Ssenyonga Haruna and Another v Kwesiga William and Others (Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2020) [2025] UGSC 53 (22 December 2025)

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (Coram: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Chibita, Bamugemereire, Mugenyi and Kbeedi, JJ.SC) 1. KWES|GAW|LLTAM l 2. SAMUEL BTHAGARO I 3. BENON KALTGA I RESPONDENTS [An appeal from the Judgment of the Cout of Appeal at Kampala before the Honourable Justlces of Appeal Elizabeth Musoke, JA., Stephen Musota, JA., & Remmy Kasule, Ag. JA dated the 20h of luly 2020, in Civil AppealNo. 35 of 20171 JUDGMENT OF MUZAMIRU MUTANGULA KIBEEDI JSC t1l This is an appeal from the judgment of the Courl of Appeal rendered on the 20th July 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2017 (now cited as 2020 UGCA 2071 l2l The background to this appeal as established from the Record of Appeal is that in 1982, Ssenyonga Haruna (the first appellant), Sulaiman Mbazira and Mary Nassaka were granted a lease by the Uganda Land Commission over land located in the current Sembabule District measuring approximately 1228.8 hectares (5 square miles). The land was subsequently registered under Leasehold Register Volume 1343 Folio 19, Mawogola Ranch No. 40, land at Masaka. Sulaiman Mbazira and Mary Nassaka have Poge 7 oJ 30 ctvtL APPEAL NO. 00't7 0F 2020 BETWEEN 1. SSENYONGAHARUNA I 2. NYOMBI HUSSEIN (Administrator of the l Estate of the Late SULAIMAN MBAZIIRA) I :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANTS 3. NAMBAZIIRA JANE (Administrator of the l Estate of the Late MARY NASSAKA I AND lntroduction since passed on and their estates were represented rn the court litigation by the second and third respondents, respectively. t3l The lease was for an initial term of five yeans from January 1982 extendable to 40 years upon satisfaction of the development covenants. Upon expiry of the initial lease in January '1987, the lessees never applied to the Uganda Land Commission for the lease renewal or extension. 14] ln 1990 the government canied out a Ranch Restructuring Exercise in some parts of Uganda under which the affected ranches were subdivided, the Ranchers retained a portion of their former land, sunendered the other portion to government for settling thereon the squatters, and were to be compensated for the surrendered portion. The Appellants' ranch was one of the ranches affected by the Ranch Restructuring Exercise. Out of the original flve square miles of land constituting the Appellant's ranch, the government took away four square miles leaving behind a balance of approximately one square mile (259 Hectares). t5l ln July 2008, the Appellants obtained a 49 year lease from Sembabule District Land Board over the 259 Hectares which was subsequently registered and the Certificate of Land Title issued in the names of Sulaiman Mbazira, Haruna Ssenyonga and Mary Nassaka under SBR/40, Leasehold Register Volume 3942 Folio '15 Ranch 40A Masaka Ranching Scheme, Masaka District. t6l Unknown to the Appellants, a one Paulo Sabiiti had earlier on (in July 2002) obtained a 49 year lease from Sembabule District Land Board over the same 259 Hectares of Land under the same Ranch No. 40A which he subsequently registered in 2006 and obtained a Certificate of Title to the same described as SBR/40, Leasehold Register Volume 3586 Folio 21 Ranch 40A Mawogola Ranching Scheme, Sembabule District. Thereafter, the said Certificate of title was transfened into the names of the Respondents on 12th June 2008. t71 ln 2012, the Appellants instituted Civil Suit No. 37 of 2012 in the High Court of Uganda at Masaka seeking, inter alia, the cancellation of the Respondents' Certificate of Title Page 2 of 30 for having been fraudulently and illegally obtained, an eviction order, general damages, mesne profits and the costs of the suit. The suit was against the three Respondents together with Paul Sabiti and the Commissioner of Land Registration, but the latter two were neither parties to the first appeal nor the current appeal. t81 The Respondents denied the Appellants' claims of fraud and illegality against them and counter-claimed against the Appellants for cancellation of the Appellants' certificate of title with costs. High Court Decision tgl After hearing the evidence of all the parties, the High Court entered judgment in favour of the Appellantstor inter alia a declaration that the Appellants were the lawful owners of the suit land, and that the Respondents' title was null and void for fraud, The High Court accordingly granted an eviction order against the Respondents and also ordered for the cancellation of the Respondents' title. lt awarded general damages, mesne profits with interest and costs to the Appellants. [10] Dissatisfied with the decision and orders of the High Court, the Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. Court of Appeal Decision [1 'l] ln its judgment rendered on the 20rh of July 2020, the Court of Appeal held that the Appellants' lease expired in '1987 and that in 2002 when the Respondents'predecessor in title obtained a lease over the suit land, the land had reverted back to Sembabule District Land Board and was available for leasing since the Appellants had never expressed any interest in applying for an extension of their lease during that time. [12] The Court further held that the current Appellants failed to prove the claims of fraud and illegality against the currenl Respondents. lt accordingly set aside the judgment and orders of the High Court and substituted the same with an order dismissing the High Court suit with costs. lt also allowed the Counterclaim with costs. Poge 3 oI 30 [1 3] Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Appellants now appeal to this Court. Grounds of Appeal to the Supreme Court [14] ln their Memorandum of Appeal, the Appellants sel out seven (7) grounds of appeal, namely: - 1. Thelearned Justices of appeal erredinlawinfailingtorecognisethatthesuit land was a residue, under the Ranches Restructuring Scheme and therefore not available lor leasing to the Respondents. 2. The leamed Justrces of appeal ened in law and in fact in holding that the suit land reverted to Sembabule Drbtrict Land Board which could re-allocate it. 3. ThelearnedJustlces of appeal erredinlawinholdingthattherewasnofraudon the paft of the Respondents. 4. The leamed Justices of appeal ened in law in holding that the lease which was not dated and had no names of the Chairman and secretary was valid. 5. The learned Justices oI appeal erred in law and in fact in holding that the illegalities in the processing of the lease for the respondents werc mere irregularities. 6. The learned Jusfices of appeal erred in law in ignoring the fact that the original l"t Defendant had actual knowledge that the suit land could not be available for leasing. 7. The learned Justices of appeal erred in law in failing to properly evaluate the evidence on record, and thereby came to wrong conclusions. [15] However, in their written submissions, the Appellants acknowledged, rightly in my view, that some of the grounds overlap. They accordingly reduced them to three issues for determination by this Court namely: Poqe 4 of 30 l Whether the Appellants are the lawful owners of the 259 hectares of land and the same could not be reallocated by the Sembabule District Land Board? This issue encompasses grounds 1 and 2. Whether the 259 hectares were illegally and fraudulently acquired and transferred to the Respondents? Whether the Respondents are Bonafide purchasers for value without notice? [16] However, in my view, the third issue arises from the same grounds as the issue on fraud, namely grounds 3 and 6. As such, I will combine its resolution when dealing with fraud. Thereafter, I will resolve the issue of illegality separately as it arises from grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal. [17] When the matter came up for hearing before this Court, the Appellants were represented by Mr. Godfrey Rwalinda Jambo instructed by M/S Jambo & Co. Advocates, while the Respondents were represented by Mr. Arthur Murangira instructed by M/S A Murangira Advocates. [18] Both Counsel