MARTEY VRS. MOHAMMED (A9/09/18) [2024] GHACC 377 (12 February 2024)

IN THE TDC DISTRICT COURT HELD AT TEMA ON MONDAY THE 12TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 BEFORE HER HONOUR AKOSUA ANOKYEWAA ADJEPONG (MRS.), CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, SITTING AS AN ADDITIONAL MAGISTRATE SUIT NO. A9/09/18 LEMUEL QUARSHIE MARTEY --------------- PLAINTIFF TEMA VRS INUSAH MOHAMMED --------------- DEFENDANT AFIENYA PARTIES: PLAINTIFF PRESENT DEFENDANT ABSENT REPRESENTED BY NUHU MOHAMMED COUNSEL: SIKA ABLA ADDO FOR PLAINTIFF ABSENT EMMANUEL KYEI YANKSON, ESQ. HOLDING THE BRIEF OF ERIC ASUMAN-ADU, ESQ. FOR DEFENDANT PRESENT JUDGMENT Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 1 of 20 On 31st July 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Statement of Claim upon the orders of this Court that pleadings be filed by the parties for the matter to be heard on its merits as it emanated from the Rent Office, Tema. The Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant, the following reliefs: a. Recovery of possession of the premises being occupied by the Defendant. b. An order for immediate ejection of the Defendant from the premises he uses as a living place. c. Cost. A Statement of Defence and Counterclaim was filed for the Defendant by the Solicitor for Defendant on 15thAugust 2018 to which the Plaintiff filed a Reply and Statement of Defence. The Defendant on 23rd July 2019 amended his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim pursuant to leave of the Court. He counterclaimed against the Plaintiff as follows: i. A declaration to all that piece of land situate and being at Afienya Mataheko in the Dangme West District and bounded on the North by Lessors land measuring 70.3 feet more or less on the East by a proposed road measuring 200.0 feet more or less on the South by Lessors land measuring 72.33 feet more or less and on the West by Lessors land measuring 200.1 feet more or less containing an approximate area of 0.31 acres or 0.131 hectares more or less which piece or parcel of land is more particularly delineated on the plan. ii. General damages for trespassing on Defendant’s land. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 2 of 20 iii. Perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiff, his agents, assigns, heirs, personal representatives, workmen, etc. from in anyway interfering in Defendant’s quiet enjoyment of the Defendant’s property. The Plaintiff subsequently on 30th August 2019 filed a Reply to the said Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. THE CASE OF THE PLAINTIFF The Plaintiff in his Statement of Claim averred that he gave part of the premises in his farmhouse to the Defendant to live on humanitarian grounds temporarily until the Defendant found a place of his own and he also lives in the said premises. That the Defendant started to show wanton disrespect to him and as a result of the Defendant’s unruly behavior, he asked him to give vacant possession but all attempts by him to recover possession have been fiercely resisted by the Defendant. The Plaintiff continued that he lodged a complainant with the Rent Office in Tema to have the Defendant ejected and recover possession which was referred to this Court after the rent officer had heard the matter in the absence of the Defendant who failed to attend the trial although he was duly served. According to the Plaintiff, he is the legal and bonafide owner of the said premises being occupied by the Defendant. That unless the Defendant is compelled by this Honourable Court he would continue to perpetrate his illegal occupation of the Plaintiff’s premises. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 3 of 20 In his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim pursuant to leave of the Court, the Defendant denied the allegations of the Plaintiff; and stated that the Plaintiff was the one who first gave him the disputed land. That the Plaintiff gave him the land after contracting him to guard the land when there was a struggle over the land and he was also serving as the foreman on his farm without paying cash and upon possessing the land, he put up a wooden structure as his place of abode. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff sought to eject him from the land but his recent grantor Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh of Numo James Lartey Gberbie family who has been declared the owner of the land by a Court of competent jurisdiction formally regranted the land to him and was given the requisite documents. It is his case that the land regranted to him consists of two plots as described above in his counterclaim. He further averred that the said Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh in Suit No. FAL 507/12, High Court, Land Division in Accra on 19th October 2016 was adjudged the owner of a large tract of land which includes the land in dispute. That the Plaintiff is not the owner of the land and therefore has no capacity to eject him. He concluded that the Plaintiff is not entitled to his claims endorsed on the Statement of Claim. At the end of the hearing, counsel for the Defendant on 9th October 2023, filed her written address on behalf of the Defendant; and the Court has duly taken notice of same. LEGAL ISSUES Based on the pleadings and the evidence led; and further considering the written address filed on behalf of the Defendant by his counsel, the Court set down the following issues for determination. 