Kasumba Wilfred Ngulube and 86 Ors v Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited (Appeal No. 49 of 2024) (15 November 2024) – ZambiaLII

I THE COURT OF APPEAL OF Z · HOLD£ AT KABWE ( Civil Jurisdiction) 15 NOV 2024 BETWEEN: RECltSTRY Appellant AND NITROGEN CHEMICALS OF ZAMBIA LIMITED Respondent CORAM: Makungu, Sichinga and Sharpe-Phiri, JJA on 15 October 2024 and 15 November 2024 For the Appellant: Mr. M. Khunga of Barnaby, Chitundu & Khunga Advocates For the Respondent: Mr. Y. Daka of George Kunda & Company JUDGMENT SHARPE-PHIRI, JA, delivered the judgment of the Court. Legislation referred to: I. The Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1965 (White Book). 1999 Edition 2. The Cou11 of Appeal Rules, Statutory Instrument No. 65 of 2016 3. The Court of Appeal Act No. 7 of 2016. Section 24 (I), (a). (b) (iv) and (c ) Cases referred to: I. Victor C Kunda and 136 Others v itrogen Chemicals Zambia Li 111 itcd (2007 /I IP /918) 2. Robert Mwangala & 136 Others v Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia Limited (2009/HPC/486) 3. Wilson Masasuo Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Limited ( 1982) Z.R. 172, (S.C) 4. Stewards Company (Z) Limited v Apollo Enterprises Limited and Attorney General. SCZ Ruling No. I of 2000 JI 5. Y.B and F Transport v Supersonic Motors Limited. SCZ Judgment o. 3 of2000 6. Emmanuel Mutale v Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited. SCZ Appeal o. 67 of 7. Attorney General v Musakanya (1981) Z.R. 188 8. Glocom Marketing Limited v Contract Haulage Limited, 1998/HP/787 9. Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (Zamtel) v Aaron Mweene Mulwanda Paul gandwe. (2012) Vol. I ZR I 0. Minister of Home Affairs & Attorney General v Lee Habasonda (2007) ZR 207 11. Kenmuir v Hattingh ( 1974) ZR 162 ( C) 12. Kelvin Hangandu and Company (a firm) v Webby Mulubisha (2008) ZR 82 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 This appeal, brought before this Court pursuant to a notice of appeal filed on 29 September 2023. challenges a ruling rendered by Justice Christine B.C. Phiri in the High Court on 12 June 2013, over eleven years ago. 2.0 BACKGROUND 2. l An action was commenced in the High Court on 23 ovember 20 IO by writ of summons and statement of claim under cause number 20 I O/HP/1267, brought by eighty-six Plaintiffs (now the Appellants), in their capacity as former employees, against Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia Limited, the Defendant (now the Respondent). 2.2 For the purposes of this appeal, the parties shall be referred to by their respective designations in these proceedings. J2 2.2 The writ of summons was amended on 21 April 201 1, wherein the Appellants sought, inter alia, the payment of K7,633.325. 708.93 (unrebased), being the total sum allegedly unlawfully deducted by the Respondent from the /\ppellant's terminal or retirement benefits. The Appellants further claimed payment of upkeep and housing allowances owed to them from the date of their retirement until full settlement of their retirement benefits. 2.3 The Respondent entered an amended defence on 26 July 2011, renected on pages 80 lo 83 of volume I of the record of appeal. In its defence, the Respondent contended that each employee·s claim was addressed in accordance with the applicable terms and conditions of service at the time of their separation from employment. 2.4 The Respondent further contended that the present action before the Court, under cause number 2010/HP/1267, which seeks to re-litigate the issue or terminal benefits, amounts to an abuse of court process. The Appellants had previously initiated two actions: Victor C Kunda and 136 Others v Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia Limited (2007/HP/918)1 in which judgment was rendered. and Robert Mwangala & 136 Others v Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia Limited (2009/HPC/486),2 an action also aimed at liquidating the Company. J3 3.0 NOTICE TO RAISE PRELIMINARY APPLICATION 3.1 On 29 September 2011, the Respondent brought an application before the trial Judge by way of summons to determine matter on a point of law. The application was made pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England (White Book) 1999 Edition and was based on the Respondent's contention that the action initiated by the Appellants in the High Court was barred by the doctrine of res Judi ca ta. 3.2 In the application, the Respondent sought a ruling that the Plaintiffs' (now Appellants') attempt to raise the issue of underpayment of their terminal benefits in the current proceedings constituted an abuse of the Court"s process, as this matter could have been raised or argued in the prior case of Victor Kunda & 136 Others v Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (2007/HP/918). The Respondent further prayed for an order dismissing the entire action brought by the Appellants, with costs awarded in favour of the Respondent. 3.3 In the suppo1iing affidavit, the deponent, Austin Hanantonga g'andu, reiterated that the Appellants had previously initiated an action under cause number 2007/HP/918 against the Respondent, in which they sought the payment of their terminal benefits. The deponent exhibited copies of the writ of summons, statement of claim, and the list of 136 Plaintiffs. 