Adam v Issahaku (BA/KPO/99/2024) [2025] GHADC 217 (17 January 2025)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT KINTAMPO HELD ON FRIDAY 17TH JANUARY, 2025 BEFOREHIS WORSHIP KWAMEADJEI MANUESQ. SUITNO: BA/KPO/99/2024 ABUBAKARIADAM - PLAINTIFF VRS AWUDUISSAHAKU - DEFENDANT JUDGMENT 1. BACKGROUND 1.1. Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant claiming against Defendant as follow: “a. the recovery of cash the sum of seven hundred dollars ($700.00) being financial assistance Defendant sought from the Plaintiff to aid him travel to Libya and promised to pay back as soon as he arrives in Libya but has refused topay backsince 2022. b. costs” 1.2. Pleadings were not ordered in this suit and parties’ respective cases were gleaned entirely from the writ of summons, statements made in Court and the entirety of processes filed by them in the suit. Parties are additionally lay court users so I have reminded myself that it is imperative for the court to extend to them all necessary indulgences to ensure fairness of the proceedings, for the court to decide the actual dispute and effectively determine the issues in contention. In Mante and Another v. Botwe [1989-90] 2 GLR 479 Taylor J.S.C had his say on the duty owed to parties in similar position to that of parties in this suit, and though Page1of17 the reference in that judgment was made to illiterates, I consider it equally applicable to lay court users acting pro se. The court made the following observations: “In this connection, it is worthy of note that our judges have traditionally taken the view that some indulgence should be shown to illiterates appearing before our courts as is illustrated by the editorial note of Hayes Redwar J. in his judgment in Bossom v. Attonie (1897) Red. 199 at 201. See also the judgment of the Full Court (coram Sir William Brandford Griffiths C.J. and Francis Smith J.) in Ansah v. Kwesi Essuman (1898) Ren. 136 and the Fiakpoli Concession (1903)Ren. 281.” 1.3. Additionally, Adade J.S.C. in Nartey v. Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 314, S.C. reminds the courts of this same duty. Cases such as Edun v. Koledoye (1954) 14 W.A.CA. 642. as relied on in Wiafe v. Kom [1973] 1 GLR 240 have all applied the same reasoning and admonished its application. Justice S.A. Brobbey (Retired) observed in his book Practice and Procedure in the Trial Courts and Tribunals of Ghana, 2011 concerning this duty of the court thus: “Sometimes the task of deciphering the precise claimfrom "home- made" writs, especially those prepared by letter writers, is no mean one. The best approach is to be guided by the principle enunciated in Atiafu v Dzaka [1962] 1 GLR 280which concerned actions in the erstwhile native courts. In that case, itwas held that in actions where writs have been prepared by semi-literates, one has to look to the issues involved rather than the wording of the writ of summons. Similar views were expressed in Ankrah v Ankrah [1966] GLR 60, SC and Donkor vNkrumah [1964] GLR739,SC.” Page2of17 1.4. This Court will also indulge parties by not holding their failure to cross-examine on essential matters against them, and evaluate the evidence of both sides holistically minded by the rules of law in Edun v Koledoye(supra), Mante v Botwe(supra)and Wiafe v. Kom (supra)that where lay parties in asummary trial were not represented by counsel, strict application of the rules of cross- examination would defeat the ends of justice. The proper test applied by this Court in this suit will be to find out whether there were positive admissions of facts in issue and if not, whether there was contrary evidence from the opposing side. Where appropriate, all issues of fact joined in the suit are resolved on the reliabilityofthe evidence, credibility ofparties and that oftheir witnesses. 1.5. Having the foregone in mind, the court gleaned parties’ cases and the issues in contentionfromthe entiretyofthe processes onrecord. I discuss themnext, Plaintiff’scase 1.6. Plaintiff’s case is that in 2022, Defendant approached him for financial support to travel to Libya and promised to refund Plaintiff's money as soon as he arrives in Libya. Plaintiff asked his brother Mohammed who was resident in Libya to assist Defendant at Plaintiff’s instance. Plaintiff says his brother gave all necessary financial assistance to Defendant until he successfully arrived in Libya in 2022. Plaintiff says the total sum of money his brother assisted Defendant with at Plaintiff’s instance was $700.00. Defendant has ignored the refund of the financial assistance for two years after same was given to him, and all Plaintiff’s efforts to retrieve the said amount fromDefendant have beenfutile. Defendant’scase 1.7. Defendant denies that he went to Plaintiff personally to ask for financial assistance to travel