sought and were granted leave by the Court to adopt their respective Written submissions as their legal arguments before this Court. I will make reference to the submissions when resolving the specific Around(s) to which they relate in case I make a finding that the points of law that have been raised by the Respondents against the appeal do not dispose of the whole appeal. Preliminary objections to the appeal [19] The Respondents raised two preliminary objections to the appeal, namely: that the appeal as it stands is moot and an abuse ofthe court process, and that the Appellants were involved in contemptuous conduct prior to the filing of the appeal and during the pendency of CACA No. 35 of 2017 from which the current appeal emanates. [20] ln elaboration of their claims, the Respondents stated that on 18.05.2016, during the pendency of CACA No. 35 of 2017 before the Court of Appeal, the Appellants Poge 5 of 30 Representation transferred their leasehold interest in the suit property comprised in LRV 3942 Folio'15 Ranch No. 40 to a third party known as M/s Pillars Trading Co. Limited. That the said kansferee was entered on the title on 18.05,2016 under land instrument number SK00011793. That the aforesaid acts only came to light on or about 30.'11.2020 following a letter from the Registrar of Titles of Masaka Zonal Office addressed to the Registrar ofthe Court of Appeal by which the latter sought guidance from the Court on the implementation of the decree of the Court of Appeal in CACA No. 35 of 2017 which had among others declared the Appellants' aforesaid ce(ificate of title null and void and ordered that it be cancelled. [2'1] lt was the Respondents'case that the acts of the Appellants in transfening their interest in the suit property - the subject matter of the instant appeal - to a 3d party, M/s Pillars Trading Co. Ltd, during the pendency of CACA No. 35 of 2017 amounted to contempt of court as it was intended to, and/or had the effect of defeating and/or perverting the course of .justice by removing the Appellants' interest in the suit property from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and, by extension, this Court through placing it into the hands o1 u 3'o party who is not a party to the Iitigation. [22] Thereafter, the Appellants still went ahead to flle the present appeal well-knowing that their contemptuous actions effectively extinguished the would-be dispute between them and the Respondents in the rnstant appeal. [23] lt was the Respondents' contention that in the circumstances, the appeal is moot and ought to be dismissed with costs to the Respondents. The Respondents cited the cases of Sudir Ruparalia V. Crane Bank Ltd. (ln Receivership) & Anor. Misc. Application No. 39 of 2020 (S.C); Human Rights Netuort for Journalists & Anor. v. Uganda Communications Commrssion E 6 Others, High Coutt Misc. Cause lVo. 219 of 2013; and Jingo Livingstone Mukasa v. Hope Rwaguma, CACA No. 190 ol 2015 in support of their submissions. Poge 6 of 30 [24] The Appellants opposed the objections raised by the Respondents on the ground that the same were raised by the Respondents in Supreme Court Civil Application No. '17 of 2020 between the paftes and dismissed, [25] I have looked closely at the pleadings and submissions of the parties together with the Ruling of this Court (Hon. Lady iustice Faith Mwondha, JSC) rendered on 15tt November 2021 in Kwesiga William & 2 Others Vs Ssenyonga Haruna & 2 Others, (Civil Application 43 of 2021) [20211 UGSC 72 (15 Novenher 2021). The questions of the appeal being moot, and the alleged contemptuous conduct of the Appellants were raised by the Respondents and the Court found that they had no merit. The Respondents did not make a reference from the said decision, They are, as such, estopped from raising the same complaints again before this Court. [26] I would accordingly dismiss the preliminary objections and proceed with resolving the appeal on its merits. Resolution of the appeal [27] ln resolving this appeal, I am alive to the duty ofthis Court as a second appellate court, which basically is to establish whether the Court of Appeal properly discharged its mandate as a first appellate Court. This duty has been stated in the different decisions of this Courl differently, ln Tito Buhingiro Vs Uganda SCCA IrJo. I of 2014, il was stated thus: - 'lt is trite law that as a second appellate coutt, we are not expected to re- evaluate the evidence or question the concunent findings of fact by the High Couft and Coutt of Appeal. However, where lt ls shown that they did not evaluate or re-evaluate the evidence or where they are proved to be manifestly wrong on findings of fact, the cout is obliged to do so and to ensure that justice is properly and timely served." l28l ln Kfamunte Henry Vs Uganda SC Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997, the Supreme Court stated thus: - "This Courl will no doubt consider the facts of the appeal to the extent of considering the relevant point of law or mixed law and fact raised in any appeal. lf we re-evaluate the facts of each case wholesale, we will assume the duty of the first appellate Coui and create unnecessary unceftainty. We can Poge 7 ol30 interfere with the conclusions of the Court of Appeal if it appears that in its consideration of the appealas a frst appellate Court, il misapplied or failed to apply the principles sel out rn such decrslons. " [29] | shall bear in mind the above principles while resolving this appeal. Grounds 1 and 2 - Ownership of the suit land by the Appellants. [30] The first complaint raised by the Appellants relates to the ownership of the suit land measuring about 259 hectares ( or one square mile) and in respect of which there existed two different Certificates of title at the time of commencement of the litigation in the High Court, namely: SBR/40, I-easeho/d Register Volume 3942 Folio 15 Ranch 404 Masaka Ranching Scheme, Masaka District created in favour of the Appellants in 2009 and SBR/40, Leasehold Regisfer Volume 3586 Folio 21 Ranch 40A Mawogola Ranching Schemg Sembabule Drtrhf created in favour of the Respondents' predecessor-in{itle in 2006 and was transfened into the Appellants' names in 2008. Appellant's submissions on grounds 1 and 2 [31 ] lt was the Appellants' case that they were equitable owners of the 259 hectares of land which they retained as ranchers after the government had subdivided Ranch No. 40 into 40A (measuring approximately 259 Hectares or I square mile) and 408 (measuring approximately 969.8 Hectares or 4 square miles) and taken the 4 square miles. The Appellants claimed that when the government took over the four square miles of the land during the ranches restructuring exercise, the remaining portion of one square mile was theirs. As such, contended the Appellants, under lhe principle of legitimate expectation they had an interest in the land and the same could not be reallocated by the District Land Board, The Appellants contended that their interest was independent of whether their original lease in the land from which the one square mile was curved oul had expired or not. [32] Further, the Appellants argued that their interest in the suit land was continued and protected by section 95(4) of the Land Act which provides that a person whose lease Poqe I of 30 had expired by the time of the coming into force of the Constitution and who had partially or fully developed the land, was entitled to a fresh grant upon application to the District Land Board, [33] The Appellants faulted the Courl of Appeal for not considering the history of the restructuring of ranches by the Government and how the land was obtained under the Ranches Restructuring Scheme. lnstead, contended the Appellants, the Court treated the expiry of the Appellants' original lease like the usual leases which expire by effluxion of time. The Appellants referred to the cases ol Kyepaka Francis & Anor v George Rwakarongo & 2 Ors (Civil Suit-2007/289) and Sheema Cooperative Ranching Society & 31 Ors v Attorney General (High Court Civil Suit-2010/103) [2013/ which explained the establishment of the Ranch Restructuring Board, its functions and how land was allocated to the