Nurucea v Nuru (A2/89/2023) [2024] GHADC 762 (5 December 2024)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 1, MADINA, HELD ON THURSDAY, 5TH DECEMBER, 2024 BEFORE HER WORSHIP ROSEMARY ABENA GYIMAH AS MAGISTRATE SUIT NO: A2/89/2023 FRANK KWABENA NURUCEA …. PLAINTIFF House No. 2 Chow Street SDA last stop UN Madina Zongo VRS. ABDUL JABAR NURU …. DEFENDANT …………………..…………………………………………………………………………… JUDGMENT ………………...……………………………………………………………………………… INTRODUCTION This matter involves parties who at all time material during the construction and development of the subject matter of this suit, regarded themselves as father and son. With persuasive effect, I shall commence my judgment with four (4) quotes on fatherhood by some renowned poets and writers. 1 a. "It's a father's duty to give his sons a fine chance." (George Eliot, "Middlemarch ") b. "Listen, there is no way any true man is going to let children live around him in his home and not discipline and teach, fight and mold them until they know all he knows. His goal is to make them better than he is. Being their friend is a distant second to this." (Victor Devlin) c. "It is not flesh and blood, but the heart which makes us fathers and sons." (Johann Friedrich von Schiller) d. "It takes great courage to love unconditionally." (Isaac Mogilevsky, "A Letter to My Father: What Your Son Wants to Tell You But Doesn't") The Plaintiff in his writ of summons and statement of claim filed on 29th November 2023 claimed against the Defendant the following reliefs; a. An order to eject Defendant from Plaintiff’s house with immediate effect. b. An order directed at Plaintiff to rent the room being occupied by Defendant and hand over proceeds of the rent to Defendant for the next three years. c. Cost including legal fees incurred by Plaintiff. The Defendant on 13th February 2024, filed his statement of defence and counter claims as follows; a. An Order for the Plaintiff to refund an amount of GHS300,000.00 to the Defendant being the cost the Defendant incurred in building the 2- bedroom house on the Plaintiff's land. b. An Order for the Plaintiff to pay interest on relief (a) above at the prevailing commercial bank rate from 2018 to date of final payment. c. Damages for breach of contract 2 d. Cost, including solicitors' fees After parties were unable to reconcile their differences at Court Connected Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), trial in this matter began and concluded on 7th November 2024. THE CASE OF BOTH PARTIES THE PLAINTIFF The case of the Plaintiff is that he is the landlord of House Number 2 Chow Street and the Defendant is his tenant. The Plaintiff, despite describing the Defendant as his son under paragraph 6 of his statement of claim and subsequently during his evidence in chief before this Court, stated on 6th February 2024 in open Court that the Defendant was his former son. The Plaintiff states that he has lived in his house for a while now and wanted Defendant to join him. It is Plaintiff’s case that he had started building on the remainder of his land and was at the lentil level when he handed over same to the Defendant to complete and move in with his family. According to the Plaintiff, the agreement was on a build-use-return-the-room system where Plaintiff would allow Defendant to recoup his investment in the room by using it without paying rent but paying for all other utilities and the room reverting to Plaintiff after the agreed years. Plaintiff says that because Defendant is his son, he did not bother to enforce the rules of their engagement and allowed Defendant to occupy the room immediately after he finished. The Plaintiff says that per his calculations Defendant would have been entitled to a rent period of five or six years. Plaintiff says he has known no peace since Defendant moved into the house with his wife and that the Defendant challenges his title and rivals with him on who is the landlord. The Plaintiff contends that Defendant uses the room for illegal activities including indulging in illicit drugs. Besides the nuisance he creates for neighbours, Plaintiff says 3 that there are other tenants and minors in the house, as such, the activities of the Defendant and his acquaintances are likely to have negative consequences on the other tenants and minors in the house. The Plaintiff further contends that all efforts to get the Defendant to mend his ways have resulted in the Defendant challenging the title of Plaintiff including physically fighting the Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he caused a letter to be written to Defendant to vacate the house but Defendant has refused and or neglected to do so. Plaintiff insists he wants the Defendant to vacate the said house and that even though the Defendant has stayed in the house for five years already and has technically exhausted any investments he has put in the room, Plaintiff is willing to grant to the Defendant the rents of the room for the next three years. THE DEFENDANT The Defendant’s case is that in 2012 in his quest to purchase land at Lakeside Estate to build his dream house, he paid to officers of Lakeside Estate an amount of Twelve Thousand United States Dollars (USD12,000.00) for the acquisition of the land. Later an issue arose causing the Defendant to call for a refund of the Twelve Thousand United States Dollars (USD12,000.00) he had given to the persons at Lakeside Estate for the purchase of the said land. It is the Defendant’s case that he discussed his desire to build his dream house with his father; the Plaintiff and based on that the Plaintiff offered to grant to the Defendant his land at footing level for the Defendant to complete same so as to move in with his family and live in there forever. The Defendant asserts that he subsequently gave the said Twelve Thousand United States Dollars (USD12,000.00) to the Plaintiff to complete the construction of the two (2) bedroom house. The Defendant further asserts that he completed the two (2) bedroom house and has been in occupation of same with his family since 2018. It is the Defendant’s contention from his statement of defence and counterclaim before this Court that he spent a total amount 4 of Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) in the completion of the said two (2) bedroom house and that the agreement he had with the Plaintiff was not on a build-use-return-the-room system but rather for the Defendant to complete the said building which was at footing level and dwell in same with his family forever, as such if the Plaintiff now insists he should vacate the said premises then he is entitled to a refund of the Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) he claims he spent on the said building. EVALUATION OF THE LAW BURDEN OF PROOF In Fred Reimmer v Pastor Baffour, Suit No.FAL 314/11 dated 23 June 2017, Sittie J, restated the position of the law on burden of proof as follows ; “The position of the law on evidence in civil cases is that a party must win his case on the preponderance of probabilities. Section 11, 12 and 14 of NRCD 323 refers. This position of the law was affirmed by Kpegah JA (as he then was) in the case of Zabrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2 GLR 221 at 224 when he stated as follows; . a person who makes an averment or assertion, which is denied by his opponent, has the burden to establish that his averment or assertion is true. And he does not discharge this burden unless he leads admissible and credible evidence from which the fact or facts he asserts can properly and safely be inferred. The nature of each averment or assertion determines the degree and nature of that burden.” Proof was defined in Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190 at 192 as follows: 5 Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means. Where a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way, e,g by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances, and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness-box and repeating that averment on oath, or having it repeated on oath by his witness. He proves it by producing other evidence of facts and circumstances from which the Court can be satisfied that what he avers is true.” In Peter Kojo Biney and Others v. Geoffrey Adebayo Biney and Atlantic Port Services Limited (2017) JELR 67689 (HC) the High Court per his Lordship Justice Kweku T. Ackaah-Boafo in determining whether a failure to challenge an averment amounts to an admission stated as below; The law is that when a party makes an averment and same is not denied by the adversary, no issue is joined and the party does not have to lead any evidence to prove same. Similarly, when a party gives evidence of a material fact and was not cross-examined upon he needs not call further evidence to corroborate that fact. See KUSI & KUSI v. BONSU 2010 SCGLR @ 60.[21] Significantly, the Plaintiffs through their witness have made material averments that have not been challenged in any way either by way of cross-examination or evidence in rebuttal. By a stream of decided cases, it is now a settled rule of law that where a party has given material evidence and that party was not seriously challenged by way of cross-examination it is then accepted as a fact. The cardinal presumption is that the party against whom the evidence was led admits that fact even if sub silentio. See: AYIREBI v. FORI (1966) GLR 627 SC, HAMMOND v. AMUAH (1991) 1GLR 89 and KUSI & KUSI v. BONSU 2010 6 SCGLR @ 60 and TAKORADI FLOUR MILLS v. SAMIR FARIS [2005-2006] SCGLR 882 per Ansah JSC. The issue of the Defendant engaging in drug activities and the Defendant’s wife disrespecting the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff in his statement of claim describes the Defendant as his tenant and that he had an agreement with the Defendant to build on the remainder of his land, use same and return the room to the Plaintiff after an agreed number of years (which number of years the Plaintiff failed to indicate or ascertain same) so as to allow the Defendant recoup his investment in the two (2) bedroom house by using same without paying rent but paying for all other utilities. A tenant under Section 36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) - which serves as the interpretation section of Act 220 provides the meaning of a tenant as follows; "tenant" means any person who leases premises from