Aux Cayes Fin Tech Co Ltd v Liu ([2025] Civil Appeal SCA 17/2025 (15 December 2025) (Arising in MA 34/2024 out of CS125 of 2023)) [2025] SCCA 23 (15 December 2025)

**IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES** _**Reportable**_ [2025] Civil Appeal SCA 17/2025 (15 December 2025) (Arising in MA 34/2024 out of CS125 of 2023) In the matter Between Aux Cayes Fin Tech Co Ltd **Appellant** _(rep. by Ms. Ruby Simeon)_ And Dr Samson Liu**Respondent** _(Mr Audric Govinden)_ **Neutral Citation:** _Aux Cayes Fin Tech Co Ltd_ _v Liu_(Civil Appeal SCA 17/2025 [2025] (Arising in MA 34/2024 out of CS 125 of 2023) **Before:** Andre, Twomey-Woods, Robinson JJA **Summary:** Appeal against Supreme Court judgment – Security for Costs – Non-resident plaintiff – Discretion under Section 219 SCCP, Quantum – Appellate review – Oppressive/Prohibitive security – Evidentiary sufficiency. **Heard:** 4th December 2025 **Delivered:** 15 December 2025 **ORDER** S The Court makes the following Orders: [i] For the reasons set out below, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety. The ruling of the Supreme Court in MA 81 of 2024 is upheld. The order for security for costs in the sum of SCR 5,000 stands. [ii] Each party to bear the costs of this appeal. **JUDGMENT** **ANDRE, JA** **INTRODUCTION** 1. This is an appeal arising from the Notice of Appeal dated 26th June 2025, filed by Aux Cayes Fin Tech Co Ltd (the Appellant) against the Supreme Court ruling delivered by Madeleine J on 31st October 2024 in MA 81 of 2024 (arising from CS 125 of 2023). The learned Judge partially allowed the Appellant’s application for security for costs under section 219 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (“SCCP”), ordering Dr. Samson Liu (the Respondent) to deposit SCR 5,000 as security for costs. 2. Dissatisfied with that quantum, the Appellant now appeals to this Court. **GROUNDS OF APPEAL** 3. The Appellant raises five grounds of appeal, which state verbatim as follows: 1. _The Learned Judge failed to appreciate that the Applicant will have to adduce an expert report and expert testimony to defend against the misconceived claim, even if it is weak on/lacking in evidence so that the Applicant can appraise the court on technical issues involving virtual assets, especially when the Respondent has referred to and pleaded his reliance of a blockchain investigation agency's services, CipherBlade in his Plaint._ 2. _The Learned Judge failed to appreciate that to defend the claim, the Applicant is required to fly in factual and/or expert witnesses to Seychelles and therefore security for costs ought to be granted for travel and accommodation expenses for the expert and factual witnesses._ 3. _The Learned Judge also failed to appreciate that the quotes on travel and accommodation were genuine quotes from the sources stated by the Applicant._ 4. _The Learned Judge erred in granting insufficient amount as security for costs as the amount awarded will only cover a fraction of the costs necessary for the Applicant to defend against the Plaint._ 5. _The Learned Judge erred in granting insufficient security for costs as the Respondent is not domiciled and has no assets in Seychelles and the Learned Judge failed to consider that the Applicant will have no means to recover costs as the Respondent has no assets in Seychelles._ 4. The Appellant, as per paragraph 3, prays that this Honourable Court set aside the order of the Learned Judge and order the following: (i) Allow this Appeal; (ii) Order Security for Costs of SR 442,023.46 or such security as the Court sees fit and sufficient to be deposited or paid into court by the Respondent, failing which, the Respondent's Plaint (CS No 125 of 2023) dated 29th January 2024 be struck off; (iii) Costs; and (iv) Any other order that the court sees fit. **APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS** [5] The Appellant, through its learned Counsel Mr. Divino Sabino, filed its skeleton heads of argument dated 23rd October 2025. The submissions are structured around the five grounds of appeal raised. [6] In relation to the 1st ground, the Appellant submits that since the Respondent intends to rely on the CipherBlade blockchain investigation report, it is necessary for the Appellant to commission its own expert report from AlixPartners to rebut the allegations. It argues that these expenses are genuine and necessary and that the judge erred by treating them as oppressive or intended to stifle the claim. The Appellant further submits that the Respondent is a non-resident with no assets in Seychelles and meaningful security is required to avoid injustice. The Appellant adds that the low award effectively encourages frivolous claims by foreign plaintiffs and unfairly prejudices defendants. [7] As to the 2nd ground, it is the Appellant’s submission that it must bring three factual and expert witnesses from abroad to defend the Plaint, namely two AlixPartners experts and one company representative. Quotations for flights and accommodation were provided, yet the Court made no provision for these costs. The Appellant disputes the Respondent’s suggestion that evidence can be given by video link, arguing that video testimony is subject to judicial discretion under section 11C of the Evidence Act and may raise risks of coaching and compromised credibility. The Appellant further notes that taking video evidence from witnesses in the USA or