Ranchers and non-ranchers. [34] The Appellants further relied on a research publication by Frank Emmanuel Muhereza titled "Ranchers and Pastoralists: The Restructuring of Government Ranching, Uganda" published in "African Pastoralism: Conflicl lnstitutions and Government", a 2001 publication by Pluto Press, (Appellants' authorrty No.3/ which explains in detail the history of restructuring of ranches under which the Appellants' ranch fell. The Appellants submitted that the said research corroborates the explanation that whenever a ranch was restructured, Government would take part of the land, and the rancher would be given another portion, and that this was independent of whether the original leases had expired or not. [35] The Appellants urged this Court to resolve the first issue in their favour and find that the suit land was "a residue under the Ranches Restructuring Scheme" and therefore not available for leasing to the Respondents. Respondents' Reply to grounds 1 and 2 [36] The Respondents supported the findings of the Court of Appeal and advanced several reasons to back their support, Poge 9 of 30 [37] First, that by the time of the establishment of the Ranches Restructuring Board (hereinafter refered to as the 'RRB') ylde General Notice No. 1 82 of 1990 published in The Uganda Gazette of 12.10.1990), the original lease granted to the Appellants had already expired on or about 02.01.1987. That when the Appellants failed to take any steps thereafler to have the lease renewed or extended and/or to remain in occupation or possession of any part of the land covered by their original lease, they retained zero interest in the whole of the land covered by the original lease including the suit land. [38] That in conkast, the evidence before the High Court which was re-evaluated by the Court of Appeal is that after the expiry of the original lease the Respondents' predecessor-in{itle, Paulo Sabiiti, came onto the suit land, started utilizing it for grazing his cattle for a period of about 15 years before he applied to the District Land Board for the lease over it. [39] Second, the Respondents submitted that the mere fact that the land covered under the original lease (1228 8ha or 5 square miles) was affected by the activities of the RRB, in particular its sub-division into two parts measuring four square miles and one square mile, could not per se form a valid basis for the Appellants' claim to the one square mile. The Respondents contended that the Appellants had a duty to adduce evidence of the restructuring policy and how it applied to their expired leasehold, but they failed to discharge this legal burden. [40] Citing General Notice No. 182 of 'l 990 which was published in The Uganda Gazette o'f 12.10.1990 as the Legal lnstrument by which the RRB was crealed, the Respondents argued that it was provided nowhere that the lands affected by the ranches reskucturing exercise whose lease had expired would automatically be renewed in favour of the former rancher. Further, that it was not stated anywhere in that Legal lnstrument that in cases where only part of the affected ranches were taken over by government pursuant to the Restructuring Exercise (as in the present case), then the residue left behind would remain preserved for the original lessees/ranchers inespective of whether the original leases issued in respect of such ranches had expired by the date of the partial repossession. Poge 70 ol 30 [41] The Respondents ended by concluding that the Appellants failed to adduce credible evidence before the trial Court to prove their claim that the suit land was not available for leasing to the Respondents' predecessor in title, Paul Sabiiti. They accordingly urged this Court to uphold the findings of the Court of Appeal. [42] With regard to the Appellants' submissions that the suit land having been fully or partially developed by the time of the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution could only be leased to the Appellants, the Respondents contended that this argument raised a new matter which was neither pleaded by the Appellants in their Plaint in the High Court nor proved in evidence and ought to be rejected by this Court, Determination of grounds 1 and 2 - Ownership of the suit land by the Appellants. [43] The Appellant's claim of ownership of, and/or equitable interest in, the suit land is traceable from the 1228.8 hectares (5 square miles) of land originally leased by the Uganda Land Commission to the first Appellant and the predecessors-in{itle of the second and third Appellants namely, the late Sulaiman Mbazira and Mary Nassaka, for a five-year term commencing from January 1982. The said land (hereinafter called 'the parent land') was registered under Leasehold Register Volume 1343 Folio 19, Mawogola Ranch No. 40, land at Masaka. [44] The Court of Appeal found that the lease for the parent land expired in 1987 by effluxion of time. The Court further re-evaluated the evidence and found that at no time before or after the expiry of the said lease did the Appellants make any effort to renew or extend the lease of the parent land. lnstead, the Court established that during the restructuring exercise which took place in the 1990s, the 259 hectares of land claimed by the Appellants were curved out of the parent land, and that there was a lapse of about 15 years between the expiry ofthe lease ofthe parent title and the grant ofthe lease in respect of the suit land to the Respondents' predecessor-in{itle, Mr. Sabiiti, by the District Land Board. The Court concluded thus: "The legal implication is that the land held on the lease reverted back to the controlling authori$, r,h thrls case, Sembabule Distict Land Board which could choose Poge 17 of 30 to reallocate it. Therefore, for about 15 years from 1987 when the lease expired until 2002 when Mr. Sabiiti, the [RespondenlsJ predecessor-in4rtle obtained a lease over the suit land, the land had reveied backto Sembabule District Land Board. lt must be obseNed that the [Appellants] never expressed any interest in applying for an extension of their lease during that time." [45] The Appellants' complaints about the above decision of the Court of Appeal are to the effect that the Court of Appeal never addressed its mind to two other factors peculiar to the suit land which likewise impact on the determination of the Appellants' interest in the suit land and its availability for leasing, These are: 1) The Ranch Restructuring exercise; 2) The continuation of the lease by the Land Act in 1 998 - Act No. 16 of 1998 Ranch Restructuring Exercise [46] A review of the judgment of the Court of Appeal reveals that the Ranch Restructuring Exercise was not a key consideration by the Court when resolving the issue of ownership and availability of the suit land for leasing to the Respondents. This was an abdication of the Court's duty since this question was given prominence in the submissions of the Appellants before both the High Court and the Court of appeal and formed the crux of the High Court's finding that the suit land belonged to the current Appellants as the ranchers from whom the government had taken the bigger part of their land. ln the circumstances, this Court is under a duty to re-evaluate the evidence and applicable law in respect of this specific aspect, and then determine the impact thereof on the findings of the Court of Appeal. [47] There is no contention between the pa(ies to this appeal that the suit land was one of those affected by the Ranch Restructuring scheme. The implementing agency of the scheme was the Ranches Restructuring Eoard (hereinafter called "the Board') lhal was established by the EstablShment of the Ranches Restructuring Board Notice, Poge 72 of 30 [a8] The terms of reference of the Board as set out in the Notice which are relevant to the resolution of the instant matter are the following: To implement Government policy on restructuring of ranches in the Government sponsored ranching schernes in Ankole, Masaka, Singo, Buruli and Masindi for the purpose of reseftling the landless people with their livestock now squafting in ranches... - (4(2)(b) o a o a o To allocate the repossessed ranches lo