National Foods Limited vs Madzama and Others (LC/H/1072/25) [2026] ZWLC 4 (30 January 2026)

LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE JUDGMENT No: HELD AT HARARE, 16 JANUARY 2026 CASE No: LC/H/1072/25 & 21 JANUARY 2026 In the matter between: - NATIONAL FOODS LIMITED APPLICANT AND TENDAI HUMPREY MADZAMBA 1st RESPONDENT MAXWELL KUIMBA 2nd RESPONDENT ARNOLD GUNDA 3rd RESPONDENT PETROS MHLANGA 4th RESPONDENT BERNARD MAPHOSA 5th RESPONDENT SHADRECK MANYANGE 6th RESPONDENT Before Honourable Justice Tsikwa J For the Applicant: Mr A.K Maguchu For the Respondents: Mr S.M Mandizha TSIKWA J: Before this court is an appeal against the whole judgment of the arbitrator, Honourable F.V Marovanyika dated 29 September 2025 in terms of Section 98(10) the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (hereafter referred to as the Act). FACTUAL BACKGROUND The respondents were employed by the appellant and were classified in grades C3 to C6. Employees in these grades were referred to as Non-NEC employees. The complaint by the respondents was that the appellant unilaterally banned their meetings claiming that they were managerial employees. They further alleged that the appellant embarked on a job grading exercise without consulting them, resultantly their jobs were downgraded as well as their conditions of service. The respondents were also aggrieved by the fact that the appellant refused to negotiate with an elected committee. The dispute was referred to the labour officer for conciliation but no consensus could be reached and it was referred for compulsory arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favour of the respondents and this gave rise to the present appeal. GROUNDS OF APPEAL The arbitrator erred at law in relating to issues of downgrading of employees arising from the job grading exercise when such an issue did not form part of the statement of claim by the respondents.The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a failure to consult the workers committee or works council in a job grading exercise is fatal to the results of the said exercise. To the contrary, the position of the law is that any such failure has got no such consequence.The arbitrator erred at law at law in coming up with a speculative award to the effect that some unnamed employees were downgraded in an unstated manner yet no evidence of any sorts was led by the respondents on who was downgraded and how.Having found that the respondents were non-managerial employees, and that there is a workers committee and a works council for this category of employees, the arbitrator erred at law in effectively finding that the respondent and other employees in their grades could form a second non-managerial workers committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/1985. The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a worker’s committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an employer generally and in any case without complying with Section 24(3) (6) of the Labour Act which requires that the extend of negotiations be compliant with a Collective Bargaining Agreement to which the workers’ trade union is a party to. RELIEF SOUGHT The appellant prayed for an order in the following terms: The claim be and is hereby dismissed with costs.The arbitration award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “a. The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit with costs.” ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law by addressing issues of employee downgrading in the job grading exercise and by issuing a speculative award that some unnamed employees were downgraded.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in holding that failure to consult the workers’ committee is fatal to the job grading exercise.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that the respondents and other employees could form a non-managerial workers’ committee.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that a workers’ committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an Employer without compliance with Section 24(3) and (6) of the Act. THE APPLICABLE LAW In terms of Section 98(10) of the Act, appeals against decisions of the arbitrator are only on a point of law. The provision in question reads as follows: “An appeal on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator appointed in terms of this Section.” What constitutes a point of was dealt with in the case of Muzuva v United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 217. It was held that a point of law concerns the determination of what law actually is- matters reserved for the judge rather than the jury. It was emphasised that such questions are those already authoritatively answered by law, those that ask what the true rule of law is, and those that fall within the exclusive province of the judge. The same position was stated in Zvokusekwa v Bikita RDC SC-44-15 where the Supreme Court reiterated that appeals from the arbitrator, like those from the Labour Court to the Supreme Court, must rest on points of law. Where an appeal touches on facts, it must allege a misdirection so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have reached the same conclusion, whether by failing to appreciate a fact or by making findings contrary to the evidence presented. In Nyoni v Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Anor 1997 (2) ZLR 516 (H), the court also held that irrationality arises where a decision lacks any evidentiary foundation or where the evidence is so inadequate that no reasonable person applying their mind could have arrived at such a conclusion. SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1 AND 3 The appellant’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator grossly misdirected himself by introducing an issue of employee downgrading which was never pleaded and by issuing a speculative award without evidence. It was further argued that the matter properly before him concerned the procedure of job grading exercise not its substantive outcome. The appellant’s counsel further submitted that by creating issues for the parties and ruling on them, the arbitrator acted irregularly. The appellant further argued