1. Whether or not the Plaintiff has capacity to institute the instant action? Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 4 of 20 2. Whether or not the land in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff or the said Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh? 3. Whether or not the Plaintiff granted the land in dispute to the Defendant or same was granted to the Defendant by the said Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh? 4. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to an order of recovery of possession of the premises being occupied by the Defendant and an order for immediate ejection of the Defendant from the premises he uses as a living place? 5. Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s counterclaim at the time he filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim pursuant to leave of the Court on 23rd July 2019? BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF In civil cases, the general rule is that the party who in his pleadings raises an issue essential to the success of his case assumes the onus of proof. See Sections 10, 11(1) and (4) and 12(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). Section 12(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), provides that: “except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of probabilities.” In the case of Adwubeng v. Domfe [1996-97] SCGLR 660, the Supreme Court held thus: “Sections 11(4) and 12 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323)… have clearly provided that the standard of proof in all civil actions was proof by preponderance of probabilities – no exceptions were made. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 5 of 20 Section 11(4) of the Evidence Act explains the burden of proof in civil cases as follows: “In other circumstances, the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence, a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence”. In the case of Fosua & Adu-Poku v. Adu-Poku Mensah-Ansah [2009] SCGLR 310, the Supreme Court held that where the Plaintiff is able to produce sufficient evidence to prove his case then the onus shifts to the Defendant to lead evidence that would tilt the balance of probabilities in his favour. This principle is found in Section 14 of the Evidence Act, supra, which provides as follows: “Except as otherwise provided by law, unless it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact, the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence that party is asserting.” Also, in the case of In Re: Ashalley Botwe lands; Adjetey Agbosu and Others v. Kotey and Others (2003-04) SCGLR 420, Brobbey JSC interpreted section 11(1) of the Evidence Decree 1975 (N.R.C.D 323) at pages 464 to 465 and held that: “A litigant who is a Defendant in a civil case does not need to prove anything; the Plaintiff who took the Defendant to Court has to prove what he claims he is entitled to from the Defendant. At the same time, if the Court has to make a determination of a fact or of an issue, and the determination depends on evaluation of facts and evidence, the Defendant must realize that the determination cannot be made on nothing. If the Defendant desires the determination to be made in his favour, then he has the duty to help his own cause or case by adducing before the Court such facts or evidence that will induce the determination to be made in his favour ...”. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 6 of 20 ANALYSIS I shall now analyse and evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their respective cases within the context of their corresponding burdens and the prescribed standard of proof as provided under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) to resolve the above issues. 1. Whether or not the Plaintiff has capacity to institute the instant action? The Plaintiff in his pleadings stated that he gave part of the premises in his farmhouse to the Defendant to live on humanitarian grounds. The Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff was the one who first gave him the disputed land and added that the Plaintiff sought to eject him from the land but his recent grantor Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh of Numo James Lartey Gberbie family who has been declared the owner of the land by a Court of competent jurisdiction formally regranted the land to him and was given the requisite documents. In his evidence the Plaintiff told the Court that he permitted the Defendant to live in his farmhouse when the Defendant was ejected from his premises at Ashaiman. That his mother, Leticia Narkuor Nartey is the legal and beneficial owner of 183.08 acres of land situate at Afedenyigba between Mataheko and Afienya on the Tema Akosombo road popularly known as Rice City. He tendered exhibit ‘A’ to that effect. That after he gave the Defendant a place to sleep and to cultivate his vegetables, the Defendant joined forces with the Gberbie family who had instituted an action against his mother and himself over ownership of 183.04 acres of land. That he has every right and capacity to eject the Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 7 of 20 Defendant from the land in dispute since he permitted the Defendant to be on the land as he rightly admits. The Defendant admitted in his evidence that the Plaintiff initially