People v Attorney General and Ors (2025/HP/0482) (22 December 2025) – ZambiaLII

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR ZAMBIA 2025/HP/0482 AT THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRY HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (CIVIL JURISDICTION) IN THE MATTER OF: ORDER 53 RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ENGLAND AND 1965 (THE WHITE BOOK) 1999 AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 145 (1), OF THE ZAMBIA WILDLIFE ACT NO. 14 OF 2015 OF THE LAWS OF ZAMBIA AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE FAILURE BY THE MINISTER OF TOURISM AND ARTS TO RENDER A DECISION OF AN APPEAL AGAINST THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE ON AN APPLICATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION FROM THE LOWER ZAMBEZI NATIONAL PARK BETWF.EN: THE PEOPLE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT Ex-parte CHAPTER ONE FOUNDATION 1 ST APPLICANT Ex-parte CONSERVATION ADVOCATES ZAMBIA APPLICANT 2ND Before the Honourable Mrs Justice Ruth Chibbabbuka on the 22nd day of December, 2025 F'or the Applicant: Mr B. Malisa, Messrs Malisa and Partners Legal Pracli lioncrs For the Respondent: Mr C. Bikoko and Ms A. Bowa, State Advocates JUDGMENT Cases referred to: 7. Derrick Chitala (Secretary of tlte Zam/Jill Democratic Congress Vs The Attorney General (7 995-97) Z.R 91 2. Zambia Federation of Employers V.s The l\tlomey General 20 72 /H P/ 0884 3. Dean Namulya Mung'omba and others Vs /Jeter Machungwa Golden Mandandila and another SCZ Judgment No. 3 of 2003 Jl 4. R Vs Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex-parte National Federation of Self Employment & Small Businesses Ltd [1982/ AC 617 5. Cahil Vs Sutton (1980) 1.R 269 6. Chikuta Vs Chipata Rural Council (1974) Z.R 241 7. Ridge Vs Baldwin [1964} A. C 40 8. Council of Civil Service Union Vs Minister for Civil Service 1985 A.C 374 9. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Vs Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B 223 CA 10. Council of Civic Service Union Vs Minister of State for Civil Service (1984) 3 ALL E.R 935 11. Patel V Municipal Council of Broken Hill 1912 R&N 600 12. The People Vs Luanshya Municipal Council, ex parte Chendaeka (1969) ZR 69 73 . The People Vs Livingstone Municipal Council, ex parte Simioti (1969) ZR 53 (HC) 14. Re RH (1999) WDA 20 7 1 15. Padfiled Vs Agriculture Food and Fisheries (1968) AC 997 Legislation referred to: High Court Act, Chapter 27 of the Laws ofZ ambia Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999 Edition (The White Book) Other works referred to: Administrative Law in Zambia: Cases and Material Chewe, A.N (2020), Juta and Company Limited, Claremont at page 3 96 Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Bryan A. Gamer Judicial Review of Public decisions, Citizens Information, www.citizensinformation.ie 1.0 Introduction This is an application by way of Judicial Review made pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999 Edition (The White Book), for an Order of Mandamus to compel the Minister to perform his statutory duty. The applicant alleges that the respondent's disregard and neglect to adhere to the procedure as prescribed is procedurally improper, illegal and irrational. Leave having been granted to commence judicial review proceedings on the 6th May, 2025, the same operated as a stay of the respondent's actions through the Department of National Parks and Wildlife granting Tourism Concession Agreements in the Lower Zambezi National Park until final determinalion of the matter. 1.1 Reliefs Sought The main applicant seeks the following reliefs: J2 1. An order of mandamus directed to the Minister of Tourism and Arts compelling him to perform his statutory duty under Section 145(1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 to determine the Appeal submitted to him by the applicants on the 3rd day of February, 2025 and to render and communicate his decision to the applicants in writing. 2. An order of mandamus compelling the Minister of Tourism and Arts to fulfil his statutory duty under Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 by undertaking a comprehensive Wildlife Impact Assessment in the Lower Zambezi National Park, as formally requested in a letter dated 3rd February, 2025. Furthermore, the Minister is required to ensure that the findings of the assessment are duly documented, finalized and formally served upon the applicants in accordance with legal and procedural requirements. 3. Costs. 1.2 Facts relied on On the 2nd June, 2023, the 2nd applicant through its advocates wrote a letter to the Director of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) asserting that Tourism Concession Agreements within the Lower Zambezi National Park had been awarded by DNPW without adherence to a public tendering process. This lack of transparency was said to have resulted in an information gap among members of the public which led to the 1st applicant formally requesting access to all relevant documents pertaining to the aforementioned agreements. On the 26Lh June, 2023, the 1st applicant wrote a follow up letter to the Director of DNPW reminding them no response had been provided to the request made in the previous correspondence. In light of the refusal of DNPW to avail the requested documentation, the 1st applicant filed a petition into court on the 7th September, 2023 alongside other environmental issues in the petition in relation to the granting of Tourism Concession Agreements through Adaptive Management processes. On the 16th April, 2024, the Constitutional Court rendered a judgment in two parts being the majority judgment and the J3 st dissenting judgment. In the dissenting judgment, the Court affirmed the 1 applicant's right to access the requested documentation. On the 2nd December, 2024, the 1st and 2nd applicants wrote to the Director DNPW, formally requesting for the documentation relating to the award of Tourism Concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park. In response, the respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter on the 13th December, 2024. Another letter dated 26th December, 2024 was written by the DNPW in response to the applicant's letter of the 2nd December, 2024. This letter provided a justification for the DNPW's reliance on adaptive management processes but regrettably failed to address the matter of furnishing the requested documentation as previously sought by the applicants. In order to formally notify the respondent of their failure to address and provide the documents requested for in prior correspondence, and to reiterate their request, the applicants wrote a letter to the Director of DNPW, on the 15th January, 2025. That in accordance with the guidance provided by the Constitutional Court in the aforementioned judgment, the applicants on the 3rd February, 2025 submitted a formal letter to the Honourable Minister of Tourism and Arts, requesting that a Wildlife Impact Assessment be conducted in the Lower Zambezi National Park. Upon observing the respondents continued failure to provide the requested documentation, the applicants resolved to escalate the matter by lodging an appeal with the Minister of Tourism and Arts, citing the Director of DNPW's non-disclosure of the required documentation. 1.3 Affidavit verifying facts An affidavit verifying facts was filed on the 8th April, 2025 sworn and deposed nd to by Raymond Kaima, a Governance Specialist in the 2 applicant company. The said affidavit verifies the facts as outlined above. 1.4 Grounds on which relief is sought Procedural impropriety J4 On the ground of procedural impropriety, the applicants contend as follows: a. The respondent wilfully disregarded and/or neglected to adhere to the procedures prescribed under Section 146 ( 1) and (2) (d) of the Act concerning the handling of the appeal submitted by the applicant. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the respondent is legally obligated to collaborate with the Director of the DNPW to establish regulations aimed at facilitating the effective implementation of the law. That these regulations are required to include procedural mechanisms for the Minister to hear and determine appeals, thereby ensuring the existence of a robust system for addressing grievance and resolving disputes arising under the Act. b. The respondent failed and/ or neglected to comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act. In accordance with the Act, the respondent is legally obligated to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment upon request by a party that has reasonable grounds to believe that an existing or proposed government plan, activity, or action undertaken by the Government, an individual, or an organisation may result in adverse effects on wildlife within in the National Park, as was the case with the applicants. c. In the present case, the respondent has neither initiated an inquiry to address the issues raised in the appeal nor formally rejected the appeal by providing written reasons to the applicants. Such inaction represents a deviation from the procedural requirements established under the Zambia Wildlife Act and amounts to procedural impropriety. Furthermore, the respondent has failed and/ or neglected to respond to the aforementioned letter requesting the conduct of a Wildlife Impact Assessment. To date, no such assessment has been undertaken, despite the formal request and the statutory obligation imposed under the relevant provision Illegality Under the ground of illegality, the applicant contends as follows: JS a. The respondent's failure to determine the appeal and carry out a Wildlife Impact Assessment, as mandated by Section 145 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act respectively, constitutes an illegality and amounts to an abdication of a statutory duty. Section 145 (2) of the Act further stipulates that any decision rendered by the Minister following an appeal is subject to further appeal before the High Court. This provision underscores the legal obligation of the Minister to render a decision. The law does not permit the Minister to remain inactive or fail to address the appeal, as is the case in the present matter. Such inaction by the respondent amounts to breach of a statutory duty and constitutes an illegality. Irrationality Under the ground of irrationality, the applicant contends that: a. The respondent's failure and/or neglect to either consider and determine the applicant's appeal or outrightly reject it and communicate its decision, even after the lapse of over 2 years, is unreasonable and constitutes a violation of the principles established under the W ednesbury standard of unreasonableness. No reasonable administrative body, properly applying itself to the relevant law and facts, would take more than a year to decide whether to accept or reject an application, especially given that the applicants have been actively requesting the necessary documentation for a period exceeding 1 year. b. The failure by the respondent amounts to a continuing breach of the applicant's constitutionality guaranteed rights under Article 255 (m) of the Constitution, which provides that the public shall have access to environmental information in order to preserve, protect and conserve the environment. c. The respondent's unjustified delay in rendering its decision is unreasonable, particularly in light of Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act, which expressly allows an aggrieved party to appeal the decision of the Director of the DNPW to the Minister. The J6 respondent's failure to either reject or consider the appeal constitutes unreasonable conduct, as the absence of a decision creates a clog in the administrative process available to the applicants. This inaction effectively obstructs the applicants' ability to seek recourse through the administrative channels that are dependent on the respondent's decision. d. The respondent's failure and/ or neglect to provide a response or, more critically, to take action on the applicant's request: for the Minister to conduct a Wildlife Assessment within a two-month period was unreasonable given the sensitivity of the matter. The inaction is particularly concerning in light of the applicant's prior notification that the department has been continually awarding Tourism Concession Agreements, resulting in overcrowding in the western part of the Lower Zambezi National park. Such failure to act constitutes an ongoing breach of the applicant's rights under Section 38 of the Zambia Wildlife Act, thereby jeopardizing ecological balance and potentially leading to irreversible environmental degradation in the affected area. 2.0 The applicant's submissions in support of the Judicial Review application Counsel for the applicant in their Notice filed on the 8th April, 2025 contended that the respondent is the Chief Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Zambia and is sued in that capacity pursuant to the provisions of the State Proceedings Act and the High Court is vested with the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction to review the actions, inaction and decisions of statutory bodies and other exercising a public function such as the respondent. That in this regard, the Constitution under Article 134 (c) Act No. 2 of 2016 states: "134. The High Court has subject to Article 128- (c) jurisdiction to review decisions as prescribed J7 It was counsel's further argument that the respondent is a body amenable to judicial review and for this argument reference was made to the case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress Vs The Attorney General1. Counsel went on to contend that the Minister of Tourism and the Director of the Department, exercise functions as outlined under Section 5 (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015. That these functions clearly constitute public duties, thereby rendering them subject to judicial review. Furthermore, that in the process of hearing appeals, the respondent performs functions that are undeniably quasi-judicial in nature, which underscores the need for compliance with legal standards and procedural fairness in the execution of such duties. Counsel contended that the superior courts in this jurisdiction have advanced and affirmed the scope and breadth of judicial review through a series of landmark decisions. That in the case of Zambia Federation of Employers Vs The Attorney Genera12 Judge Kondolo S.C as he was then stated succinctly that: "In Zambia, the length and breadth of judicial review has been pronounced in several Supreme Court decisions and High Court matters one of which is Nyampala Safaris Zambia Limited & others Vs Zambia Wildlife Authority in which the Court said as follows: ' .... A decision of an inferior Court or a public authority may be quashed (by an order of certiorari) where the Court or authority acted: - 1. Without jurisdiction 2. Exceeded its jurisdiction 3. Or failed to comply with rules of natural justice where those rules are applicable 4. Where there is an error of law on the face of the record; or 5. The decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense J8 It was argued further that the Supreme Court in the case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) Vs The Attorney General in approving the principles from the English jurisprudence simplified the grounds of judicial review as follows: "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can consistently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call "illegality", the second "irrationality" and third ''procedural impropriety". Counsel submitted that in relation to citation of parties, in