Gyan v Opoku and Others (A1/6/2021) [2025] GHADC 225 (10 March 2025)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT KINTAMPO HELD ON MONDAY 10TH MARCH 2025BEFOREHIS WORSHIP KWAMEADJEI MANUESQ. SUITNO: A1/6/2021 APPIAHKUBIGYAN - PLAINTIFF VRS 1. YAWOPOKU 2. SOFOKWASI 3. NANA OWUSU PINKRA II - DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT 1. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff’scase 1.1. According to Plaintiff, in the year 2004 he acquired one and a half acres of land equivalent to Six (6) building plots from Nana Kwaku Nsowaa Damoah Stephen and Nana Kwadwo Fosu. Plaintiff says he farmed on the said plots from 2004 to 2016 and allowed it to fallow. Then, oneAdwoa Fie claimed ownership of this land and reported him to Kyeremankumahene and Krontihene that he had claimed her land. The Chiefs sat on the matter and the land was givento him, that although the entire farmland belonged to his father, Plaintiff has acquired that portion of land from the Chiefs. According toPlaintiff, he cut the treesonthe land and removed the stumps fromthe disputed land. 1.2. Plaintiff says that the two Chiefs Nana Kwaku Nsonwaa Damoah Stephen and Nana Kwadwo Fosu entrusted Wofa Appiah and Anane Kobo (Committee Chairman) to go and demarcate the said land for him. Wofa Page1of20 Appiah and Anane Kobo went and demarcated the disputed land for him and aSite Plan was prepared to coverthe said land which was duly thumb printed by the Chiefs and the ownerofthe land. 1.3. Plaintiff makes the case that Defendants and one Burger Effah had demarcated Plaintiff’s land for some people, and after a confrontation by Plaintiff, his mother and brother, Defendants informed them that it was the Krontihene who instructed them to do that. According to Plaintiff, himself his father,mother,and brotherwentto the Krontihene who said he could not claim the land of the son of Mr. Gyan. After this, Plaintiff returned to inform Defendants that the Krontihene says Defendants should give his land back to him. Plaintiff’s case is that defendants have refused to give the land back to him and have given the land to some people who are eagerly developing same, hence his suit. He claimed against Defendants asfollow: “(a) The Plaintiff claims as against Defendants jointly and severally is for declaration of title and recovery of possession of all that parcel of landmeasuring 1.5acreslying situate and beingat Kwame-Akuraa. (b)General damages for trespass (c) “An order for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, assigns, labourers, workmen, relatives, descendants and all those who claim through the Defendants from entering the said land.“ 1.4. It is worth noting that at the time Plaintiff’s statement of claim was filed, the Krontihene in the person of 3rd Defendant was not a party to the suit, Page2of20 but he was subsequently joined to the suit before the filing of Defendants’ defence. Defendants’ case 1.5. From Defendants’ defence filed on 25th January 2021, the following material admissions were made, that 1st and 2nd Defendants and one Burger Effah acting on the instructions of 3rd Defendant demarcated Plaintiff’s land to 3rd parties, 3rd Defendant was confronted by Plaintiff, his mother and brother and 3rd Defendant admitted that it was under his instruction that these actions were carried out. Defendants also admit that they have given Plaintiff’s land to other people who are eagerly developing it. 1.6. The position of the law on admissions and their effect is well known. An admission as defined in the 7th edition of the Black’s Law Dictionary, is “a voluntary acknowledgment of the existence of facts relevant to an adversary’s case.” As held in Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa & Anor v. Jake Obetsebi Lamptey & Anor [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 16, where a matter is admitted proof is dispensed with. In the case of in re Asere Stool; Nikoi Olai Amontia IV (substituted by Tafo Amon II) v. Akotia Oworsika III (substituted by)Laryea Ayiku III [2005-2006] SCGLR 637at 656,the court exlplained therule asfollows: “Where an adversary has admitted a fact advantageous to the cause of a party, the party does not need any better evidence to establish that factthan by relying on such admission, which is an example of estoppel by conduct.” Page3of20 1.7. Defendants contend contrary to Plaintiff’s case that the disputed land is part of the Nkoranza stool land under the caretakership of the Kintampo Nwoase stool and the Kintampo Nwoase stool has appointed the Ntankorohene as a representative of the Kintampo Nwoase stool over all lands lying at Ntankoro, of which the disputed land is part. They contend that Nana Kwaku Nsowaa and Nana Kwadwo Fosu did not grant the disputed land toPlaintiff. 