that the arbitrator acted contrary to the principle that tribunals that tribunals may only decide matters placed before them. Reference was made to the case of Nzara v Kashumba SC-18-18. The appellant submitted that the arbitrator’s conduct undermined the adversarial system and prejudiced its case and must be set aside. The respondents further argued that the arbitrator never dealt with issues not placed before him because the record clearly lists the illegality of the Patterson job grading system and its resultant downgrading as issues for determination and such issues were also raised in the statement of claim. It was argued that if the applicant was not in agreement with this, it must have been challenged during arbitration stage. The respondents further argued that the award by the arbitrator was not speculative in any way as it was directed to the named respondents including Tendai Humphrey Madzamba and that any wider effect on similarly graded staff does not invalidate the relief. The respondents summed up on this aspect by citing the case of ZESA v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (SC). APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is settled law that courts and tribunals generally adjudicate on the specific issues and disputes raised by the parties. See Nzara v Kashumba (supra) where the court held as follows: “The function of the court is to determine disputes placed before it by the parties It cannot go on a frolic of its own. Where a point of law or a factual issue exercises the court’s mind but has not been raised by the parties or addressed by them either in their pleadings in evidence or in submissions from the bar, the court is at liberty to put the question to the parties and ask them to make submissions on the matter.” In casu, whilst the arbitrator appeared as if he was dealing with an issue properly placed before him, he strayed in so far as he gave an award to the effect that employees affected by the Patterson system job grading be restored to their original grades. That was not part of the statement of claim. The issue that was before the arbitrator was as per statement of claim was couched as follows: “Whether or not the Patterson system job gradings were procedurally done.” There is no where in the statement of claim relating to a claim of restoration of status quo nor was evidence of those prejudiced led or even mentioned be it in the notice of response or submissions in writing or orally. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant was supposed to have challenged this before the arbitrator, however, it was not possible to challenge an issue not on the statement of claim. The award remains speculative in so far as it was granted without evidence of the downgrading and specific persons disadvantaged. These two grounds of appeal have got merit and are hereby upheld. GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 2 It is the appellant’s contention that the arbitrator erred in law by holding that the employer’s failure to consult the workers committee or works council invalidates the job grading exercise. It was further submitted that the Act does not prescribe such a sanction or remedy and that whilst consultation is encouraged, failure to consult does not nullify the outcome of the job evaluation exercise. The appellant made reference to the case of Chemco Holdings v Tendere & Ors SC14-17. In that case, it was submitted, the Supreme Court held that lack of consultation with the works council does not invalidate the employer’s action. No works council has got veto power under the Act, it was submitted. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Act might give the employees a right to sue the employer but not to invalidate the process. It finally submitted that the award was grossly irregular and must be set aside. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator did not err in finding that failure to consult employees in the job evaluation exercise invalidates the results of that job evaluation exercise because the provisions of Section 25(5) (b) of the Act are mandatory. It was further argued that reliance on the case Chemco Holdings case (supra) was misplaced since it dealt with business transfers as opposed to unilateral variation of employment terms. It was further submitted that unilateral downgrading of grades, job titles and remuneration are core elements of the contract of employment that constitute an unfair labour practice in terms of Section 8(c) and violate Section 2A of the Act. Reference was made to the case of Crempton Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Matekenya 2012 (2) ZLR 161 (H). APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is important to note that while Section 25 A(5) makes consultation mandatory, it does not provide for a remedy or sanction for failure to comply with that provision. In the case of Chemco Holdings relied on by the appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that failure to consult workers committee did not invalidate the transfer of the business. The argument that the case is not applicable to the case at hand is misplaced because the provisions of Section 25A(5) refer to both transfer of business and job grading as among other issues that require consultation with employees. The sub section reads: “(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of any collective bargaining agreement ---------- a works council shall be entitled to be consulted by the employer about proposals relating to any of following matters- product development plans, job grading and training and education schemes affecting employees. partial or total plant closures and mergers and transfers of ownership”. These two issues are contained in the same sub-section and what the Supreme Court ruled in the Chemco Holdings case is applicable to both scenarios. The case of Crempton Trading (supra) which is said to have held to the contrary cannot take precedence over a Supreme Court decision. It is my finding that the arbitrator erred in holding that failure to consult the works council invalidated the Patterson job evaluation results. The decision was bad at law and ought to be vacated. This ground of appeal is