Hong Kong may require permission from foreign authorities under Article 17 of the Hague Convention, which has not been obtained. It therefore submits that evidence must be given in person and that the travel and accommodation expenses are necessary and recoverable. [8] Turning to the 3rd ground, the Appellant submits that the judge failed to appreciate that the travel and accommodation quotations were genuine and supported by affidavit evidence and documentary exhibits. These quotations reflected real and necessary expenses the Appellant would incur. By failing to allocate any amount for them, the judge denied the Appellant any realistic chance of recovering these costs from the non-resident Respondent. [9] On the 4th ground, the Appellant submits that the award of SCR 5,000 was manifestly inadequate and represents only a small fraction of the necessary costs of defending the claim. The Appellant argues that even if the full amount sought was considered high, the judge should have awarded a reasonable proportion rather than a nominal sum. The Appellant argues that such a low award undermines the purpose of section 219(2) and leaves defendants exposed to unrecoverable costs in claims brought by foreign plaintiffs. [10] With respect to the 5th ground, the Appellant submits that the judge failed to give adequate weight to the Respondent’s non-residence and lack of assets in Seychelles. It relies on JFA Holdings v Latitudes Consulting, where security was ordered on this basis and distinguishes Leonard Gill v Christopher Gill, where security was refused because the plaintiff owned property in Seychelles. [11] The Appellant further argues that the Respondent’s underlying claim is misconceived, inadequately pleaded and wrongly directed at the Appellant rather than the alleged scammers. The Appellant notes that the Respondent has provided no legal basis for asserting due diligence obligations on the Appellant and that the alleged tokens had already left its platform. It submits that allowing minimal security invites speculative and weak crypto-related claims from non-resident plaintiffs, leaving defendants with no realistic prospect of recovering costs. The Appellant therefore prays that the appeal be allowed and that the full amount of security for costs be ordered. **RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS** [12] The Respondent, through his counsel Mr. Audric Govinden, filed his Skeleton Heads of Argument dated 10th November 2025 opposing the appeal. [13] As a preliminary matter, the Respondent submits that Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal contravene Rules 18(3) and 18(7) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2023 as they are vague, couched in general terms and fail to specify whether the alleged misdirection concerns law or fact. On this basis, he contends that these grounds should not be entertained. [14] In reply to Ground 1, the Respondent submits that the trial judge fully addressed the applicable legal principles governing security for costs, including the considerations set out in Barton v Lafontaine and correctly approached section 219 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure as interpreted in _**Leonard Gill v Christopher Gill**_. He submits that the judge properly found that the Respondent is a non-resident but that this alone is insufficient to warrant substantial security; that the Respondent has no assets in Seychelles but denies insolvency; and that the Plaint is bona fide and not a sham. [15] He maintains that the judge was entitled to find that the sums claimed in respect of expert fees and related expenses were oppressive, unreasonable, prohibitive and intended to stifle the claim, especially as the quotations relied upon were not addressed to the Appellant and their provenance was unclear. He submits that the Appellant’s argument of security for costs preventing frivolous cases such as the present one reinforces its intention to deter the Respondent from pursuing his case. Citing _**Marengo & Ors v Anderson**_, the Respondent submits that factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong, which has not been demonstrated. [16] With respect to Ground 2, the Respondent submits that the judge clearly considered the quotations for flights and accommodation before rejecting them as excessive and unsupported. He argues that the Appellant’s discussion of perceived challenges of video-link evidence is misplaced, as the judge’s decision was based on the oppressiveness and lack of substantiation of the claimed sums, not on any assessment of whether evidence could be taken remotely. [17] In reply to Ground 3, the Respondent submits that the judge did not fail to appreciate the genuineness of the quotations but correctly found them inadequately substantiated. The quotations were not addressed to the Appellant and did not disclose their source, leading the judge to view them as oppressive and intended to stifle the Plaint. He argues that it was the Appellant’s burden to properly prove these costs, which it failed to do. [18] As to Ground 4, the Respondent contends that the challenge to the quantum of SCR 5,000 is similarly unfounded and the judge was entitled to reject the majority of the claim. For Ground 5, the Respondent submits that the judge did consider the Respondent’s non-residency and lack of assets but correctly found that these factors do not automatically justify