1.8. According to Defendants, the land in dispute was demarcated into building plots in the year 2013 by the Kintampo South Town Planning Authority and people have fully developed it being in possession of their buildings. For this reason, Defendants say that Plaintiff’s action is caught by acquiescence, leaches, Estoppel by conduct which they particularized asfollow: “PARTICULARSOF ESTOPPEL. The Plaintiff having sat by and allowed the land to be demarcated into building plots since 2013 and having allowed developers to fully develop the land by putting up buildings and living in them for over seven(7)years.” 1.9. According to Defendants, Plaintiff has no title whatsoever to the disputed land, so they denyhis claims. 1.10. Plaintiff’s reply to the defence was essentially that it is the Damoama and Kyeremankuma families that appoint the chief of Ntankoro, and the chief of Nwoase has no control over Ntankoro lands. He disputed the demarcation of the disputed land by the Kintampo South Planning Authority in 2013. The sum of Plaintiff’s contentions here is that since 2020 Page4of20 when footings were constructed on the land the buildings thereon are not complete and unoccupied. According to Plaintiff’s reply, he confronted 3rd Defendant in 2016 for which reason he quizzed Defendants’ claim that sevenyearselapsed without actionfromhim. 1.11. The main issues raised in this suit are whether the disputed land belongs to Plaintiffand whether Defendants have trespassed untoPlaintiff’sland. 2. BURDENAND STANDARD OF PROOF Generalburden 2.1. In Memuna Moudy and Others v Antwi [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 967 at pages 974-975, the Supreme Court speaking through Wood JSC (as she then was) stated the rule in the law of evidence that when a fact alleged by a party pleading it is denied by the opponent, an issue arises for determination and the party who has introduced the denied fact has the burdenofproving same. The Courtexplained as follows: “A cardinal principle of law on proof as enunciated in the age-old case of Majolagbe v Larbi (1959) GLR 190 and reiterated in a number of cases, including Zabrama v Segbedzi (1991) 2 GLR 221 at 246, is that, a person who makes an averment or assertion which is denied by his opponent, has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And he does not discharge his burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from which the fact or facts he asserts can be properlyand safely inferred." Page5of20 2.2. Asexplained inAckah v.PergahTransportLtd. & ORS (2010) SCGLR 728, by the Supreme Court, Plaintiff bears this evidential burden. The court in thatsuit explained Plaintiff’sburdenthus: “It is abasic principle of the law on evidence that a party who bears the burden of proof is to produce the required evidence of the facts in issue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim will fail. The method of producing evidence is varied and it includes the testimonies of parties and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the court or tribunal of fact such as a jury. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. This is a requirement of the law on evidence under sections 10(1) and (2) and 11(2) and (4) of the EvidenceAct, 1975(NRCD323)” 2.3. It is worth noting that this burden shifts and is not static. This statement of the law has statutory support firstly at section 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD323)which provides that: "Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non- existenceof which isessential to the claimor defence he is asserting." Page6of20 2.4. The burden when it has been discharged shifts unto the person against whom a finding may be made in the absence of further contradictory evidence, depending on the issues, and the facts in contention. This position was expressed by the Court in In Re Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu & Ors v. Kotey & ORS [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR and finds expression at section 17 of NRCD 323 particularly subsection (b). The entire sectionprovides as follows: “17.Allocationof burdenofproducing evidence Exceptas otherwise provided by law, (a)the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party againstwhom afinding on that factwould be requiredin the absenceof furtherproof (b) the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasionas to that fact.” Laycourtusers 2.5. Plaintiff in this suit is a lay person acting pro se. The Court for this reason extended all indulgences to him as recommended in Nartey v.Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 314, S.C. The duty owed to him as a lay court user and the need to indulge him has been the subject of endorsement by the courts in cases such as Edun v. Koledoye (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 642. as relied on in Wiafe v. Kom [1973] 1 GLR 240. Plaintff’s case was accordingly gleaned from his processes filed and the evidence given in support thereof, and the appropriate evidential standards specifically in relationto evidentialadmissions were applied. Declarationoftitle toland Page7of20 2.6. In a claim for a declaration of title to land, the evidence Plaintiff is required to give to succeed was clarified in Benyak Company Ltd v. Paytell ltd & 3 Ors [2014] 76 GMJ 1, where the Supreme court explained that Plaintiff apart from proving his root of title, mode of acquisition and overt acts of ownership must prove that he is entitled to the declaration sought. In Mondial Veneer (Gh) Ltd v. Amuah Gyebu XV [2011] 1 SCGLR466at 475the courtsaid this: “In land litigation, even where living witnesses who were directly involved in the transaction under reference are produced in court as witnesses, the law requires the person asserting title, and on whom the burden of persuasion falls, as in this instant case, to prove the root of his title, mode of acquisition and various acts of possession exercised over the subject-matter of litigation” 2.7. Plaintiff in a case as this puts his title in issue and must prove his root of title, the boundaries of the land in dispute and acts of ownership exercised over same. This position of the law was applied in Ebusuapanyin Yaa Kwesi v. Arhin Davis & Anor (2005) JELR 92075 (SC). The standard of proof under discussion is on the balance of probabilities. In Ebusuapanyin James Boye Ferguson (Substituted by Afua Amerley) v. I. K. Mbeah and 2 Others, Civil Appeal No. J4/61/2017, dated 11th July 2018, S.C. (Unreported),Appau JSCexplained this standard inthe following words: “The standard of proof in civil cases, including land, is one on the preponderance of probabilities - {See sections 11 (4) and 12 of the EvidenceAct, 1975[NRCD323]”. Page8of20 2.8. It is not relevant that the claim is for a declaration of title to land. In Adwubeng v. Domfe [1996-97] SCGLR 660, the Supreme Court explained the general absence of such distinctions in the standard of proof of matters incivilsuits thus: “Sections 11(4) and 12 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323)... have clearly provided that the standard of proof in all civil actions was proof by preponderance of probabilities – no exceptions were made. In the light of the provisions of the Evidence Decree, 1975, cases which had held that proof in titles to land required proof beyond reasonable doubt nolongerrepresented the presentstate of the law...” 2.9. However, this evidence when offered must be sufficient and the test of satisfactoriness or sufficiency of the evidence is the degree of belief that the evidence or its proponent creates in the mind of the trial court concerning the fact or facts in issue. For evidence to pass this test, after having assessed the facts on all the evidence adduced, a reasonable mind should conclude that the existence of some fact in issue is more probable and reasonable than its non-existence. This position ofthe law wasapplied in Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd [2010] SCGLR 728 and Faibi v. State Hotels Corp.[1968] 471. 3. THE EVIDENCE 3.1. All parties testified and called witnesses in the suit. Both sides in this suit have attempted to put in evidence Site Plans and Plans of land, but none of them is of any probative value. Plaintiff and Defendants did this. These plans ought to have been signed by a qualified Surveyor and approved by the appropriate Survey Director at the Lands Commission or at the very Page9of20 least by a Physical Planning officer in terms of section 140 of the Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016 (Act 925) to prove the unique plot number of the disputed land, I doubt the conclusion would be different even if I found the Town and Country Planning Act 1945, (Cap 84) as amended by Act 33 of 1960 to be the applicable law. Were it a survey plan, there are legal requirements which ought to have been satisfied, which were not. The Supreme Court speaking through Akamba JSC and unanimously too, in Nortey No. 2 v. African Institute of Journalism and Communication No 2[2013-2014] 1SCGLR703at 717said this “The plaintiff tendered exhibit A a site plan which bears the same endorsements as in the writ of summons in apparent proof of his claim to the land, i.e. his root of title. Exhibit A is however not dated. It is also not signed by the Director of Survey or his representative. This is contrary to section 3 (1) of L.I.1444, the Survey (Supervision and Approval of Plans) Regulations, 1989 which makes it mandatory for plans of any parcel of land attached to any instrument for the registration of such instruments to be approved by the Director of Survey or any official surveyor authorized in that behalf. This stark infringement of the statutory requirement renders the exhibit A of no probative value as rightly determined by the Court of Appeal. Notwithstanding that the exhibit A was accepted in evidence without any objection, it could not constitute evidence for the purpose for which it was tendered since it infringed the Instrument. This is so because our courts have a duty to ensure compliance with statutes including subsidiary legislations like the LI 1444 in this case. (See Ex Parte National Lottery Authority (2009)SCGLR390at 402).” Page10of20 3.2. I note that these requirements were carried forward under Section 208 of the Land Act, 2020 (ACT 1036). The onus of proof