squaflers after restructuring - g(Z)(c) Where onlv paft of a ranch ls repossessed to recommend to the Uganda Land Commission lhe issuance of fresh and extension to full term of titles to the lease and to existinq sett/ed squatfers for thei respective poftions. - 4 (2)(d) To receive and examine any claims for compensation by the former squatters and ranchers and make fhe necessary recomm endations to the Minister of Lands and Surveys regarding such claims. - 4(2)(0 To advise the Government on appropiate measures that the Board may consider necessary for the expeditious implementation of the restructuring to ranches and related matters. - 4(2)(k) [Emphasis mine] [49] The Board was required to submit its final report to the Minister of Animal lndustry and Fisheries not later than eight months after the commencement of work or within such other longer period as directed by the Minister after consultation with the President. [50] From the above lay-out of the mandate of the Board applicable to the resolution of the question of ownership of the suit land as set out in paragraph 48 of this judgment, the mandate of the Board can be summarized as having been threefold: First, implementing the government policy on restructuring. Second, making Poge 73 oJ 30 1990, which was published in The Uganda Gazefte of 12th October 1990 as General NoticeNo. 1820f1990. recommendation to the Uganda Land Commission to grant the sitting lessee fresh or full term lease. Third, rendering advise to the Government relating to the expeditious implementation of the restructuring of the ranches. [51] I have closely examined the evidence before the trial Court. The Appellants did not adduce the Ranch Restructudng Policy in their evidence before the trial Court. Further, the Appellants did not adduce any iota of evidence as to the recommendations made by the Board to the Uganda Land Commission in respecl of the grant or extension of the lease of the contested one square mile of land, and whether the Uganda Land Commission accepted or rejected the said recommendations, Neither did the Appellants adduce any evidence as to the advice rendered by the Board to lhe Government in respect of the restructuring of the Appellants' former ranch and the status of the Appellant's interest as a former Rancher. The Policy Documents and the Reports of the Board being public documents, evidence thereof would, at the very basic, have consisted of certified copies of excerpts therefrom relevant to the resolution of the Appellants' claim. [52] The closest "evidence" that lhe Appellants adduced before the trial Court as to the status of the suit land under the ranches restructuring scheme was "annexture D" to the Plaint. The trial Court relied on the said report and the evidence of theformer Registrar of Titles, PW2 Edward Karibwende, to conclude thus: "The [Appellants] had obtained a title for the land but by the time of the restructuring, the [Appellants] were the legal owners of the suit land though their original title expired in 1987 (as reflected in the repoft of the restructuring committee aftached to the plaint (annexture D to the Plaint)." [53] There is no doubt that the trial Court erred in keating "annexture D" to the plaint as part of the evidence before the trial Court. An annexure to a pleading, unless admitted in evidence with the consent of the opposite party, does not form part of the evidence before the Court. A document becomes evidence only after it has been duly proved, Poge 14 of 30 and formally tendered as an exhibit by the party and admitted in evidence by the Court. See: Des Raj Sharna Vs Reginam, Vol. 20 [1953] EACA 310. [54] Further, the said annexture was not a report of the Restructuring Committee as stated by the trial Judge. The Cover Page of the annexture states cleady that the document was a "Final Valuation Summary Repoft" prepared by "Resco Propefty Consuftant Surveyors'and submitted by them to the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. [55] As regards PW2 Edward Karibwende's evidence, admission of his oral evidence in respect of the government policy and guidelines on restructuring contravened Sections 58 63,64(1)(e)and64(4)of theEvidenceAct,Cap.Softhe2023RevisedEditionof the Laws of Uganda which bar proof of the contents of documents by oral evidence. The said sections provide as follows: "58. Proof of facts by oral evidence All facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence." "63. Proof of documents by primary evidence Documents must be proved by primary evidence except ln fhe cases hereafter mentioned." "64. Cases in which secondary evidence relaling to documents may be given (1) (e) Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document ... when the original is a public document within the meaning of section tJ... (4) ln case of [a public document], a cetified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admisslble.' [56] The necessity for provision of certified copies of the Policy and other documents relating to the ranches restructuring exercise was even greater in the instant matter as at the time of his testimony PW2 Karibwende had become an advocate of the Appellants after his retirement from his office as a Principal Registrar of Titles. Poge 75 oI 30 [57] ln addition to the absence of admissible evidence of the Ranch Restructuring Policy and guidelines, there was no evidence that the Appellants had physical possession of the parent land or any portion thereof after the expiry of their lease in 1987. The LC3 Chairperson (DW3) confirmed before the trial Court that whereas the Appellants had the documents of title of the ranch, they had never been in its occupation. [58] ln the circumstances, the Court of Appeal cannot be faulted for finding that the suit land was available for leasing after the passage of a period of about '15 years from 1987 when the lease expired until when the Respondents' predecessor-in{itle, Mr. Sabiiti, obtained a lease over the suit land, while on the other hand, the Appellants never expressed any interest in applying for extension or renewal of their lease during the that period. Continuation of the lease by the Land Act [59] The second complaint raised by the Appellants against the decision of the Court of Appeal was its failure to find that even after its expiry in 1987, the lease of the Parent Land was continued by Section 91(1) of the Land Act, Cap. 236 of the 2023 Revised Edition of the Laws of Uganda. [60] There is no doubt that in 1998 the Parliament of Uganda restricted the powers of the District Land Boards to allocate land which had reverted to the former Controlling Authority (in this case, the Uganda Land Commission) before October 1995 through the enactment of Section 98(4) of the Land Act No. 16 of 1998 (renamed Section 91(1) of the Land Act, Cap. 236 of the 2023 Revised Edition of the Laws of Uganda). The said section is couched in the following terms: "A person whose /ease had expied by the time of the coming into force of the Constitution and who had patly or fully developed the land, shall be entitled to a fresh grant upon application to the board." [61] From my perusal of the Appellants' Memorandum of Appeal before this Court, the question of continuation of the Appellants' lease was not set out as one of the grounds Poge 76 oI 30 of appeal. As such, raising the said question at the stage of submissions and without leave of this Court contravenes Rule 98 (a) of the Supreme Court Rules which provides as follows: " At the hearing of an appeal ta no pafty shall, withoutthe leave ofthe court, arguethatthe decision ofthe Court of Appeal should be reversed or varied except on a ground specified in the memorandum of appeal or in a notice of cross-appeal, or support the decision of the Cout of Appeal on any ground not relied on by lhat coui or specified in a notice given under rule 88 of fhese Ru/es' [62] ln the instant matler, leave was neither sought nor granted to the Appellants to fault the Court of Appeal on the ground not set out in their Memorandum of Appeal. [63] To make matters worse, a close review of the Record of Appeal reveals that the question of continuation of the Appellants' lease on