an oppressive order for security. He notes that the reduction of the claimed security was based on the Appellant’s failure to satisfy the Court as to the reasonableness of the figures claimed. He further argues that the Appellant’s attempt to characterize the Plaint as misconceived is improper, as this issue does not arise under Ground 5 and should not be entertained. [19] The Respondent therefore submits that the Supreme Court correctly applied the law, properly evaluated the evidence before it, and exercised its discretion judiciously. He prays that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety with costs. **ANALYSIS OF THE COURT** [20] As a preliminary matter, the Respondent objects that Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal offend Rules 18(3) and 18(7) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2023, on the basis that they are vague, couched in general terms and do not clearly indicate whether the alleged misdirections are of law or of fact. [21] It is true that these grounds are not framed with the clarity one would expect and could have been articulated with greater precision. However, reading the Notice of Appeal together with the Appellant’s Skeleton Heads of Argument and the record, I am satisfied that the substance of the appeal can be understood without injustice to either party. [22] In the exercise of this Court’s discretion and bearing in mind that justice is best served by determining disputes on their merits rather than on technical imperfections in drafting, I decline to strike out Grounds 1, 2 and 3. [23] Against that backdrop and having considered the Notice of Appeal, the record of proceedings and the written submissions, it is apparent that the grounds advanced by the Appellant overlap significantly in substance. Although framed as five separate grounds, they ultimately challenge two aspects of the ruling, being, the evaluation of the evidence relating to the claimed expenses and the discretion of the court in ordering the quantum of security. [24] The two consolidated issues arising for determination are thus as follows: _**(a) Whether the learned Judge erred in her assessment of the Appellant’s evidence and justification of expenses, including expert and witness-related costs (Grounds 1–3); and (b) Whether the learned Judge erred in the exercise of her discretion in fixing the quantum of security at SCR 5,000, notwithstanding the Respondent’s non-residency and lack of assets in Seychelles (Grounds 4–5).**_ 1. **Whether the learned Judge erred in her assessment of the Appellant’s evidence and justification of expenses, including expert and witness related costs (Grounds 1–3).** 25. Section 219 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure establishes the statutory framework governing security for costs. Under subsection (1), the Court may, on the application of a defendant, require a plaintiff to provide security in circumstances where such security would be required under the Civil Code, as well as where the plaintiff is known to be insolvent. 26. Section 219(2) of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court, upon request and for good reason, to order a non-resident party to furnish security for costs. It provides that: “ _When one party to a civil action is non-resident, the Court may, at the request of the other party, and for good reason, make an order requiring the non-resident party to give security for costs and for any damages that may be awarded against that party_.” 25. The jurisdiction to make such an order is **discretionary** and as the Court of Appeal held in _**Attorney-General v F.C.L. Public Relations**_**[[1999] SCCA 4](/akn/sc/judgment/scca/1999/4)**: “… _**it is trite law that the amount of security for costs to be given is in the discretion of the court which is entitled to fix such sum as it thinks just, having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.”**_ 25. Accordingly, non-residency is a necessary gateway but not in itself, a sufficient basis for an order for security for costs. The Court must also be satisfied that there is “good reason” in all the circumstances. The burden also lies on the applicant to place before the Court **cogent and reliable evidence** establishing the necessity and reasonableness of the quantum sought. 25. In the present appeal, the Appellant maintains that the learned Judge erred by failing to accept its proposed litigation expenses relating to expert evidence, witness attendance, travel and accommodation. It argues that because the Respondent’s pleadings rely on a technical blockchain report, expert testimony is indispensable and that the quotations presented being USD 35,000 for an expert report, USD 30,000 for expert attendance, USD 26,535 for airfares and USD 3,219 for accommodation should have been accepted. 25. The record shows, however, that the learned Judge undertook an assessment of these claimed sums and found that the totality of these claimed sums amounting to SCR 442,023.46 was oppressive, unreasonable and prohibitive and would have the effect of stifling the Plaintiff’s claim. In relation to the travel and accommodation quotations, she observed that the quotes from Qatar Airways and for hotel accommodation were not addressed to the Appellant and it was not clear from which hotel the accommodation quote emanated. She also noted that instructions to AlixPartners would “only be confirmed if security for costs is granted”, indicating that even the engagement of that particular expert was, at the material time, contingent and not yet firmly committed. 