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Case Law[2026] ZWLC 6Zimbabwe

Nyabadza vs National Pharmaceutical Company of Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd (LC/H/225/25) [2026] ZWLC 6 (30 January 2026)

Labour Court of Zimbabwe
30 January 2026
Home J, Journals J, Musariri J

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Judgment

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE JUDGMENT NO LC/H/26 HARARE 25 NOVEMBER 2025 CASE NO LC/H/225/25 ZEALOUS NYABADZA APPLICANT NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RESPONDENT OF ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD Before the Honourable G. Musariri Judge: For Applicant - ST. Mutema Attorney For Respondent - P. Dube, Attorney MUSARIRI, J: Applicant applied to this Court for alteration of a default judgement in his favour. The application was made in terms of section 92C(1)(a) of the Labour Act Chapter 28:01 hereafter called the Act. Respondent opposed the application. By judgement LCH 475/25 dated 17th November 2025 this Court ordered respondent to file its board resolution authorising opposition of the application. The resolution was duly on 25 November 2025. The Court will thus proceed to determine the merits of the application. On the 18th February 2025 in the matter between the parties referenced LCH 857/22-1 this Court issued an order in the following terms, “1. The application in terms of section 93(7) as read with section 89(1)(c) of the Labour Act Chapter 28:01 be and is hereby granted; 2(a) The second respondent (now Respondent) shall reinstate applicant’s posts without loss of salaries and benefits, or (b) The second respondent shall pay applicant damages in lieu of reinstatement in a sum either agreed by the parties or assessed by this Court; and 3. Second respondent shall pay half of applicant’s costs of suit.” Applicant alleges that the said impugned order did not “pronounce itself on” issues he raised which should have been resolved per his draft order thus, “2 The operative part of the Applicant’s Default judgement under cover LCH 857/22-1 dated 18 February 2025 be and is hereby altered and the entire judgement shall read as follows:- The applicant’s points in limine having been upheld and the 2nd Respondent’s opposing affidavit expunged from the record for want of deponent’s locus standi and breach of section 17 of the public entities corporate governance Act (Chapter 10:31) application for alteration is granted in the following terms:- The 2nd Respondent having failed to show good cause why a person with requisite authority has not deposed to its notice of response, it is hereby barred and Default Judgement be and is hereby granted in terms of rule 29(b)(1) in the following terms; 1st respondent’s failure to issue a certificate of no settlement within 30 days from the date of referral of the dispute to her is a breach of section 93(3) of the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01), consequently, Application in terms of section 93(b)(II) as read with section 89(2)(c) of the Labour Act be and is hereby granted. II The termination of Applicant’s fixed term contracts of employment as the Information Technology Manager and acting Operations Manager on notice, and termination of his Acting Managing Director contract by the purported Representative of the 2nd Respondent is irregular, consequently it is ordered that:- Application for specific performance be and is hereby granted.2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to reinstate Applicant to the position of Information Technology Manager, Operations Manager and Acting Managing Director without loss of salaries and benefits as such contracts have tacitly relocated as at the date of termination. In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible at either party’s instance, 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement in the following terms:- In respect of the Information Technology Manager post the sum of USD 586 376.The Applicant be and is hereby awarded the vehicle allocated to him under registration number AEK 1508 in terms of clause 6.3 of the vehicle policy.The 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to buy Applicant two brand new and similar vehicles to the one under registration AEK 1508 within 10 days of this order, in the alternative 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay the market value of USD 71000 per vehicle.The 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suite on an attorney client scale. 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay interest on all awarded amounts at the prescribed rate from the date of unlawful termination to the date of full and final payment. 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay Applicant all amounts awarded at the inflation rate of 258% per annum as gazetted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as at 2 December 2022 from the date of termination of the contract to the date of full and final payment. III The Applicant be and is hereby authorised to approach this court with an application for quantification of damages in lieu of reinstatement in respect of both his Operations Manager and acting Management Director Contracts of employments within three calendar months of this order.” The basis of the application is set out in applicant’s heads of argument in two paragraphs thus, “Correction of Default Judgment proper at Law 10. Section 92C(1)(a) is very clear that “the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made.” There is no doubt that the Respondent having been barred, its notice of opposition expunged from the record, and an application for default judgement specifically made, what was then granted was a judgment in default. It follows that the application at hand is proper at law. What the Respondent does not answer is the allegation that the court failed to pronounce itself on issues specifically raised for determination. This the court can redress through this application as the judgement was not on the merits. 