upheld. GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 4 The appellant’s argument was that the arbitrator erred in law by allowing the respondents to form a second non-managerial workers committee and to negotiate a separate collective bargaining agreement. It submitted further that Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85 prohibits more than one workers’ committee per employer. It was also the appellant’s submission that Section 24 (3) (b) of the Act limits workers’ committee’s negotiating rights where a trade union and binding NEC agreement already exist. The appellant also submitted that since the respondents are members of the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union under NEC Food Sector, the arbitrator’s finding contravenes the provisions of the Act and must be set aside. The respondents on the other hand argued that the arbitrator did not err in law by holding that non-managerial employees in grades C3-C6 are entitled to their own representation in terms of Section 23(1) of the Act. They further argued that appellant’s reliance on Section 23(2) which prohibits second committee is misplaced since it only bars duplicate committees for the same group. It was submitted further that the appellant’s code of conduct recognises more than one works council and therefore refusal to bargain with the elected committee was unlawful. Counsel for the respondents also submitted that the respondents have got no CBA with any NEC, they have got no workers committee or works council. It was further submitted that the SI prohibiting multiple workers committees must not be read in isolation but together with Section 23 of the Act. Counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 23(1) (a) and (b) of the Act which he said allows for formation of a workers committee where employees are not represented by a trade union. He submitted further that the respondents have a right to form a workers committee in terms of Section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In replication, counsel for the appellant submitted that reference to Section 23(1) (a) and (b) is misplaced because such subsections do not exist and subject matter in Section 23(1) is totally different. Section 23 deals with formation of workers committees and a single workers committee for employees employed by one employer. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that it is a misrepresentation of facts to say that the respondents have got no workers committee because the truth is that they want to form their own separate from junior non-managerial employees. He also submitted that it is not true that the respondents do not belong to any trade union because in casu the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the trade union. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO FACTS From the above arguments it is apparent that the arbitrator misdirected himself by allowing the creation of more than one workers’ committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85. It is a decision also at tangent with the provisions of Section 23(1) of the Act which provides for the creation of a single workers committee by employees employed by one employer. In a desperate bid to convince the court that the respondents have got no representation, it was submitted that they have got no workers committee and they do not belong to any trade union. However, the record of proceedings betrayed them as it is apparent that the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe. It is abundantly clear that the arbitrator misdirected himself on this issue and therefore this ground of appeal is bound to succeed. The appellant did not pursue the fifth ground of appeal. COSTS Ordinarily costs are awarded to the successful party, however appellant’s counsel indicated he was not seeking any order for costs therefore none will be granted. DISPOSITION Appeal against the decision of the arbitrator be and is hereby allowed with no order as to costs.The arbitral award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.” Maguchu and Muchada Business Attorneys, Appellant’s legal practitioners Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe, Respondent’s legal representatives TSIKWA J 7 LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE JUDGMENT No: HELD AT HARARE, 16 JANUARY 2026 CASE No: LC/H/1072/25 & 21 JANUARY 2026 In the matter between: - NATIONAL FOODS LIMITED APPLICANT AND TENDAI HUMPREY MADZAMBA 1st RESPONDENT MAXWELL KUIMBA 2nd RESPONDENT ARNOLD GUNDA 3rd RESPONDENT PETROS MHLANGA 4th RESPONDENT BERNARD MAPHOSA 5th RESPONDENT SHADRECK MANYANGE 6th RESPONDENT Before Honourable Justice Tsikwa J For the Applicant: Mr A.K Maguchu For the Respondents: Mr S.M Mandizha TSIKWA J: Before this court is an appeal against the whole judgment of the arbitrator, Honourable F.V Marovanyika dated 29 September 2025 in terms of Section 98(10) the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (hereafter referred to as the Act). # SHADRECK MANYANGE 6th RESPONDENT Before Honourable Justice Tsikwa J For the Applicant: Mr A.K Maguchu For the Respondents: Mr S.M Mandizha TSIKWA J: Before this court is an appeal against the whole judgment of the arbitrator, Honourable F.V Marovanyika dated 29 September 2025 in terms of Section 98(10) the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (hereafter referred to as the Act). FACTUAL BACKGROUND The respondents were employed by the appellant and were classified in grades C3 to C6. Employees in these grades were referred to as Non-NEC employees. The complaint by the respondents was that the appellant unilaterally banned their meetings claiming that they were managerial employees. They further alleged that the appellant embarked on a job grading exercise without consulting them, resultantly their jobs were downgraded as well as their conditions of service. The respondents were also aggrieved by the fact that the appellant refused to negotiate with an elected committee. The dispute was referred to the labour officer for conciliation but no consensus could be reached and it was referred for compulsory arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favour of the respondents and this gave rise to the present