Jackson W. Kiggundu Kato v Lukwago Stephen and Others (Civil Application No. 10 of 2026) [2026] UGSC 19 (27 April 2026)

5 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA SINGLE JUSTICE CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10 OF 2026 JACT(SoN W. KTGGUNDU KATo) APPLICANT 15 20 25 30 VERSUS 1. 2 3 LUKWAGo STEPHEN) . SSALTPETER) . ABAS MUI(!\/AYA) RESPONDENTS RULING OF CHRISTOPHER MADRAMA IZAMA, JSC The Appticant brought this apptication under sections 6 and 8 of the Judicature Act, rute 6 (2)and rul.e 41 (2), t+2ot The Judiciat (Supreme Court) Rules, Directions and other enabting provisions of the [aw. The apptication rs for an order of a temporary injunctron to issue maintarning the status quo and restraining the Respondents, their agents or atI those deriving authority from them from changing the proprietorship of tand comprised in Mukono District Btock 109. Plots 287'l and 2872 and evicting them from the same land pending the determination of the Appl.icant's appeal.. The Appticant prays that the costs of the apptication are granted. The apptication is supported by the grounds of apptication and the aff idavrt of the Appticant. The grounds are that the Appticant instituted civil. suit No. 114. of 2020 at the High Court of Uganda against the Respondents seeking among other things a dectaration that he is the lawful owner of Land. That on lhe 22^d day of December 2022 Judgment was entered in favour of the Appticant, dectaring the Apptrcant the Lawful owner of the Land together wrth several other reliefs but the Respondents being dissatisfied wrth it, appeated to the Court of Appeat in Civit Appeat No 221 of 2023. The Court of Appeat partiatty 1 10 5 at[owed the appeal to the dissatisfactron of the Appttcant. The Appticant was drssatisfied wrth the decision and todged an appeaI against the decisron in this Court The Respondents have gone ahead to extract a decree and have started threatening to change the proprietorship of the suit property and evict the Appticant from the Land. The Appticant was advised by his Lawyers that the extraction of such a decree is an imminent threat of execution and if not hatted has the potentia[ of changing the ownership of the suit property. ln the premises the Appticant prays for an interim injunction pending the hearing of the appeat. He states that the appeal has a high Lrkel.ihood of success He initiatty fiLed an application before the Court of Appeal and avers that because such an appl.ication requires a panet, his right of appeaL wilt be prejudiced if he continued to wait for the panet. Therefore, he contends that it is in the interest of justice that the apptication is granted. At the hearing of the appeat, learned counsel Mr. Musimenta Sam hotding brief for Obed Mwebesa represented the Appticant. The Respondent Mr. Abbas Mukwaya was in court while one Kizza Muhammad stated that he was standing in for SsaLi Peter whereupon the matter was adjourned to serve their lawyers again ln my interim ruLing I noted that the Respondents counsel one Nazaami and Co. Advocates was served on l9th March for the hearing. Mr. Abbas Mukwaya, the third Respondent turned up. The second Respondent SsaLi Peter was represented in court by one Kizza Muhammad. The first Respondent did not turn up. The Respondents sought for adjournment to put in therr defence. Clearl.y the Appticant atLeged imminent threat of executron and was seeking a temporary injunction to marntain the status quo. In the premises. it was in the interest of justice that the Respondents be given time to respond to the apptication and submissions so that both sides are fairty heard. I issued an rnterim order maintaining the status quo pending the hearing of the main apptication. Under section 8 of the Judicature Act, I noted that a singLe justice has powers to entertarn any intertocutory matter pending before the Supreme Court. The Respondents were given 14 days within which to fite their reply to the appl.ication and fil'e their affidavit in repty and submissions. Thereafter the 10 15 20 25 30 2 35 5 Appticant had a right of rejoinder within 5 days of berng served with the repties. Ruting was reserved on notice and would be in the main apptication Civit Appl.ication No 10 of 2026. Consideration of the Appl.ication I have carefulty considered the Appticant's application, the affidavit in repty, the written submissions of counsel and the Law. When considered atongside the Respondents' affidavit in repLy and wrrtten submissions a pretiminary point of law has been disctosed and has to be determined first. A. The Appl.icant's Submissions The Appticants counsel initiatl.y submitted on an interim order and relies on Hwang Sung lndustrres Ltd v. Taldrn Hussein, Rainbow Foods Ltd & Nizar Hussein, Supreme Court CiviL Apptication No. 19 of 2008 [hereafler Hwang Sungl.The Appl.icant's counsel submitted that to secure interim protection, the Court need onty satisfy itsetf that a substantive apptication is pending and that an imminent threat of executron exists. The AppLicant contends this threat is actuatized by the extraction of the decree and the Regrstrar's request for boundary openrng. He ctarms rrreparabte harm based on his advanced age (88 years) and a purported 25-year residency on the suit [and. B. The Respondents' Pretiminary Objection: Lis Pendens and Rul,e 41(1) Through the affidavit in repty sworn by Abbas Mukwaya, the Respondents raise a preIiminary objection. They assert that the appl.ication is incompetent due lo lls pendens and forum shopping, pointing out that two identicaL apptications (C0A-00-CV-CL-0521-2026 and 0522-2026) were f ited in the Court of Appeat and remain pending The Respondents counsel reties on Global Capltal Save 2004 Ltd & Anor v. Alice Okrror & Ors Supreme Court CiviI AppLication No. 57 of 2021 [hereafter Global Capital Sarze], the Respondents correctty argue that Rute 41(1) of the Supreme Court Rutes mandates that apptications must f irst be made to the Court of Appeal. ln Global Capital Sarze Chibrta JSC firmLy held that 15 20 25 30 3 10 5 entertaining an apptication in the Supreme