The Republic V Evans & Anor (CC/BO/33/2024) [2024] GHADC 491 (31 October 2024)

CORAM: HER HONOUR (MRS.) ROSEMARY EDITH HAYFORD, SITTING AS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, DISTRICT COURT EJISU ON 31ST OCTOBER, 2024 __________________________________________________________________ CC/BO33/2024 THEREPUBLIC V KWAKUEVANS &ANOTHER ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TIME:1.30PM ACCUSEDPERSONPRESENT COMPLAINANT ABSENT CHIEFINSPECTOR FRANCIS ATIA ATINDORFOR THEREPUBLICPRESENT ACCUSEDPERSONUNREPRESENTED INTRODUCTION: 1 The accused person was charged with the offences of unlawful entry and stealing contrary to sections 152 and 124(1) respectively of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). The particulars of the offences are that on the 5th of February, 2024 at Ejisu in the Ashanti Region and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused person unlawfully entered the storeroom of one Sarpong Kwabena with the intent to commit a crime, to wit: stealing. On that same day, 5th February, 2024 at Ejisu in the Ashanti Region and within the jurisdiction of the court, the accused person stole 25 pairs of rubber slippers valued at GH₵2,500.00, the property of Sarpong Kwabena. On the 9th of February, 2024, when the Accused person was arraigned before this court, the 1st Accused (A1) pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, the 2nd Accused (A2) is at large, therefore the prosecutionis onlyagainst A1. THEFACTS PRESENTEDBY PROSECUTION: Complainant Sarpong Kwabena is a trader and he resides at Krapa near Ejisu. Accused, Kwaku Evans is a porter living at Ampabame near Ejisu. On the 5th day of February, 2024, the complainant closed from the market around 8.00 pm and kept his goods made up of one hundred (100) pairs of rubber slippers in a wooden storeroom close to the Ejisu roundabout. On the 6th day ofFebruary, 2024 at about 8:00 am as usual, he went to the said storeroom for his goods only to detect that one-quarter of the goods valued at GH₵2,500.00 had been stolen. The complainant started his own investigation during 2 which he met awitness in this case who was thenwearing one ofhis stolenslippers and during interrogation, the witness mentioned that he got the slippers from the accused. Subsequently, the accused was arrested by Ejisu police and during interrogation, he admitted the offence and mentioned one Mission as his accomplice but intelligence gathered disclosed that the said Mission is currently on the run. After investigations, theaccused was chargedwith theoffences before this honourable court. Section 11(2)of the Evidence Act1975NRCD 323states; “In a criminal action the burden of producing evidence when it is on the prosecution as to any fact which is essential to guilt requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind will find the existence of the facts beyondreasonable doubt.” Section 13(1) of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD 323 provides the extent of proof or the burdenonthe prosecutionin acriminalactionthus: (1) In a civil or criminal action, the burden of persuasion as to the commission by a party of a crime which is directly in issue requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The failure on the part of the prosecution will lead to acquittal and discharge of the accused. 3 See: Donkorv The State {1964} GLR598, SC Yeboahv TheRepublic (Consolidated) {1972}2GLR281 Republicv Adams{1960} GLR91at 95CA Maliv The State {1965} GLR710SC The criminal law in Ghana is settled that one cannot ground a conviction if the prosecution bases its findings on mere probabilities if not beyond reasonable doubt which clearly, draws a distinction between our civil law and criminal law. See: Oteng v TheState {1966} GLR352 –354,SC. The onus was heavily on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had indeed committed the offences charged. In the case of Philip Assibit Akpeenav. TheRepublic,(2020) 163G.M.J 32,Dennis Adjei, JA,stated thus: “proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean a shadow of doubt but the prosecution is under obligation to produce sufficient evidence so that on the totality of the evidence a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt…” In the Supreme Court case of Richard Banousin v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. J3/2/2014 dated 18th March, 2015), now reported in the [2016] 94 GMJ 1, Dotse, JSC (as he thenwas) expounded thelaw ontheburden ofproof in criminal mattersasfollows: 4 It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubtin all criminal cases. A corollary to the above rule is based on the fact that an accused is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty in a court of law. This, the prosecution can only do if they proffer enough evidence to convince the Judge or jury that the accused is guilty of the ingredients of the offence charged. The prosecution has the burden to provide evidence to satisfy all the elements of the offence charged. The burden the prosecution has to prove is the accused person’s guilt and this is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the highest burden the law can impose and it is in contra distinction to the burden a plaintiffhas in acivilcase which isproof on apreponderanceof the evidence. What