appeal. # FACTUAL BACKGROUND The respondents were employed by the appellant and were classified in grades C3 to C6. Employees in these grades were referred to as Non-NEC employees. The complaint by the respondents was that the appellant unilaterally banned their meetings claiming that they were managerial employees. They further alleged that the appellant embarked on a job grading exercise without consulting them, resultantly their jobs were downgraded as well as their conditions of service. The respondents were also aggrieved by the fact that the appellant refused to negotiate with an elected committee. The dispute was referred to the labour officer for conciliation but no consensus could be reached and it was referred for compulsory arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favour of the respondents and this gave rise to the present appeal. GROUNDS OF APPEAL The arbitrator erred at law in relating to issues of downgrading of employees arising from the job grading exercise when such an issue did not form part of the statement of claim by the respondents.The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a failure to consult the workers committee or works council in a job grading exercise is fatal to the results of the said exercise. To the contrary, the position of the law is that any such failure has got no such consequence.The arbitrator erred at law at law in coming up with a speculative award to the effect that some unnamed employees were downgraded in an unstated manner yet no evidence of any sorts was led by the respondents on who was downgraded and how.Having found that the respondents were non-managerial employees, and that there is a workers committee and a works council for this category of employees, the arbitrator erred at law in effectively finding that the respondent and other employees in their grades could form a second non-managerial workers committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/1985. The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a worker’s committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an employer generally and in any case without complying with Section 24(3) (6) of the Labour Act which requires that the extend of negotiations be compliant with a Collective Bargaining Agreement to which the workers’ trade union is a party to. # GROUNDS OF APPEAL The arbitrator erred at law in relating to issues of downgrading of employees arising from the job grading exercise when such an issue did not form part of the statement of claim by the respondents. The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a failure to consult the workers committee or works council in a job grading exercise is fatal to the results of the said exercise. To the contrary, the position of the law is that any such failure has got no such consequence. The arbitrator erred at law at law in coming up with a speculative award to the effect that some unnamed employees were downgraded in an unstated manner yet no evidence of any sorts was led by the respondents on who was downgraded and how. Having found that the respondents were non-managerial employees, and that there is a workers committee and a works council for this category of employees, the arbitrator erred at law in effectively finding that the respondent and other employees in their grades could form a second non-managerial workers committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/1985. The arbitrator erred at law in finding that a worker’s committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an employer generally and in any case without complying with Section 24(3) (6) of the Labour Act which requires that the extend of negotiations be compliant with a Collective Bargaining Agreement to which the workers’ trade union is a party to. RELIEF SOUGHT The appellant prayed for an order in the following terms: The claim be and is hereby dismissed with costs.The arbitration award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “a. The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit with costs.” # RELIEF SOUGHT The appellant prayed for an order in the following terms: The claim be and is hereby dismissed with costs. The arbitration award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “a. The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit with costs.” ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law by addressing issues of employee downgrading in the job grading exercise and by issuing a speculative award that some unnamed employees were downgraded.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in holding that failure to consult the workers’ committee is fatal to the job grading exercise.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that the respondents and other employees could form a non-managerial workers’ committee.Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that a workers’ committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an Employer without compliance with Section 24(3) and (6) of the Act. # ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law by addressing issues of employee downgrading in the job grading exercise and by issuing a speculative award that some unnamed employees were downgraded. Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in holding that failure to consult the workers’ committee is fatal to the job grading exercise. Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that the respondents and other employees could form a non-managerial workers’ committee. Whether or not the arbitrator erred at law in finding that a workers’ committee has an enforceable right to negotiate a Collective Bargaining Agreement with an Employer without compliance with Section 24(3) and (6) of the Act. THE APPLICABLE LAW In terms of Section 98(10) of the Act, appeals against decisions of the arbitrator are only on a point of law. The provision in question reads as follows: “An appeal on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator appointed in terms of this Section.” What constitutes a point of was dealt with in the case of Muzuva v United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 217. It was held that a point of law concerns the determination of what law actually is- matters reserved for the judge rather than the jury. It was emphasised that such questions are those already authoritatively answered by law, those that ask what the true rule of law is, and those that fall within the exclusive province of the judge. The same position was stated in Zvokusekwa v Bikita RDC SC-44-15 where the Supreme Court reiterated that appeals from the arbitrator, like those from the Labour Court to the Supreme Court, must rest on points of law. Where an appeal touches on facts, it must allege a misdirection so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have reached the same conclusion, whether by failing to appreciate a fact or by making findings contrary to the evidence presented. In Nyoni v Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Anor 1997 (2) ZLR 516 (H), the court also held that irrationality arises where a decision lacks any evidentiary foundation or where the evidence is so inadequate that no reasonable person applying their mind could have arrived at such a conclusion. SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES # THE APPLICABLE LAW In terms of Section 98(10) of the Act, appeals against decisions of the arbitrator are only on a point of law. The provision in question reads as follows: “An appeal on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator appointed in terms of this Section.” What constitutes a point of was dealt with in the case of Muzuva v United Bottlers (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 217. It was held that a point of law concerns the determination of what law actually is- matters reserved for the judge rather than the jury. It was emphasised that such questions are those already authoritatively answered by law, those that ask what the true rule of law is, and those that fall within the exclusive province of the judge. The same position was stated in Zvokusekwa v Bikita RDC SC-44-15 where the Supreme Court reiterated that appeals from the arbitrator, like those from the Labour Court to the Supreme Court, must rest on points of law. Where an appeal touches on facts, it must allege a misdirection so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have reached the same conclusion, whether by failing to appreciate a fact or by making findings contrary to the evidence presented. In Nyoni v Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Anor 1997 (2) ZLR 516 (H), the court also held that irrationality arises where a decision lacks any evidentiary foundation or where the evidence is so inadequate that no reasonable person applying their mind could have arrived at such a conclusion. SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1 AND 3 The appellant’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator grossly misdirected himself by introducing an issue of employee downgrading which was never pleaded and by issuing a speculative award without evidence. It was further argued that the matter properly before him concerned the procedure of job grading exercise not its substantive outcome. The appellant’s counsel further submitted that by creating issues for the parties and ruling on them, the arbitrator acted irregularly. The appellant further argued that the arbitrator acted contrary to the principle that tribunals that tribunals may only decide matters placed before them. Reference was made to the case of Nzara v Kashumba SC-18-18. The appellant submitted that the arbitrator’s conduct undermined the adversarial system and prejudiced its case and must be set aside. The respondents further argued that the arbitrator never dealt with issues not placed before him because the record clearly lists the illegality of the Patterson job grading system and its resultant downgrading as issues for determination and such issues were also raised in the statement of claim. It was argued that if the applicant was not in agreement with this, it must have been challenged during arbitration stage. The respondents further argued that the award by the arbitrator was not speculative in any way as it was directed to the named respondents including Tendai Humphrey Madzamba and that any wider effect on similarly graded staff does not invalidate the relief. The respondents summed up on this aspect by citing the case of ZESA v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (SC). # GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1 AND 3 The appellant’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator grossly misdirected himself by introducing an issue of employee downgrading which was never pleaded and by issuing a speculative award without evidence. It was further argued that the matter properly before him concerned the procedure of job grading exercise not its substantive outcome. The appellant’s counsel further submitted that by creating issues for the parties and ruling on them, the arbitrator acted irregularly. The appellant further argued that the arbitrator acted contrary to the principle that tribunals that tribunals may only decide matters placed before them. Reference was made to the case of Nzara v Kashumba SC-18-18. The appellant submitted that the arbitrator’s conduct undermined the adversarial system and prejudiced its case and must be set aside. The respondents further argued that the arbitrator never dealt with issues not placed before him because the record clearly lists the illegality of the Patterson job grading system and its resultant downgrading as issues for determination and such issues were also raised in the statement of claim. It was argued that if the applicant was not in agreement with this, it must have been challenged during arbitration stage. The respondents further argued that the award by the arbitrator was not speculative in any way as it was directed to the named respondents including Tendai Humphrey Madzamba and that any wider effect on similarly graded staff does not invalidate the relief. The respondents summed up on this aspect by citing the case of ZESA v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452 (SC). APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is settled law that courts and tribunals generally adjudicate on the specific issues and disputes raised by the parties. See Nzara v