Court white a simitar one is pendrng in the Court of Appeat constitutes an abuse of court process. \Nhile Haruna Sentongo v. / & M Bank (Uganda) Limlted, Supreme Court Civit Appl.ication No. 003 of 2025 [hereafter Haruna Sentongo], provides a narrow exception under Rute 41(2); attowing the Supreme Court to assume lurisdiction if [ower court applications are formal.Ly withdrawn or admrnrstrativety ctosed due to delays; the Appticant bears the burden to def initivety prove such closure. Faiture to overcome this proceduraI hurdLe as estabLishedin Global Capital Savers fataL to the applicatron. Havrng carefutty considered the matter, there is uncontroverted evidence that there is a pending apptication for the same orders in the Court of Appeat in C0A-00-CV-CL-0521-2026 and 0522-2026. The generaI provision which prohibits the triaI of any proceedings concurrentty in two courts on where the same issues are disctosed is section 6 of the CiviI Procedure Act, Cap 282 Laws of Uganda 2023 whrch provrdes that: 6. Stay of su it. No court shaLL proceed with the triaI of any suit or proceeding in which the matter in issue is atso directty and substantiaLty in issue in a previousty instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them cLaim, Iitigating under the same titLe, where that suit or proceeding is pending rn the same or any other court having jurisdiction in Uganda to grant the relief ctaimed. The term "suit" is def ined by section 2 of the Crvil. Procedure Act to mean "a// civi/ proceedings commenced in any manner prescribed." SecondLy the term "prescribed" is defined by section 2 to mean; "prescribed by rule!. fhe AppLicant's appLicatron is a civiI proceedings and there are other crvil proceedings on the same matter in issue between the same parties which were fited in the Court of Appeal and therefore this court cannot proceed with the triaI of the matter before court. However, I cannot merety stay proceedings pending resolution of other simiLar proceedings in the Court of Appeat as the Appticant raised a second 10 15 20 25 30 4 35 5 objection. There is a specific rule which a[tows temporary orders to be made for injunctions to preserve the right of appeaL and this is under Rute hl (2) of the Judicature (Supreme Court Rutes) Directions whrch provides the purpose of an order of injunction, stay of execution or proceedings This appties where the apptication is made direct to the Supreme Court provided no application for the same orders has been made to the Court of Appeat concurrentty. RuLe 4l of the Rutes of the Supreme Court provrdes that. (1) Where an apptication may be made either to the court or to the Court of Appeat, it shall be made to the Court of Appeal first (Emphasis added) (2) Notwithstanding sub ruLe (1) of this rute. in any civiI or criminaL matter, the court may, in its discretion, on application or of its own motion, give [eave to appeal and make any consequentia[ order to extend the time for the doing of any act, as the justice of the case requires. or entertain an application under rute 6(2)(b) of these Rutes to safeguard the right of appeal. notwithstanding the fact that no apptication has first been made to the Court of Appeal (Emphasis added) Rul.e 41 (1) envisages the application being made either in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeat. lt appties where an appLication rs made direct to the Supreme Court, without an apptication f irst having been made in the Court of Appeat and the purpose of the apptication woutd be to safeguard the right of appeaI RuLe 4l (2) read together with rute 6 (2) (b) of the Rutes of Court confers discretionary powers on the Supreme Court. Where the Supreme Court decides to hear and altow the apptication, it woutd be to safeguard the right of appeat. Further it is an exception to the generaL ruLe that the appl.icatron shallftrsl be fiLed in the Lower court ln G.M Combined (U) Ltd Vs A.K. Detergents (U) Ltd; (Civit Apptication No. 23 of 1994) n994] UGSC 3 the Supreme Court considered rule 4] of the Rutes of this Court and inter alra hetd that it provides that the appIication for leave sha[[ f irst be made informaLl.y at the time the decision is made to court issuing the order or formatly within 14 days after the order intended to be appeal.ed against rs issued. Where the appl.ication is refused, it can then be fited in the Supreme Court. White that appl.ication deaLt with appLication for leave, rute 4'l (2) incLudes the List of 10 15 20 25 30 35 5 15 20 possibte applications that can be made under rute 6 (2) (b) of the Rutes of Court. The conc[usion is that an apptication must f irst made in the Court of Appeat unless special circumstances exist that require the safeguarding of a right of appeaL and these circumstances have to be proved at the hearing Where such an apptication has been made in the Court of Appeal, the concurrent appl.ication in the Supreme Court is incompetent. The Appticant's application further presents a novel issue. Conceptuatl.y, the Appticant faited to precisety distinguish between a stay of execution designed to stop the judiciat machinery under Rule 6(2), and a temporary injunction designed to restrain the physicat acts of the Respondents. Yet he seems to be trying to stay execution of a court order. ln the premrses, the Appticant apptication rs incompetent under Rute 41(1) by maintaining parattet appl.ications in the Court of Appeat and the Supreme Court. Proceedings with the apptication is barred under section 6 of the Civit Procedure Act as wetl under rule 4'l (1) of the Rutes of this court where there is a pending simitar appl.ication in the Court of AppeaL. lt can either be fiied in the Court of Appeat or in the Supreme Court (on exceptional grounds) but not in both. I woutd sustain the Respondents' pretiminary objection and strike out the apptication, as I do here, with costs to the Respondents. Signed at a the 23'd day of Aprit 2026 fls opher Madram bma a z Justice of the Supreme Court Detivered at Kampata the ay of Aprit 2026 Signature 30 Name and Titte: A^-l -lUwtut%le. fa,rntw<, BIPt?cl^e cao(LT 6 22 10 25