25. Such scrutiny falls squarely within the domain of the trial judge’s factual assessment. In _AG v F.C.L. Public Relations_ , the Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s reduction of an inflated security for costs request on the basis that the applicant had failed to provide evidence showing how the amount had been computed, describing the affidavit relied upon as “ _**devoid of cogent evidence**_ ” and the sum sought as “ _**evidently arbitrary**_ ” and “ _**grossly inflated**_.” The parallels with the present matter are evident. Here too, the Appellant provided no breakdown demonstrating why its proposed quantum was reasonable or proportionate in the circumstances. 25. The court is not bound to accept, at face value, any figure an applicant chooses to place before it. Where the estimates presented rely on premium choices such as five-star accommodation and business class travel without showing that such options are necessary or that more moderate arrangements would be inadequate, the Court is entitled to treat the claim with caution. Section 219 is designed to protect a defendant against the risk of irrecoverable costs where there is good reason to fear non-payment. It is not intended to underwrite in advance the defendant’s preferred litigation strategy at whatever cost. 26. As regards the Appellant’s submissions on the difficulties of video-link evidence and the requirements of section 11C of the Evidence Act and the Hague Evidence Convention, these points were largely directed to establishing that the witnesses ought to travel to Seychelles to give evidence in person. Taking these submissions at their highest, they do not undermine the Judge’s conclusion that the particular security for costs claimed in this case were excessive and prohibitive. 25. The learned Judge did not deny the Appellant the right to call witnesses in person. She merely declined to require the Respondent to furnish security at the level claimed. The mode by which evidence will ultimately be received remains a matter for case management at the trial stage. It was not necessary, at the interlocutory stage, for the Judge to determine speculative issues concerning foreign sovereignty and international co-operation in order to decide whether the specific quotations placed before her were reasonable. 25. It is trite that a court of appeal should be slow to interfere with a trial court’s exercise of discretion. Appellate intervention is justified only where the judge misdirected herself on the law, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant considerations or reached a conclusion so plainly wrong that it lies outside the permissible ambit of reasonable disagreement. 25. The fact that an appellate court might have reached a different figure is not by itself sufficient to warrant substitution. This approach was restated in _**Esparon v Philo**_**(SCA 17** _**of 2021)[[2023] SCCA 15](/akn/sc/judgment/scca/2023/15)**_, where the Court held that a trial court’s discretion ought not to be interfered with if the exercise of that discretion is based on a correct principle of law, even though the appellate court might have come to a different decision. In _Verlaque v Government of Seychelles_ (2000–2001) SCAR 165, this Court held that it will not interfere with a trial court’s discretion unless there was an error of law, a failure to properly appreciate the facts, a decision so unreasonable as to be erroneous, or an unjudicial exercise of discretion. The same principle has been applied in _**Jean Francois Adrienne & Anor v R**_ _**(**_**SCA 25 of 2015)[[2017] SCCA 25](/akn/sc/judgment/scca/2017/25)** and _**Intelvision Network Ltd & Ors v Multichoice Africa Ltd**_ _**(**_**SCA 31 of 2014)[[2015] SCCA 31](/akn/sc/judgment/scca/2015/31)** _**.**_ [37] In light of the foregoing, the Appellant has not shown that the learned Judge applied the wrong principles, overlooked any relevant matter or reached a conclusion outside the limits of her discretion. Her assessment of the evidence was properly grounded in the material before her. There is therefore no basis for appellate interference. **Grounds 1, 2 and 3 fail.** 2. **Whether the learned Judge erred in the exercise of her discretion in fixing the quantum of security at SCR 5,000, notwithstanding the Respondent’s non-residency and lack of assets in Seychelles (Grounds 4–5).** 38. Grounds 4 and 5 challenge the quantum of SCR 5,000 ordered as security, contending that it is manifestly inadequate in light of the Respondent being a non-resident, his lack of assets in Seychelles and the substantial costs the Appellant anticipates incurring in defending the claim. The Appellant argues that such a modest amount encourages “vexatious” or speculative claims by foreign litigants and undermines the protective purpose of section 219. 38. As already noted, section 219(2) empowers the Court, for good reason, to order a non-resident party to furnish security for costs. Once non-residency is established, the question of whether security should be ordered and in what amount, remains a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised having regard to all the relevant circumstances. In this context, the Court must balance the legitimate interest of a defendant in being protected against the risk of irrecoverable costs with the need to avoid orders that are oppressive or that effectively bar access to justice. 