3.4 The deponent further asserted that judgment was delivered in the prior proceedings, and terminal benefits had been disbursed. He argued that the J4 claims concerning underpayment of terminal benefits. as raised in the current action, stem from the claims and judgment in the Victor Kunda case, and that any issue regarding underpayment of terminal benefits should have been addressed in the earlier action. The deponent further argued that the actions were no longer being instituted under the name of Victor C Kunda due to his passing· instead, following his death. proceedings were initiated under cause number 2009/HPC/486 in the matter of Robert MlVangala & 136 Others. 3.5 The Respondent contended that resolving the question of law as set out in the summons- namely, "whether or not it is an abuse of the Court"s process for the Plaintiff to raise the issue of underpayment of terminal benefits in these proceedings. which could have been raised or argued in the case of Victor C. Kunda and Others v. Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia"- will dete1mine or dispose of this matter without necessitating a fu II trial. 3.6 The Appellants opposed the application by way of affidavit in opposition dated 25 November 2011, contending that the request for a determination on the point of law was untimely, as it was raised after the matter had been set down for trial. Further, that not all the parties in the cu1Tent action were in the earlier cause of action. The further contention was that the Respondent had acknowledged part of their claim pertaining to housing allowances and had failed to present any ubstantive defence to the is ues pleaded before the Court. 4.0 DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT 4.1 Upon consideration of the submissions presented before her, the affidavits filed in support and opposition to the preliminary application, as well as the relevant legal authorities cited therein, the trial Judge concluded that a party could raise an application on a point of law at any stage of the proceedings prior to the conclusion of the matter. Consequently, she found that the Respondent acted within its rights to file a notice to raise a preliminary issue on a point of law. She granted the application but awarded costs to the Appellants. She further directed that the matter be heard on its merits and granted leave to appeal. 5.0 FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 5.1 The record indicates that following the delivery of the Ruling, the trial Judge, Justice Christine Phiri, proceeded to retire, while the parties continued to take necessary steps to have the matter set down for hearing. The proceedings recorded at pages I 105 to l l 22, volume 3 of the record of appeal show the pa1iies entered a consent order dated 6 August 20 l 4, stipulating that the matter would proceed to be heard on its merits. Additionally, they submitted an agreed statement of facts and bundles of documents, which are located at pages 678 to 799 of volume 2 of the record of appeal. This submission served as a request to the Court to adjudicate the substantive issues on record considering the agreed statement of facts. Subsequently, the matter was reallocated to Justice Mwila Chitabo (now deceased). J6 5.2 On 23 July 2015, Justice Chitabo rendered a decision holding that he lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the ruling of 12 June 2013, as it had been rendered by a High Court Judge of equal jurisdiction. He further determined that the parties' approach was an attempt to circumvent the 2013 ruling and improperly persuade him to revisit it. Consequently. the Judge concluded that the Court having upheld the preliminary issue on a point of law connotes that the action had collapsed and that he wasfunctus officio. The parties were given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 5.3 According to Counsel for the Appellant, in paragraph 2.9 of their amended heads of argument dated 25 September 2024, an appeal vvas lodged before the Supreme Court against the ruling delivered by Justice Chitabo on 23 July 2015. That, the Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 11 November 2016, found at pages 1157 to 1159 of the record of appeal, directed the Appellants to return to the High Court to seek leave to appeal against the ruling of 12 June 2013. otably, the Supreme Court of Zambia judgment at pages 1157 to 1159 of volume three relates to a motion for leave to set aside an order of dismissal for want of prosecution by a single Judge, and not, as counsel contends, the decision of the Supreme Court pertaining to the Appellants appeal against either the 2013 or 2015 decision. 