required by law as regards the identity of land would be discharged by meeting the conditions explained in Tetteh v. Hayford (2012) SCGLR 417 citing the case of Kwabena v. Atuahene (1981) GLR 136 namely, Plaintiff has to establish positively the identity of the land, all his boundaries and where there is no properly oriented plan drawn to scale, which made compass bearings vague and uncertain, the court would hold that Plaintiff had not discharged the onus of proof of his title. The principle is that to succeed in an action for the declaration of title to land, injunction and recovery of possession, the Plaintiff must establish by positive evidence the identity and the limits of the land he claims, as decided in Nyikplorkpo v. Agbedotor[1987-88] 1GLR165at page171,CA. 3.3. InMajolagbe v.Larbi [1959] GLR 190 it was held that when a partymakes and averment in his pleading which is capable of proof in a positive way and the averment is denied, the averment cannot be sufficiently proved by just mounting the witness-box and reciting the averment on oath without adducing some corroborative evidence. In such a case the party is expected to prove his case by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances and other relevant evidence. Again, the Supreme Court in Ofori Agyekum v. Madam Akua Bio (2016)JELR66782(SC),held per Benin JSC thus: “...Where no evidence is adduced on a fact that has been pleaded, it is treated as having been abandoned by the pleader,the courtdoes not call it into question in its judgment. The court’s only duty is to consider the evidence the party has profferred in determining whether or not he has metthe rightstandard of proof”. Page11of20 3.4. Additionally, all the site plans put in evidence and bearing the insignia of the Kintampo South District Assembly were prepared by a private surveyor. This not only smacks of fraud as it is a private document masquerading asan official document, but leads the court toan inclination to a preference of Plaintiff's evidence on the collateral issue that the area of the disputed land was never demarcated into building plots as alleged by Defendants and challenged by Plaintiff in the trial. I am strengthened in this position by 1st Defendant’s admission under cross-examination that the disputed area was never demarcated into building plots by the district Assembly. This was what transpired while he was under cross- examination: Q: Do you recall that neither the Ntankoro, Kintampo North or South Assemblyhas made any layouton Ntankoro lands? A: That is true. There is no layout. However, in 2013, when the land was givento us to oversee. Wewent to Kintampo South Assembly and requested that anytime somebody wants land, the come and demarcate it for them because we realized that we could not do this without authority. OneMr.Sule the Town PlanningOfficer was consulted. Q: Can you show the Court a plan of land that Mr. Sule has signed in respectof ademarcated landin this Court? A: Yes there are many. Since 2013 till date, it is Mr.Sule who has been working on the land. Page12of20 Q: Are you saying Mr. Sule is the Physical Planning Officer at the KintampoSouth Assembly as we speaktoday? A: itis himthat we work with. 3.5. In this suit, Plaintiff in the opinion of the court failed to lead sufficient evidence regarding the identity of the disputed land. the Plan of land put in evidence by him does not provide any competent compass bearings nor does it provide any specific identity of the land in terms of what would have been achieved with a Physical Planning Officer’s Site Plan or a plan of land approved by the appropriate officer of the Lands Commission. On that foot alone, Plaintiff’s suit must fail. This is because whatever declaration of title that this Court could make in his favour ought to relate to a specific portion of land on the ground and not an abiguous general reference to the land. The law is that failure to prove even one side of the boundaries of a land in dispute can be fatal to a claim for declaration of title. This is especially important, since it is at present a mandatory requirement under the Land Act 2020 (Act 1036) at section 156 in respect ofregistration post-judgment,but has alwaysbeenthe position ofthe law. 3.6. It is worth nothing that though 3rd Defendant alleges that he made grants of the disputed land as far back as the year 2014and these lands havebeen developed, no evidence in proof of this was offered. In fact, regarding the estoppel particularised in Defendants' pleadings, the earliest of any proof of such grants before this court is dated the year 2019. It is not sufficient to enter the witness box and repeat on oath the contents of pleadings. Some credible corroborating evidence must be provided. I conclude that Defendants’plea of estoppel by conduct is without merit. At any rate, 3rd Page13of20 Defendant admits that Plaintiff confronted him regarding the sale and that alone defeatsthis plea. Theusufruct 3.7. However, the evidence on record points to Plaintiff’s usufructuary ownership of land at the area claimed by him. Plaintiff’s claim of acquisition of the land by formal grant is corroborated and unimpeached. It is worth noting that Defendants did not lead any credible evidence nor explain to the Court the state of the disputed land at the time they proceeded to make grants of it to third parties. Whereas Plaintiff stated that he had previously farmed that land and left it fallow, Defendants said nothing of the land, whether it was completely vacant, grassland or fallow landasalleged by Plaintiff. 