to Libya, but rather from one Mohammed, Plaintiff’s brother. According to Defendant though he discussed his intention to travel to Libya with Plaintiff, he informed Plaintiff that he had his own resources to travel to Agades and travelled there with his own resources at which point the Mohammed whom Plaintiff had arranged to receive Defendant as promised met him. This Page3of17 Mohammed took Defendant to Tripoli at a cost of 2000 Dinars which was agreed to be paid when Defendant got a job. Defendant lived with this Mohammed for three (3) months but could not find a job and after some time was introduced to an employer by Mohammed with whom he worked and received 900 Dinars as his first income outofwhichhe gave Mohammed 700Dinars. 1.8. Defendant says he shortly became jobless and went back to live with Mohammed for an additional two (2) months within which he was introduced by Mohammed to another employer being entitled to 4500 Dinars pay, but was denied this as Mohammed was the one who negotiated finances in respect of this employment. Defendant spent nine (9) months in total in Libya before returning to Ghana due to lack of employment, followed shortly by Mohammed who arranged a meeting between himself and Defendant in Plaintiff’s presence to ask for the balance of his money. Defendant requested for a month to pay due to his protracted unemployment. Plaintiff at this meeting told him to enquire about the dollar equivalentofthe money. 1.9. Defendant could not pay as promised in a month and received a police invitation that Plaintiff alleged Defendant owed him a debt of 700 dollars. Defendant admitted that he owed Mohammed and not Plaintiff personally. Subsequently this suit wascommenced against him. 1.10. Fromthe foregoing, the principal issue for determination inthis suit raised by the court on parties’ cases is whether parties agreed for Plaintiff to render financial assistance to Defendant to travel to Libya. This leads invariably to the discussion of the issue, whether Plaintiff rendered financial assistance to Defendant to travel to Libya, repayable to Plaintiff. To ensure the coherence of this judgment, bothissues shallbe discussed together. Page4of17 2. BURDENOF PROOF ANDEVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES 2.1. I consider next what standard Plaintiff who is really the party under the pressures of the law to prove his claims must meet to ensure a favourable exercise of the court’s discretion. Since not much of the facts were formally admitted,it would appear at first glance thatall is inissue. Burden ofproof 2.2. A primary principle of the law of evidence is that parties in civil litigation must succeed on the strength of their respective cases and not by a reliance on the weaknesses in that of their opponent. The Supreme Court in Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd. & Ors (2010) SCGLR 728, stated the law on this evidential burden thus: “It is a basic principle of the law on evidence that a party who bears the burdenof proof isto producethe requiredevidence of the facts inissue that has the quality of credibility short of which his claim will fail. The method of producing evidence is varied and it includes the testimonies of parties and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary and things (often described as real evidence), without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the court or tribunal of fact such as a jury. It is trite law that matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. This is a requirement of the law on evidence under sections 10(1) and (2) and 11(2) and (4) of the Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD323)” 2.3. By Sections 10(1)and 11(1)ofthe Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD323)parties bear the burdens of persuasion being the obligation of a party to establish a requisite Page5of17 degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court and the burden of producing evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against them on an issue. This is especially important when parties have raised allegations in their case on which the success of their claims or defence hinge. In Ishack v. Praba(2007) 12MLRG 172at 181,the CourtofAppealexplained thus: “The general principle of law is that it is the duty of a plaintiff to prove his case, ie. he must prove what he alleges. In other words, it is the party who raises in his pleadings an issue essential to the success of his case who assumes the burden of proving it. The burden only shifts to the defendant to lead sufficient evidence to tip the scales in his favour when on a particular issue Plaintiff leads some evidence to prove his claim. If the defendant succeeds in doingthis, he wins,if nothe loses on that particularissue.” 