gave him the disputed land on which he was cultivating his onions, tomatoes and other vegetables. That the Plaintiff later sought to eject him by asking him to move further away from the disputed land and to continue his farming activities there, meanwhile he had nursed his onions and he had to abandon them to find a place further away as the Plaintiff had instructed. That he therefore moved further away where he started cultivating his vegetables all over again. Counsel for Defendant in her written address submitted that the Plaintiff purports to be acting as the lawful attorney of his mother but nowhere in his entire pleadings has he demonstrated this capacity in the title. The issue of capacity came up during the trial of the instant action, where this Court gave its ruling on same. From the entire evidence before this Court it is the Plaintiff who gave the premises occupied by the Defendant to live there. It is trite law that when capacity of a Plaintiff is challenged he has a duty to establish it as this is a common legal principle. Even though capacity was raised and the Court addressed same, given that counsel for Defendant has brought it up again in her written address, the Court would consider it again in this judgment. In the case of Fosua & Adu-Poku vrs. Dufie (Dec’d) Adu-Poku Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310, Ansah JSC held that: “Capacity to sue was a matter of law and could be raised by a party at any stage of proceedings, even on appeal. It can also be raised by the Court suo motu” Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 8 of 20 It is trite learning that capacity goes to the root of every suit however in the case of Republic vrs High Court Accra Ex Parte Aryeetey, (Annan; Interested Party) 1 [2003- 2004] SCGLR 405, Kpegah JSC alluded to the fact that even though capacity goes to the root of the matter, a Court must exercise that discretion not capriciously or arbitrarily. The Court therefore in determining the issue of capacity must consider all issues at stake to arrive at a fair determination. We are in an era where the Courts are known to be charting the course of substantial justice as opposed to strict technicalities. Dzamefe JA in the case of Nii Odoi Kwao Asumang & 2 Others vrs. William Sowa Charway and 14 Others [2014] 75 GMJ 108 at 133 held: “the cardinal principle of our law is for the Court as much as possible to determine cases on their merits so as to resolve disputes between parties effectively and efficiently once and for all. To dismiss cases on technicalities sometimes is tantamount to pushing the disputes between the parties under the carpet unresolved and to resurface later” Also, in the case of Obeng vrs. Assemblies of God Church Ghana [2010] SCGLR 300 it was held as follows: “… We take the view that since the Courts exist to do substantial justice, it would be manifestly unjust to non-suit… Courts must strive to prevent and avoid ambush litigation by resorting and looking more at the substance than the form.” See also the case of Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority vrs. Issoufou [1993-94] 1 GLR 24, SC where the Supreme Court held that: “… The Courts had a duty to ensure that justice was done in cases before them and should not let that duty be circumvented by mere technicalities. Since the power to make Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 9 of 20 amendments to the capacity of a party rested in the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts, and the Courts could, when the issue was raised either in trial Court any time after judgment was delivered or in the appellate Court on the application of a party to the suit, orally or otherwise, grant such amendments as were necessary to meet the justice of the case.” From the entire evidence on record, the Plaintiff is seeking for an order for recovery of possession and ejectment against the Defendant because according to the Plaintiff he is the one who gave the farmland to the Defendant on humanitarian grounds. The Defendant did not deny the said claim by the Plaintiff and has indeed admitted that the Plaintiff is the one who gave the said farmland to him to occupy but his defence is that he moved from same and was regranted same by another person he calls his recent grantor therefore the Plaintiff is not entitled to his reliefs against him. Ownership of the said farmland is not an issue before this Court for determination as the Plaintiff has not claimed for declaration of title to the land but ejection of the Defendant upon the basis that he allowed him to be on the land. The Plaintiff also told the Court that he has every right and capacity to eject the Defendant from the land in dispute since he permitted the Defendant to be on the land. From the processes and evidence on record, the Plaintiff gave the said farmland to the Defendant and it is based on the authority the Plaintiff had over the said land that made him give same to the Defendant. The Defendant did not ask of Plaintiff’s ownership of the land at that time the Plaintiff gave the land to him on whatever grounds but he is now claiming that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the said land so he cannot seek to eject him from same. Once the beneficial and legal owner of the said land gave the Plaintiff the authority to deal with the land at the time he allowed the Defendant to occupy the said farmland, the authority the