account of the Parent Land having been "pally or fully developed" was neither pleaded nor canvassed before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. lt was clearly raised for the first time before this Court and without leave of the Court. The Appellants have not demonstrated that this is a matter that fits within the ambit of exceptional circumstances under which this Court is permitted to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal before this Court. [64] This Court in the case ol Osherura Owen and Tumwesigye Frank Vs Uganda (S.C.C.A No.50 of 2015) 2018 UGSC 24 (14 June 2fi$neld as follows: "This court has previously found that it is erroneous to fault the learned Jusflces of Appeal as having erred when the conplaint was not raised before them for consideration. See Twinomuqisha Alex Alias Twine. P atrick Kwezi and John Sanvu Katuramu Vs Uqanda , Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 2002 ln the recent decision of Bogere Asiimwe Moses and Senyonga Sunday v Uganda, Supreme Couft Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 2016, this courl drcmrssed a ground of appeal not raised before the Cout of Appeal. lt held that the Court of Appeal justices never had oppoftunity to handle the issue of conviction, which the appellants were then raising, when they heard the appeal. The Court Poge 77 of 30 We associate with the above decision and consider it an error for counsel to have levelled criticism on the Justices of the Cout of Appeal on a mafter which was not availed to them to enterlain." [65] The above statement of the law is still good law and I have no reason to depart from it Concluding remarks on grounds 1 and 2 - Ownership of the suit land by the Appellants. [66] From my analysis of the first issue, I am satisfied that the Court of Appeal cannot be faulted for not considering the question of the alleged continuation of the lease for the suit land, I am also satisfied that the failure of the Court of Appeal to consider the question of the ranch restructuring exercise did not affect the propriety of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the suit land was available for allocalion. I would accordingly dismiss the Appellants' complaint as set out in grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal. Consideration of grounds 3 and 6 - Fraudulent acquisition of title by the Respondents [67] The issue of fraudulent acquisition of the title to the one square mile of land by the Respondents arose from grounds 3, and 6 which were couched as follows: Ground 3: "The learned Justlces of appeal erred in law in holding that there was no fraud on the parl of the Respondenls. " o a Ground 6: "The learned Justices of appeal ened in law in ignoing the fact that the original 1d Defendant had actual knowledge that the suit land could not be available for leasing." of Appeal could not therefore be faulted on a matter which was never raised before them. Poge 78 of 30 The Appellants'submissions on grounds 3 and 6 [68] ln their submissions, the Appellants faulted the Court of Appeal for failing to find fraud on the part of the Respondents and their predecessor-in-title, Paul Sabiiti, Further, the Appellants faulted the Court of Appeal for failing to find that the Respondents were not bonafide purchasers for value of the suit land. [69] lt was the Appellants' case that they were beneficiaries of the Ranch Restructuring exercise under which they were allocated One Square Mile as former ranch owners. That the conduct of the Respondents to procure registration to the suit land in order to defeat the Appellants' unregistered equitable interest, which they were aware of after the restructuring exercise, amounted to fraud. The Appellants cited the case of Fredrick J.K. Zaabwe vs. Orient Bank Ltd and 5 others Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2006 for the definition of "fraud" in land transactions. [70] The other evidence of fraud highlighted by the Appellants was the alleged failure of the Respondents and their predecessor-in{itle to conduct any due diligence on the suit land before acquisition of the same, and possession of actual and/or constructive knoWedge that the suit land was a residue which was allocated to the Appellants under the Ranches Restructuring Exercise. [71] The Appellants further submitted that the evidence on record shows that none of the Respondents conducted a search over the land but simply relied on what they were told by the 1't Defendant (Paulo Sabiiti); and that they did not even bother to check the status of the land with Sembabule District Land Board. The Appellants also relied on the letter of the Commissioner Land Registration which, according to the Appellants, also found the Respondents' registration fraudulent. [72] ln conclusion, the Appellants implored this Court to find that the Court of Appeal failed in its duty as a first appellate Court when it failed to evaluate the evidence on the court record to the effect that the Respondents had actual notice of the Appellants' unregistered interest in the 259 acres, bought land from a person who had no valid title to the land, did not make a search to determine what claims were on the land, and did Poge 79 of 30 not buy the land for valuable consideration a fraud. As a result, contended the Appellants, the Court came to a wrong conclusion which they crave to be overturned by this Court. Respondents' reply to grounds 3 and 6 - Fraud [73] The Respondents supported the Court of Appeal's finding that there was no fraud that was proved on the part of the Respondents in the acquisition of their title to the suit property. [74] The Respondents submitted that all the arguments of the Appellants on the issue of fraud cannot hold because their claim to the suit property was based on an unfounded right to the 'residue' land which they claimed to have been reserved for them as former ranchers pursuant to the policy of the Ranches Restructuring Exercise. The Respondents conlended that the Court of Appeal rightly found that after the expiry of the lease, and in the absence of evidence of possession of the suit land by the Appellants or any efforts on their part to apply for renewal or extension of the lease, the Appellants had no valid or existing right, claim or interest in the suit property capable of being defeated by fraud as alleged in paragraphs 12, 13, 14,'15, 16 and 17 of their submissions, [75] The Respondents further argued that the components offraud raised by the Appellants before this Court were simply an afterthought. The Respondents refened to the Plaint which shows that no allegations of fraud were pleaded or proved against the Respondents who were respectively the 2nd, 3rd or 4th defendants in the High Court. [76] The Respondents also submitted the said components of fraud raised by the Appellants before this Court were never canvassed in the Appellants' pleadings and evidence in the trial Court or even in their arguments during the firsl appeal. The Respondents avened that the Appellants' submission on "defeating the Appellants' unregistered interest' has been raised for the first time before this Court and ought to be rejected. Poge 20 of 30 [77] The Respondents urged this Court to dismiss the Appellants' grounds of appeal on fraud. Resolution of grounds 3 and 6 - Fraud [78] From the Appellants' submissions, it is apparent that the crux of their complaint in grounds 3, and 6 is that the suit land was not available for leasing to the Respondents as it belonged to the Appellants as the former ranchers with an equitable interest in it. As such, contended the Appellants, the Respondents were fraudulent in so far as they were aware of the Appellants' unregistered interest but, nonetheless, went ahead and obtained the title in respecl of the suit land to defeat the Appellants' unregistered interest. ln the same vein, argued the Appellants, the Respondents were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the Appellants' unregistered interest which, opined the Appellants, the Respondents were aware of. [79] ln her judgment which the other Justices of Appeal agreed with, Hon. Lady Justice Elizabeth Musoke, JA (as she then was) set out