the case of Dean Namulya Mung'omba and others Vs Peter Machungwa Golden Mandandila and another3 the Supreme Court held that: "1. There is no rule under the High Court in which judicial proceedings can be instituted and conduced. Thus, by virtue of Section 10 oft he High Court Act Chapter 27 oft he Laws ofZ ambia, the High Court is guided as to the procedure and practice to be adopted. ...3 . Order 53 is comprehensive. It provides for the basis ofj udicial review; the parties; how to seek the remedies and what remedies are available." That in the foregoing case, it was stated that our High Court Rules were not applicable and further that under the Rules of the Supreme Court ofE ngland 1965 (White Book), the citation of parties in judicial review matters, parties are cited as herein cited. Counsel went on to argue that the applicant further relies on the underlying policy that all inferior courts and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within in their legal bounds. That this is the concern of the crown, for the sake of ordinary administration of justice, but it is a private complaint, which sets the crown in motion. J9 2.1 The applicant's skeleton arguments In their skeleton arguments, filed on the 8th April, 2025, counsel argued that notwithstanding the statutory obligation imposed upon the respondent under Section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which mandates the rendering of a decision upon receipt of an appeal, the respondent, has to date, failed to provide a determination on the matter. That this omission constitutes a breach of statutory duty as prescribed by the said section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which states: "145 (1) A person who is aggrieved with the decision oft he Director or Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director of Committee. (2) The decision of the Minister on an appeal under this section shall be subject to appeal to the High Court within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Minister. It was counsel's considered view that an inference arises from the foregoing provisions establishing that the respondent is statutorily obliged to render a decision upon receipt of an appeal. That upon receiving the applicant's appeal on the 3rd February, 2025, Lhe respondent incurred a legal duty to decide on the said appeal and to communicate its determination to the applicant. Further that the respondent has failed Lo fulfil these statutory obligations as no decision has been rendered, nor has any communication been made to the applicants in relation to the appeal. Counsel argued that the applicants have demonstrated before this court that on the 3rd February, 2025, they formally submitted a letter to the respondent, requesting the respondent's intervention in conducting a Wildlife Impact Assessment in the lower Zambezi National Park. That the respondent has to date failed lo take any action in respect of this request and that this omission constitutes a. breach of a statutory duty, contrary to the provisions of Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which explicitly mandates the Minister to carry out such an assessment as it provides: JlO "38(1) A person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a proposed or existing government plan or activity of the Government, an organisation or person may have an adverse effect on wildlife in a National Park, Community Partnership Park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, Game Management Area or open area, may request the Minister through the Director that a wildlife impact assessment be conducted." In making reference to the foregoing provision, counsel contended that an inference of the same establishes that the respondent is statutorily obligated to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment. Counsel was of the considered view that upon receiving the applicant's request on 3rd February, 2025, the respondent incurred a legal duty to not only conduct the assessment but also to communicate its findings to the applicants. On this basis, counsel submitted that the applicants have demonstrated sufficient grounds to seek the remedy of mandamus, compelling the respondent to fulfil its statutory obligations. For this argument reference was made to the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia: Cases and Material Chewe, A.N (2020), Juta and Company Limited, Claremont at page 396 which states: "The remedy of mandamus operates to compel an administrative authority to perform its duty. It does not lie to direct the authority with respect to the manner in which to perform such duty. In Zambia, mandamus has shown great potential for being a good device to compel administrative bodies to execute their duties. It has been invoked in many cases. In two licensing cases namely, the People u Luanshya Municipal Council ex parte Chendaeka (1969) ZR 69 and The People v Livingstone Municipal Council ex parte Simioti, (1969) ZR 53 mandamus was expected as an appropriate device to compel licensing authorities to hear and determine applications for trading licenses in accordance with the law." On the foregoing submissions, counsel prayed that an Order of Mandamus be granted. J11 3.0 The respondent's Affidavit in Opposition The respondent filed an affidavit in opposition on the 23rd July, 2025 sworn and deposed to by Dominic Chiinda a Director in the DNPW who avers as follows: The applicants wrote to the respondent to request for information with regard to the award of Tourism Concession Agreements in the Lower Zambezi National Park. In response, the respondent on the 26th December, 2024 did write to the applicants providing information with regard to the Tourism Concession Agreements and further explained that the respondent was open for any further meetings to clarify any concerns the applicants may have. By a letter dated 3rd February, 2025, the applicants appealed to the Minister, seeking his indulgence in a review of the decision by the DNPW issued in respecl of the letter regarding the request for documentation as made by themselves. Before the Minister of Tourism could hear and determine the Appeal, the applicants proceeded to commence Judicial Review proceedings against the respondent. The Minister requested for a meeting with the applicants for the purpose of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the appeal. The purpose of the meeting was to explore how best the matter could be resolved and to cater to the interest of all stakeholders. The DNPW has not issued any Tourism Block Concession in any National Park or Game Management Arca since 2015. The Department has instead been granting Tourism Concession Agreements for leasing of tourism sites on a regular basis as part of the national agenda to develop national parks using internal guidelines for site allocation. The DNPW has granted approximately 70 tourism sites to various operation over the years through Tourism Concession Agreements for accommodation and other tourism purposes across the country using the same guidelines. The Department has not exceeded any limits of sites in any Protected Area that has resulted in overcrowding and degradation of natural ecosystems. The General Management Plans for South Luangwa and Kafue National Parks are still valid and tourism developments have been allowed in zones where developments through tourism concession agreements are permissible. The Lower Zambezi National Park however, has no subsisting General J12 Management Plan as such all-site allocation through tourism concession agreements are based on internal guidelines for site allocation in the park and Game Management Areas. One of the mandates of the DNPW is to carry out commercial activities related to consumptive and non-consumptive tourism and carry out any other activities relating to tourism wildlife conservation