2.4. Additionally, in Memuna Moudy and Others v Antwi [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 967., the Supreme Court speaking through Wood JSC (as she then was) explained at pages974-975 as follows: “A cardinal principle of law on proof as enunciated in the age-old case of Majolagbe v Larbi (1959) GLR 190 and reiterated in a number of cases, including Zabrama v Segbedzi (1991) 2 GLR 221at 246, is that, a person who makes an averment or assertion which is denied by his opponent, has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And he does not discharge his burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from whichthe fact or facts he asserts can be properly and safely inferred." 2.5. This means that at law a party who alleges a particular fact bears the burden of proving it and where the fact alleged is denied by his opponent, an issue arises Page6of17 for determination. It is the party who has introduced a fact, which is denied, who has the initial burden of proving the denied fact. As explained in Re Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu & ORS v. Kotey & Ors [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 420 the burdens ofproduction of evidence and persuasion shift fromparty to party at variousstagesofthe trial, depending onthe issue(s), and thefacts asserted andor denied. This point is supported by sections 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD323)the first ofwhichprovides that: "Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claimor defence he is asserting." 2.6. section 17 of NRCD 323 particularly subsection also provides thus in full as follows: “17.Allocationof burdenofproducing evidence Exceptas otherwise provided by law, (a)the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a findingon that factwould be required inthe absence of further proof; (b)the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burdenof persuasion as to that fact.” 2.7. In assessing evidence led by parties, the Court is mindful of the settled rule of law as applied in Takoradi Flour Mills v Samir Faris [2005-2006] SCGLR 882 by Ansah JSC at page 890 referring to the case of Tutu v Gogo, Civil Appeal No 25/67, dated 28 April 1969, Court of Appeal, unreported; digested in (1969) CC 76, where OllenuJA said that: Page7of17 “in law, where evidence is led by a party and that evidence is not challenged by his opponent in cross-examination, and the opponent did not tender evidence to the contrary, the facts deposed to in the evidence are deemed to have been admitted by the party against whom it is led, and must be accepted by the court.” Parties’ evidence 2.8. Whereas Plaintiff gave evidence by himself and called one witness to corroborate his claims, Defendant testified by himself and called no corroborating witness when from his own testimony, there were clearly other persons he could have procured such corroborating evidence from. The Court will accordingly apply the rule in Faibi v State Hotels Corporation [1968] GLR 471 that “Where a party would not produce evidence which evidence is available and within his peculiar knowledge, it could be inferred in law that that evidence is against him", in reaching its conclusion that any evidence that Defendant could have given is squarely against him. 2.9. Defendant however admitted in his evidence that he discussed with Plaintiff his intention to travel to Libya and Plaintiff offered to assist him. Though the nature of this assistance Defendant contends was only an arrangement by Plaintiff for another person, Mohammed Sando, PW1 to receive Defendant when he arrived in Agades Libya. Defendant insisted that he used his own resources to travel from Ghana to Agades Libya. Defendant did not challenge PW1’s evidence in much substance and did not lead any credible evidence to contradict it. If at any rate I am to consider the statements put by him to PW1 while the latter was under cross-examination, it is clear not only that Defendant himself is not a credible witness, but that he does not dispute that parties met at Plaintiff’s house and it was agreed for Plaintiff to assist Defendant financially, I consider these statements keeping in mind the rule that they do not by themelves constitute Page8of17 evidence. This was what transpired while PW1 was under cross-examination by Defendant: Q: On the day I arrived at Tripoli Libya and you were handing the money to the driver, did you call and inform me of the amount you were giving to the driver? A: It was Defendant’s agent that I paid the money to. Defendant spoke with his agentand they came. Q: I put it to you that we all met at Plaintiff’s house and that was where the money was converted intodollars? A: Not true. It was Defendant’s agent who informed me, Defendant and Plaintiffof the amount. Additionally, Defendant kept prevaricating while