the law on fraud, and in particular the requirement that fraud must be attributable to the transferee. Then afier re-evaluating the evidence, she concluded thus: "l have not found any drbhonesty in dealing with the suit land, which was attributable to the [cunent RespondenfsJ or thei predecessor-in title. I have instead found that when the [current Appellants'] lease expired in 1987, there was no effort by them to apply for ertension of their lease. lnstead, the [current Respondentsl rightly applied for a lease over the same, which was granted in 2002, fifteen years later. Therefore, when the [current Appellants] applied for and obtained a lease in 2007, there was no land available for leasing. lf Sembabule District Land Board Officials had been cognizant of this position, they would not have granted a lease to the [Cunent Appellants]." [80] AfterreviewingtheCourtRecord, lflndnobasisforfaultingthedecisionoftheCourtof Appeal with regard to the alleged fraudulent acquisition of the suit land by the Respondents herein. ln any case, I have already likewise found, when resolving Page 27 of 30 grounds '1 and 2 of this appeal, that the suit land was available for leasing at the time the Respondents' predecessor-in{itle obtained the title to it in 2002 and that the Appellants' claim of an equitable interest in it was not backed by the evidence on the Court record. [81] Grounds 3 and 6 of appeal accordingly fail. Grounds 4 and 5 - lllegalig [82] The question of the illegalities committed during the processing of the Respondents' title arose from grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal which were couched as follows: Ground 4: "The learned Justlces of appeal erred in law in holdingthatthe lease which was not dated and had no names of the Chairman and secretary was valid.' o a Ground 5: "The learned Juslices of appeal erred in law and in fact in holding that the illegalities in the processing of the lease for the respondents were mere tregularities." Appellants' submissions on grounds 4 and 5 - lllegality [83] lt was the Appellants' case that it was illegal for the Respondents, who were not ranchers, to obtain a "residue title" under Ranch No. 40A which was preserved for the Appellants as the ranchers. Further, that Ranch No. 40A was rooted in the same file number SBR/40 as the Appellants' land. The Appellants contended that the above anomalies were contrary to the Ranch Restructuring Scheme established under General Notice No. 182 of 1990, The Uganda Gazette, Vol, LXXX|ll, October 12, 1990 and Government Policy as was stated in the case of Sheema Cooperative Ranching Socrety & 31 Others Vs. The Attomey General (supra) and Kyepaka Francis & Anorv George Rwakarongo & 2 (supra). [84] The other "illegality" raised by the Appellants was that the Respondents' predecessor- in{itle, Paul Sabiiti, did not have title to pass onto the Respondents as he derived his interest from a one Njuki who did not have letters of administration to sell. Poge 22 of 30 [85] Further, that it was illegal for the District Land Board to grant the lease to the Respondents without first giving the Appellants the priority as required under S. 95(4) of the Land Act and in total violation of the principle of legitimate expectation and natural justice. That the Board was expected to implement the decisions of the Ranch Reskucturing Board and could not allocate the suit land to the Respondents under Part A without first giving a fair hearing to the Appellants, The Appellants opined that the failure to consult the lessee/sitting tenant amounts to breach of natural justice and renders the decision of the District Land Board void. The Appellants cited Uganda Ex- Servicemen Assocration Vs. Kiboga District Land Board & 3 Ors HCCS NO. 091 OF 2009; Kampala District Land Board Vs Babweyaka & 3 others SCCA No. 2 of 2007; and Agandru Vs Etoma (Civil Suit-2011/) in support of their submission, [86] Lastly, the Appellants further faulted the holding of the Court of Appeal to the effect that "there is no law requiring that the names of the office holder to be indicated thereon" as erroneous in law on the ground that Section '148 of the Registration of Titles Act (RTA) requires that all signatures must be in Latin Character. The Appellants argued that this requrrement was held to be mandatory by the Supreme Court in Fredrck J.K. Zaabwe vs. Orient Bank Ltd and 5 otherc Supreme Courl Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2006 and was relied on in Belex fours & Travel Ltd Vs. Crane Bank Ltd & Anor (Civil Appeal-2009/71), where the Court nullifled a mortgage instrument where the names of office bearers were missing as being contrary to Sections 147 and 148 of the RTA, Respondents' reply to grounds 4 and 5 - lllegality [88] The Respondents, once again, supporled the finding of the Court of Appeal that the illegalities and/or irregularities alleged against the Respondents' title were largely mere Poge 23 ol 30 [87] The Appellants concluded their submissions by stating that the Respondents were affected by fraudulent and illegal acquisition of registration on the suit land title as they got no better title from the 1st Defendant since they were aware of the inegularities and fraud by the 1s Defendant and took advantage of the Appellants' equitable interest at the time, inegularities which were due to no fault on the part of the Respondents' predecessor- in{itle or the Respondents themselves. The Respondents further objected to the Appellants' submission on the Appellants' claim that the signatures on the lease were not in Latin character as it was not one of illegalities/inegularities which were canvassed in their pleadings and evidence at the kial Court or even in the arguments during the first appeal. They, as such, prayed to this Court to reject them. Resolution of grounds 4 and 5 - lllegality [89] There is no doubt that save the question of the absence of the date, the names of the officials who signed the Respondents' lease in respect of the suit properties and their alleged failure to sign in Latin character, all the other complaints which the Appellants baptized "illegalities" and "inegularities" have already been dealt with when resolving grounds 1,2,3 and 6 of the appeal. They are accordingly rejected, [90] When dealing with the question of absence of date and names of the officials who signed on behalf of the lessor, Justice Elizabeth Musoke, JA (as she then was) with whom the other Justices agreed stated thus: "l have considered some of the alleged illegalities and/or irregularities especially alleged against the [current RespondenlsJ title ... that the [current RespondentsJ /ease was undated and the names of the Chairman and Secretary of the Distict Land Board were undisclosed; and ...that the [current Respondents'l lease did not indicate the names of the officials who signed on behaff of Sembabule District Land Board...ln my view,...the [said] allegations were nere inegularities. which were no fault of the [cunent RespondentsJ predecessor-in title or the [current Respondents] themselves. I cannot fauft them for any deficiencies in that connection. ln any case, as /ong as the offices of the persons signing the lease are indicated, there is no law requiing that the names of the office holder have to be indicated thereon, as well." [91] lfind no reason to fault the Court of Appeal's holding that the failure to indicate the dates and names of the officials of Sembabule District Land Board who signed as Page 24 of iO Chairman and Secretary were mere irregularities. My opinion is reinforced by the reasons below: [92] First, there is no doubt that the reason underlying the placement of the date and names of the signatories onlo the Lease Deed is to ensure that the Land Registry registers only documents which have been signed by authorized persons or officials. Placement of the names of the signatories near their respeclive signatures makes it easier for the Registrar of Titles to identify the signatory and satisfy him/herself that he/she is dealing with documents signed by the right officials or persons. However, does it automatically mean that in the absence of the date and name it is impossible for