3.8. Usufructuary ownership was explained by Appau JSC (As he then was) in Togbe Lugu Awadali IV v. Togbe Gbadawu IV (2018) JELR 68854 (SC) in these words: “The word ‘Usufruct’ comes from the Latin phrase ‘usus et fructus’, which means; ‘use and enjoyment’, with ‘fructus’ used in a figurative sense to mean fruits enjoyed from the use, which include; the right to convey, transfer, lease, assign or tax during the pendency of the use of the property concerned. The term stands for a limited real right (or in rem right) found in civil law and mixed jurisdictions that unite the two property interests of ‘usus’ and ‘fructus’; i.e. the right to use and enjoy a thing possessed, directly and without altering it. It connotes the right of enjoying all the advantages derivable from the use of something (not only land) that belongs to another, as far as is compatible with the substance of the thing not being destroyed or Page14of20 injured. The Cambridge English Dictionary describes it as; “the legal right to use someone else’s property temporarily and to keep any profit made”. Black’s Law Dictionary, in its ninth edition, defined it as; “the right of using and enjoying property belonging to another provided the substance of the property remained unimpaired. More exactly, was the right granted to a man personally to use and enjoy, usually for his life...the property of another which, when the usufruct ended, was to revert intact to the dominus or his heir”. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; Deluxe Edition, describes it as; “The right of enjoying the use of and income from another’s property without destroying, damaging, or diminishing the property”. In customary law, usufruct means land is owned in common by the people, but families and individuals have the right to use certain plots or portions of the land. While people can take fruits of the land, they may not sell or abuse it in ways that stop futureuse of the land bythe community.” 3.9. In Mansu v. Abboye and Another [1982-83] GLR 1313-1323 the Court of Appealper Francois JA(as he then was) explained the nature and extent of theusufructuary interestin these words: “...Some of the cardinal incidence of the usufructuary interest were that the usufructuary had exclusive possession of the portion of land and he could not capriciously be divested of that interest by the stool neither could the stool alienate that portion of land to any other person without the prior consent and concurrence of the usufructuary. Thus, the usufructuary interest was potentially perpetual the interest of the usufructuary could be determined only by his consent, his abandonment or upon failure of his successors”. (emphasis mine) Page15of20 3.10. Additionally, usufructuary owners in possession can only be dispossessed of their usufruct in land on proven and unrectified breaches of customary tenure, or upon abandonment as explained in Asseh v. Anto [1961] G.L.R. 103, S.C., Amoabimaa v. Okyir (Consolidated) [1965] G.L.R. 59, S.C. and Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] G.L.R. 492, P.C. The Supreme Court also in Oppong Kofi and Ors v. Attiburukusu III [2011] 1 SCGLR 176 applied Awuah v. Adututu and Anor. [1987-88] 2G.L.R. 191 where it was held that the subject of the stool or a stranger-grantee of the stool could maintain an action against even the stool in defence of the usufructuary title and might impeach any disposition of such interest effected without his consent in favourofathird party. 3.11. Considering the issue of which caretaker stool had control over the disputed land lying at Ntankoro, the evidence in this suit, consisting largelyoforalevidence is ofsuch nature that the circumstances require me to consider it oath against oath. I apply Oxyair Ltd & Darko v. Wood [2005-2006] SCGLR 1057, and Lutterodt v. Commissioner of Police [1963]2 GLR 429, SC, where it was held that it is the duty of the trial court in such a situation is to consider the evidence adduced to form a judgment as to what version of events was more credible. The determination of crucial facts would then be a question of judicial choice of belief based on the comparative credibility of parties and their witnesses. It is incumbent upon the trial court to examine the evidence before preferring one to the other and give reasons for the preference. The trial judge cannot be faulted on his decision once it is based on the evidence on record. Her Ladyship Afia Serwaa Asare-Botwe (Mrs.) relied on these rules in Lydia Tetteh v. Madam Akweley &Anor(2019) JELR107108(HC). Page16of20 3.12. There is sufficient evidence that Defendants have always had knowledge of Plaintiff’s interest in the disputed land. This did not stop them from purporting to make grants of it to third parties. It is not sufficient excuse for 3rd Defendant to claim after admitting in his evidence that Plaintiff informed him of his interest in the disputed land and to say that since Plaintiff failed to show him documents covering the said land, he proceeded to deal with the land to Plaintiff’s disadvantage. By simple reason of 3rd Defendant’s position as chief and a respected traditional authority, he ought to have known that there are more ways of establishing ownership of land than by the showing of documents. 