under cross-examination among other things about how he came to meet Mohammed Sando. Defendant initially claimed to have known Mohammed personally before Plaintiff introduced themas seenfromcross-examinationthus: “Q: Before you came to my house and asked for assistance, did you know Mohammed? A: Yes Iknewhim. Q:How did you knowhim? A: He ismyfriend. Q:At the time, did you have any interaction with Mohammed? A: Yes.” 2.10. He eventually admitted that it was through Plaintiff’s introduction that he got to knowMr. Mohammed Sandoasevident in hisresponses thus: Page9of17 “Q:Through whom didyou go toLibya? A: Plaintiff introduced me to Mr. Mohammed and I used my own money to travel from here toAgades. Q:At the time, did you have Mohammed’s contact number through whichyou were communicatingwith him? A: It was there that Plaintiffintroduced meto Mr. Mohammed. Q:Soyou admit that itwas through me that you got to knowMr. Mohammed? A: Iknewhim already though Plaintiffgave me his number. Q: I put it to you that it was on the day I introduced you to Mohammed that you are my friendabout totravel toLibya? A: It istrue” 2.11. This is in addition to his admission contradicting his evidence-in-chief that he financed his own travel to Libya. Defendant admitted under cross-examination that his agent sent him to Libya before Mohammed Sando paid the cost. This was what transpired while Defendant was under cross-examination: Q: Do you admit that it was your agent who sent you to Libya before Mohammedpaid the cost? A: Iadmit that. 2.12. It was held in Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa & Anor v. Jake Obetsebi Lamptey & Anor [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 16, that where a matter is admitted proof is dispensed with. In discussing the effect of admission of a fact advantageous to an opponent’s case in the case of In re Asere Stool; Nikoi Olai Amontia IV (substituted by Tafo Amon II) v. Akotia Oworsika III (substituted by) Laryea Ayiku III [2005-2006] SCGLR 637 at 656, the court explained the rule of law on admissionsthus: Page10of17 “Where an adversary has admitted a fact advantageous to the cause of a party, the party does not need any better evidence to establish that fact than by relyingon such admission, whichis an example of estoppel by conduct.” 2.13. Additionally, under Section 80 of NRCD 323 this Court may determine the credibility of a witness and consider same in determining the probative value of thewitness’testimony. Itreads: “80.Attackingor supportingcredibility (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the Court or jury may, in determining the credibility of a witness, consider a matter which is relevant to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witnessat the trial. (2) Matters which maybe relevantto the determination of the credibility of the witnessinclude, butare notlimited to (c)the existenceor non-existenceof afacttestified to by the witness; (g) a statement or conduct which is consistent or inconsistent with the testimony of the witness atthe trial;” 2.14. I am mindful of all these statutory provisions in setting out beforehand, that Defendant in the court’s opinion is not at all a credible witness. His evidence contradicting Plaintiff on the nature of parties’ agreement in the Court’s view oughtnot tobe considered ashaving any morethannegligible weight. 3. DISCUSSIONOF THEISSUES 3.1. The first issue I will discuss is whether parties agreed for Plaintiff to render financial assistance to Defendant to travel to Libya. I have considered whether Plaintiff has led sufficient evidence to support a positive finding in his favour on this issue. The test of satisfactoriness or sufficiency of evidence is the degree of Page11of17 belief that the party creates in the mind of the trial court concerning the fact or facts inissue. After the court hasassessed the facts onallthe evidence adduced, it should be able to reasonably conclude that the existence of a fact in issue is more probable and reasonable than its non-existence. This standard applied in a plethora of cases including Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd [2010] SCGLR 728, is applied to the present suit. I am also guided by the words of Her Ladyship Mrs. Wood, as she then was, in Yeboah vrs. Amofa (1997-1998) 1 GLR 674 at page 683 concerning the sufficiency ofevidence thus: “I notice from section 11 of NRCD 323 that the statute does not attempt any definition of “sufficient evidence”. In other words no attempt is made in disclosing what evidence will be deemed sufficient and what could be classified as insufficient. The reason is not difficult to find. It is definitely a question of fact determinable on the peculiar facts of each particular case. So that what constitutes sufficient evidence in case A may not necessarily be sufficient evidence in case B.............. I think when the two cases are read in the light of sections 11(1) and (4) and 12 of NRCD 323, all the law required of a person who seeks declaration of title is to lead such particular or sufficient evidence as the circumstances of the case would permit, so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind would conclude the probabilities of the existence rather than the nonexistence of the fact”. 