38. The Appellant argues that the learned Judge failed to give adequate weight to the Respondent’s non-residency and lack of assets and that as a result, ordered a sum so low. The Respondent maintains that the learned Judge did consider these factors but that they could not overcome the deficiencies in the Appellant’s evidential basis for the much higher quantum sought. 38. The standard of appellate review in respect of discretionary decisions has been set out at paragraph 35 above and need not be repeated. It suffices to recall that this Court does not interfere merely because it might have set a different figure. The question is whether the figure actually chosen falls outside the range of outcomes reasonably open to the trial judge on the evidence. 38. In the present case, the learned Judge’s reasons read as a whole make it clear that she did not disregard the Respondent’s non-residency or lack of assets in Seychelles. On the contrary, she accepted those factual premises. However, she also found that the Appellant had failed to substantiate the high level of security claimed. The quotations were generic, not addressed to the Appellant and reflected premium costs without any explanation why more moderate options would not suffice. The engagement of AlixPartners also remained contingent. 38. In those circumstances, the learned Judge was entitled to conclude that the claim for security for costs should succeed but not in the claimed sum. The mere fact that the amount awarded is significantly lower than what was sought does not in itself demonstrate error. Where an applicant fails to show that a high quantum is necessary and reasonable, the court is not obliged to fix a higher sum simply because the other party is non-resident and/or has no assets. 38. It follows that the sum of SCR 5,000 reflects the amount which the learned Judge was satisfied, on the material before her, could be justified as security for costs. Whether this Court might have been inclined to fix a somewhat higher figure is beside the point. The question is whether the learned Judge’s decision lies outside the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion. On the record and in light of the principles in _**Esparon**_ _**,**__**Verlaque**_ _**,**__**Adrienne**_ __ and _**Intelvision**_ , I am unable to conclude that it does. 38. Accordingly, no misdirection of law, misappreciation of fact or unjudicial exercise of discretion has been shown in relation to the quantum of SCR 5,000. **Grounds 4 and 5 likewise fail.** **OBSERVATIONS** 38. This judgment illustrates the balance that must be maintained between procedural fairness and meaningful access to justice. The power to order security for costs is protective in nature but must not be wielded as an instrument of oppression. A court must remain alert to the risk that disproportionate or insufficiently justified applications may be deployed to financially wear down a litigant, thereby stifling a bona fide claim. 38. This approach is consistent with broader Commonwealth principles. In _**Keary Developments Ltd v Tarmac Construction Ltd**_ _**[1995] 3 All ER 534**_ , the English Court of Appeal stated that the court must balance the injustice to a plaintiff who may be prevented from pursuing a proper and bona fide claim by an order for security, against the injustice to a defendant who may succeed at trial yet find himself unable to recover his costs if no security is ordered. This balancing exercise lies at the heart of modern approaches to security for costs, ensuring that the remedy remains protective rather than punitive and that it does not operate to stifle genuine litigation merely because a party is financially weaker or a non-resident. The Court’s reliance on _**Leonard Gill v Christopher Gill & Anor (MA 140/2022) [2023]**_ which quoted _**Barton v Lafontaine SLR [1986]**_ and _**Sunshine Properties v Amadou Dina MA 182/2023 Arising in CS 182/2022[2023]**_ demonstrates that the emphasis in our courts has shifted from rigid formalism to a contextual evaluation anchored in proportionality, bona fides and evidentiary reliability. 38. The decision reinforces that judicial discretion under section 219 is not merely guided by financial risk but by the integrity of the proceedings and the reasonableness of the evidence placed before the Court. The present judgment thus contributes to a maturing body of jurisprudence in which security for costs is calibrated to the realities of cross-border litigation, the reliability of documentary proof and the overarching imperative of preserving access to justice. **CONCLUSION AND ORDERS OF THE COURT** 38. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety. The ruling of the Supreme Court in MA 81 of 2024 is upheld. The order for security for costs in the sum of SCR 5,000 stands. 39. Each party to bear the costs of this appeal. Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025 _____________________ S. Andre, JA I concur _________________ Dr M. Twomey-Woods, JA **ROBINSON JA** I agree with the conclusion reached by Andre JA that the appeal should be dismissed in its entirety. With no order as to costs. _________________ ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ _­­­­_ F. Robinson, JA Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025 8