5.4 Counsel further submits that the Appellants subsequently filed an application in the High Court seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out of time against the decision of 12 June 2013 (See pages 1124 to 1135, volume three of the record of appeal). This application was brought before Judge Bowa on 18 November 2022, pursuant to Order XIII J7 Rule Ill of the Court of Appeal Rules.2 It was presented on two grounds: firstly, that the Supreme Court had directed that the appropriate course or action was to appeal against the ruling of 12 June 2013: and secondly. that the subject matter pertains to terminal benefits, and the Plaintiffs (Appellants) would suffer prejudice if the matter remained unresolved. 5.5 Upon reviewing the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out or time, challenging the ruling of the trial Judge dated 12 June 2013, the High Court Judge granted the application on 28 September 2023, as reflected at page 1135 or volume three of the record of appeal. This is the basis upon which the appeal is before us. 6.0 THE APPEAL 6.1 The Appellant lodged a notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal on 29 September 2023, advancing the following two grounds of appeal: i) That the learned Honourable Judge fell into grave error when she failed to clearly render an Order in favor of the Plaintiffs to the effect that the matter be heard on its merits. ii) That the orders in the Ruling of 12 June 2013 were contradictory in effect rendering the holding of Court ambiguous and leaving the parties in a quagmire. J8 6.2 An amended Memorandum of Appeal having been filed on 25 September 2024, the above grounds were essentially abandoned, and the Appellants now advance one ground or appeal namely that: 'The Honourable Judge, having ordered that the matter he heard on the merits, misdirected herself in law andf act when she granted the Defendant's application to raise a preliminary issue.' 7.0 HEARING OF THE APPEAL 7.1 The appeal was heard on 15 October 2024; the parties were represented by their respective Counsel as indicated above. In suppo1t of the appeal, Mr. Khunga relied on the record of appeal dated 5 March 2024, as well as the amended memorandum of appeal and heads of argument of 25 September 2024. 7.2 In view of the Appellants' amendments. the Respondent vvas granted leave to file heads of argument out of time, which were filed instantly on 15 October 2024. The arguments of the parties will be referenced where appropriate in our judgment. 7.3 Mr Daka submitted before Court that the Respondent would rely on the arguments filed before Cou11. He augmented same by asking this Court to consider the preliminary issue on point of law raised in the Court below and dismiss that action in the lower Court for being an abuse or process using the provisions under Order 14A of the White Book. J9 7.4 In reply, Mr. Khunga respectfully urged the Court to exercise its powers pursuant to Section 24(I)(a), (b)(iv), and (c) of the Court of Appeal Act3 in civil proceedings, seeking an order to set aside the ruling delivered on 12 June 2013 and to remit the application to the High Court for reconsideration and hearing. 8.0 OUR DECISION ON THE APPEAL 8.1 We have thoroughly reviewed the record of appeal, the amended memorandum of appeal. and the submissions of the parties. The Appellant now proceeds on a single ground of appeal, contending that the trial Judge erred in law by misdirecting herself when she granted the Respondent's application to raise a preliminary issue after having ordered that the matter be heard on its merits. 8.2 In determining this appeal, we first turn to the issues that were presented for adjudication in the High Court, as outlined in the summons for determination ofa point of law, found at pages 382 to 383 of volume I of the record of appeal. 8.3 The Respondent raised the following question for determination on a point of law: "Whether or not it is an abuse of the process of the Court for the Plaintiffs to raise the issue of under payment of their terminal benefits in the proceedings that could have been raised or argued in another case of Victor Kunda and 136 others v Nitrogen Chemicals ofZ ambia limited cause 2007/HP/918. AND further that upon determination of the question of law; that is: a) That it is an abuse oft he process oft he Court for the Plaintiffs to raise the issue of under payment oft heir terminal benefits in these proceedings that could have been raised or argued in another case of Victor Kunda and 136 others vs Nitrogen Chemicals ofZ ambia Limited cause 2007/HP/918. The Defendants prays for an order to be granted in favour of the Defendant dismissing the whole oft he Plaintiffs action with costs to the Defendant." 8.4 By this application, the trial Judge was called upon to determine whether it was improper for the Appellants to commence a new action involving the same or related claims. on the basis that such claims could have been adjudicated in the prior litigation. The central legal issue under the preliminary application was whether the Appellants' new action, seeking payment of their terminal benefits, amounted to an abuse of court process by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata. This doctrine precludes parties from re-litigating issues that have already been conclusively determined in an earlier suit. Should the Court have found that thi constituted an abuse of process, the Respondent sought an order dismissing the entire action instituted by the Appellants, with a request to be awarded the costs. JI I 8.5 Upon considering the application, the trial Judge decided as follows: "Having heard the submissions in this matter and having read the affidavit in support and opposition of this application and further having referred to the law cited in this application; I find that an application on a point of law may be raised at any stage of the proceedings before the matter is closed. For the foregoing I find that the defendants were in order to file a notice to raise preliminary issue on a point of law and I grant this application with costs for the plaintiffs and order that this matter be heard on its merits. Leave to appeal is granted." 