial Judge was on firm ground by holding that the Act superseded the conditions of service. 5.12 That, in any event, the Appellant's own letter dated 11th February 2021, appearing at pages 160-161 ROA, showed that she refused to accept an extension of the notice period. J 19 of 31 5.13 Ground 3 5.14 In reply to Ground Three, the Respondent argued that the Appellant's termination was a lawful redundancy and not a dismissal. The arguments advanced in ground one were repeated. 5.15 The same reason given with regard to the Appellants submissions in the LIFO principle equally apply to the Respondent's arguments on the issue. 5.16 It was prayed that ground three be dismissed. 5.17 Ground 4 5.18 In response to Ground Four, on the claim of constructive dismissal, the Respondent submitted that in the case of Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited v Boyd Chomba Mutambo and Others, scz!31, the Supreme Court set out the three requirements for constructive dismissal as follows; (i) the employee must resign, (ii) the resignation must result from a fundamental breach of contract, and (iii) the employee must act promptly. J 20 of 31 5.19 That the Appellant had not satisfied the three conditions and the lower Court was therefore on firm ground when it dismissed the claim for constructive dismissal. 5.20 Ground 5 5.21 In Ground Five, in relation to the claim for victimisation it was submitted that as confirmed at pages 356-357 of the Record of Appeal, the Appellant was not the only employee interviewed by the police and that four employees, including the Appellant's deputy, were fined. That the trial Court rightly found no proof of victimisation. 5.22 We were urged to dismiss the Appeal in its entirety. 6.0 HEARING 6.1 Neither party attended the hearing as both of them had filed notices of non-attendance. 7.0 DECISION OF THE COURT 7.1 We have considered the Record of Appeal and the arguments advanced by both parties and note that the central issue in this Appeal is whether the Respondent lawfully declared the J 21 of 31 Respondent redundant. The Appellant insists that she was unlawfully dismissed. 7. 2 We shall address grounds 1, 2 and 3 together as they all directly relate to the question of redundancy. Grounds 4 and 5 on the claims for constructive dismissal, victimisation and discrimination shall be considered separately. 7 .3 With regard to the issues raised by the Appellant and the lower Courts findings, we have reproduced what we see as the relevant legislation as follows; Termination by Redundancy 55. (1) An employer is considered to have terminated a contract of employment of an employee by reason of redundancy if the termination is wholly or in part due to - (a) the employer ceasing or intending to cease to carry on the business by virtue of which the employees were engaged; (b) the business ceasing or diminishing or expected ceasing or diminishing the requirement for the employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employees were engaged; or J 22 of 31 (c) an adverse alteration of the employee's conditions of service which the employee has not consented to. (2) Where an employer intends to terminate a contract of employment by reason of redundancy, the employer shall - (a) give notice of not less than thirty days to the employee or a representative of the employee of the impending Redundancy and inform the representative on the number of employees, if more than one to be affected and the period within which the termination is intended to be carried out 7.4 Grounds 1, 2 and 3 7.5 The gravamen of the Appellant's argument that she was unlawfully dismissed, largely rests on the fact that the Choma Branch where she worked and the position of Branch Manager were still in existence. Added to this was the fact that she actually exceeded the minimum requirements for the re advertised job of Branch Manager at Choma. 7 .6 According to the Appellant, there was therefore no need to place her in the employment pool and the whole exercise was designed to ensure that she was dismissed from employment. J 23 of 31 7. 7 The evidence shows at page 146 ROA that the Respondent issued an internal memo dated 8th October, 2020 addressed to all members of staff and heads of department that it had recognised the need to turn-around the business. That in so doing its board of directors had found it necessary to review the organisations structure. 7.8 The memo stated that the Respondent had in January 2019 contracted Beatmas Human Resource Consultants Ltd ("Consultant") to undertake an independent study to achieve that end and the terms of reference included the following; 1. Setting manpower/ workload ratios to ensure effective and efficient usage of the banks human resources; 2. Reviewing and evaluating job descriptions to determine their relevance to the revised Investrust Bank Plc processes and procedures. 3. Recommending appropriate placement of staff in the new structure; 4. Job evaluation, grading and placement. 7.9 On 4th November 2020, the Respondent notified the Labour Commissioner that on account of various challenges, its board of directors had decided to restructure the organisation. The .!. .. J 24 of 31 Commissioner was also informed of the exercise undertaken by the Consultant and that as a result, 34 management staff and 50 unionised staff faced potential redundancy. 7 .10 The Respondent notified the Appellant by a letter dated 16th October, 2020 that her role in the bank had been restructured and that she would accordingly be immediately placed in the employment pool and she was encouraged to apply for vacant positions. The Appellant opted to not apply for any of the advertised jobs. 7 .11 The Appellant was later served with a notice of redundancy dated 14th January, 2021 and she reacted by seeking the reliefs herein. 7 .12 We shall begin by stating that we disagree that this entire restructuring process was undertaken as a means of targeting the Appellant in a bid to dismiss her from employment. To begin with, the decision to restructure the organisation was not made by management but by the board of directors and it affected the entire organisation. 7 .13 It is important that we address the findings by the learned trial Judge that; J 25 of 31 1. There was no redundancy as provided by Section 55 ( 1) (a) and (b) of the Employment Code Act. 2. Placing the Appellant in the employment pool was a unilateral change to the Appellants conditions of service resulting in redundancy under Section 55 (1) (c) of the Act. 3. That Section 55 (2) (a) of the Act which provides for 30 days' notice of redundancy to an employee supersedes the 3 months' notice period set out in the Appellants conditions of service. 