11. This court …Applicant placed before the court certain issues that required grant in the default judgement to wit reference is made to paragraph 10 of the founding affidavit. These issues constituted part of the prayer that was placed before the court in default and should have been granted as prayed for hence should be allowed in alteration proceedings.” Respondent’s heads of argument pushed back mainly as follows, “8 The Respondent argues that the application is made under section 92C(1)(a) of the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) as per the Notice of Application and paragraph 3 of the founding affidavit. 9. However, the relief sought and the body of the founding affidavit for example paragraph 11 suggests that there was a patent error on the part of the court. 10, This position is misplaced in that the court properly related to the issues placed before it. 11 The Respondent argues that section 92 C(1)(a) is at the disposal of the party against whom the default judgement was granted. Not the one who succeeded unless the successful party demonstrates an error on the part of the court. 13. The Respondent argues that the founding affidavit demonstrates that the applicant is aggrieved by the default judgement granted in his favour. It is argued that the founding affidavit is a pseudo appeal disguised as an application. 14. As such, the application must be dismissed on the basis that it is an appeal disguised in an application for rescission beyond the remit of a party that was present a quo.” ANALYSIS The Court is persuaded by respondent’s argument. Applicant’s founding affidavit talks of error/s allegedly made by this Court. The alleged errors are resolved under section 92C(1)(c) of the Act. Yet applicant brought this application under section 92C(1)(a) which deals with default judgements. The relief therein 1(a) is afforded to the defaulting party. Applicant ws not the defaulting party. Evidently the application has been brought under the wrong provision and must be dismissed as incompetent. Further and in any event there is no patent or obvious error as alleged. What is patent is applicant’s dissatisfaction with the impugned order. His remedy is an appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of section 92F of the Act. Therefore the application ought to be struck off as incompetent. Wherefore it is ordered that, The application for alteration of court order be and is hereby struck off as incompetent, and Applicant shall pay respondent’s costs of suit. G MUSARIRI J-U-D-G-E IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE JUDGMENT NO LC/H/26 HARARE 25 NOVEMBER 2025 CASE NO LC/H/225/25 ZEALOUS NYABADZA APPLICANT NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RESPONDENT OF ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD Before the Honourable G. Musariri Judge: For Applicant - ST. Mutema Attorney For Respondent - P. Dube, Attorney MUSARIRI, J: Applicant applied to this Court for alteration of a default judgement in his favour. The application was made in terms of section 92C(1)(a) of the Labour Act Chapter 28:01 hereafter called the Act. Respondent opposed the application. By judgement LCH 475/25 dated 17th November 2025 this Court ordered respondent to file its board resolution authorising opposition of the application. The resolution was duly on 25 November 2025. The Court will thus proceed to determine the merits of the application. On the 18th February 2025 in the matter between the parties referenced LCH 857/22-1 this Court issued an order in the following terms, “1. The application in terms of section 93(7) as read with section 89(1)(c) of the Labour Act Chapter 28:01 be and is hereby granted; 2(a) The second respondent (now Respondent) shall reinstate applicant’s posts without loss of salaries and benefits, or (b) The second respondent shall pay applicant damages in lieu of reinstatement in a sum either agreed by the parties or assessed by this Court; and 3. Second respondent shall pay half of applicant’s costs of suit.” Applicant alleges that the said impugned order did not “pronounce itself on” issues he raised which should have been resolved per his draft order thus, “2 The operative part of the Applicant’s Default judgement under cover LCH 857/22-1 dated 18 February 2025 be and is hereby altered and the entire judgement shall read as follows:- The applicant’s points in limine having been upheld and the 2nd Respondent’s opposing affidavit expunged from the record for want of deponent’s locus standi and breach of section 17 of the public entities corporate governance Act (Chapter 10:31) application for alteration is granted in the following terms:- The 2nd Respondent having failed to show good cause why a person with requisite authority has not deposed to its notice of response, it is hereby barred and Default Judgement be and is hereby granted in terms of rule 29(b)(1) in the following terms; 1st respondent’s failure to issue a certificate of no settlement within 30 days from the date of referral of the dispute to her is a breach of section 93(3) of the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01), consequently, Application in terms of section 93(b)(II) as read with section 89(2)(c) of the Labour Act be and is hereby granted. II The termination of Applicant’s fixed term contracts of employment as the Information Technology Manager and acting Operations Manager on notice, and termination of his Acting Managing Director contract by the purported Representative of the 2nd Respondent is irregular, consequently it is ordered that:- Application for specific performance be and is hereby granted. 