3.2. The Court’s duty is to assess all the evidence on record to determine in which of the parties’ favour the balance of probabilities is tilted. In the discharge of this duty, I rely on the mind of the Court in the case of In re Presidential Election Petition (No. 4) Akuffo-Addo & Ors. v. Mahama & Ors. [2013] SCGLR (Special Edition)73,wherethe Supreme Courtstatedat page 322asfollows: Page12of17 “Our understanding of the rules in the Evidence Decree, 1975 on the burden of proof is that in assessing the balance of probabilities, all the evidence, be it that of the plaintiff, or the defendant, must be considered and the party in whose favour the balance tilts is the person whose case is the more probable of the rival versionsand is deserving of a favourable verdict.” 3.3. From the matters established as being in admission in the foregoing, Plaintiff introduced Defendant to Mohammed Sando who paid for Defendant’s travel to Libya. Additionally, on the preponderance of the probabilities, preferring Plaintiff’s corroborated and unimpeached evidence to Defendant’s, I find that the agreement was for Mohammed Sando to pay for this travel on Plaintiff’s behalf, recoverable in the same manner on Plaintiff’s behalf. I find that Defendant knew at all times that this financial assistance rendered to him was repayable to Plaintiff or his agent. The arrangement betweenparties appearsto the Court tobe inthe natureofHawala. Hawala 3.4. Hawala system, an informal form of money transfer used of often by migrant workers appears to have been the arrangement between parties in this suit. A relatively faster low-cost and "underground" banking transaction, a largely paperless remittance system. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines Hawala which is often employed where persons are desirous of avoiding carrying cash thus: “(in Arab countries and South Asia) a traditional system of transferring money to aperson inanother country or area, which involves paying money to an agent who then tells another agent in the relevant place to pay that person.” Page13of17 3.5. Though this is an informal arrangement based more on trust and not one with the usual markings of an ordinary contract, I have little doubt that such an agreement would raise enforceable promissory obligations. Defendant in this suit needed money and Plaintiff desired to give that money to him. Plaintiff approached Mohammed his Hawaladar(agent) in this instance and instructed him to give the money he wanted Defendant to receive, money that stood to Plaintiff’s credit with him. This third party or hawaladar gave the money to Defendant from his own account, though in this case there was no evidence of any commissionhavingbeen paid, whichis the usual practice. 3.6. Plaintiff’s claim in this suit is in substance for specific performance of Defendant’s promise to repay to him the financial assistance rendered to Defendant. I take opportunity here to find the following as facts, that Parties agreed for Defendant to be assisted by Plaintiff in the sum of USD 700, which assistance was given, but Defendant has reneged on his obligation to refund same. Having found Defendant to have made this promise, it would be inequitable to permit Defendant to renege on it without some lawful excuse. The principle of promissory estoppelas referred to by some as equitable estoppel was explained by Denning J (as he then was) in the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 where it was held, as stated in theheadnote thus: “... where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promisee, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it even although the promise may not be supported by consideration in the strictsense ...” Page14of17 3.7. A party whose case relies on promissory estoppel as discussed in Ibm World Trade Corporation v. Hasnem Enterprises Ltd [2001-2002] 2 GLR 248 must prove that a promise was made with the intention that the claimant should rely on it and that the promise was in fact relied on by the claimant oft to his detriment. All are sufficiently proven in this suit. It is clear from the conduct of Defendant, especially in this court that he is presently in breach of his promise to Plaintiff. Ibm World Trade Corporation v. Hasnem Enterprises Ltd (supra) explained that the remedy of specific is an equitable relief exceptional in its character, and the court has the discretion to grant or refuse it. Factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant it include the readiness of the party claiming specific performance to perform his obligations in respect of the underlying agreement. Inthis suit, Plaintiff has alreadyperformed his end ofthe bargain. 