and management. Accordingly, the Minister through the Department has the responsibility to award sites subject to laid down procedures in order to promote and increase bed capacity in National Parks so as to raise revenue for sustainable wildlife conservation and management of wildlife protected areas. In circumstances where a Protected Area has an expired General Management Plan (GMP) or no GMP, the Ministry of Tourism through the DNPW is mandated to manage such a Protected Area and in doing so it uses Adaptive Management Processes by relying on site suitability assessments and guidelines formulated for such circumstances. Prior to any site award, it is a requirement that a multidisciplinary team of officers conducts a site suitability assessment, which report informs management decisions. The final determination for granting of tourism sites is made after receiving a positive decision letter of the Environmental Project Brief (EPB) or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) from U,e Zambia Environmental Agency (ZEMA), acceptable business plan, negotiation of terms and conditions and clearances by the Ministries of Tourism, Finance and Justice. The awarding of sites is a fair and transparent process executed in accordance ,vith Tourism Concession Investment Guidelines (Guidelines on site allocation to investors) and relying on the approved Client Service Charter for the Ministry of Tourism and the DNPW. Any investor at anytime is at liberty to apply for sites in the National Parks across the country, subject to site availability as part of the national agenda to develop national parks. The Department as a public institution has always availed information to any person or institution that requests for information that may be availed to the public. The Department relies on formulated guidelines for the award of J13 Tourism Concession Agreements as neither the Act nor General Management plans prescribe procedures for so doing. 3.1 The respondent's skeleton arguments In their skeleton arguments filed on even date, counsel for the respondent argued that this case is not fit for judicial review as the applicants have presented before this court misguided or trivial complaints of an administrative nature. For this argument reliance was placed on the case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) Vs Attorney General. Counsel argued further that the applicants lack the requisite locus standi as their interest is expressed as that of "public interest" in transparent concession-awarding. That in the case of R Vs Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex-parte National Federation of Self Employment & Small Businesses Ltd4 Lord Diplock held that: "mere interest of a citizen in having correct administration of the law is insufficient" It was counsel's further submission that in an application for judicial review, the threshold inquiry is whether the applicant possess a sufficient interest in the decision challenged. That the applicants assert that the award of the Tourism Concession Agreements within the Lower Zambezi was not public enough, yet advances no claim that they themselves were a bidder, a prospective concessionaire, or otherwise personally harmed by the process. Further that in an application for judicial review an applicant must show more than "intellectual interest or concern for good governance". Rather they must demonstrate or have real personal interest in an outcome which is something that goes beyond mere public spiritedness or curiosity. For these arguments, reference was made to the case of Cahil Vs Sutton5 where Henchy J stated: "Where the person who questions the validity of a law can point to no right of his which has by reason of the alleged invalidity been broken, endangered or threatened, then, if nothing more can be advanced, the courts should not entertain a question so raised. J14 To do so would be to make oft he Courts the happy hunting ground of the busy-body and the crank." Counsel argued further that a precondition to invoke Judicial Review is the existence of a decision or action by the public authority that is capable of being reviewed. That where no decision has been made, that is where there is an omission or inaction, the jurisdictional basis for judicial review is significantly undermined unless it can be shown that the inaction amounts to a constructive refusal or abuse of discretion. Counsel went on to argue that the Director of National Parks and Wildlife wrote to the applicants on 26th December, 2024 stating that the department had been issuing out Tourism Concession Agreements within the Lower Zambezi. Further that the Director stated that the area in question had no subsisting General Management Plan but relied on internal guidelines and Game Management Areas. That although Section 28 (5) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No, 14 of 2015 which provides that the Minister is not prevented from granting concession agreements within a Game Management Area this had not been done. It was counsel's considered view that unless the applicants could demonstrate that the delay by the Minister is a failure to perform a statutory duty under Section 145 (1) o[ the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 then judicial review could not be employed as it cannot serve as a tool to compel authorities to make decisions in the absence of a clear legal duty to do so within a defined time frame. That the courts are primarily concerned with assessing whether a decision once made, was unlawful due to irrationality, procedural unfairness or illegality and not with intervening in administrative silence per se. Reference was made to Section 145 of the Zambia Wildlife Act, of 2015 which provides" "A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or the Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director or Committee." Counsel argued that where a written law has laid down a procedure to follow, all parties are bound by that procedure and a party has no jurisdiction to address an issue via any means other than the laid down procedure. For this JlS argument reliance was placed on the case of Chikuta Vs Chipata Rural Counci16. That the applicants herein lodged an appeal to the Minister of Tourism, and the decision of the Minister in this matter has not been determined. Notwithstanding this position, the Minister should be allowed an opportunily to hear and determine the matter. Counsel contended that while judicial review traditionally targets decisions rather than omissions, in certain cases, a prolonged failure to act where the action is mandated by the law itself can be the subject of Judicial Review. But that such a claim would need to be carefully framed around the failure to perform a legal duty and not merely dissatisfied with administrative silence. That the appellants have not demonstrated the appropriateness of the remedy of judicial review. [twas counsel's further argument that Sections 5 and 2 of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of201S give the DNPW authority to enter into agreements to carry out commercial activities related to tourism which involves conventional tourist activities such as viewing animals, photographing, bird watching, wilderness walks, walking safaris, angling, canoeing and boat ride. Further that the said Act empowers the Department to encourage development of wildlife and regulate tourism block concessions consequently, the awarding of Tourism Concession Agreements is an incidental power of the Department. In response to the grounds relied on by the applicant for judicial review, counsel for the respondent contended as follows: Procedural impropriety or failure to comply with the rules of natural justice It was counsel's conlention that where the rules of natural justice apply and the decision has been reached in breach of those rules judicial review will lie and for this argument reference was made to the case of Ridge Vs Baldwin7 . That the rules of natural justice embody a duty to act fairly. Further that procedural impropriety was defined in the case of Council of Civil Service Union Vs Minister for Civil Service8 where Lord Diplock stated that: "Procedural impropriety is the breach of an express stat;,..,1.tory requirement and comm.on rules of natural justice." J16 Counsel argued that the respondent has neither breached any express statutory requirement nor the common rules of natural justice. That this is because neither the Minister nor the Director have rejected the request of the applicant. It was counsel's considered view that the applicants have misconstrued the provisions of Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which provides: "A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or Committed under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director or Committee." Further that Section 146 (1) of the said Act provides that the Minister may after consultation with the Director, by regulation, prescribe anything required to be prescribed under the Act and for the better carrying out of the provisions of the Act. That although Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act provides that a person t.hat has reasonable grounds that a proposed existing plan may have an adverse effect may request for a Wildlife Impact Assessment, the applicants has not demonstrated any such reasonable grounds t.o warrant the Wildlife Impact Assessment as they have not advanced any evidence to that effect. As such it was unreasonable for the applicants to assert that a delay by the Minister and the Director amounts to an abdication in that the Wildlife Impact Assessment not being carried out will amount to an excess of jurisdiction. Unreasonableness or the Wednesbury principle Counsel argued that the locus classicus with regard t.o unreasonableness is the well-known decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Vs Wednesbury Corporation9 which established thatjudicial review is meant to ensure decisions are not so unreasonable that no sensible authority could have arrived at them. It was counsel's considered view that a mere delay in responding to the applicants does not fall within the confines of what has been classified as unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. J17 Irrationality and Unreasonableness Reference was made to lhe case of Council of Civic Service Union Vs Minister of State for Civil Service10 where the Court defined irrationality and unreasonableness as follows: "By irrationality I mean what now rs succinctly referred to be Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies lo a decision which is oulrageous in defiance ofl ogic or ofa ccepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could arrive at it.. ............... . A decision is unreasonable if it is manifestly absurd, if it is outrageous in its defiance of logic, or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to he decided could have arrived at it." On the basis of the aforementioned case, counsel argued that for irrationality to be applied as a ground for judicial review, the action in question must be so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person or authority, having applied its mind to it could have made the decision. That again, the actions of the respondent cannot be classified as such. On the foregoing arguments, counsel argued that the application for judicial review be dismissed with costs to the respondent. 4.0 The applicant's affidavit in reply In an affidavit in reply filed on the 14th August, 2025 sworn and deposed to by Chipego Musisi a Programme Assistant in the 2nd applicant institution, it was averred as follows: On the 26Lh December, 2024 the respondent did provide a letter containing some information, but the information was incomplete and omitted key documents specifically requested for. The letter of appeal to the Minister was dated 3l5L January, 2025 which was received by the office of the Minister on the 3rd February, 2025. Judicial review proceedings were commenced before Jl8 the Minister rendered a decision due to the Minister's failure to act within a reasonable time after the appeal was lodged despite repeated follow-ups by the applicants and the Minislcr has not rendered any decision to date. The applicants are both public interest organizations whose mandates include governance, transparency, wildlife conservation and environmental protection, while the respondent has a statutory responsibility to safeguard the environment in protected areas such as the Lower Zambezi National Park. The applicants have been denied access to critical environmental information relating to tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park and have had to expend resources in pursuit of lawful processes. The applicants are acting within their mandates to promote transparency, good governance and environmental conservation. As such their involvement is prompted by the respondent's allocation of tourism concession in the Lower Zambezi National Park without availing the requested environmental information essential to prevent potential irreversible harm to the environment. A meeting was held with the respondent and it was later discovered that the General Management Plan had nol expired, but was subject to review at certain intervals. The respondent has not made any further effort to engage the applicants on their appeal and has in the meantime, proceeded to grant tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park. The procedure for the grant of tourism concessions requires among other steps a transparent call for proposals, evaluation against pre-determined criteria and stakeholder consultations prior to awarding any concession. These procedures have not been followed by the respondent in the allocation of tourism sites in lhe Lower Zambezi National Park. The failure by the respondent to review the General Management Plan docs nol invalidate its contents. The applicants have not been furnished with any site suitability assessment reports, environmental project briefs, environmental impact assessments or other documentation demonstrating that the procedure has been complied with for the concessions in question. There has been no transparency by the respondent in the allocation of sites due to the absence of disclosure of key environmental information and procedural documents requested by the J19 applicants as well as the failure to engage stakeholders and members of the public through a consultative process. As such the allocation of sites to investors has not followed the procedure. The information provided by the respondent to the applicant was incomplete and insufficient for the applicants to assess potential environmental harm. The General Management Plan does not provide the procedures and criteria to be considered in the award of Tourism Concessions as well as detailing the allowable limits of use for different zones in the National Park. The General Management Plan does however provide for a transparent and competitive process for allocation of tourism sites in the National Park, which has not been followed by the respondent. 4.1 The applicant's skeleton arguments in support of the affidavit in reply In their skeleton arguments of even date, counsel argued that the Minister's failure to render a decision on their appeal, lodged on the 31st January, 2025 for over three months, constitutes a constructive failure to act under Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015. Thal this prolonged inaction amounts to a breach of the Minister's statutory duty to act without unr-easonable delay. Further that the respondent's contention that no statutory Limeframe exists for determining the appeal does not absolve the Minister of the duty to act expeditiously. Counsel contended that the principle of reasonableness in administrative action as recognized in the High Court Act and general administrative law principles requires that statutory duties be discharged within a reasonable time, particularly in matters concerning environmental protection where delay risks irreversible. To buttress this argument, reference was made to the case of Patel V Municipal Council of Broken Hil111 where the Court of Appeal held that failure to proceed upon lawflllly determined policy amount to a wrongful abdication of duly. Counsel contended f1.ulher that the remedy of mandamus has been consistently applied by Zambian courts to compel public authorities to discharge statutory duties. That in the cases of The People Vs Luanshya J20 Municipal Council, ex parte Chendaeka12 and The People Vs Livingstone Municipal Council, ex parte Simioti13, the remedy of mandamus was granted to compel licensing at1thorities to hear and determine applications in accordance with the law. Further that in the cases of Re RR (1999) WDA14 and Padfiled Vs Agriculture Food and Fisheries15 the courts held that a Minister cannot decline to exercise statutory powers if doing so frustrates the purpose of the legislation. That in casu the Minister's prolonged inaction is frustrating the legislation and squarely attracts mandamus. That the respondent's inaction coupled with the ongoing allocation of tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park, justifies the applicant's recourse to this court to compel the performance of the Minister's statutory duty. IL was contended that the respondent's failure to disclose critical information, including site suitability assessment reports, environmental project briefs and environmental impact assessments violates the principles of transparency and public participation as provided for under Sections 6 and 91 of the Environmental Management Act No. 12 of2 011. Counsel was of the considered view that the incomplete information provided by the respondent on the 26th December, 2024 and the absence of key procedural documents undermine the respondent's statutory obligation to ensure transparency in the management. of protected areas as required under the Zambia Wildlife Act and the Environmental Management Act. Counsel went on to argue that while there exists a General Management Plan for Lower Zambezi National Park, the same is subject to periodic review which review process as well as granting of concessions must adhere to transparent and cons1.1ltativc procedures to safeguard environmental integrity. That the absence of disclosed documentation demonstrating compliance with these procedures, undermines the respondent's claim of lawful administration. Further that the argument that there is no General Management Plan cannot substitute for the transparent and competitive process required for concession allocation. J21 With regard to the applicant's locus standi counsel argued that the applicants as public interest organizations dedicated to governance, transparency, wildlife conservation and environmental protection have clear standing to pursue this application. That their mandates align with the public interest in preventing irreversible environmental harm in the Lower Zambezi National Park, a protected area of significant ecological value. Further that the applicant's pursuit of environmental information is grounded in specific concerns about the lack of transparency in concession allocation as evidenced by the incomplete information provided on the 26lh December, 2024. Additionally, that Section 4 (3) of the Environmental Management Act as read together with Article 256 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 empowers any person in Zambia to take out an action to compel government authorities to desist from or take action that will prevent environmental harm. On this basis, counsel was of the considered view that the argument that the applicants do not have standing is without merit and should not entertained by lhis court. Lastly, counsel argued that timely access lo environmental information is critical to prevent irreversible harm to the Lower Zambezi National Park. That the ongoing allocation of tourism concessions during the pendency of the appeal heightens Lhe urgency of this matter. Further that the Environmental Management Act underscores the public's right to access the environmental information to participate in decision-making processes. As such the respondent's failure to provide the requested documentation frustrates the applicant's ability to assess and address potential environmental risks, constituting substantial harm that warrants judicial intervention. On the foregoing arguments counsel prayed that this court grants the applicant's application for judicial review, compelling the respondent to render a decision on the appeal and disclose the requested documentation 5.0 The Hearing At the hearing counsel for the applicants submitted that in their application for judicial review they were seeking two orders of Mandamus. Firstly, to J22 compel the Minister of Tourism and Art lo perform a statutory duty by rendering a decision on the appeal submitted to the Minister on the 3rd February, 2025. Secondly, to act on the request made on the day of 3rd February, 2025 requiring him to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment in the Lower Zambezi National Park. Counsel placed reliance on the Notice of Application for leave to commence judicial review, the affidavit in support, statement of facts, list of authorities and skeleton arguments all filed on the 8th April, 2025. Reliance was also placed on the Originating Notice of Motion filed on the 7th May, 2025 after leave was granted. Counsel argued that the reason for their application was because of administrative inertia on the part of the Minister of Tourism and Arts who ·had a simple task of rendering a decision, whether positive or negative. That if the applicants were to be dissatisfied with the Minister's decision, Section 145 of the Zambia Wildlife Act provides an avenue of appeal against the decision of the Minister. The failure or neglect by the Minister to make a decision presents a clog in the administration procedure provided for by statute and this can attract a mandamus from this court. That they were mindful that judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision that the decision maker makes and this court is not being invited to dive into the merits of the appeal before the Minister. Rather the question before this court is whether the delay or failure by the Minister to render a decision for 68 days and when the applicants made an application before this court which is now 6 months ago, is too long a delay given the nature of the matter being that of the environment. That this court must therefore construe it as a failure to perform a statutory function and order the Minister to forthwith make a decision on the appeal and also direct that a Wildlife Impact Assessment be undertaken in line with the applicant's request. Counsel also prayed for costs. In opposing thC:; application, counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the affidavit in opposition dated 23rd July, 2025 as well as their list of authorities and skeleton arguments. Counsel argued that judicial review is not concerned with the decision but the decision-making process, that it to say, it is J23 concerned with the legality, rationality and procedural propriety of the decisions made. That a crucial pre-condition for the invocation of judicial review is the existence of the decision or action of the public authority that is capable of being reviewed. Counsel submitted that where there is an omission or inaction, this does not invite the jurisdictional basis of judicial review unless it can be shown that the inaction amounts to a constructive refusal or abuse of discretion. That judicial review does not serve as a tool to compel authorities to make decisions in the absence of a clear legal duty to do so within a defined time fran1e. Further that the courts in judicial review are primarily concerned with assessing whether a decision once made was unlawful due to irrationality, procedural unfairness or illegality. As such mere silence or indeed administrative delay docs not amount to a decision rcviewable under judicial review unless a clear statutory duty has been breached. Counsel argued that the applicants have placed reliance on Section 145 (1) and Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act, which provisions do not impose an express tirnebound obligation on the Minister or indeed the Director of Wildlife and National Parks to respond directly to the letter or to commission a Wildli.fe Impact Assessment. It was counsel's submission that without a statutory duty being breached, judicial review cannot stand. It was argued further Lhat although there was a delay on behalf of the respondent, the respondent did try to furnish the applicants with the requested information and had called for meetings to settle the matter so that all parties could have their needs met. On this basis counsel submitted that the applicants were prematurely before the courts and this application should therefore be dismissed with costs to the respondent. In reply, counsel for the applicants argued that they were at a loss as to why a public body exercising an administrative function like a Minister would casually refer to a failure to perform an administrative task as a mere delay. That the respondent had not appreciated that the remedy of mandamus under judicial review exists for specifically this reason, to compel a body or someone with a statutory duty to perform that function. J24 Counsel argued further that although Section 145(1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act do not give a timeframe within which a Minister is supposed to render a decision, the Act does give a timeframe of 30 days v.,ithin which a person aggrieved with the decision of the Committee or Director must appeal to the Minister. That the Act also gives a time frame of 30 days for someone who is aggrieved with the decision of the Minister to appeal to the High Court. As such from these provisions this court should interpret them to give effect to Lhe statute. That from their reading of the said provisions it is clear that the Minister does not have carte blanche to just sit and do nothing when an appeal or request to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment comes to his table. Counsel argued firmly that to suggest that because the statute does not give a specific time frame in which the Minister should respond, yet the neighbouring provisions have a time frame is actually unreasonable and irrational. That the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Materials, Dr Anne Kangwa Chewe at page 295, paragraph 10.2.4 dedicates an entire section about a failure or refusal to perform. Counsel argued further that when the law requires someone to do something and in this case the Minister fails to attend to the appeals as part of the administrative process, that person is expected to do that function and it has to be performed within a reasonable time. That for the test of reasonableness as to the time the Minister should take before rendering a decision, this court should look no further than the provisions in Section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act. In concluding their arguments, counsel contended that they were not prematurely before the court because no decision had been made, rather that they were before the court specifically because of that. Counsel made reference to pages 396 to 398 of Administrative Law in Zambia which text dedicates a section on the writ of mandamus which is currently before this court. Counsel reiteraled that lhe because the decision of the Minster is a vital step between the decision of a Director and an appeal before this court, the inordinate delay by the Minister is a fetter which presents a blockage in J25 the administrative process enshrined by the Act and as such 1s liable to judicial review. Counsel prayed that all the three re.liefs in the applicant's Notice for Judicial Review be granted. 5.0 The decision of the Court Before delving into the main issue before the court, there is an aspect of the locus standi of U1e applicants before this court. Counsel for the respondent argues that in an application for judicial review, an applicant must show more than "intellectual interest or a concern for good governance". That they must demonstrate or have real personal interest in an outcome. Counsel for the applicants, on the other hand argued that Section 4 (3) of the Environmental Management Act as read with Article 256 of the Constitution empowers any person in Zambia to take out an action to compel government authorities to desist from or take action that. will prevent environmental harm. In addressing this issue, the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Materials, Dr A.K Chewe at page 364 states that: "A person who is aggrieved by the action of an administrative officer can apply to court for judicial review of that administrator's action." From the foregoing, it is clear that there must be a nexus between the action of the administrative officer and the person who indicates that they have been aggrieved for them to have locus standi. On a perusal of the core mandate of the applicants, J find that they do have locus standi to present their application before court more so that their queries are being attended to by the respondent through the office of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife and the office of the Minister of Tourism and Arts as is outlined in the affidavit evidence before this court. Turning now to the crux of the matter, Judicial Review is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Bryan A. Garner as: J26 "A court's power to review the actions of other branches or levels of go1Jernment especially the court's power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional." Black's Law Dictionary also defines Judicial Review as: "A court's review of a lower courts or an administrative body's factual or legal findings." The applicant has brought this application pursuant to Sections 145 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 which provide as follows: "145 (1) A person who is aggrieved with the decision oft he Director or Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director of Committee." "38 (1) A person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a proposed or existing gol.)emment plan or activity of the Government, an organisation or person may have an adverse effect on wildlife in a National Park, Community Partnership Park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, Game Mangagment Area or open area, may request the Minister through the Director that that wildlife impact assessment be conducted." The main grievance before this Court is that the Minister of Tourism and Arts has failed to make a determination on the applicant's appeal following the decision of the DNPW in a letter dated 26th December 2024. The said DNPW in its letter justified its reliance on an adaptative management process to issue Tourism Concession Agreements in the Lower Zambezi. The applicant claims that although it lodged its appeal against the Director's decision on the 3rd February, 2025, contrary to the said Sections 745 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act cited above, the Minister of Tourism and Arts has not made a decision over its appeal to date. It is the applicant's contention that the lack of a decision over the