another person in consideration of the payment of rent, and includes— (a) any person deriving title under the original tenant; (b) a sub-tenant; (c) a person who, before the commencement of this Act has retained possession of premises and who on and after such commencement continues in possession of such premises; and (d) a person who shall retain possession of any premises by virtue of the provisions of this Act. 7 From Section 36 of Act 220 supra, one of the prerequisites of a tenant is that the said tenant ought to pay rent. However the Defendant in this case does not pay any rent to the Plaintiff. The Defendant however states emphatically in his statement of defence that the agreement between both parties was that the Plaintiff offered the two (2) bedroom structure at footing level to him as a father to complete and live in forever with his wife and children. Indeed on 7th November 2024 during cross examination of the Defendant by the Plaintiff on the agreement between both parties, the following ensued; Q. Did we do any agreement in respect of you building on my land? A. No, we did not do any agreement because you are my father. It was a verbal agreement and you were the one who started the building with money Since both parties denied each other's assertion the onus was on either party to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the extent of the agreement they claim to exist between them. However neither party was able to fulfill this obligation placed on them by law. In fact the Plaintiff during his evidence-in-chief before this Court did not even repeat on oath, his claim of a build-use-return agreement that existed between both parties as he claimed in his statement of claim not to talk of having to adduce sufficient evidence in support of same. The Court notes however that both parties are ad idem on the fact that the Plaintiff granted the Defendant his land to complete the subject matter of this suit for the Defendant and his family to occupy same. 8 The Plaintiff does not deny that the Defendant indeed completed the subject matter of instant suit; House Number 2 Chow Street at Madina same of which the Defendant occupies. In fact the Plaintiff during his evidence in chief stated; “…..When I came back I saw that the Defendant had matured into an adult; 18 years and above and since he did not have any money or any relative to take care of him, I decided to take him in and for him to move in with me in my house at Madina. I informed him that I was building so he should come and complete the building and move in. The building was at the lentil stage so the Defendant came to do the plastering and concrete and completed the rooms in the building and he moved in….” Also the Defendant does not also deny that the land on which the house he occupies at Madina belongs to the Plaintiff and does not also deny that the Plaintiff had started building on the land before handing over same to him to complete. Indeed during the evidence in chief of the Defendant he stated as follows; “…..Later on they came and said there is an issue with the land so it is either they move me from where I am to somewhere else or they refund my money to me and I told them ok I have to discuss it with my father. As I discussed it with the Plaintiff he told me, there is a two (2) bedroom house footings in his house so why don't I collect the money from Mr. Awal and build on his two bedroom house footings. I told the Plaintiff that my dream is not to build on his land but rather to build on my own land so that I can move in with my family. My father; the Plaintiff said that place can be mine as my birthright and I told him no, if he wants to help me why doesn't he give me one of his chamber and hall for me to stay with my family and he said I have four (4) children with my wife and we are living in a single room so it will be better for me to build on the two (2) bedroom house footings he is willing to give me so that my children and I 9 can be comfortable in that two (2) bedroom house. So I said ok I agree with him so ….” Therefore, the point of divergence between both parties is at which stage the Defendant came in to complete the said subject matter of this suit before moving in to occupy same. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the building was at the lentil level whilst the Defendant claims otherwise, saying, the building was at the footing level. As a result, the Defendant claims per his statement of claim and counterclaim that he spent an amount of Three Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,000.00) in completing the building; subject matter of this suit before moving in with his family in 2018. However, in the schedule of estimate for work done filed by the Defendant in support of this assertion, the Defendant now seeks to convince this Court that he rather spent an amount of Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) in completing the subject matter of this suit. The Plaintiff contends this amount spent by the Defendant as being overinflated. In Quagraine v. Adams (1980) JELR 69241 (CA) the Court of Appeal stated the rule that a person who spends money on improving the property of another does so at his own risk and provided the exceptions to same as below; As a general rule, a person who spends money on improving the property of another, does so at his own risk, for he cannot claim, as of right, any reimbursement nor can he claim any proprietary interest in the property on account of his expenditure. However, there are a number of exceptions to the general rule. Equity, for instance, will intervene to protect the other party in circumstances where undue advantages accrue to the owner of the property and where such owner is guilty of inequitable conduct. 10 In the instant case, the nature or the purpose of the Defendant’s engagement on the land was to complete a two (2) bedroom house on the Plaintiff’s land. The Plaintiff offering his land to the Defendant for the purpose of completing a two (2) bedroom house and same devoid of any consideration of the payment of rent by the Defendant, I find that the Defendant cannot be described as a tenant within the meaning of Section 36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) but that this case presents a proper case of a license relationship between both parties. In Dasi Akakpo & Anor. v. Ben Johnson & Anor. (1999) JELR 69558 (CA), the Court of Appeal explained who a bare licensee is as follows; By definition a bare licensee is a person who, for his own purposes, is permitted by the occupier of property to go or be upon that property, so as not to be a trespasser. The bare licensee has no contractual right to use the land and the occupier may revoke the license at any time. See Osborn’s Concise law Dictionary, 8th Ed. P.43. A similar definition will be found in “Ghana land law and conveyance” by a Rocha & London”, 1st Ed at p.77 which reads: “A license is a permission given by owner of land or of an interest in land which allowed the licensee to do certain acts in relation to the land which would without the permission, amount to a trespass. A licence strictly speaking, does not create or confer interest in land. The original common law was that, except in the case of a license complied with an interest in land, a licensor may revoke a licence granted by him. This definition fits well with the position of the Defendant as I find that the Plaintiff as owner of the land, gave permission to the Defendant to complete the two (2) bedroom house; subject matter of this suit which without the permission of the Plaintiff would otherwise have amounted to trespass on the part of the Defendant. 11 Again, in Marian Obeng Mintah v. Francis Ampenyin (2015) JELR 68940 (SC) the Supreme Court in discussing what a license is and the various categories of licenses stated as below; In the light of the evidence on the record, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the appellant was a licensee of a sort since she occupied the building upon the invitation of the owner thereof, the respondent herein. The common law recognized three categories of licenses notably, bare or gratuitous licenses; license coupled with a grant or interest and contractual licences. As to what category of license was granted the appellant, the facts on record support the view that the appellant’s permission was a bare or gratuitous permission. A bare or gratuitous licence is a mere permission for the licensee to enter upon the licensor’s land. This permission may be withdrawn at any time by the licensor. (See Modern Law of Real Property 16th Edition by E.H. Burn, page 640.) Black’s Law Dictionary also defines licensee as: “1. One to whom a license is granted. 2. One who has permission to enter or use another’s premises but only for one’s own purposes and not for the occupier’s benefit” The appellant was a gratuitous licensee or tenant given the fact that she was invited to occupy the uncompleted building without consideration and in circumstances that do not otherwise impose a duty hence she can have her tenancy withdrawn at any time by the licensor. The concept of a gratuitous tenant has received considerable treatment by Ghanaian writers in Land Law and Property. In his Ewe Law of Property, (1973) by Prof A.K.P. Kludze and edited by Anthony Allott, at page 245 the learned author highlighted on the concept thus: 12 “A gratuitous tenancy may be determined if the tenant tries to set up an adverse title to the land. As its basis is usually blood relationship or friendship, it may also be determined for ingratitude, disobedience or bad behavior towards the grantor or for committing waste. The right and grounds for determining a gratuitous tenancy extend to the successors of the grantor and grantee. Hence a gratuitous tenancy granted several generations ago may be determined today if a bad relationship develops between those who have succeeded the original parties.” It is Plaintiff’s claim that he wants the Defendant out of the subject matter of dispute because the Defendant is conducting illegal business in his property to wit engaging in the sale of drugs and also because the Defendant’s wife insults him and has caused some people from Nima to beat his wife. I find that throughout the trial beyond the Plaintiff and his witness repeating this averment on oath the Plaintiff failed to adduce any form of evidence to