Plaintiff exercised to allow the Defendant to be on the said farmland is the same authority he is exercising to seek for his ejection. From the evidence Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 10 of 20 before this Court, the Plaintiff has not stated that he is seeking the said reliefs against the Defendant on behalf of his mother but on the basis that he brought the Defendant to stay onto the land and not his mother. The Defendant at all material times acknowledged that the Plaintiff is the one who gave him the land, save that his defence to the reliefs of the Plaintiff is that he moved from the said land and was given same again by another grantor. Therefore the Defendant cannot turn around to claim that the Plaintiff does not have capacity to bring the instant action against him. In view of the above reasons and authorities, I hereby find that the Plaintiff has capacity to institute the instant action. 2. Whether or not the premises in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff or the said Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh? Counsel for the Defendant raised an issue of ownership of the land in dispute in her written address. However, ownership of the premises in dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is not in issue before this Court because the Defendant admitted that it is the Plaintiff that first gave him the disputed premises to live on same and further counterclaims for a declaration of title but the said counterclaim will be addressed in the subsequent analysis. The relief of the Plaintiff is not a declaration of title for the Court to determine ownership. The Plaintiff’s relief is simply recovery of possession and immediate ejectment on the basis that he permitted the Defendant to live in the said farmhouse. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 11 of 20 Whether the land in dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, belongs to the Plaintiff or the Defendant’s alleged grantor is another matter not pending before this Court. As far as the evidence on record is concerned there is a Court of Appeal judgment in favour of the Plaintiff and his mother where the said Gberbie family are seeking to appeal the said judgment at the Supreme Court. As it stands, the said Court of Appeal judgment is still in force and has not been set aside. From the evidence on record, I find that the Plaintiff had authority and control over the premises in dispute and therefore permitted the Defendant to be on same. 3. Whether or not the Plaintiff granted the land in dispute to the Defendant or same was granted to the Defendant by the said Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh? From the evidence on record, it is not in dispute that the premises being occupied by the Defendant was given to him by the Plaintiff as the Defendant himself admitted same both in his pleadings and evidence. However the Defendant further stated that the Plaintiff sought to eject him by asking him to move further away from the disputed land and to continue his farming activities there, which he did. That he was regranted same by his recent grantor, Joseph Moses Nee Tetteh of Numo James Lartey Gberbie Family who has been declared the owner of the land by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and was given the requisite documents. He tendered exhibits ‘2’ and ‘3’ to that effect. From the evidence on record, there is not sufficient evidence before this Court that the Defendant moved out of the premises the Plaintiff gave him. The Defendant has tendered some documents of land in support of his counterclaim for declaration of title to that piece of land. The said counterclaim of the Defendant is another issue to be discussed subsequently in this judgment. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 12 of 20 From the evidence on record, I hereby find that the Plaintiff granted the premises being occupied by the Defendant to him to live in same. 4. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to an order of recovery of possession of the premises being occupied by the Defendant and an order for immediate ejection of the Defendant from the premises he uses as a living place? From the facts of the case, the Plaintiff in his pleadings and evidence indicated that he is a farmer. That he constructed the farmhouse on the land and he lived in the farmhouse for his farming activities before releasing part of the premises to the Defendant. That he continued to live on the same premises with the Defendant where they both carried on with their farming activities. That after sometime the Defendant started showing disrespect to the Plaintiff and as a result of the unruly behaviour of the Defendant, Plaintiff served Defendant a notice to vacate the premises but all the attempts by the Plaintiff to recover the possession were fiercely resisted by the Defendant. It is therefore the Plaintiff’s case that he gave the premises being occupied by the Defendant on humanitarian grounds but he is now seeking to recover possession from him and seeks an order for immediate ejection against the Defendant. The Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff gave the said premises to him but he sought to eject him and his recent grantors regranted the land to him so the Plaintiff is not entitled to his reliefs against. Clearly from the evidence before this court, the Plaintiff was occupying the farmhouse