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to reinstate Applicant to the position of Information Technology Manager, Operations Manager and Acting Managing Director without loss of salaries and benefits as such contracts have tacitly relocated as at the date of termination. In the event that reinstatement is no longer possible at either party’s instance, 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement in the following terms:- In respect of the Information Technology Manager post the sum of USD 586 376. The Applicant be and is hereby awarded the vehicle allocated to him under registration number AEK 1508 in terms of clause 6.3 of the vehicle policy. The 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to buy Applicant two brand new and similar vehicles to the one under registration AEK 1508 within 10 days of this order, in the alternative 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay the market value of USD 71000 per vehicle. The 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suite on an attorney client scale. 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay interest on all awarded amounts at the prescribed rate from the date of unlawful termination to the date of full and final payment. 2nd Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay Applicant all amounts awarded at the inflation rate of 258% per annum as gazetted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as at 2 December 2022 from the date of termination of the contract to the date of full and final payment. III The Applicant be and is hereby authorised to approach this court with an application for quantification of damages in lieu of reinstatement in respect of both his Operations Manager and acting Management Director Contracts of employments within three calendar months of this order.” The basis of the application is set out in applicant’s heads of argument in two paragraphs thus, “Correction of Default Judgment proper at Law 10. Section 92C(1)(a) is very clear that “the Labour Court may, on application, rescind or vary any determination or order which it made in the absence of the party against whom it was made.” There is no doubt that the Respondent having been barred, its notice of opposition expunged from the record, and an application for default judgement specifically made, what was then granted was a judgment in default. It follows that the application at hand is proper at law. What the Respondent does not answer is the allegation that the court failed to pronounce itself on issues specifically raised for determination. This the court can redress through this application as the judgement was not on the merits. 11. This court …Applicant placed before the court certain issues that required grant in the default judgement to wit reference is made to paragraph 10 of the founding affidavit. These issues constituted part of the prayer that was placed before the court in default and should have been granted as prayed for hence should be allowed in alteration proceedings.” Respondent’s heads of argument pushed back mainly as follows, “8 The Respondent argues that the application is made under section 92C(1)(a) of the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) as per the Notice of Application and paragraph 3 of the founding affidavit. 9. However, the relief sought and the body of the founding affidavit for example paragraph 11 suggests that there was a patent error on the part of the court. 10, This position is misplaced in that the court properly related to the issues placed before it. 11 The Respondent argues that section 92 C(1)(a) is at the disposal of the party against whom the default judgement was granted. Not the one who succeeded unless the successful party demonstrates an error on the part of the court. 13. The Respondent argues that the founding affidavit demonstrates that the applicant is aggrieved by the default judgement granted in his favour. It is argued that the founding affidavit is a pseudo appeal disguised as an application. 14. As such, the application must be dismissed on the basis that it is an appeal disguised in an application for rescission beyond the remit of a party that was present a quo.” ANALYSIS The Court is persuaded by respondent’s argument. Applicant’s founding affidavit talks of error/s allegedly made by this Court. The alleged errors are resolved under section 92C(1)(c) of the Act. Yet applicant brought this application under section 92C(1)(a) which deals with default judgements. The relief therein 1(a) is afforded to the defaulting party. Applicant ws not the defaulting party. Evidently the application has been brought under the wrong provision and must be dismissed as incompetent. Further and in any event there is no patent or obvious error as alleged. What is patent is applicant’s dissatisfaction with the impugned order. His remedy is an appeal to the Supreme Court in terms of section 92F of the Act. Therefore the application ought to be struck off as incompetent. Wherefore it is ordered that, The application for alteration of court order be and is hereby struck off as incompetent, and Applicant shall pay respondent’s costs of suit. G MUSARIRI J-U-D-G-E

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