support this claim against the Defendant. However, having found that the Defendant is a licensee in this case, the Plaintiff as owner can determine the licence at any time as provided by law. The Court of Appeal in the case of Sadia Salifu v. Alhaji Muntaru Sofo (2018) JELR 69811 (CA) stated when the possessory entitlement of a licensee ends as follows; It is trite law that the possessory entitlement of a licensee ends with the assertion of the owner’s right to possession. Since the Defendant is a licensee, all that was required of the Plaintiff as a licensor was that the Defendant had to be given reasonable notice to quit the said two bedroom house. In the Dasi case supra, a licensee who will not quit land voluntarily after being given reasonable notice may be ejected by reasonable means. 13 The Issue of Refund of money Defendant expended in completing the said two (2) bedroom house. It is the case of the Defendant that in 2012 he was to purchase land at Lakeside Estate to build his dream house as he describes it. According to the Defendant an issue arose therefrom causing him to call for a refund of Twelve Thousand United States Dollars (USD12,000.00) he had given to the persons at Lakeside Estate. The Defendant further stated that he gave the said money to the Plaintiff to complete the construction of the said two (2) bedroom house based on the fact that the Plaintiff had offered to grant to the Defendant his land at footing level for the Defendant to complete same so as to move in with his family and live in there forever. It is the Defendant’s case from his evidence in chief before this Court that he spent a total amount of Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) in the completion of the said two (2) bedroom house which he has occupied with his family since 2018. The Defendant filed an estimate for work and called his cousin; Awal Issah, to give evidence in support of his case. The Defendant’s witness in his evidence in chief before this Court on 7th November 2024 stated as follows; Q: Straight to the point, kindly tell the Court why you are here today? A: Jamal is my cousin. We have lived in the same house before at Nungua. So one day he told me he wanted to travel and I asked him why he wanted to travel and he told me the way we are living in the same room we are so many with the other siblings. Q: Did the Defendant give you any money for a land? A: Yes. Q; How much did he give you? A: He gave me $ 12,000.00 at that time. 14 Q: Where was this land located? A: Lakeside Estate. Q: Did you deliver the land to the Defendant? A: Yes but later there was a problem and I told him the problem. So after the problem he told me that I should refund his money to him. Q: Did he tell you why he wanted you to refund the money to him? A: The Defendant said his father has given him a piece of land at this house that he should come and build on it so I refunded $8,000.00 at that moment to him so I later added $4,000.00. So when the Defendant took the money from me, I went to the site where he said his father had given him land to supervise the work. At that time the building was going on so after that I could not go there until they finished the building and that was in 2018 that the Defendant moved in so that is all I know about the matter. I find that the evidence of the Defendant’s witness on record was only to inform the Court of the fact that at a point in time in 2012, the Defendant gave him Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) for the purchase of land at Lakeside Estate but a problem arose for which he could not provide the Defendant with the land any longer. The Defendant therefore demanded a refund of his Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) which the Defendant witness claims he refunded - this is the evidence of the Defendant’s witness, nothing more, nothing less. The Defendant’s witness’s evidence in no way proves that the said Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) he refunded was given to the Plaintiff to complete the subject matter of this suit. Again, I find that the estimate for work filed by the Defendant is a self serving document as same was drawn up by the Defendant himself and in no way proves that 15 he indeed spent Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) on the said 2 bedroom house especially more so when in another breadth in his statement of defence and counterclaim before this Court, the amount the Defendant claims he spent is Three Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,000.00). As a result, I find that the evidence of the Defendant on record does in no way prove on the balance of probabilities that indeed the Defendant spent neither Three Hundred, Two Hundred and Two Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,202.00) nor Three Hundred Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS300,000.00) as the Defendant claims. However during cross-examination of the Defendant by the Plaintiff on how much the Defendant gave to the Plaintiff to put up the two (2) bedroom house, the following ensued; Q: How much physical cash did you give to me in 2011? A: In 2012, I gave you exactly the equivalent of $ 12,000.00 in Ghana