8.6 Counsel Khunga argued that in the ruling of the lower Court delivered on 12 June 2013, the trial Judge on the one hand, appeared to grant the application for dismissal of the action before her, while on the other hand, directed that the matter proceeds to be heard on its merits. Counsel submitted in the arguments that the ruling of the trial Court was thus contradictory and lacked clarity and finality as to whether the matter was to proceed to be heard on the merits. The Court's attention was drawn to the case of Wilson Masauso Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Limited,3 where the Supreme Court guided that ·a decision which because of uncertainty or want off inality Leaves a door open for further litigation on the same issue between the same parties can and should be avoided.· J 12 8. 7 Counsel further submitted that the ruling of the lo\, er Court dated 12 June 2013 was ambiguous and placed the parties in a state of uncertainty. leaving them unclear as to the appropriate course of action. Additionally, Counsel argued that the Appellant's Counsel, Mr. Oaka, concurred with their position that the ruling of the lower Court vvas inconsistent. Counsel emphasized the need for a clear, reasoned, and definitive decision that would conclusively determine the rights of the parties, rather than leaving them in a state of confusion as to whether they had succeeded as is the case with the ruling currently under appeal. Counsel Khunga urged the Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction and remit the matter to the l ligh Court for determination on the merits. 8.8 Counsel further argued that the decision of the lower Court of 12 June 2013 fell short of the standard of a ruling or judgment and did not meet the minimum requirements of a judgment as stipulated by the Supreme Court in the Stewards Company (Z) Limited v Apollo Enterprises Limited and Attorney General;' which Counsel cited as follows: 'There is a clear duty on the part ofa trial judge to give reasons and that such duty is a/unction ofd ue process and therefore, ofjustice. Indeed, our own Constitution and the judicial function as embraced in this country requires that a judge adjudicate the disputes that are brought b) litigants and that this be done within a reasonable time. To simply pronounce the outcome ofa cause at trial in the High Court is plainly a failure oft he duty to adjudicate and ii is not allowed. While the law may allow this Court to announce results/or reasons to be given later, the same is not permilled lo Jl3 a trial Court where the parties are entitled to knmv 1l'hy the decision has gone in a particular lllay and any aggrieved party can then exercise the right of appeal. In the instant case, the absence of a reasoned judgment deprives the dissatisfied litigant ofh is right lo challenge the decision on its merits since none have been discussed. in the second place, llle agree 11 ith the Court of Appeal that failure lo render a reasoned judgment is a good selfs tanding ground ofa ppeal. Above all, the failure to render a reasoned judgment quite apart from failing the most fundamental judicial function within the principle discussed in the SENTOR MOTOR'S case ( 1995-97) Z R. 163 also results in afailure a/justice, a terrible miscarriage ofjuslice since the consequences are that the parties are lllorse offf rom any point of view than lllhen they started. ' 8.9 In the heads of argument filed on 15 October 2024, the Respondent's Counsel, Mr. Daka highlighted a summary of the findings in the ruling of 12 June 2013, which is the subject of this appeal, as follows that: i) An application on a point of lalll can be raised at any stage of the proceedings before the matter is closed. ii) The Defendant [Respondent herein] were in order to flle notice lo raise a preliminary issue on a point of law and granted the application. iii) The costs lllere awarded to the Plaintiffs [Appellants herein] and not the Defendants who succeeded on their application. iv) The mal/er be heard on the merits. J 14 8.10 Counsel further submitted that the effect of the pronouncement in paragraph (ii), which upheld the preliminary issue. was to terminate the proceedings as a result of the Defendant's uccessful challenge on a point of law. Counsel further contended that the pronouncement in paragraph (iv), directing that the matter proceeds to be heard on its merits, wa superfluous, given that the Court had already upheld the preliminary issue on a point of law, thereby effectively concluding the matter. 