before he released a part of it to the Defendant. From the preceding analysis, the Plaintiff Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 13 of 20 is the one who gave the premises being occupied by the Defendant to him. The Defendant has denied the Plaintiff’s claims and indicated that the place does not belong to the Plaintiff but rather to some other person who has regranted the land to him. Section 36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) defines “premises" to mean any building, structure, stall or other erection or part thereof, movable or otherwise, which is the subject of a separate letting, other than a dwelling house or part thereof bona fide let at a rent which includes a payment for board or attendance, and includes land outbuildings and appurtenances let together with such premises at a single rent when adjoining the premises let therewith; The Plaintiff under cross examination testified that the said farmhouse was constructed with wawa board and roofing sheet. Per the definition of premises above, the farmhouse indeed is a premises. Under the Common Law the main ground for the recovery of possession of premises from the tenant is when the tenant denies the title of the landlord. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1975 deals with estoppel of tenant to deny title of landlord. It states that “except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, against a claim by a tenant, the title of a landlord at the time of the commencement of their relation is conclusively presumed to be true.” Section 36 of Act 220 defines a landlord as follows: “Landlord includes a person who leases premises to another person in consideration of the payment of rent and a person deriving title under the original landlord.” Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 14 of 20 In the case of Antie & Adjuwuah v Ogbo 2005-2006 SCGLR 49 the Supreme Court per Georgina Wood JSC (as she then was), said as follows; “The Common Law rule as to forfeiture by a licensee or tenant who challenges the title of his licensor or landlord has received statutory recognition under sections 27 and 28 of the Evidence decree 1975 (NRCD 323). The law is that a licensee or tenant who denies the title of his licensor or landlord, either by claiming that title to the subject matter is vested in himself or herself or someone else forfeits his or her interest. In view of the Plaintiff’s direct challenge to the Defendant’s lawful claim to ownership, he has forfeited his right to remain in the premises.” In his evidence the Plaintiff told the Court that, after he gave the Defendant a place to sleep in his farmhouse, the Defendant later joined forces with the Gberbie family who later instituted an action against the Plaintiff and his mother over the ownership of the 183.04 acres of land on which the farmhouse situate. During the cross examination of the Defendant, he affirmed this position that the Plaintiff and his mother are not the owners of the land on which the farmhouse that housed him and his family situate. Clearly, the Defendant by this act denies the title of the Plaintiff who permitted him to be in the said premises, and this is enough ground for the Plaintiff to recover the premises from the Defendant. This is because the Defendant having directly challenged the Plaintiff’s ownership of the premises he gave him to live in, he has forfeited his right to remain in the said premises. Plaintiff permitted the Defendant to stay in the farmhouse and in the same way, he has capacity to seek to recover possession and eject the Defendant from where he put him. Consequently, I find that the Plaintiff is entitled to an order of recovery of possession of Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 15 of 20 the premises being occupied by the Defendant and an order for immediate ejection of the Defendant from the premises he uses as a living place. 5. Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s reliefs contained in the counterclaim at the time he filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim pursuant to leave of the Court on 23rd July 2019? Pursuant to leave of the Court, the Defendant filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on 23rd July 2019. The reliefs contained in his counterclaim against the Plaintiff are declaration of title to all that piece of land as described therein and restated supra, general damages against the Plaintiff for trespassing on his land and perpetual injunction to restrain the Plaintiff in interfering in his dealing with the land. The Court having considered the nature of the counterclaim of the Defendant being declaration of title among others, made a preliminary enquiry to satisfy itself whether or not it had jurisdiction regarding the value of the property under the counterclaim in light of section 47 (1) (e) of the Courts Act, Act 459 as amended and L.I. 2211 (which was the existing relevant law on jurisdiction of this Court at the time the counterclaim was filed) which provided that: “A District Court shall within the area of its jurisdiction have civil jurisdiction in the following matters— (e) in actions relating to ownership, possession or occupation of land where the value of the land does not exceed twenty thousand Ghana Cedis”. Accordingly, on 28th November 2019, before the hearing of the instant case began, the Court drew the attention of the lawyers to the fact that