beyond a reasonable doubt" means is that the prosecution must overcome all reasonable inferences favouring the innocence of the accused. Discharging this burden is a serious business and should not be taken lightly. The doubts that must be resolved in favour of the accused must be based on the evidence, in other words, the prosecution should not be called upon to disprove all imaginary explanations that established the innocence of the accused. The rule beyond a reasonable doubt can thus be formulated thus:- 5 An accused person in a criminal trial or action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to a verdict of notguilty. Significantly, whereas the prosecution carries the burden to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt, there is no such burden on the accused person to prove his innocence. At best, all that the accused person is required by law to dois toraise adoubt inthe case ofthe prosecution. Section 11(1) of the Evidence Act 1975 NRCD323 defines the burden of producing evidence as the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling on the issue against that party. The extent of onus on the defense on the other hand is provided bysection 13(2) of the Evidence Act 1975which states: “Except as provided in section 15 (c), in a criminal action, the burden of persuasion, when it is on the accused as to a fact the converse of which is essential to guilt, requires only that the accused raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt.” See Commissionerof Police vAntwi {1961} GLR408SC. See:Bruce-Konuahv.TheRepublic [1967]GLR611 In an attempt to discharge its legal obligation of proving its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution filed four witness statements 6 however only three of them testified in support of their case. They tendered five (5) Exhibits in support oftheir case. The Accused on the other hand just gave evidence viva voceand did notcall anywitnesses ortenderany exhibitsinevidence. THECASE FORTHE PROSECUTION PRESENTEDATTHE TRIAL: PW1 is a trader at Krapa, near Ejisu. On the 5th of February, 2024, at about 8.00 pm, he kept his goods at a storeroom close to the Ejisu roundabout and locked the place. On the 6th of February, 2024, he was informed by Peter Kofi Asamoah, (PW2) that his goods had been tampered with. He rushed tothe scene and detected that25pairs ofhis rubber slippers valued at GH₵2,500.00 had been stolen. Upon personal investigation, he met one Dominic Opoku wearing one of the slippers and upon interrogating him; he was led to the accused person. With the help of some friends, the accused person was arrested together with two pairs of the stolen slippers and he was handed over to the Ejisu police for necessary action. The accused person chose not to cross examine PW1 onhis evidence. PW2 is a porter who was tasked by the complainant on 5th February, 2024 to send his goods to the storeroom. This storeroom is used by a lot of traders, with all of the users having a spare key to same. He was sent by another trader to retrieve his goods from the storeroom where he saw that the complainant's sack containing his goods had been 7 tampered with and he informed the complainant. The complainant rushed to the scene and upon inspection of his goods, noticed that 25 pairs of rubber slippers, valued at GH₵2,500.00 had been stolen. The complainant conducted his own investigation on the same day and found one pair of stolen slippers with a witness, Dominic Opoku who indicated that the slippers he was wearing were for the accused, this, then led to his arrest. Under cross-examination, PW2 indicated that he did not see the accused tampering with thesack and thatwhen he gotthereit had alreadybeen done. The next was PW3, the investigator on the matter. PW3 by his witness statement indicated he was on duty when a case of stealing was referred to him to investigate. He stated that during his investigation he took statements from the complainant and his witnesses. He said he also took investigation cautioned statements from the accused person, in the presence of Matilda Nyarko, an independent witness. He visited the crime scene with both parties. He also took photographs of the crime scene. The parties weretakentohis superiorofficer and after listening tothemhe instructed him to charge the accused with the offence of unlawful entry and stealing. Under cross examination, theaccused denied thesaid offences. THECASE OF THE DEFENCE The accused person's defense was a denial of the charge and the facts presented. He denied entering unlawfully any wooden structure. It is the case of the accused that, it 8 was rather the other suspect at large who gave him the slippers to wear when he came to sleep in his house and that he does not know the said suspect from anywhere. However, when they were arrested and at the police station, on one of the days, that suspect the accused claimed he did not know anywhere, brought him food and since then he had not seen him again. Under cross examination the prosecution tried to impugn the credibility of the witness by putting to him that even though he claimed he did not know the suspect, he again admitted, that the suspect came to sleep in his house and broughthim food. The issues tobe determined are 1. Whether or not the accusedperson unlawfully enteredthe storeroom of Sarpong. 2. Whether or not the accused person appropriated the twenty-five (25) pairs of rubber slippersvalued atGHc2,500 ANALYSISOF THE CASE Section 152 of the Criminal Offences Act under which the accused is charged provides that: “A person who unlawfully enters a building with the intention of committing a criminaloffence in thebuilding commits acriminaloffence. 9 Section153furtherexplains unlawfulentryas: “a person unlawfully enters a building if that person enters otherwise than in the exercise of a lawful right or by the consent of any other person able to give theconsentfor thepurposes for which that personenters’. P. K. Twumasi in his book Criminal Law in Ghana, 1985 at page 382 states that to constitute theoffence the elementsthatare required tobe proved by the prosecutionare:  Thatthere was anentry  Thatthe entry was unlawful  Thatthere was anintention to committhe offence The offence of stealing is established under Section 124 of the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960(Act 29)as asecond-degreefelony. Same is defined under section 125 of the Criminal and Other Offences Act to mean the dishonest appropriation ofathing ofwhich thepersonis notanowner. Furthermore, Section 123 of the same Act gives a list of items capable of being appropriated. This means that for an accused person to be convicted of stealing, the prosecution bears theburden ofproving that 10 1.Therewas an appropriation 2.The appropriation was dishonest 3.The appropriation was of a thingcapable of being stolen 4.The accusedwas notthe owner of the thing Section 122(2) of Act 29 makes provision to the effect that the appropriation of a thing means any moving, taking, obtaining, carrying away or dealing with a thing, with the intent of depriving the owner of the benefit of ownership. See: Aning v The Republic. [1984-86] 2GLR85-89 Section 120 of Act 29 defines dishonest to the effect that the appropriation of a thing is dishonest if it is made with the intention to (a) defraud (b) without claim of right and with knowledge or belief that the appropriated thing is without the consent of the ownerorapersonwithright ofpossession The Prosecution in proving their case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt relied heavily onthe investigationcaution and charge statements that were given by the accused on the 7th and 8th of February, 2024 respectively wherein accused admitted to stealing twopairsofslippers belonging tothe complainant. 11 The gravamen of this judgment rests on the outcome of the admissibility and weight to be attached to the confession statement given by the accused to the police. As such I shall proceed toanalyse thesaid confession statementsoftheaccused. ADMISSIBILITYOFTHE CAUTIONEDSTATEMENTS Akamba JSC, in the case of Ekow Russell vs. The Republic [2017-2020] SCGLR 469defines aconfession statementas follows: "A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal charge, of the truth of the main fact charged or of some essential part of it. By its nature, such a statement if voluntarily given by an accused person himself, offers the most reliable piece of evidence upon which to convict the accused. It is for this reason that safeguards have been put in place to ensure that what is given as a confession is voluntary and of the accused person's own free will withoutanyfear, intimidation, coercion, promises orfavours." The accused person's cautioned statements dated the 7th and 8th of February, 2024 which turned out to be confession statements aregoverned by Section 120 ofthe Evidence Act, 1975(NRCD323).It provides 120.Confessions 12 (1) In acriminal action, evidence of ahearsay statementmade by an accused admitting amatter which (a) constitutes, or (b)forms an essential part of, or (c)taken together with other information already disclosed bythe accusedis a basis for an inferenceof, the commission of acrimefor which the accusedis being tried inthe action is notadmissible againstthe accused unlessthe statementwas made voluntarily.(emphasis mine) Applying Akamba’s dictum (supra) and the Evidence Act to the facts of this case, the basic point ofthe admissibility ofaconfessionstatement is the questionofvoluntariness. As confession statements, therefore, the cautioned statements are not admissible unless they were made voluntarily and in the presence of an independent witness. These requirements shall not be belaboured except that it is important to stress on the requirement ofvoluntariness. In determining what a ‘voluntary statement’ is, Taylor J in Republic V Kokombaopined asfollows: “In my view, in ordinary parlance, ‘voluntary statement’ means a statement offered by a person on his own, freely, willingly, intentionally, 13 knowingly and without any interference from any person or circumstance. If a person of unsound mind makes a statement, it is not voluntary, due to the interference induced by insanity; if short of insanity, a person makes a statement not because he wishes to make it but because of circumstances however induced, it will not be voluntary because of the interfering circumstances. If a statement is induced by threats and violence, it cannot be said to have been made without interference from any person and so it is not voluntary. If a statement is induced by promises, then it is not offered by the personofhis ownandit is accordinglynotvoluntary”. The burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the confession statement made was voluntary. In otherwords, the prosecution must prove that there was no inducement by threatorduress, orpromise held out tothe accused byapersoninauthority. Paragraph2ofExhibit A statesthat “I Kwaku Evans wish to make a statement. I want someone to write down what I say. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so but whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence. I have also been reminded of my rights toconsulta counselof my own choice.” The above statement was right thumb printed by the accused and same signed by the investigator as well as an independent witness. It further stated at paragraph 3 that 14 “suspect stated in twi language and same recorded down in English language in presence MatildaNyarko an independentwitness as follows…” Furtherin paragraph5,this waswhat waswritten “This is my true statement. I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. I made this statement on my own free will without any force or duress” (emphasismine) The above was also signed by the investigator (PW3) and thump printed by the accused. Itwas also signed by the independent witness (Matilda Nyarko). Beneath the above is the statement below at paragraph 6 made by the independent witness which she signed asfollows: “I Matilda Nyarko of H/No. AC103 Actiakrom hereby certify that, the above statement was voluntarily made by suspect Kwaku Evans in my presence and that the statement were (sic) read over to him in twi and he appeared to understand its contents and approved of them” Again, the abovestatement was signed by the saidindependent witness, the investigatorand it was right thumbprinted by theaccused. Clearlyfromthe abovethe accused’s rightswere explained tohim, thelanguage that theaccused opted forwas used and same takendown in thepresence ofan 15 independent witness who by the certificate confirmed that theaccused made the statement(confession) voluntarily satisfying theconditions under section120(2)ofthe Evidence Act which stipulatesas follows: “Evidenceof ahearsay statementis notadmissible undersubsection(1) if the statement was made by the declarantwhilearrested, restrictedor detained by the State unless the statementwas made inthe presence of an independentwitness, 2(2)who (a) canunderstand the language spoken by the accused, (b)can read and understand the language inwhich the statement ismade, and where the statementis inwriting the independentwitness shallcertify inwriting that the statementwas made voluntarily inthe presence of the independentwitness and that the contents werefully understood bythe accused” It must be stated that if the confession statement made by the accused fell short of the above,Exhibit A wouldhavebeen inadmissible. The same applied to Exhibit B, which is the statement made by the accused before he was charged with the offence of unlawful entry and stealing. The accused relied on his former statement (Exhibit A) and same was given in the presence of an independent witness who certified asfollows: 16 “I, Matilda Nyarko of H/No. AC103 Actiakrom hereby certify that the above statement was voluntarily made by accused person Kwaku Evans in my presence, the contents were read over to him in twi and he appeared to understand its contents and approved of them” It is noteworthy that when the matter came to court and during Case Management Conference (CMC) no objection was raised whatsoever by the accused person. Again, when the witness statement and all the attached exhibits (including Exhibits A and B) were tendered in court by PW3 (the investigator), no objection was raised and thus same were admitted by the court. The accused person when asked whether there was any objection indicated there was none. If the accused person had raised any objection to the tendering of the two cautioned statements, a mini-trial would have been conducted. But no objection was raised. Furthermore, during cross examination of PW3, the same investigator who took down the two cautioned statements, the accused person never challenged PW3’s evidence or exhibits A and B that were voluntarily given(being confession statements)beforethe independent witness. It must further be noted that the accused person during his cross examination stated that he did not make any statement. However, in his own evidence on the 29th of July, 2024,this is what the accused said “Fromthere Ididnot seethe boy even when mystatement was taken and Iwas putincells” 17 The statement above clearly shows that the statement of the accused was taken he cannot therefore deny same. I find therefore that Exhibits “A” and “B” are admissible and have probative value. Amegatcher JSC (as he then was), in the case of Francis Arthur v The Republic CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. J3/02/2020 dated 8 December, 2021 stated that the position of the law regarding a conviction based solely on the evidence of a confession by an accused person was stated by the Supreme Court in a Practice Note in the case of State v Aholo [1961] GLR 626 where Van Lare JSC citing with approval the case of R. v. Omokaro (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 