8.11 Mr. Daka acknowledged the contradiction in the ruling of the lower Court. He argued that the trial Judge deviated from the standard procedure typically followed when an application is granted. Additionally. he noted that the Appellants· counsel had relied on an erroneous portion of the ruling but failed to address the issue of whether the lower Court was justified in granting the application for dismissal, as the Appellant should not be relitigating settled matters. Mr. Daka therefore urged this Court to correct the inconsistency by setting aside the lower Court's ruling and affirming the Respondent as the prevailing party in the preliminary application, as the trial Judge had intended. 8.12 Coun el for the Respondent also argued that the lower Court erred in failing to award costs to the Respondent, despite its success in the application. This, Counsel argued, constituted a misdirection, especially considering numerous authorities on the issue of costs. Attention was drawn to the case of Y.B. and F. Transport v. Supersonic Motors Limited=\ where it was established that the general rule is that costs should follow the event, meaning that a successful party should not ordinarily be J 15 deprived of its costs unless it has engaged in misconduct during the action or the conduct of the proceedings. The cases of Emmanuel Mutate v. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited,6 Attorney General v. Musakanya,7 and Glocom Marketing Limited v. Contract Haulage Limited8 were also cited to reinforce the Respondent's argument that the successful party is entitled to recover costs from the unsuccessful party. 8.13 In reaching her determination, the trial Judge concluded that the Respondent was justified in filing a notice to raise a preliminary issue concerning a point of law. The Judge subsequently granted the application, implying that the action initiated by the Appellants should be dismissed for constituting an abuse of court proceedings. However, in the same ruling, the Court awarded the costs of the application to the Appellants, which did not align with its determination regarding the application in question. Furthermore, the Court directed that the action be heard on its merits, despite having previously indicated that it was granting the application on the grounds that the action constituted an abuse of court process. 8.14 Turning to consider the format of the Ruling of 12 June 2013 delivered by the trial Court, which we have closely reviewed, it is apparent that the Ruling under appeal is deficient in both structure and coherence. The Supreme Court provided explicit guidance on the appropriate format and essential elements expected in judicial decisions in the case of Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (Zamtel) v Aaron Mweene Mulwanda and others.9 In that decision, the requisite components of a judgment were delineated as follows: an introduction outlining the nature J 16 of the case, an overview of the relevant legal principles applicable to the issues at hand, a detailed application of those principles to the specific facts, a statement of the remedies sought, and, ultimately, the order of the Court. This standard has been affirmed in numerous cases and is widely upheld by Courts within this jurisdiction. 8.15 Upon consideration and a review of the subject Ruling of 12 June 2013. it is clear that the Ruling issued by the High Court Judge, as she then was. failed to meet the essential standards expected of a court ruling. We therefore concur with both Counsel that the Ruling was incoherent and failed to adhere to established standards. Further, it was contradictory. granting the Respondent's application to dismiss the case as an abu e of process, while also ordering that the matter be heard on its merits. 8.16 The trial Judge failed to adequately address her mind to the implications of the application before her, resulting in a lack of clarity in her orders and directives for the partie to follow. This created ambiguity in the lo,, er Court's Ruling, leaving the parties uncertain about the status of the ca e. In the cited Zamtel case, the Supreme Court also emphasized that a decision of the Court should not require interpretation; it must be comprehensive, exhaustive, and clear on all issues and as expounded in the case of Minister ° of Home Affairs & Attorney General v Lee Habasonda.1 For the foregoing reasons. the ground of appeal is successful. 8.17 Given the success of the appeal, the Ruling of the High Court or 12 June 2013 is set aside. However, the question of law presented for determination Jl7 before the High Court was not conclusively addressed and remams unresolved to this day, a period of over thirteen years since the application was filed before the High Court as shown at page 382 of Volume I of the record of appeal. This application has been reproduced in our head 3 .0 above. 