1st Defendant also admits by his responses under cross-examination that the land at the disputed area is under the chief of Ntankoro, since he claims to have been appointed as the representative. His admission that he is of the same Royal family as Plaintiff of Ntankoro further betrays his allegation that the disputed land is under not under the domain of the chief of Ntankoro. He claims that he was the caretaker of Ntankoro lands himself at some point, and this was what transpired while 1st Defendant was under cross-examinationon14thAugust 2024: Q:Was ityou who sold the land to 2ndDefendant? A: It was notme, who sold the land. Itwas the caretaker chief. Q: Do you remember that you have stated that you have been caretaker of Nkankorolandssince 2008till date? A: Iremember,but Itake careof the lands on behalf of its owner. Q:Which chiefwas the owner that you were hiscaretaker? Page17of20 A: When I started, it was Nana Owusu Yeboah, after him came Nana Awiti Kuffour and when Nana Awiti Kuffour was removed, then came 3rdDefendant. Q: Do you saythat NanaOwusuYeboah was the chiefof Ntankoro? A: Yes. It was Nana Owusu Yeboah because it was Nana Kwadwo Fosuwho appointed him as his regent. Q: From 1983 till 2008 who were Nana Kwadwo Fosu and Nana Kwaku Nsoae at Ntankoro? A: NanaKwadwo Fosu was the chiefand Nana Kwaku Nsoaa was removed and NanaOwusuYeboah was installed. 3.13. If from all the evidence on record there is a long history of control of Ntankoro lands by its own chief, then there is no basis for any claim that some other chief has control over those lands. 1st Defendant’s claim of representing 3rd Defendant and acting on his instructions in respect of that land is therefore to my mind an afterthought, his prevarications in his responses aside. For context, this was what transpired while 1st Defendant wasunder cross-examinationonthesame day: Q: From what you have said you did not represent Nana Fosu, but representedNana AwitiKuffour and 3rd Defendant? A: I represented Nana Fosu because Nana Owusu Yeboah stood for NanaFosu. Page18of20 Q: I put it to you that it was you and 3rd Defendant who sold my land to2nd Defendantbutnot the chiefof Ntankoro? A: I have said that it was 3rd Defendant who sold the land but not the chiefof Ntankoro. 3.14. There is no evidence that 3rd Defendant is the chief of Ntankoro or his representative. I am inclined to find that the disputed land is under the domain of the chief of Ntankoro and I so find. For this reason, 3rd Defendant had no business ratifiying any acts of 1st Defendant. I must again say today, that this court is not new to litigation with facts almost identical to that of this suit within the geographical jurisdiction of this court. The conduct of Defendants has the propensity to foment protracted litigation, misunderstanding and conflict. This conduct has very often been the subject of antipathy in the Ghanaian society and punitive judgmentsofthe Court. 4. CONCLUSION 4.1. It is noteworthy that this position of the society towards conduct such as that ofDefendants is expressed in the criminalization ofthe conduct under the Land Act 2020 (Act 1036). This judgment in my opinion ought not be any different. 4.2. Plaintiff’s action having failed however, I am of the view that it would be unfair for him to be mulcted twice in the payment of any significant costs to Defendants who clearly do not deserve it having dealt with Plaintiff’s land to his detriment. As explained in Kofi III v. Akrasi II and Another (NO 2) (1993) JELR 69447 (CA) relying on Ritter v. Godfrey [1920] 22 KB Page19of20 47, it is settled practice of the courts that in the absence of special circumstances, a successful litigant should receive his costs and some ground for exercising discretion to deny him ought to be shown. Having considered all relevant factors including parties retention of counsel and the length of time the suit took I have settled on what quantum of costs to award. Plaintiff’s suit fails and is accordingly dismissed. I award costs of GHS 3000.00in favour ofDefendants. Parties present except3rd Defendant (Plaintiff unrepresented) Hamidatu Banawabali Seidu Esq. holding the brief of Francis Asiedu Esq. for 1st and 3rd Defendants Theophilus Appoh Esq. holding the brief of Kwaku Gyambrah Esq. for 2nd Defendant Page20of20