3.8. However, I am minded in this suit to order damages for a breach of the parties’ contract as opposed to an order of specific performance. The settled law is that specific performance will not be granted if damages will be an adequate remedy, where there is want of mutuality, where performance requires the Court’s supervision, if it will be pointless to grant it, if the contract cannot be enforced in its entirety, if the order will cause severe hardship to Defendant and if Defendant’s personal freedomwill be retrained by it. Inthis suit, there is not only a want of mutuality between parties as clearly demonstrated in their conduct and stances in court, but it would be pointless to make such an order. In any case, the payment of money due and owing with accompanying orders to ameliorate potential losses occasioned by the passing of time, all in the nature of damages and interest on it, should suffice. As pointed out in Holland West Africa & Anor v. Pan African Trading Company & Anor. (1976) 2 GLR 179 ‘if a breach of contract had deprived a plaintiff of the use of a sum of money or other capital asset, the defendant Page15of17 must be presumed to have agreed to pay interest for the period between the date when the causeof action arose and the date of the judgment’. Interest 3.9. As explained by the Court in Kama Health Services Limited v. Unilever Ghana Limited (supra), Parties need not provide in their contract that interest shall be paid in the event of a breach. Interest payment follows failure of a contract under which payment has been made, as a form of damages for breach of contract. Additionally, by the Court (Award of Interest and Post Judgement Interest) Rules, 2005 (C.I. 52) it is provided at Rule 1 that if the court in a civil cause or matter decides to make an order for the payment of interest on a sum of money due to a party in the action, that interest shall be calculated (a) at the bank rate prevailing at the time the order is made, and (b) at simple interest, but where an enactment, instrument or agreement between the parties specifies a rate of interest which is to be calculated in a particular manner the court shall award that rate of interest calculated in that manner. In this suit there is no contractual or statutorily applicable rate. Rule 2(1) of C.I. 52 provides that Subject to subrule (2) each judgment debt shall bear interest at the statutory interest rate from the date of delivery of the judgment up to the date of final payment. I have in this suit decided that it is not only fair, but required, that all sums of money ordered tobe paid must attract the appropriate interest. 3.10. The statutory orprevailing bank rateas provided under Rule 4(1) is the bank rate prevailing at the time the judgement or order is made by the court and where there is doubt as to the prevailing bank rate, the 91 days Treasury Bill interest rate as determined by the Bank of Ghana shall be the prevailing bank rate as provided by rule 4(2). I apply Daniel Ofori v. Ecobank Ghana Limited (2020) JELR 92012 (SC) in the absence of an agreed or other statutorily applicable rate to assess interest in this suit at the statutory rate of 28.33% per annum, which I have Page16of17 taken notice of as the Bank of Ghana 91-day treasury bill interest rate as at judgment. I shall also order that the judgment sum in this suit be paid in the cedi equivalentof700USDatthe bank ofGhana forexrate asat judgment. 3.11. Though I must say that it appears that Defendant's ill-fortunes while in Libya may be motivating his desire to renege on his obligations, his personal fortunes cannot offer him respite or legal excuse from his lawful obligations. These are obligations he may at law be appropriately compelled to fulfil on pain of the award ofdamages. CONCLUSION In conclusion, Plaintiff’s action succeeds entirely, and judgment is entered for him on his reliefs asclaimed. Plaintiff shall recoverfromDefendant as follows: a. The Ghana cedi equivalent of the sum of seven hundred dollars ($700.00) being Ten thousand four Hundred and forty-four cedis (GHS 10,444) as at judgment, with interest at the statutory of 28.3% rate from the last day of the year 2022 till final payment. b. Costs of One Thousand Five hundred Ghana cedis (GHS 1,500.00) in favour of Plaintiff against Defendant, with interest at the statutory rate in order “a” above fromjudgment till finalpayment. SGD. H.W. KWAMEADJEI MANU ESQ. (DISTRICTMAGISTRATE) Parties present(unrepresented). Page17of17