the Registrar of titles to identify the owner of the signature which was appended onto the Lease? [93] I think NOT. I am cognizant of the fact that the Registrars of the different Land Registries on a regular basis deal with a myriad of leases and other documents signed by the Chairpersons and Secretaries of the different District Land Boards in Uganda. That gives them a great opportunity to acquaint themselves with the signatures of such officials and thereby develop the competence to attribute recurrent signatures to specific officials of the District Land Boards even where no names of the Distnct Land Official are indicated. The Land Registrars also have the opportunity to compare the signatures on a current document (pending before them) with the older documents already in the custody of the Land Registry which were previously handled by the Registrars and registered in the Land Registry without any contest and thereby be able to determine fairly well the identity of the signatory of the document before them . As such, in the absence of any claim of forgery of any of the signatures, the nondisclosure of names of the signatories of the Lease becomes a mere irregularity and it would cause greater injustice for the Court to automatically nullify the impugned lease simply on account of the omission or failure to indicate the date and names of the officials who signed the lease as Chairman and Secretary of the District Land Board. [94] Second, a District Land Board being a Statutory body, the Court is mandated by section 56('l)(f) of the EvidenceAct, Cap.8 of the 2023 Revised Edition of the Laws of Uganda the Evidence Act to take judicial notice ol inter alia, the accession to office, Poge 25 of 30 names, titles, functions and signatures of its Chairperson, Secretary and other members, especially after the fact of their appointment is published in the Uganda Gazette. Section 56(1)(f) provides thus: "56. Facts of which couft must take judicial notice: (1)(f) the accesslon to office, names, tltles, functions and signatures of the persons filling for the time being any public office in any part of Uganda, if the fact of thek appointment to that office is notified in the Gazette" [95] Third, the foundation or root of a grant of the Respondents' lease interest in the suit land is the minute of the District Land Board. ln the case o'f Livingstone Sewanyana V Martin Aliker (Civil Appeal4 of 1990) [199U UGSC I (27 February 1991) this Court held that the grant of lease made under lhe minute of the Controlling Authority (Uganda Land Commission) formed the root from which the lease offer and the leasehold certificate of title derived their validity. [97] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Court of Appeal did not en to hold that failure to date the Lease and to disclose the names of the signatories of the impugned Lease Deed was a mere irregulanty. Such an irregularity can always be rectified by the parties upon discovery of the same. [98] As regards the Appellants' submission that the impugned lease was invalid on account ofthe signatures not being in Latin character, lacceptthe Respondents'argumentthat Poge 26 of iO [96] As such, it logically follows that even if the Court were to invalidate the Lease Deed or Leasehold Certificate on account of failing to date the lease Deed or to write the names of the officials who signed the Lease Deed as the Chairman and Secretary of the District Land Board, such invalidation would still not extinguish the Respondents' leasehold interest which is rooted in the Minute of the District Land Board granting the lease. lt is like cutting the branches of a tree and leaving intact the tree stem and roots: The tree still retains the propensity to continue to live and give forth new leaves and branches. this was not one of the "illegalities" which were pleaded and/or canvassed before the Court of Appeal. I can add that neither is it one of the grounds of appeal as set out in the Memorandum ofAppeal, The gist of the Appellants' grounds 4 and 5 of appeal is to fault the Court's finding that the failure to indicate the date and the names of the persons who signed the contested lease on behalf of Sembabule District Land Board did not affect the validity ofthe lease. As such, the Appellants have widened the scope of their complaint beyond the grounds of appeal by incorporating in their written submissions a complaint about the alleged failure of the officials of Sembabule District Land Board to sign the lease in Latin character which, they contend, was contrary to the mandatory provision in Section 148 of the Registration of Titles Act (RTA) which requires that all signatures must be in Latin Character, and the decision of this Court in Fredrick J.K. Zaabwe vs. Orient Bank Lfd and 5 ofhers (supra). [99] I have already stated in this judgment that as a general rule, this Court will not entertain arguments on a matter which was neither raised nor canvassed before the Court of Appeal. Further, that a party will not be allowed to argue a matter which is outside the grounds of his/her memorandum of appeal except with leave. However, one of the exceptions to the above general rule is where the new matter relates to illegality as Courls of law cannot sanction an illegality. See; Kisumu Quarries vs. The Administrator General SCCA No.10 of 1998 and Rwabugande v Uganda (Supreme Couft Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2014) [201] UGSC I (3 March 2017). [100] As such, I will consider the Appellants'submissions on the alleged failure lo sign the impugned lease in Latin character as qualifying for resolution by this Court under the exception to the general rule. [101lThe law applicable to the signing and attestation of leases and other instruments under the 2023 Revised Edition of the Laws of Uganda is Section 131 and 132 of the RTA, Cap.240.ln particular, Section 132 provides as follows: "No instrument or power of attorney shall be deemed to be duly execufed unless either: - Poge 27 of 30 a) the sianature of each paiy to it is in Latin character: or b) a transliteration into Latin character of the signature of any pafty whose signature is not in Latin character and the name of any pafty who has affixed a mark instead of signing his or her name are added to the instrument or power of attorney by or in the presence of the attesting wrtness al the time of execution, and beneath the signature or mark there is insefted celificate in the form in the Eighteenth Scheduled to this Acl. ' [Emphasis added] [102] The consequence of failure to sign a land instrument in Latin Character was discussed extensively by this Court in the case of Zaabwe v Orient Bank Ltd and 5 Others (Civil Appeal 4 of 2006) [2007] UGSC 21 ('10 July 2007). The Court held that the requirement for the signature to an instrument under the RTA to be in Latin character is a matter of a substantive provision of the law, not a mere technicality, and that noncompliance rendered the mortgage invalid. [103] Hon. Katureebe, JSC who wrote lhe lead judgment with which the other justices agreed stated the rationale for the above decision thus: "ln my view, the rationale behind section fl32 of the RTA, Cap, 2401 requiring a signature to be in Latin character must be to make clear to everybody receiving that document as to who the signatory ls so that it can also be asceiained whether he had the authority or capacity to sign. When fhe wrlness attesting to a signature merely scrlbb/es a signature, without giving his name or capacity, how would the Registrar or anyone else asceiain that that wrtness had capacity fo wrfness in terms of section [131] of the Registration of Titles Act?" [104] Under the principle of Sfare declsrs I am bound to follow the decision in Zaabwe case (lbrd) unless it appears right to depart from it in accordance with the laid out principles. This principle is enshrined in Article 134(4) of the Constitution in the following terms: "The Supreme Coul may, while treating its own previous decr.slons as normally binding depat from a previous decision when it appears to it right to do so; and all Poge 28 of 30 other Courts shall be bound to follow the decislons of the Supreme