8.18 This position defies the age old, entrenched practice that there must be an end to litigation. Given the success of the appeal, we are alive to the fact that resending the matter for rehearing the application before the High Court has potential to contradict our po ition on judicial administration regarding the aforesaid settled position of law and the need for efficiency on our justice delivery. This is so, because re-hearing v ill require the matter to be allocated to a different Judge of the High Court as the initial Judge has since retired. This would further aid in the delay of justice and prejudice of the parties who have been in the corridors or court rooms for well over fou11een years. 8.19 We are alive to the age-old principle of law as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Kenmuir v Hattingh II where it was held that: 'An appeal from a decision of a Judge sitting alone is by way of rehearing 011 the record and the appellate court can make the necessary findings off act if the findings were co11clusio11s based 011 facts which were common cause or 011 items of real evidence, when the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court. ' J 18 8.20 Furthermore in the case of Kelvin Hang'andu and Company (a Firm) v Webby Mulubisha,12 the Supreme Court held as follows: ··Once a matter is before a court in any forum, provided that the process is properly placed, that court should serve as the sole tribunal to adjudicate all issues therein, and all interested parties are obligated to bring all related issues before that specific court. Fornm shopping constitutes an abuse ofc ourt process, which is impermissible:· 8.21 While we are very mindful that when an appellate Court rehears a matter that was tried before the trial Court, its interference with the findings of fact is governed by principles well entrenched at law in thi juri diction. we do not, as an appellate Court interfere with findings of fact determined by a trial Court, lightly. However, this case, raises a point of law that fell for determination in the High Court which remains unattended for over thi11een years, and we feel justified to determine the said application that was filed before Phiri J. as she then was, on 29 September 2011. 8.22 The real question that fell for determination by the application filed in the High Court on 29 September 2011 was whether the action commenced by the Appellants before Phiri J. was an abuse of process for duplicity of actions given the earlier action Victor C. Kunda and 136 Others v Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia limited, which \: as later renamed to the case of Robert M1vangala and 136 Others v itrogen Chemicals of Zambia 2009/HPC/486 after the demise of Mr Victor C. Kunda. A perusal of the main relief sought by the Plaintiffs in that case against the Respondent as shown at pages 388 of Volume I of the record of appeal shows a 'su111 of J 19 K 15,110,126,328.59 being the total amount O\Ved by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs in separation packages· with interest, costs and any other remedy deemed fit by the Court. 8.23 In the later matter before Phiri J. before which the application in casu was filed, the main relief sought by the Appellants as shown in the statement of claim found at pages 52 to 53 or the volume I of the record or appeal is the relier or ·payment of the of Kl,633,325,708.93 being total amount Sll/11 deducted by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs' terminal or retirement benefits·, and payment of subsistence allowance and housing allowances, interest, costs and any other reliefs the Court may deem fit. 8.24 There is no dispute that the two matters arose from the Appellants· incidence of employment with the Respondent. A further analysis or the two schedules of litigants in both matters as shown at pages 42 of volume 1 of the record of Appeal by way of example, and the other schedule in the earlier case shown in part at pages 391 to 393 demonstrates, for instance that the current Plaintiff in the action before Phiri J. who are the 151 Appellant, Ndumba L (Lizzie Ndumba) and Chol a A (A lex Henry Chola) were Plaintiffs in both actions. 8.25 Without belabouring further on the principle of res judicata which espouses that all matters in contention must be brought in one action for determination rather than piece meal, it is our considered view that the Appellants' attempt at the second High Cou11 action was resjudicata. as it J20 raised issues which ought to have been determined in the earlier action involving the same parties. 8.26 For this reason, the application of 29 September 20 I I ought to have succeeded, and it is so successful. Given the merit of that application, the action in the High Court stands dismissed for being res judicata. 9.0 CONCLUSION 9. I Given the success of the appeal and the preliminary issue to determine point of law filed in the High Court, we clarify and reaffirm that the Ruling of the High Court of 12 June 2013 is set aside and the matter in the Court below stands dismissed for being resjudicata. 9.2 We make no order as to costs given that this matter stems from an employment dispute. C.K. Makungu COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE ~ arpe-Phirf"" COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE J21