appeal to date is unreasonable and that the said delay warrants this court's intervention. J27 As already indicated above, Judicial Review's provmce relates to the determination as to the validity of either an executive's, legislator's or administrative body's action or decision. The Court is not concerned with the merit or demerits of the decision taken. With regard to the case at hand, it is apparent that the Minister is yet to make a decision and hence this application. According to the authors of Judicial Review of Public decisions, if the adjudicating body has yet to issue a decision, the High Court can compel them Lo make a decision by issuing an Order of Mandamus. Further the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Materials, Dr A.K Chewe at pages 394 to 395 states that: "Through judicial control of administrative actions, a number of remedies have been designed and accepted within the legal system to ensure that those affected by decisions receive fairness and justice under the available systems. The remedies include the following: • application for judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Couri of England (White Book 1999) by which means a person who is aggrieved by an administrative action or determination may seek one or more of the following remedies, namely certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, declaration, injunction and damages ..... " The said learned author at page 295 also states that: "10.2.4 Failure or refusal to perform When the law requires someone to do something, the person or authority is expected _to perform that function. The autho,~ity cannot contract out of it, and failure to perform amounts to breach and is ultra vires ......A person can be said to have failed to exercise his or her duty if that person unlawfully delegates it, surrenders it or abdicates it. The couri will compel such a person to act." J28 With the foregoing in mind, the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that Lhe judicial review process cannot be employed lo compel a public officer to perform an administrative function is misconstrued. A clear reading of the above texts indicates that a public officer can be compelled by way of judicial review to perform an administrative duty. That. being said, it must be noted that neither Sections 145 (1) or section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 provide for the Minister's response to an appeal or a request for a Wildlife Impact Assessment. In relation to the handling of appeals by the Minister, Section 146 (1) and (2) (d) of the said Act provides that: "146 (1) The Minister may, after consultation with the Director, by regulation, prescribe anything required to be prescribed under this Act and for the better carrying out of the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the regulations made under that subsection may make provision for- (d) the hearing and determination of appeals by the Minister" From a reading of the above provisions, there is nothing that obligates the Minister by law to determine appeals received from the decision of the Director or Committee of the DNPW within a given time frame. It is also to be noted that there is no time frame given for the Director or Committee of the DNPW to respond to a query as was the case in casu as the applicants wrote to the DNPW on the 2nct June, 2023 and only got a response on the 13th December, 2024 and thereafter on the 26th December, 2024. Evidently, this is not a desirable position on the score that the said Minister and DNPW cannot have a carte blanche approach in dealing with the said queries and appeals as argued by counsel for the applicants. This is because as public officers, they owe a duty to the general citizenry of the Republic of Zambia to diligently perform their functions in accordance with the power and authority bestowed upon them in their office. The key word then is performing their duties within a reasonable time which aspect I will discuss in a bit more detail below. J29 In relation to Section 38 (]) of Lhe ?,ambia Wildlife Act Lhis courl notes that equally there is nothing in this provision Lhal obligates the Minister of Tourism and Arts to conduct a Wildlife lmpacl Assessment as earlier pointed out. It merely indicates that a person may request for it to be done on reasonable grounds that a proposed or existent activity of the Government, an organisation or a person may have an adverse effect on the wildlife in a national park, community parlnersh.ip park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, game management area or open area. Section 38 (2) indicates that where the Minster requires an environmental impact assessment lo be conducted, it shall be conducted m accordance with the procedures specified under the Environmental Management Act. Consequently, the law as it stands under the Zambia Wildlife Act is such that once an appeal or request for a Wildlife Impact Assessment is made to the Minister, the response and timeframe for responding lies very much within that Minister's hands. The applicants have argued that the delay in response by the respondent is an abdication of the Minister's duty. The respondent however has argued that lhe Minister has nol failed or delayed in giving a response to the applicant's query as an initial meeting was held to try and address the interests of lhc parlics. I find and agree that the respondent having responded to tbc applicant's lellcr and initiating talks by way of meeting is an intention to respond Lo Lhe questions raised by the applicants. As such, the respondent cannot be said lo have abdicated its responsibility as alleged by the applicant. Conscqucnlly, Lhc argument that there exists an illegality on the part of lhe rcspondenl cannot stand. The question that begs an answer however, is whether the respondent has taken steps to respond to the applicants queries and requests within a reasonable time. As already established, there is no fixed statutory timeframe for a Minister to respond lo a decision made on appeal to his office. Additionally, there is no fixed st.a Lu Lory timcframe for him to conduct a Wildlife Assessment. Thal being said, is Lhc respondenl at liberty to take as much time as it feels or noL Lo acl al all? l do not think that that was the intention of the legislature when iL passed this particular piece of legislation, J30 and would agree that this would be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. What is apparent however, is Lhat the response must take into account the context of the query and what is being asked. r say so because the query or request must take into accounl Lhe nature and complexity of the issue at hand for it to be classified as a "reasonable lime". Without delving into the meril of lhe substantive issue, the request on the appeal before the Minister in my considered view may not require as long a period of time for him to make a decision on or take action as compared to the request to undertake a Wildlife Impact Assessment. A period of three months at the time this application was made in my view is too short a time to expect an exercise of such proportions, that is the Wildlife Impact Assessment, to be undertaken. Additionally, there is nothing in the law that compels the Minister lo underlake such an exercise and as such an Order of Mandamus is not approprimc for Lhis particular request. The parties are however encouraged to discuss an appropriate course of action with regard to the said Wildlife Impact Assessment.. Consequently, an Order of Mandamus will only issue as follows: 1. To compel the Minister of Tourism lo determine the Appeal submitted to him by the applicants on the 3rd day of February, 2025 and to render his decision to the applicants in writing within 90 days of this Judgment. Each party will bear their own costs. Leave to appeal is granted. J31