7 .14 Section 55 ( 1) (b) provides that termination by redundancy can occur as the result of "diminishing the requirement for the employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employees were engaged". In our view, this basically refers to the abolishment or restructuring of particular jobs and is precisely the effect the Respondent's restructuring exercise had on the organisation. This was also adequately explained to the Labour Commissioner as well as to employees in a number of internal memos. J 26 of 31 7 .15 The mere fact that a Branch, managed by a Branch Manager remained in existence does not imply that nothing has changed. Restructuring could result in changes in the operational model of a Branch as well as reduced or enhanced responsibilities of the Branch Manager. In Zesco Ltd v Patricia Kabwe Lungu19l restructuring for efficiency was upheld as lawful, even where roles remained. 7.16 In the cited case, the Respondent sued the Appellant for wrongful dismissal because her employment was terminated on account of a restructuring exercise but the job she previously held was still in existence and her junior had been promoted to the same position. The Respondent stated that the Appellant had been declared redundant due to a restructuring exercise and that the positions held by the Appellant was not abolished and her junior was appointed to in her place. The Supreme Court inter alia held as follows; ". ..... where an employer is terminating the service of an employee for purposes of reorganisation or in order to facilitate improvements in efficiency or organisation, the view we take is that the employer can reemploy in those J 27 of 31 positions because the positions will not have been abolished." 7 .17 In casu the Appellants redundancy resulted from a restructuring exercise which involved the outcomes from the terms of reference given to the Consultant which are reproduced in paragraph 7.8 above. We hold the view that the outcome of such an exercise could, inter alia, result in a job title being maintained but the job description and responsibilities being altered. Whatever the case, the Appellant was declared redundant as a consequence of the Respondents restructuring exercise. 7 .18 We find that the restructuring process undertaken by the Respondent and consequent notice of redundancy served on the Appellant complied with Section 55 (1) (b) of the Act. 7 .19 Having found that the reason for the redundancy complied with Section 55 ( 1) (b) of the Act, it follows that the trial Court's finding that the Appellants' employment was rendered redundant because the Respondent unilaterally altered her conditions of service was a misdirection. J 28 of 31 7 .20 Placing the Appellant in the employment pool, was not an isolated act but a consequence of the restructuring exercise, which was properly explained to the Labour Commissioner and the employees, and arose from the Respondent's right to restructure and reorganise itself as provided by Section 55 (1) (b) aforesaid and Section 52 (2) of the Act which allows for termination of employment for operational reasons and reads as follows; "A contract of employment shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for the termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the employee or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking." 7 .21 The record shows that having been placed in the employment pool, despite being encouraged to apply for vacant positions, the Appellant, quite inadvisably, decided that she would not do so because the position of Branch Manager Choma was still in existence and she perceived it as a ploy to dismiss her from employment. 7 .22 We therefore find that the lower Court misdirected itself when it found that placing the Respondent in the employment pool J 29 of 31 was a unilateral change to her conditions of service resulting in redundancy. We consequently set aside the said finding. 7 .23 In Ground Three, we find that the lower Court misdirected itself by holding that the notice period for redundancy prescribed in the Act superseded the notice period set out in the Appellant's conditions of service. The law on this issue is quite clear as Section 127 of the Act reads as follows; "Where a contract of employment, collective agreement or other written law provides conditions more favourable to the employee, the contract, agreement or other written law shall prevail to the extent of the favourable conditions" 7 .24 The lower Courts finding in this regard is set aside but we also note that the Respondent had offered to extend the notice period so as to comply with the conditions of service but the Appellant declined the offer. If not already paid, the difference is due and should be paid to the Appellant and in the event of the parties failing to agree, the sum shall be assessed by the Registrar. J 30 of 31 7 .25 Ground 4 7 .26 Ground Four was on the Appellants claim for damages for constructive dismissal. The law on this subject is quite clear that as a pre-condition to pursuing this claim, an aggrieved employee must first show that he resigned from employment. See the case of Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited v Boyd Chomba Mutambo and Others 1io1. 7.27 The lower Court was on firm ground and Ground Four 1s therefore dismissed. 7 .28 Ground 5 7.29 We see absolutely no merit in Ground Five on the claim for damages for victimisation. The claim is based on the Appellants experience where she alleges that she was the only person reported to and interrogated by the police when Kl00,000.00 went missing from the Chingola office. The evidence shows that three other officers were tried and convicted arising from the said allegations. Ground Five therefore has no merit and is equally dismissed. J 31 of 31 8.0 CONCLUSION 8.1. We find that the restructuring exercise undertaken by the Respondent and the Appellant being declared redundant was in compliance with Section 55 (1) (b) of the Employment Code Act and this Appeal is dismissed in its entirety. .:........ ~ .......: ::-. .....~... .... . M.M. KONDOLO, SC COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE i~ f~Q ....................................... ...........~ 6l'l~. ............ . A.N. PATEL, SC Y. CHEMBE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE