RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL v MWASHAENYI and ANOTHER (39 of 2025) [2025] ZWMTHC 39 (18 July 2025)

7 HCMTJ 39-25 HCMTC 70/25 RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL versus TAKUDZWA NOEL MWASHAENYI and SHERIFF OF HIGH COURT N.O HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE SIZIBA J MUTARE,14 & 18 JULY 2025 OPPOSED APPLICATION Mr S.A Murondoti with Mr S. Machigere, for the applicant Mr L. Chigadza with Mr W. Mangwende, for the first respondent SIZIBA J: On 31 March 2025, the applicant filed the present application on an urgent basis and he was granted an interim interdict against the first respondent without opposition by the first respondent and it was in the following terms: That the 1st respondent, his agents and or assignees be prohibited from further posting, circulating, transferring any material relating to the award of the tender awarded by it to Hurntspine Enterprises (Pvt)Ltd on any social media platform. (b) The 2nd respondent be and is hereby ordered to engage the services of the Zimbabwe Republic Police in the event of resistance from the 1st respondent.” The first respondent now opposes the granting of the final interdict sought by the applicant in the following terms: “(a) The 1st respondent deletes and removes any post of such nature and issues a public apology and a retraction of the statements made publicly in a widely circulating Newspaper within ten (10) days of the granting of this order. (b) The 1 Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suit on an attorney- client scale.” BACKGROUND FACTS The applicant is a local authority duly constituted as such in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe. The first respondent is a resident of Rusape. On 25 October 2024, the applicant advertised a tender in the Sunday Mail Newspaper and also in the Government Gazette seeking a potential investor to renew its property being stand 39 Rusape Township. The said property was an old building that the applicant sought to renovate and develop into a state of the art four story building which would be a shopping mall in the Central Business District. The applicant intended to grant a sectional title to the developer and retain the third floor of the building to itself so that it could collect rentals to generate its revenue. The tender closed on 4 November 2024 and the winning company being Hurntspine Enterprises (Pvt) Limited (hereinafter called the tender wining company) signed a contract with the applicant on 10 November 2024. On 18 March 2025, the applicant discovered that the first respondent, who had not been a bidder in the tender process, was spreading information concerning the tender process through emails and in the WhatsApp groups which accused the applicant of having corruptly awarded the tender to the wining company when it did not qualify for such tender. The first respondent also alleged that the tender process had been a one-day process. He also made accusations about mismanagement of funds by the applicant which resulted in employees being owed some wages. These issues were liberally discussed by the first respondent and other members of a WhatsApp group for Rusape residents and some damning exaggerations were made over these subjects. Some of the applicant’s senior officers were also members of the said WhatsApp group and that is how the applicant was alerted to such offensive material. The allegations made against the applicant were that the tender wining company did not have a PRAZ registration number, it had no track record of completed projects, no due diligence was conducted prior to the tender award, the tender wining company had no physical address or physical existence and there was insinuation that the tender wining company would benefit US$850 000. The respondent’s response in his opposing affidavit was on one hand a denial that he had initiated the accusations against the applicant while at the same time he justified himself that he had obtained most of the information from the PRAZ website. The papers presented before this court demonstrates that most of the allegations made by the first respondent against the applicant were inaccurate. It was not true that the tender had been approved in one day. The written contract between the applicant and the tender wining company contained a physical address of stand 19704 Cleverland Road, Milton Park, Harare contrary to the physical address that the first respondent had alleged to be fictitious in Kuwadzana. Again, the terms of the written contract between the applicant and the tender wining company showed that rather than being paid any sum of money, the tender wining company was obligated to construct a building in the value of US$850 000 at its own expense. In addition, the tender winning company had a letter of recommendation and reference from Mutare Rural District Council where it had done a project previously. LEGAL ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES Although both parties had taken points in limine against each other on the papers, none of those points were pursued during the hearing. The first respondent’s first point in limine was that the matter was not urgent which issue had already been overtaken by events after the interim order was granted by this court. There was also a second point in limine concerning non joinder of the tender wining company. It is now a trite position that non joinder of a party is not fatal in an application of this nature. I do not also find any merit in the applicant’s contention that the first respondent has no locus standi to defend this application after it has cited him as a party. It makes no logic for a litigant to drag a party to court and then seek to elbow it from the bar by saying that it has no locus standi to defend itself. The law cannot permit such a misadventure which would amount to a complete harassment of a party by court proceedings and also a violation of the rules of natural justice. The applicant’s contention was that the first respondent had damaged its reputation nationally and abroad and that such a bad image of itself would negatively impact its ability to attract investors to develop its town. The applicant contended further that the accusations made by the first respondent would also disadvantage it in its endeavors to be granted a municipality status. The applicant’s case was that the first respondent’s actions were totally illegitimate since he did not challenge the tender process in terms of the procurement laws of this country. He was not even a journalist and he did not know how to properly report such issues in any fair manner. It was submitted that the first respondent had abused the internet platforms to applicant’s detriment and that such reckless conduct can have far reaching consequences if it is not halted by means of the interdict sought before this court. It was also argued that the first respondent was biter and malicious due to the fact that his family business which had been housed in the affected building had had its lease terminated by the applicant and there was a dispute which was still ongoing in court. On the other hand, the first respondent argued that the actions of the applicant in dragging him to court were a violation of his right to freedom of expression. It was contended that a public body such as the applicant had no right to muzzle or suppress public criticism about its operations. The first respondent also argued that his publication constituted fair comment which was allowed at law. THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION The gravamen of the applicant’s case is a cry about its reputation that has been injured by the publications made by the first respondent. It is competent at common law for a court to grant an interdict to prevent the publication of defamatory words against a party and the court can also order a party to take down the defamatory material from public platforms on the internet and/or order publication of a retraction. See Paarlweb Investments (Pvt) Ltd (under corporate rescue) v Hwange Coal Gasification Company (Pvt) Ltd and Another HH 248/24, Madokero Service Station v Moromba HH 88/23. What is only peculiar about this case is that the party which is complaining about the damage to its reputation is a local authority or public body. The question that then arises is whether such a party as the applicant is entitled to sue for any damage to its reputation. In Bitou Municipality and Another v Booysen and Another (2011) ZAWCHC 52, Traverso DJP, sitting in the Western Cape High Court articulated the law as follows at para13 of the cyclostyled judgment which upheld an exception against the plaintiff in a suit for defamation damages: “Since the Spoorbond case the question whether a municipality can sue for defamation has not arisen again in any reported judgment in South Africa. This is therefore an open question in our law. Elsewhere, however, Courts have held that a municipality cannot sue for defamation. The underlying ratio in all these decisions (and the authorities cited therein) remains constant, namely that it will be contrary to public policy or public interest for organs of government, whether central or local, to have the right to sue for defamation, as it would impact on a citizen's right to freedom of speech. As pointed out by Lord Keith of KinkeL in the Derbyshire Country Council case at 1017 j: ‘It is of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism.’” The learned Deputy Judge President continued at paras 20 to 22, as follows: “The ratio for not according an action for defamation to a sovereign against its subjects remains the same, and should apply with equal force to local authorities. Municipalities are charged with an obligation to provide basic municipal services. The central mandate of local government is to develop a service delivery capacity in order to meet the basic needs of all inhabitants of South Africa. Municipalities are obliged to provide services to citizens as a public duty. These obligations are sourced by both the Constitution and the legislation. These provisions, in my view, are strong indicators that municipalities are part of the State, performs governmental functions at local level and obliged to provide basic services. I agree with the statement by McNally, JA in the Posts & Telecommunications case, supra at 1123 f: ‘Whether, if the body concerned is, at least largely or effectively, a monopoly, providing what are generally regarded as essential services traditionally provided by government, it would be contrary to public policy to muzzle criticism of it’” Furthermore, in Director General Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another v Rocha (2024) ZAGPPHC 548, F J Nalane AJ dismissed an application to interdict defamatory emails which was brought on urgency by the applicant which was a state organ and the learned acting judge held as follows at paras 12 to 13 of the cyclostyled judgment: “It would involve a serious interference with the free expression of opinion if the wealth of the State, derived from the State subjects, could be used to launch against those subjects actions for defamation because they have, falsely and unfairly it may be, criticized or condemned the management of the country. These remarks are even more applicable in a constitutional state that we have in this country where freedom of expression is guaranteed as one of the fundamental rights. In Moyane it was held that this common law position has not been altered and that this approach was also followed in Bitou Municipality and Another where it was confirmed that: “It is therefore clear that the common law denies standing to the Crown (or in this case the State) to sue for defamation.” The position that a state organ or a public body has no locus standi to sue for defamation is part of our law. The relevant inquiry will not be whether such corporation is a separate legal persona or not but whether it is part of the governance of the country and if it is such, it can only have recourse to an action for economic loss resulting from injurious falsehood or for malicious or negligent statements rather than for defamation which would require the alleged defamer to prove the truthfulness of his or her assertions and justify them. See PTC v Modus Publications (Pvt) Ltd 1997 (2) ZLR 492 at 498 and 502 (SC). It follows therefore that the applicant being a public body and a state organ is legally crippled from being granted the interdict that it seeks against the first respondent so as to protect its reputation. Such an interdict would operate to muzzle criticism against the operations of the applicant which is a local authority established to serve the interests of the public. The law therefore prevents the applicant from protecting its reputation in the manner that it seeks to do before this court. In any event, a public body such as the applicant has the capacity and privilege as well as the financial and human resources at its disposal to publish its own statements correcting any perceived wrong information about its image or operations as compared to private individuals and entities. As a matter of public policy, a local authority like the applicant cannot be allowed to muzzle public criticism under the guise that its reputation is at stake and that its financial prosperity or ability to lure investors is at risk. Such considerations are far outweighed by the need to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of the citizens to freely express themselves and demand accountability and transparency to its day-to-day operations and service delivery. The importance of the right to freedom of expression was underscored by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in a unanimous judgment in Madanhire and Another v Attorney General CCZ 2/14 wherein at p 7 of the cyclostyled judgment, PATEL JA (as he then was) held thus: “There can be no doubt that the freedom of expression, coupled with the corollary right to receive and impart information, is a core value of any democratic society deserving of the utmost legal protection. As such, it is prominently recognised and entrenched in virtually every international and regional human rights instrument.” Furthermore, at p 8 of the same judgment, the learned Justice of Appeal (as he then was) continued as follows: “This Court too has had occasion to recognise the freedom of expression as a core value of a free and democratic society. See Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd v Posts and Telecommunications Corporation & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 199 (S) at 211C-F; United Parties v Minister of Justice Legal & Parliamentary Affairs 1997 (2) ZLR 254 (S) at 269A-E. More recently, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal made the following pronouncement per Streicher JA, in the case of Hoho v The State [2008] ZASCA 98 at para. 29: ‘The importance of the right to freedom of expression has often been stressed by our courts. Suppression of available information and of ideas can only be detrimental to the decision-making process of individuals, corporations and governments. It may lead to the wrong government being elected, the wrong policies being adopted, the wrong people being appointed, corruption, dishonesty and incompetence not being exposed, wrong investments being made and a multitude of other undesirable consequences. It is for this reason that it has been said ‘that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and is one of the basic conditions for its progress and the development of man.’” I am therefore convinced that the interdict sought by the applicant is not supported by the law. It is contrary to it. Its effect will be far reaching in curtailing the fundamental rights of the citizens to express themselves and freely monitor the activities of local authorities to the detriment of good governance and service delivery. Being a public body and a state organ, a local authority in applicant’s standing is there to serve the public and it cannot therefore be allowed to sue for defamation to protect its own public image or pecuniary interests. On the basis of the above considerations, the application cannot succeed for lack of merit. I do not see it proper to award costs against the applicant as I have found that most of the material that the first respondent had published was very inaccurate and misinformed. I will therefore order as follows: All the preliminary points by both the applicant and the first respondent are hereby dismissed.The interim relief or interdict granted to the applicant is hereby discharged.The application for a final interdict is hereby dismissed.There shall be no order as to costs. Absalom & Shepherd Attorneys, applicants’ legal practitioners Chigadza &Associates, first respondent’s legal practitioners 7 HCMTJ 39-25 HCMTC 70/25 7 HCMTJ 39-25 HCMTC 70/25 RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL versus TAKUDZWA NOEL MWASHAENYI and SHERIFF OF HIGH COURT N.O HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE SIZIBA J MUTARE,14 & 18 JULY 2025 OPPOSED APPLICATION Mr S.A Murondoti with Mr S. Machigere, for the applicant Mr L. Chigadza with Mr W. Mangwende, for the first respondent SIZIBA J: On 31 March 2025, the applicant filed the present application on an urgent basis and he was granted an interim interdict against the first respondent without opposition by the first respondent and it was in the following terms: That the 1st respondent, his agents and or assignees be prohibited from further posting, circulating, transferring any material relating to the award of the tender awarded by it to Hurntspine Enterprises (Pvt)Ltd on any social media platform. (b) The 2nd respondent be and is hereby ordered to engage the services of the Zimbabwe Republic Police in the event of resistance from the 1st respondent.” The first respondent now opposes the granting of the final interdict sought by the applicant in the following terms: “(a) The 1st respondent deletes and removes any post of such nature and issues a public apology and a retraction of the statements made publicly in a widely circulating Newspaper within ten (10) days of the granting of this order. (b) The 1 Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suit on an attorney- client scale.” BACKGROUND FACTS The applicant is a local authority duly constituted as such in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe. The first respondent is a resident of Rusape. On 25 October 2024, the applicant advertised a tender in the Sunday Mail Newspaper and also in the Government Gazette seeking a potential investor to renew its property being stand 39 Rusape Township. The said property was an old building that the applicant sought to renovate and develop into a state of the art four story building which would be a shopping mall in the Central Business District. The applicant intended to grant a sectional title to the developer and retain the third floor of the building to itself so that it could collect rentals to generate its revenue. The tender closed on 4 November 2024 and the winning company being Hurntspine Enterprises (Pvt) Limited (hereinafter called the tender wining company) signed a contract with the applicant on 10 November 2024. On 18 March 2025, the applicant discovered that the first respondent, who had not been a bidder in the tender process, was spreading information concerning the tender process through emails and in the WhatsApp groups which accused the applicant of having corruptly awarded the tender to the wining company when it did not qualify for such tender. The first respondent also alleged that the tender process had been a one-day process. He also made accusations about mismanagement of funds by the applicant which resulted in employees being owed some wages. These issues were liberally discussed by the first respondent and other members of a WhatsApp group for Rusape residents and some damning exaggerations were made over these subjects. Some of the applicant’s senior officers were also members of the said WhatsApp group and that is how the applicant was alerted to such offensive material. The allegations made against the applicant were that the tender wining company did not have a PRAZ registration number, it had no track record of completed projects, no due diligence was conducted prior to the tender award, the tender wining company had no physical address or physical existence and there was insinuation that the tender wining company would benefit US$850 000. The respondent’s response in his opposing affidavit was on one hand a denial that he had initiated the accusations against the applicant while at the same time he justified himself that he had obtained most of the information from the PRAZ website. The papers presented before this court demonstrates that most of the allegations made by the first respondent against the applicant were inaccurate. It was not true that the tender had been approved in one day. The written contract between the applicant and the tender wining company contained a physical address of stand 19704 Cleverland Road, Milton Park, Harare contrary to the physical address that the first respondent had alleged to be fictitious in Kuwadzana. Again, the terms of the written contract between the applicant and the tender wining company showed that rather than being paid any sum of money, the tender wining company was obligated to construct a building in the value of US$850 000 at its own expense. In addition, the tender winning company had a letter of recommendation and reference from Mutare Rural District Council where it had done a project previously. LEGAL ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES Although both parties had taken points in limine against each other on the papers, none of those points were pursued during the hearing. The first respondent’s first point in limine was that the matter was not urgent which issue had already been overtaken by events after the interim order was granted by this court. There was also a second point in limine concerning non joinder of the tender wining company. It is now a trite position that non joinder of a party is not fatal in an application of this nature. I do not also find any merit in the applicant’s contention that the first respondent has no locus standi to defend this application after it has cited him as a party. It makes no logic for a litigant to drag a party to court and then seek to elbow it from the bar by saying that it has no locus standi to defend itself. The law cannot permit such a misadventure which would amount to a complete harassment of a party by court proceedings and also a violation of the rules of natural justice. The applicant’s contention was that the first respondent had damaged its reputation nationally and abroad and that such a bad image of itself would negatively impact its ability to attract investors to develop its town. The applicant contended further that the accusations made by the first respondent would also disadvantage it in its endeavors to be granted a municipality status. The applicant’s case was that the first respondent’s actions were totally illegitimate since he did not challenge the tender process in terms of the procurement laws of this country. He was not even a journalist and he did not know how to properly report such issues in any fair manner. It was submitted that the first respondent had abused the internet platforms to applicant’s detriment and that such reckless conduct can have far reaching consequences if it is not halted by means of the interdict sought before this court. It was also argued that the first respondent was biter and malicious due to the fact that his family business which had been housed in the affected building had had its lease terminated by the applicant and there was a dispute which was still ongoing in court. On the other hand, the first respondent argued that the actions of the applicant in dragging him to court were a violation of his right to freedom of expression. It was contended that a public body such as the applicant had no right to muzzle or suppress public criticism about its operations. The first respondent also argued that his publication constituted fair comment which was allowed at law. THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION The gravamen of the applicant’s case is a cry about its reputation that has been injured by the publications made by the first respondent. It is competent at common law for a court to grant an interdict to prevent the publication of defamatory words against a party and the court can also order a party to take down the defamatory material from public platforms on the internet and/or order publication of a retraction. See Paarlweb Investments (Pvt) Ltd (under corporate rescue) v Hwange Coal Gasification Company (Pvt) Ltd and Another HH 248/24, Madokero Service Station v Moromba HH 88/23. What is only peculiar about this case is that the party which is complaining about the damage to its reputation is a local authority or public body. The question that then arises is whether such a party as the applicant is entitled to sue for any damage to its reputation. In Bitou Municipality and Another v Booysen and Another (2011) ZAWCHC 52, Traverso DJP, sitting in the Western Cape High Court articulated the law as follows at para13 of the cyclostyled judgment which upheld an exception against the plaintiff in a suit for defamation damages: “Since the Spoorbond case the question whether a municipality can sue for defamation has not arisen again in any reported judgment in South Africa. This is therefore an open question in our law. Elsewhere, however, Courts have held that a municipality cannot sue for defamation. The underlying ratio in all these decisions (and the authorities cited therein) remains constant, namely that it will be contrary to public policy or public interest for organs of government, whether central or local, to have the right to sue for defamation, as it would impact on a citizen's right to freedom of speech. As pointed out by Lord Keith of KinkeL in the Derbyshire Country Council case at 1017 j: ‘It is of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism.’” The learned Deputy Judge President continued at paras 20 to 22, as follows: “The ratio for not according an action for defamation to a sovereign against its subjects remains the same, and should apply with equal force to local authorities. Municipalities are charged with an obligation to provide basic municipal services. The central mandate of local government is to develop a service delivery capacity in order to meet the basic needs of all inhabitants of South Africa. Municipalities are obliged to provide services to citizens as a public duty. These obligations are sourced by both the Constitution and the legislation. These provisions, in my view, are strong indicators that municipalities are part of the State, performs governmental functions at local level and obliged to provide basic services. I agree with the statement by McNally, JA in the Posts & Telecommunications case, supra at 1123 f: ‘Whether, if the body concerned is, at least largely or effectively, a monopoly, providing what are generally regarded as essential services traditionally provided by government, it would be contrary to public policy to muzzle criticism of it’” Furthermore, in Director General Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another v Rocha (2024) ZAGPPHC 548, F J Nalane AJ dismissed an application to interdict defamatory emails which was brought on urgency by the applicant which was a state organ and the learned acting judge held as follows at paras 12 to 13 of the cyclostyled judgment: “It would involve a serious interference with the free expression of opinion if the wealth of the State, derived from the State subjects, could be used to launch against those subjects actions for defamation because they have, falsely and unfairly it may be, criticized or condemned the management of the country. These remarks are even more applicable in a constitutional state that we have in this country where freedom of expression is guaranteed as one of the fundamental rights. In Moyane it was held that this common law position has not been altered and that this approach was also followed in Bitou Municipality and Another where it was confirmed that: “It is therefore clear that the common law denies standing to the Crown (or in this case the State) to sue for defamation.” The position that a state organ or a public body has no locus standi to sue for defamation is part of our law. The relevant inquiry will not be whether such corporation is a separate legal persona or not but whether it is part of the governance of the country and if it is such, it can only have recourse to an action for economic loss resulting from injurious falsehood or for malicious or negligent statements rather than for defamation which would require the alleged defamer to prove the truthfulness of his or her assertions and justify them. See PTC v Modus Publications (Pvt) Ltd 1997 (2) ZLR 492 at 498 and 502 (SC). It follows therefore that the applicant being a public body and a state organ is legally crippled from being granted the interdict that it seeks against the first respondent so as to protect its reputation. Such an interdict would operate to muzzle criticism against the operations of the applicant which is a local authority established to serve the interests of the public. The law therefore prevents the applicant from protecting its reputation in the manner that it seeks to do before this court. In any event, a public body such as the applicant has the capacity and privilege as well as the financial and human resources at its disposal to publish its own statements correcting any perceived wrong information about its image or operations as compared to private individuals and entities. As a matter of public policy, a local authority like the applicant cannot be allowed to muzzle public criticism under the guise that its reputation is at stake and that its financial prosperity or ability to lure investors is at risk. Such considerations are far outweighed by the need to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of the citizens to freely express themselves and demand accountability and transparency to its day-to-day operations and service delivery. The importance of the right to freedom of expression was underscored by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in a unanimous judgment in Madanhire and Another v Attorney General CCZ 2/14 wherein at p 7 of the cyclostyled judgment, PATEL JA (as he then was) held thus: “There can be no doubt that the freedom of expression, coupled with the corollary right to receive and impart information, is a core value of any democratic society deserving of the utmost legal protection. As such, it is prominently recognised and entrenched in virtually every international and regional human rights instrument.” Furthermore, at p 8 of the same judgment, the learned Justice of Appeal (as he then was) continued as follows: “This Court too has had occasion to recognise the freedom of expression as a core value of a free and democratic society. See Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd v Posts and Telecommunications Corporation & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 199 (S) at 211C-F; United Parties v Minister of Justice Legal & Parliamentary Affairs 1997 (2) ZLR 254 (S) at 269A-E. More recently, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal made the following pronouncement per Streicher JA, in the case of Hoho v The State [2008] ZASCA 98 at para. 29: ‘The importance of the right to freedom of expression has often been stressed by our courts. Suppression of available information and of ideas can only be detrimental to the decision-making process of individuals, corporations and governments. It may lead to the wrong government being elected, the wrong policies being adopted, the wrong people being appointed, corruption, dishonesty and incompetence not being exposed, wrong investments being made and a multitude of other undesirable consequences. It is for this reason that it has been said ‘that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and is one of the basic conditions for its progress and the development of man.’” I am therefore convinced that the interdict sought by the applicant is not supported by the law. It is contrary to it. Its effect will be far reaching in curtailing the fundamental rights of the citizens to express themselves and freely monitor the activities of local authorities to the detriment of good governance and service delivery. Being a public body and a state organ, a local authority in applicant’s standing is there to serve the public and it cannot therefore be allowed to sue for defamation to protect its own public image or pecuniary interests. On the basis of the above considerations, the application cannot succeed for lack of merit. I do not see it proper to award costs against the applicant as I have found that most of the material that the first respondent had published was very inaccurate and misinformed. I will therefore order as follows: All the preliminary points by both the applicant and the first respondent are hereby dismissed. The interim relief or interdict granted to the applicant is hereby discharged. The application for a final interdict is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Absalom & Shepherd Attorneys, applicants’ legal practitioners Chigadza &Associates, first respondent’s legal practitioners