146, which also cites the case of R. v. Walter Sykes (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 233directed asfollows: “A conviction can quite properly be based entirely on the evidence of a confession by a prisoner, and such evidence is sufficient as long as the trial judge, as in this case, enquired most carefully into the circumstances in which thealleged confession wasmadeandwassatisfied ofits genuineness.” He further referred to the subsequent Supreme Court decision in the case of State v. Otchere & Ors [1963] 2 GLR 463 where the Court per Korsah CJ emphatically stated that a confession made by an accused person in respect of a crime for which he is being tried is admissible against him provided it is shown by the prosecution that it wasmade voluntarily and that the accused was not induced to make it by any promise or favour, 18 or menaces, or undue terror. The Court then concluded that a confession made by an accused person ofthe commissionof acrime is sufficient to sustain a conviction without any independent proofofthe offence having beencommitted by the accused. It is therefore clear that the criminal jurisprudence of our Supreme Court leans towards the conviction of an accused person based on a voluntary confession to the commission of the crime charged. There have however been some exceptions where the courts decried the unreliability and of the only evidence available to convict were the confession statement and indeed set aside a conviction solely on the confession without some other corroborative evidence that the crime was committed and by the accused person. In the Francis Arthur case, Amegatcher JSC stated those cases form the exception rather than the rule. For example, in confession in murder and manslaughter cases, the courts have held that where the statement does not establish the corpus delicti, ie the concrete and essential facts which, taken together will prove that the crime has been committed, it would require some additional evidence in the form of corroborative evidence to demonstrate that the matters admitted did occur. Where the confession establishes the corpus delicti, the confession is sufficient to sustain a conviction. But in this case, the exception would not apply. Assuming without admitting that it wouldevenapply, in State v.Owusu & Anor[1967] GLR114BaidooJ held that: 19 “An extra-judicial confession by an accused that a crime had been committed by him did not necessarily absolve the prosecution of its duty to establish that a crime had actually been committed by the accused. It was desirable to have, outside the confession, some evidence, be it slight, of circumstances which made it probable thattheconfessionwastrue.” From the evidence adduced, when the accused personwas arrested he was wearing one of the stolen slippers. It is the case of the accused that, the said slippers were given to himby the second accused personwho is currently atlarge. Here is what he said onthe 29thofJuly, 2014 “At the police station we were asked where we got the slippers, I told them that it was the secondaccused(at large) whocame to sleepin myplace and brought same there” However, onthat same day in his evidence, he claims he doesn'tknowA2 “That boy, Ido notknow himfrom anywhere. I donotknow himfrom anywhere” Amazingly, the very person accused avers he does not know, was the same person he claims gave him the slippers and came to sleep in his room. In fact, in his evidence, he was the same person who visited the accused person at the police station with food. Belowis what hesaid. “One day I was there and the boy brought me food and he told me he had been freed by the police” 20 The question that begs for an answer is why would a person you claim do not know visit you at the police station and bring you food? The evidence of the accused personis full ofinconsistencies. Inhis evidence inchief, he stated asfollows: “At the police station we were asked where we got the slippers, I told them that it was the 2nd accused (at large) who came to sleep at my place and brought same them…” (emphasis mine) Meanwhile just some few minutes thereafter under cross examination, he denies his ownevidence. The following ensued during cross examination ofthe accused personon the2nd ofAugust, 2024. Q. Kwaku Evans how manyrooms doyou have inyour house? A. Oneroom Q. You have one room and you want this Honourable Court to believe that a person you do notknow before willcome and sleep with you inthat singleroom? A. That is not so. He has a friend in my house so sometimes when he comes to visit his friendand he is outhe comesto myplace and sitsto wait for his friend. Q. I put it to you that you know the person you are referring as a “boy” to be Dominic Opoku your friend which(sic)both of you doheadporter business atEjisumarket? A. That isnot correct, Ido notknow himanywhere Ihave notwalked with him before. 21 Q. But you told this Honourable Court that this same boy sits with you and talks with you and alsosleeps with you? A. He has neversleptat my placebefore”(emphasis mine) From the above accused person sought to contradict his own evidence. In State v Otchere andothers[1963] 2GLR463-531,Korsah CJstated atholding 14that “A witness whose evidence on oath is contradictory of a previous statement made by him whether sworn or unsworn is not worthy of credit and his evidence cannot therefore be regarded as being of any importance in the light of his previous contradictory statement unlesshe isable togive areasonable explanation for the contradictions.” In the instant case no reasonable explanation was given by the accused for the contradiction in his evidence. Therefore, the court would not attach any importance to his latterevidence in light ofthe previousone made. Also, in the case ofBuor v TheState [1965] GLR1,SC,it washeld that “where a witness has previously said something contrary to the evidence given during trial, his evidence shouldnot be givenmuchweight” InHayfronv Egyir [1984-86] 1GLR682,CA Itwas held that 22 “Where there are inconsistencies between documentary and oral evidence, the courts are encouragedto look atboth evidence butto lean favourably towards the documentary evidence." In the instant case, the contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the accused are overwhelming. In the circumstances, not much weight would be placed on his evidence by this court. The confession statements made by the accused having already been held to be admissible will suffice. In the said statement the accused admitted that he stole two pairs of the slippers. It is to be noted that the accused is not the owner of the said slippers. Accused therefore dishonestly appropriated the slippers which he had no claim of right over without the consent of the actual owner with the intention to deprive theowner ofitsuse Iso hold. Also in the said statement, the accused stated that on 5/2/2024 around 4.30 am he had entered the wooden structure where the complainant and some other people had been keeping their stuff after work at Ejisu roundabout with his friend Capo and that was when he took the two slippers. The accused entered the said structure without the permission of the complainant and he went ahead to take the slippers that did not also belong to him. Clearly, the accused unlawfully entered the said structure with a clear intentiontocommit theoffence I so find. 23 In the case of Commissioner of Police v. Antwi (1961) GLR 408, SC, it was held that the accused personis notrequired toprove anything. All that is required of him is to raise a reasonable doubt astohis guilt. Again, in the case of Lutterodt v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 GLR 429 @ 430, SC in holding 3held thus: “In all criminal cases where the determination of a case depends upon facts and the court forms an opinion that a prima facie case has been made, the court should proceed to examine the case for the Defence inthree stages. a. If the explanation of the defenceis acceptable, then the accused shouldbe acquitted. b. If the explanation is not acceptable but is reasonably probable, the accused should be acquitted. c. If quite apart from defence’s explanation, the court is satisfied on a consideration of the whole evidence that the accusedis guilty,it mustconvict." In sum, I do not find from the evidence adduced that a reasonable doubt was raised by the accused. In the circumstances having analyzed the facts and evidence, the court is satisfied on a consideration of the whole evidence that the accused is guilty of the offences chargedand herebyconvictshim accordingly. MITIGATION: 24 COURT:Isthe accused personknownProsecutor? PROSECUTOR: The accused person is not known to the law. But the accused person is not a novice or new in his trade of stealing. The accused was granted bail by this court but because of his acts and character in the community he is living they all failed to stand surety for him believing that this time round the accused person should face the law alone. The accused person has wasted this honourable court’s time knowing very well that he did same. Prosecution is praying this honourable court that in passing a sentence on the accused person the court should consider that justice be served to the society and hand over a punishment that would deter the accused person's age group from stealing and also serve as a lesson for the accused person when he serves the sentence. ACCUSED PERSON: I am pleading with the court to forgive me, it shall not happen again. SENTENCING I haveconsidered the plea ofmitigationby the accused personas wellas thesubmission by the Prosecutor. I have also considered the fact that the accused is a first-time offender. Indeed, the accused has wasted the court’s time by letting the court go through a full trial knowing very well that he stole the items. However, I have considered the age of the accused person, he is only 18 yearsof age, a young offender, it 25 is my humble view therefore that a reformative sentence will help the accused rather than a custodian sentence. In the circumstances, I hereby sentence the accused to pay a fine of 150 penalty units each on both counts, in default of the fine, the accused shall serve a term of three (3) months imprisonment. The accused is further ordered to execute a bond to be of good behaviour and to keep the public peace for one year, in default, the accused will serve6monthsin prison. Bothcounts will runconcurrently. COURT:Accused person, youhavethe right ofappeal. SGD H/HROSEMARY EDITHHAYFORD(MRS) (CIRCUITCOURT JUDGE SITTINGAS ADDITIONALMAGISTRATE) 26