Coui on questions of law." [105] ln The Attomey General v Uganda Law Socieg (2009) UGSC 2 the exceptional circumstances under which the departure from its previous decisions is ordinarily permissible were adjudged to include "where the previous decision is distinguishable; was over-ruled by a higher couft on appeal; or was anived at per incuriam without taking into account a law in force or a binding precedent." [106] I am satisfied that the matter before us falls within the parameters within which we can depart from the decision of this Court in the Zaabwe case (ibid). The reasons to justify my position are the same as those which I have set out in detai! when upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the failure to indicate the date and names of the signatories of the Lease was a mere inegularity which should not invalidate the Lease. ['107] Needless to add, the documents whose execution was at the centre of the dispute in lie Zaabwe case (ibid) and in the instant appeal are different: f he Zaabwe case (ibid) involved a mortgage and power of attorney between private persons, whereas the documenl at the centre of the instant appeal is a Lease Deed by a statutory body signed by holders of a public office. We have shown that there are specific provisions of the law which apply to the creation and signing of lease by a statutory body which could not have been considered by the Court in the Zaabwe case (ibid) when dealing with the impugned mortgage between private persons and the Power of Attorney. These provisions include Section 56(1)(f) of the Evidence Act. ['108] Further, we have shown the conlext in which leases by public bodies are created and get registered and that invalidation of the certificate of title does not by itself extinguish the full interest of the lessee which is rooted in the Minute of the District Land Board, [109] The net effect of section 56(1)(f) of the Evidence Act when applied to leases by statutory bodies, and the context in which Lease instruments are created and registered as detailed hereinabove, is to neutralize the risks sought to be safeguarded Poge 29 of 30 by the construction of section 132 of the RTA in mandatory terms. Accordingly, I find that the decision of this Court in Zaabwe case (ibid) to the effect that an instrument under the RTA whose signatures are not in Latin Character in compliance with S.132 of the RTA are invalid does not apply to lease instruments made by the District Land Boards and other statutory bodies. I opine that 5.132 of the RTA is a directory provision in its application to Lease documents signed by the Chairperson and Secretary of the Dishict Land Boards or other statutory bodies, so much so, that non- compliance with S.132 of the RTA by the relevant public officials of the District Land Boards and other Statutory bodies does not ipso facto invalidate the said lease instrument in the absence of allegations of forgery of the signatures on the lease instrument. [1'10]As such, I would dismiss grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal. Conclusion [1 1 1] The Appellants' complaints having failed on all the grounds of appeal, I would dismiss 'L-> MUZAMIRU MUTANGULA ria EEDI \ 2_-D Juslice of the Supreme Court Date: lS't2-'2-,o2-+, Delivered and dated at Kampala mirfr.C ot 2025 Justice of the Supreme CourU Registrar Poge 30 oI 30 the appeal with costs to the Respondents. Signed: I k THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA (Coram: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Chibita, Bamugemereire, Mugenyi and Kibeedi, JJ.SC) CIVIL APPEAL NO. OO17 OF 2O2O BETWEEN 1. SSENYONGAHARUNA 2. IYOMBI HUSSEIN (Administrator of the Estate of the Late SULAIMAN MBAZIIRA)] ::::::::::: APPELLANTS 3. NAMBAZIIRA JANE (Administrator of the Estate of the Late MARYNASSAKA 1 AND 1. KIVESrGA WTLLTAM I 2. SAMUEL BTHAGARO l 3. BENON KALTGA I RESPONDENTS [An appeal from the Judgment of the Court of Appeal at Kampala before the Honourable Justices of Appeal Elizabeth Musoke, JA., Stephen Musota, JA., & Remmy Kasule, Ag. JA dated the 2Ah of Julg 2020, in Ciuil Appeal I[o. 35 of 2017] coNcuRRrNG JUDGMENT OF MIKE J. CHIBITA, JSC I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of Muzamiru Kibeedi, JSC, in draft, I have pointed out some few areas of phraseolory which he has graciously agreed to adopt. Otherwise, I agree with the judgment that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Mike J. Chibita JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT DATE: 16,h December, 2025 LbrEa-LF Delivered and dated at Kampala, this Justice of the Supreme Court/Registrar December, 2025 K M* TIIEREPUBLIC OFUGANDA IN TIIE SI]PREME COIJRT OFUGANDAATKAMPAI,A CIVIL APPEAL NO. OOIT OF 2O2O ('or:rrrr: {'l'ilxrtcrnu'u-l',kilikulrinz:r, C'lribita, l};rn rugcnrclcilc, \'lugcrrl i, Kilrcrli,.LJS('} I. SSET{YONGAHARIJNA 2. I{YOMBI HUSSEIN (,\rlrnirtistratol ol tltc I'.statc ol' thc I ,lrtc SULAIMAN MBAZIIRA 3. NAMBAZIRAJANE (,\rlnrirtistratoI' ol tIte I'.surtc ol'thc t.atc MARYNASSAKA VERSUS l. KITVESIGAWILLIAM 2. SAMUELBIHAGARO 3. BENONKALIGA RESPONDENTS JUDGMEI{T OF CATHERINE BAMUGET{E.REIRE JSC Concurring I Iravc h:r<l the oplxrrtuuitl'to lca<l the <lr';rli olrinion ol rrrl'learrre<[ llr'othcr N{uz;rtttiru Mutangula Kilrcc<li.lSC. I ;rgrce u,itlt Itis I casorrirtg, Iris t ont'lusir>ns arul lris or<lcls. I wrrul<[ <lisrniss tlris appeul rvitlr costs in this court:trul iu the trrurts lrekrrr'. Signe<l this 15"' rlay' of' Dece rnbcr 2025 C,atherine Bamugemereire, Justice of the Supreme Court f urlgrncnt r cnrlcrc<l this .. a1' oI ll cglstr':ri .CI I I(' C<>rrrt 2025 /.ln a14;tal /htn lh<'./urlgtnt'ttt r 'lllizdlrth ,lht.x*4./.1.,.5t1<f t<'n ,lht.sotd,./.4., ll<'nttt.t. K;tsuh'. -lS ./-l it (\\il .1p1x'; -\'o. ,'/.i tl 20l7/ tit lt<' (lttut rl ..lppcal at han4t; a lat<tl tlr 2(/'rtl /rfi 2020/ THE REPUBLIC OT UGANDA THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA (Coram: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Chibita, Bamugemereire, Mugenyi & Kbeedi, JJSC) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17 OF 2OA BETWEEN 1. SSENYONGAHARUNA 2. NYOMBI HUSSEIN (Administrator of the Estate of the late SULAIMAN MBAZIRA) 3. NAMBAZIIRA JANE (Administrator of the Estate of the late MARY NASSAKA) APPELLANTS 1 2 3 AND KWESIGA WILLIAMS SAMUEL BIHAGARO BENON KALIGA RESPONOENTS (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Musoke, Musota, JJA & Kasule, Ag. JA) in Civil Appeal No.35 ol 2017) I have had the benefit of considering in draft the ludgment of my brother, Kibeedi, JSC in this Appeal. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the Appeal ought to fail in the terms proposed. Signed this day of .. 2025. Dated and delivered at Kampala this ... yof. .....,2025. Registrarl D2pat! of the Supreme Court ( t W Monica K. Mugenyi Justice of the Supreme Court JUDGMENT OF MONICA KALYEGIRA MUGENYI, JSC THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AIVIPALA ICORAII: TIBATEIIIIIA-EKIRII<WINZA; CHIBITA; BAMUGEMEREIRE; IIIUGENYI; KIBEEDI, J'.S.C/ CIVIL APPEAL NO. OOTT OF 2O2O BETWEEN 1. SSENYONGAHARUNA 2. I{YOMBI HUSSEIN (Administrator of the Estate of the Late SULAIMAN MBAZIIRA 3. NAMBAZIIRA JANE (Administrator of the Estate of the Late MARY NASSAKA AND KWESIGA WILLIAM SAMUEL BIHAGARO BENON KALIGA ::::::::::: RESPONDENTS (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal before: Hon. Jusfices; Musoke, Musota, JJA and Kasule, Ag. JA) in Ciuil Appeal No. 35 of 2O17 dated the 2An of Julg 2O20) JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JSC I have had the benefrt of reading, in draft, the judgment of my Learned Brother Kibeedi, JSC. I concur with the reasoning and conclusion therein that the appeal be dismissed. Since Chibita, Bamugemereire, Mugenyi JJSC, a-lso agree, with Kibeedi JSC, this appeal is hereby dismissed with costs to the Respondents. 1 2 3 ::::::::APPELLANTS PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMUIA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICT OF THE SUPREME COURT Delivered and dated at Kampala this ayo f Justice of Supreme Court/ Registrar 025 Dated, and signed at Kampala this ..[6 .. day of . . tr+.cP*xf... 2025.