the Defendant’s counterclaim which is declaration of title may be beyond the Court’s jurisdiction so the Defendant was Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 16 of 20 to produce evidence of the value of the property for which his reliefs are in relation to, to enable the Court ascertain whether or not it had jurisdiction over same. On 14th August 2020, after the Plaintiff had closed his case and before the Defendant opened his defence, counsel for Defendant submitted to the Court that the valuation report on the property in the Defendant’s counterclaim was ready; and the value was GH¢100,300.00. They Court ordered counsel for Defendant to furnish it with the said valuation report by submitting same to the registrar which was complied with. The Court in the course of the hearing made it known to the parties especially counsel for Defendant that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the reliefs under the counterclaim given the law on jurisdiction at that time, in relation to the value of the property and the reliefs sought by the Defendant. Although as at the time the Defendant opened his defence on 5th May 2021, the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain the counterclaim of the Defendant had been enhanced with the coming into force of the Courts Regulations, 2020, L.I. 2429, on 16th December 2020, the Court could not apply the said law retrospectively as it is about when the Defendant filed his counterclaim and not when he opened his defence. The jurisdiction of lower Courts is governed by statutes establishing them. Consequently, a Court which tries a cause or matter which it has no jurisdiction clearly acts in excess of jurisdiction. Reference to the cases of the Republic v. District Court, Ex parte Adio [1972] 2 GLR 125, Kamara v. Traore (1968) GLR 1009, Anin v. Ababio [1973] 1 GLR 509. The issue of jurisdiction is very essential in judicial proceedings as it goes to the root of the matter. The monetary jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the reliefs endorsed on the Writ of Summons; and a counterclaim that exceeds the jurisdiction of the Court Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 17 of 20 should not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the reliefs on the Writ of Summons. See the case of Akati v. Nartey [1980] GLR 218. Accordingly, any case that the statutes do not empower a lower Court to determine is outside its jurisdiction and a decision made in excess of its jurisdiction stands the risk of being set aside either by way of appeal or judicial review in the form of certiorari. Unlike geographical jurisdiction which can be waived, an objection to monetary jurisdiction of a Court can be raised for the first time even on appeal. Refer the cases of Charmant v. Mensah [1982-1983] GLR 65; Amoasi III v Twintoh [1987-88] 1 GLR 554, SC where the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court and yet it was upheld. In the instant case, it is not in doubt that the value of the property in which the Defendant is counterclaiming declaration of title was above the jurisdiction of this Court at the time the defence and counterclaim was filed. It is also undisputable that before the hearing of the case, when the issue of jurisdiction over the counterclaim was raised and it was evident that the value of the property was above the jurisdiction of this Court at the time, the parties did not consent in writing to confer jurisdiction on the Court to determine same. In view of the above, I hold that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s reliefs contained in the counterclaim at the time he filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim pursuant to leave of the Court on 23rd July 2019. Consequently, I will decline jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim; and same is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 18 of 20 CONCLUSION From the totality of the evidence on record and from the findings above, I conclude that on the balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff has been able to discharge the burden placed on him to prove his claims against the Defendant. The counterclaim of the Defendant is however dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. From the foregoing reasons, I hereby enter judgment for the Plaintiff as against the Defendant as follows; 1. The Plaintiff shall recover possession of the premises being occupied by the Defendant. 2. The Defendant is ordered to vacate from the said premises he uses as a living place forthwith. Plaintiff: Because of the time duration, I will pray for a cost of GH¢20,000.00. Counsel for Defendant: Considering all the circumstances of the matter, we will offer a cost of GH¢1,000.00 Court: In awarding cost, the Court has considered the viva voce submissions by the Plaintiff herein and Counsel for Defendant. The Court has also considered the duration of the case which has been pending since 2018, the nature of the case and the expenses reasonably incurred by the Plaintiff in prosecuting the suit in terms of filing fees for processes filed in Court. I hereby award a cost of GH¢4,000.00 against the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff. Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 19 of 20 [SGD.] H/H AKOSUA A. ADJEPONG (MRS) (CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) Lemuel Quarshie Martey v. Inusah Mohammed Page 20 of 20