cedi Q: What was the exchange rate of the cedi to dollar in 2012? A: At that time $10,000.00 was GHS 76,000.00 By a stream of decided cases, it is now a settled rule of law that where a party has given material evidence and that party was not seriously challenged by way of cross- examination it is then accepted as a fact see Peter Kojo Biney and Others v. Geoffrey Adebayo Biney and Atlantic Port Services Limited (2017) JELR 67689 (HC) supra. As a result, the Plaintiff on record not denying that he received Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) from the Defendant in 2012 for the completion of the two (2) bedroom house same is deemed as a fact that the Plaintiff indeed received Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) from the Defendant for the completion of the two (2) bedroom house; House Number 2 Chow Street Madina. 16 The Plaintiff now seeking to recover the said property from the Defendant who he granted a license to erect same, is the Defendant then eligible for a refund since the Defendant expended money to complete the said property? In Dao v. Klu (Dzaba—Claimant) (1961) JELR 64730 (HC) the High Court stated as below; Now the alleged condition of the licence that the execution-debtor should vacate the land at any moment he is requested by the claimant to do so, means that the claimant could make such demand for vacant possession, very soon after the licensee would have completed erecting a building of some considerable value on the land. That condition therefore is unconscionable, and contrary to natural justice and good conscience, and therefore is not one which would be enforced by the courts. The custom is that where the licensor requires the licensee to quit land which he has been permitted to develop, the licensor must pay to the licensee the value of the development, otherwise the court will not entertain a claim for recovery of possession of the land and ejectment of the licensee therefrom. The Defendant has been in occupation of the property from 2018 till date which amounts to six (6) years. I therefore find that the Defendant has indeed enjoyed some benefit for having lived in the property for six (6) years without paying rent. Be that as it may, in order that justice may not only be done but be seen to be done, the Court having already found as a fact that the Plaintiff granted the Defendant a licence to complete the subject matter of this dispute and that same can be withdrawn at anytime, Also, the Court having found that since the Defendant expended his own money for the completion of the subject matter of this dispute, he is entitled to a refund of the Twelve Thousand Dollars (USD 12,000.00) he gave to the Plaintiff in 2012 for the 17 completion of the two (2) bedroom house and the fact that upon the Defendant vacating the said property, the Plaintiff is going to take benefit of same, I hereby order that the Defendant is to recover the amount outstanding, if any, from the set off between the total prevailing rent the two (2) bedroom house; House Number 2 Chow Street at Madina would have been eligible for, for the respective years under the period the Defendant has been in occupation of Plaintiff's property - that is 2018 till date and the amount of Twelve Thousand Dollars (USD 12,000.00) that the Defendant paid to the Plaintiff in 2012 for the completion of the subject matter of this suit. The rent control officer for the Madina district is to make a determination of the values of rents for the said House Number 2 Chow Street at Madina from 2018 till date using the prevailing rent at the time material for the respective years the Defendant has been in occupation of the said house; 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. The Plaintiff is to bear the cost of this valuation since he brought this matter to Court. Again, the said Twelve Thousand Dollars (USD 12,000.00) should be calculated using the prevailing cedi to dollar rate in 2012. CONCLUSION In conclusion applying the cases and principles enunciated supra; I hereby enter judgment partly in favour of the Plaintiff as follows; 18 a. Recovery of possession of House number 2 Chow Street from the Defendant. The Defendant is hereby granted three (3) months from today to vacate the Plaintiff's property. b. No award as to cost. Again, judgment is entered partly in favour of the Defendant with respect to his counterclaim as follows; a. Defendant is to recover the amount outstanding, if any, from the set off between the total prevailing rents the two (2) bedroom house; House Number 2 Chow Street at Madina would have been eligible for, for the respective years under the period the Defendant has been in occupation of Plaintiff's property, that is 2018 till date and the amount of Twelve Thousand Dollars (USD 12,000.00) - The rent control officer for the Madina district is to make a determination of the value of rent for the said House Number 2 Chow Street at Madina from 2018 till date using the prevailing rent at the time material for the respective years under consideration. b. No award as to interest on the Twelve Thousand Dollars (USD 12,000.00). c. No award as to damages. d. No award as to cost. SGD H/W ROSEMARY ABENA GYIMAH 19