Kashumba (supra) where the court held as follows: “The function of the court is to determine disputes placed before it by the parties It cannot go on a frolic of its own. Where a point of law or a factual issue exercises the court’s mind but has not been raised by the parties or addressed by them either in their pleadings in evidence or in submissions from the bar, the court is at liberty to put the question to the parties and ask them to make submissions on the matter.” In casu, whilst the arbitrator appeared as if he was dealing with an issue properly placed before him, he strayed in so far as he gave an award to the effect that employees affected by the Patterson system job grading be restored to their original grades. That was not part of the statement of claim. The issue that was before the arbitrator was as per statement of claim was couched as follows: “Whether or not the Patterson system job gradings were procedurally done.” There is no where in the statement of claim relating to a claim of restoration of status quo nor was evidence of those prejudiced led or even mentioned be it in the notice of response or submissions in writing or orally. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant was supposed to have challenged this before the arbitrator, however, it was not possible to challenge an issue not on the statement of claim. The award remains speculative in so far as it was granted without evidence of the downgrading and specific persons disadvantaged. These two grounds of appeal have got merit and are hereby upheld. # APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is settled law that courts and tribunals generally adjudicate on the specific issues and disputes raised by the parties. See Nzara v Kashumba (supra) where the court held as follows: “The function of the court is to determine disputes placed before it by the parties It cannot go on a frolic of its own. Where a point of law or a factual issue exercises the court’s mind but has not been raised by the parties or addressed by them either in their pleadings in evidence or in submissions from the bar, the court is at liberty to put the question to the parties and ask them to make submissions on the matter.” In casu, whilst the arbitrator appeared as if he was dealing with an issue properly placed before him, he strayed in so far as he gave an award to the effect that employees affected by the Patterson system job grading be restored to their original grades. That was not part of the statement of claim. The issue that was before the arbitrator was as per statement of claim was couched as follows: “Whether or not the Patterson system job gradings were procedurally done.” There is no where in the statement of claim relating to a claim of restoration of status quo nor was evidence of those prejudiced led or even mentioned be it in the notice of response or submissions in writing or orally. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant was supposed to have challenged this before the arbitrator, however, it was not possible to challenge an issue not on the statement of claim. The award remains speculative in so far as it was granted without evidence of the downgrading and specific persons disadvantaged. These two grounds of appeal have got merit and are hereby upheld. GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 2 It is the appellant’s contention that the arbitrator erred in law by holding that the employer’s failure to consult the workers committee or works council invalidates the job grading exercise. It was further submitted that the Act does not prescribe such a sanction or remedy and that whilst consultation is encouraged, failure to consult does not nullify the outcome of the job evaluation exercise. The appellant made reference to the case of Chemco Holdings v Tendere & Ors SC14-17. In that case, it was submitted, the Supreme Court held that lack of consultation with the works council does not invalidate the employer’s action. No works council has got veto power under the Act, it was submitted. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Act might give the employees a right to sue the employer but not to invalidate the process. It finally submitted that the award was grossly irregular and must be set aside. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator did not err in finding that failure to consult employees in the job evaluation exercise invalidates the results of that job evaluation exercise because the provisions of Section 25(5) (b) of the Act are mandatory. It was further argued that reliance on the case Chemco Holdings case (supra) was misplaced since it dealt with business transfers as opposed to unilateral variation of employment terms. It was further submitted that unilateral downgrading of grades, job titles and remuneration are core elements of the contract of employment that constitute an unfair labour practice in terms of Section 8(c) and violate Section 2A of the Act. Reference was made to the case of Crempton Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Matekenya 2012 (2) ZLR 161 (H). # GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 2 It is the appellant’s contention that the arbitrator erred in law by holding that the employer’s failure to consult the workers committee or works council invalidates the job grading exercise. It was further submitted that the Act does not prescribe such a sanction or remedy and that whilst consultation is encouraged, failure to consult does not nullify the outcome of the job evaluation exercise. The appellant made reference to the case of Chemco Holdings v Tendere & Ors SC14-17. In that case, it was submitted, the Supreme Court held that lack of consultation with the works council does not invalidate the employer’s action. No works council has got veto power under the Act, it was submitted. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Act might give the employees a right to sue the employer but not to invalidate the process. It finally submitted that the award was grossly irregular and must be set aside. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the arbitrator did not err in finding that failure to consult employees in the job evaluation exercise invalidates the results of that job evaluation exercise because the provisions of Section 25(5) (b) of the Act are mandatory. It was further argued that reliance on the case Chemco Holdings case (supra) was misplaced since it dealt with business transfers as opposed to unilateral variation of employment terms. It was further submitted that unilateral downgrading of grades, job titles and remuneration are core elements of the contract of employment that constitute an unfair labour practice in terms of Section 8(c) and violate Section 2A of the Act. Reference was made to the case of Crempton Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Matekenya 2012 (2) ZLR 161 (H). APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is important to note that while Section 25 A(5) makes consultation mandatory, it does not provide for a remedy or sanction for failure to comply with that provision. In the case of Chemco Holdings relied on by the appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that failure to consult workers committee did not invalidate the transfer of the business. The argument that the case is not applicable to the case at hand is misplaced because the provisions of Section 25A(5) refer to both transfer of business and job grading as among other issues that require consultation with employees. The sub section reads: “(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of any collective bargaining agreement ---------- a works council shall be entitled to be consulted by the employer about proposals relating to any of following matters- product development plans, job grading and training and education schemes affecting employees. partial or total plant closures and mergers and transfers of ownership”. These two issues are contained in the same sub-section and what the Supreme Court ruled in the Chemco Holdings case is applicable to both scenarios. The case of Crempton Trading (supra) which is said to have held to the contrary cannot take precedence over a Supreme Court decision. It is my finding that the arbitrator erred in holding that failure to consult the works council invalidated the Patterson job evaluation results. The decision was bad at law and ought to be vacated. This ground of appeal is upheld. # APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS It is important to note that while Section 25 A(5) makes consultation mandatory, it does not provide for a remedy or sanction for failure to comply with that provision. In the case of Chemco Holdings relied on by the appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that failure to consult workers committee did not invalidate the transfer of the business. The argument that the case is not applicable to the case at hand is misplaced because the provisions of Section 25A(5) refer to both transfer of business and job grading as among other issues that require consultation with employees. The sub section reads: “(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of any collective bargaining agreement ---------- a works council shall be entitled to be consulted by the employer about proposals relating to any of following matters- product development plans, job grading and training and education schemes affecting employees. partial or total plant closures and mergers and transfers of ownership”. These two issues are contained in the same sub-section and what the Supreme Court ruled in the Chemco Holdings case is applicable to both scenarios. The case of Crempton Trading (supra) which is said to have held to the contrary cannot take precedence over a Supreme Court decision. It is my finding that the arbitrator erred in holding that failure to consult the works council invalidated the Patterson job evaluation results. The decision was bad at law and ought to be vacated. This ground of appeal is upheld. GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 4 The appellant’s argument was that the arbitrator erred in law by allowing the respondents to form a second non-managerial workers committee and to negotiate a separate collective bargaining agreement. It submitted further that Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85 prohibits more than one workers’ committee per employer. It was also the appellant’s submission that Section 24 (3) (b) of the Act limits workers’ committee’s negotiating rights where a trade union and binding NEC agreement already exist. The appellant also submitted that since the respondents are members of the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union under NEC Food Sector, the arbitrator’s finding contravenes the provisions of the Act and must be set aside. The respondents on the other hand argued that the arbitrator did not err in law by holding that non-managerial employees in grades C3-C6 are entitled to their own representation in terms of Section 23(1) of the Act. They further argued that appellant’s reliance on Section 23(2) which prohibits second committee is misplaced since it only bars duplicate committees for the same group. It was submitted further that the appellant’s code of conduct recognises more than one works council and therefore refusal to bargain with the elected committee was unlawful. Counsel for the respondents also submitted that the respondents have got no CBA with any NEC, they have got no workers committee or works council. It was further submitted that the SI prohibiting multiple workers committees must not be read in isolation but together with Section 23 of the Act. Counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 23(1) (a) and (b) of the Act which he said allows for formation of a workers committee where employees are not represented by a trade union. He submitted further that the respondents have a right to form a workers committee in terms of Section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In replication, counsel for the appellant submitted that reference to Section 23(1) (a) and (b) is misplaced because such subsections do not exist and subject matter in Section 23(1) is totally different. Section 23 deals with formation of workers committees and a single workers committee for employees employed by one employer. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that it is a misrepresentation of facts to say that the respondents have got no workers committee because the truth is that they want to form their own separate from junior non-managerial employees. He also submitted that it is not true that the respondents do not belong to any trade union because in casu the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the trade union. # GROUND OF APPEAL NUMBER 4 The appellant’s argument was that the arbitrator erred in law by allowing the respondents to form a second non-managerial workers committee and to negotiate a separate collective bargaining agreement. It submitted further that Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85 prohibits more than one workers’ committee per employer. It was also the appellant’s submission that Section 24 (3) (b) of the Act limits workers’ committee’s negotiating rights where a trade union and binding NEC agreement already exist. The appellant also submitted that since the respondents are members of the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union under NEC Food Sector, the arbitrator’s finding contravenes the provisions of the Act and must be set aside. The respondents on the other hand argued that the arbitrator did not err in law by holding that non-managerial employees in grades C3-C6 are entitled to their own representation in terms of Section 23(1) of the Act. They further argued that appellant’s reliance on Section 23(2) which prohibits second committee is misplaced since it only bars duplicate committees for the same group. It was submitted further that the appellant’s code of conduct recognises more than one works council and therefore refusal to bargain with the elected committee was unlawful. Counsel for the respondents also submitted that the respondents have got no CBA with any NEC, they have got no workers committee or works council. It was further submitted that the SI prohibiting multiple workers committees must not be read in isolation but together with Section 23 of the Act. Counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 23(1) (a) and (b) of the Act which he said allows for formation of a workers committee where employees are not represented by a trade union. He submitted further that the respondents have a right to form a workers committee in terms of Section 65 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In replication, counsel for the appellant submitted that reference to Section 23(1) (a) and (b) is misplaced because such subsections do not exist and subject matter in Section 23(1) is totally different. Section 23 deals with formation of workers committees and a single workers committee for employees employed by one employer. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that it is a misrepresentation of facts to say that the respondents have got no workers committee because the truth is that they want to form their own separate from junior non-managerial employees. He also submitted that it is not true that the respondents do not belong to any trade union because in casu the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the trade union. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO FACTS From the above arguments it is apparent that the arbitrator misdirected himself by allowing the creation of more than one workers’ committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85. It is a decision also at tangent with the provisions of Section 23(1) of the Act which provides for the creation of a single workers committee by employees employed by one employer. In a desperate bid to convince the court that the respondents have got no representation, it was submitted that they have got no workers committee and they do not belong to any trade union. However, the record of proceedings betrayed them as it is apparent that the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe. It is abundantly clear that the arbitrator misdirected himself on this issue and therefore this ground of appeal is bound to succeed. The appellant did not pursue the fifth ground of appeal. # APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO FACTS From the above arguments it is apparent that the arbitrator misdirected himself by allowing the creation of more than one workers’ committee contrary to the provisions of Section 3(3) of Statutory Instrument 372/85. It is a decision also at tangent with the provisions of Section 23(1) of the Act which provides for the creation of a single workers committee by employees employed by one employer. In a desperate bid to convince the court that the respondents have got no representation, it was submitted that they have got no workers committee and they do not belong to any trade union. However, the record of proceedings betrayed them as it is apparent that the notice of response and heads of argument were filed by the Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe. It is abundantly clear that the arbitrator misdirected himself on this issue and therefore this ground of appeal is bound to succeed. The appellant did not pursue the fifth ground of appeal. COSTS Ordinarily costs are awarded to the successful party, however appellant’s counsel indicated he was not seeking any order for costs therefore none will be granted. # COSTS Ordinarily costs are awarded to the successful party, however appellant’s counsel indicated he was not seeking any order for costs therefore none will be granted. DISPOSITION Appeal against the decision of the arbitrator be and is hereby allowed with no order as to costs.The arbitral award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.” Maguchu and Muchada Business Attorneys, Appellant’s legal practitioners Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe, Respondent’s legal representatives TSIKWA J 7 # DISPOSITION Appeal against the decision of the arbitrator be and is hereby allowed with no order as to costs. The arbitral award dated 29 September 2025 be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following: “The claims be and are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.” Maguchu and Muchada Business Attorneys, Appellant’s legal practitioners Food Federation and Allied Workers Union of Zimbabwe, Respondent’s legal representatives TSIKWA J 7 7