Sentongo Patrick v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 2021) [2025] UGSC 41 (15 September 2025)

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPRTME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 69 OF 2O2I (CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; CHIBITA; MUSOTA; MADRAMA; BAMUGEMEREIRT, JJ. S.C) BETWEEN SENTONGO PATRICK : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT UGANDA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RTSPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal of Uganda at Kampala in Ciminal Appeal No.37 of 2017, decided bg Kakuru, Kibeedi, and Mulyagonja, JJA dated 15h October 2O21). JUDGMENT OI. THE COURT Introduction This is a second appeal. Sentongo Patrick herein referred to as the Appellant, appeals against the decision of the Court of Appeal wherein the learned Justices of Appeal dismissed his appea-l and confirmed the convictions of ernbezzlernent ald electronic fraud and the sentences of 2 years' imprisonment on counts 1 and 2, and 10 years' imprisonment on count 3 imposed by the High Court in Criminal Session Case No. 0029 of 201O. Page 1of 28 VERSUS Background. The facts of this appeal, as were accepted by the tria-l court and the Court of Appeal, are that the appellant, and others not pa-rty to this appeal were employees of MTN Uganda Ltd, a telecommunications company that provides communication and electronic money transfer services in Uganda. The prosecution case was that between the months of May and December 20 I 1, the appellant conspired with other persons to steal money from the MTN mobile money computer system called FUNDAMO. They did so by creating fictitious journals and exiting the money through the MTN Public Access Shop which was operated by one Joan Nabugwawo. It was also the prosecution's case that the Appellant created pseudo narnes on the system who transacted as "ghosts" and drained money from the Adjustment Account for Discrepancy through the Dispute Account to 17 subscribers and accomplices such as Joan Nabugwawo and the appellalt's wife, Saudah Nakimbugwe, one of the proprietors of a company called Always Ltd, al agent of MTN. The appellant resigned from MTN before he was discovered. An audit was carried out by MTN and it was discovered that the appellant colluded with others and stole money from the company to the tune of UGX 10,200,000,000/=. The appellant was charged and convicted on 4 counts of embezzlement contra-ry to Section 19 (b) (i) of the Anti-Corruption Act, electronic fraud contra-ry to section 19 of the Computer Misuse Act and conspiracy to defraud contrary to section 309 of the Penal Code Act and imposed a total sentence PaBe 2 of 28 of 10 years' imprisonment and a compensation order of UGX 5,OOO,OO0,OO0/= to MTN Uganda Ltd. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellant contested both the conviction and sentence on the following grounds; 1. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appellant of the offence of embezzlement contrary to section 19 (b) (i) of the Anti-Corn:ption Act in Counts l,2,3 and 4, electronic fraud contrary to section 19 of the Computer Misuse Act 2011 (count 5), conspiracy to defraud contraql to section 309 of the Pena-l Code Act (count 8) without proof of the ingredients, hence occasioning a miscarriage of justice. 2. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appellant on the assumption that the username sentopl2l which made the fraudulent postings was created by/belonged to the appellant whereas not. 3. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appellant basing on the prosecution's weak evidence in isolation of the defence case hence occasioning a miscarriage of justice. 4. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact while evaluating the evidence of electronic records and data by disregarding the provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act thus arriving at a wrong conclusion. Page 3 of 28 5. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he relied on extraneous facts not canvassed in evidence and on speculations hence arrived at a wrong conclusion to convict the appellant thus occasioning a miscarriage of justice. 6. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he gave the appellant a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence in counts 3, 4 and 5 given the circumstances of the case and the sentences he imposed on other similar counts. 7. The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he ordered the appellant to pay compensation of 5 billion shillings which amount was not proved as a loss and was manifestly exorbitant and excessive. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed for the offence of conspiracy to defraud contrary to section 3O9 of the Penal Code Act. The convictions and sentences for the offence s of embezzlement and electronic fraud were upheld. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal and filed an appeal to this court on the following grounds: 1. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in Law when they upheld the trial Judges decision to convict the appellant from a tria-l founded on an illegality of Torture which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in Law when they went ahead and still convicted the appellant on assumption that PaSe 4 of 28 usernarne sentopl2l was the correct user narne for the appellant whereas not. 3. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in Law and fact by failing to adequately re-eva-luate the evidence of Electronic Records and Data, disregarding the provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act and Computer Misuse Act. 4. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in Law when they confirmed the overly severe custodial sentence of 1O years on counts of 3, 4 and 5 respectively awarded against the appellant given the circumstances of the case. Representation. The Appellant was self-represented while the Respondent was represented by Ms. Agaba Abigail and Ms. Gloria Nzikuru both Chief State Attorneys. Both parties had earlier filed their submissions, which they adopted as their legal arguments. Appellant's Submissions Ground one The appellant relied on Article 24 of lhe Constitution which makes it illegal for any person to be subjected to any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The appellant argued that the evidence on record proved that he was tortured and when the trial Judge carried out a trial within a trial, it was found that he was physically tortured while in custody. He submitted that the right to a fair hearing under Article 44 (Cl of the Constitution is a non Page 5 of 28 derogable right and his trial ought to have been declared a nullity after finding that he was tortured while in custody. The Appellant relied on the decision in Makula International Ltd Vs His Eminence Cardinal Nsubuga and another Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1981 for the proposition that once an illegality is brought to the attention of court, it cannot be ignored. The Appellant prayed that his trial be declared illegal, null and void. Ground two The Appellant submitted that the entire case was based on the Grant Thornton Report on Investigation- MM Operations Exhibit P 17 and the report found that the Appellant was directly involved in the commission of the offences and yet the user ID found to have been involved was Sentop12l. The Appellant, in his denial stated that his user ID was Senpat23 1 and not Sentopl2l, which was used to syphon money out of the MTN Mobile Money Accounts. The appellant argued that there was no evidence produced by the prosecution to show that the alleged password Sentop121 belonged to the Appellant. This was confirmed by the learned Justices of Appeal when they held that there was no direct evidence on record relating to the creation of Sentop 12 1 . The appellant submitted that the Justices of Appeal found that the trial Judge erred when he referred to the usernarne Sentopl2l instead of Sentonpl2l but found that the error originated from the report of the Forensic Investigations M.S Grant Thornton and that the trial Judge lifted the error from the report and referred to the Page 6 of 28 sarne usernarnes. It is the Appellant's contention that there was no witness that testified to the effect that the report had such an error as was held by the appellate court. The appellant submitted that the username Sentonpl2l alleged to belong to him by the Justices of Appeal was also not his usernarne and there was no evidence that he ever used it in any transaction on the MM system. There was thus no evidence to prove the offences against the appellant without proof that he used or created the alleged user narnes. The appellant relied on Section 29 (5) (b) and (c) of the Computer Misuse Act and submitted with regard to admissibility of electronic evidence, that the person giving testimony in court should not have been party to the proceedings and should not have recorded or stored the recording. In this case, the appellant argues that the evidence relied on by the trial court was that of MTN employees who were partisan to the proceedings. Further, that the data used in making the Grant Thornton report that was submitted in court was not the true version of the data on the Mobile Money Computer System, but had been altered to suit the prosecution case. Ground 4 The Appellant submitted that the 1O-year sentence in respect to counts 3, 4 and 5 was excessive and that the trial Judge did not follow the principles of consistency when sentencing the Appellant along with the other accused persons in relation to the sarne case and same facts. The appellant argued that the sentences passed Page 7 of 28 Ground 3 against him and his co-accused persons were discriminatory in nature yet they were a-11 convicted from the same series of events. Respondent's submissions Ground one Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the appellant is raising the issue of torture for the first time on a second appeal to this court and that the Court of Appeal cannot be faulted for having failed to make a decision on a matter that was not placed before the court. Counsel relied on the decision in Osherura Owen and Tumwesigye Frank vs Uganda SCCA No. 5O of 2015 for the proposition that it would be erroneous to fault the learned Justices of Appeal as having erred when the complaint was not raised before them for consideration. Counsel submitted further that Rule 98 (a) of the Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions 1996 makes it a requirement for an appellant to have sought leave of court before raising a ground that was not considered by the Justices of Appeal. Counsel submitted that the Human Rights (Enforcement) Act, 2O19 which the appellant relied on would not apply retrospectively for acts a,lleged to have been occasioned in 2Ol2 and even then, the procedure for applying for redress is in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Counsel submitted that the record does not reflect any application, complaint or petition made by the appellant in respect to the alleged physical torture by the police. Page 8 of 28 Ground trro Counsel submitted that the learned Justices of Appeal considered the evidence on record and came up with their findings that the appellant created the user name Sentonpl2l which was used to defraud his employer. The court considered the evidence of PW3 and PW4, hired by MTN (U) Ltd to ca-rry out an investigation into the alleged fraud and found that the appellant had originated the fictitious transactions and authorised the hctitious transactions of the associates. The appellant was the linance administrator and the only one with a token used to create users on the system and this evidence remained unchallenged. Page 9 of 28 Counsel argued that the evidence of PW3 was that the system used by MTN (U) kept records of whoever logged in, time, date and the computer used to log in together with the source ald destination of the funds. PW3 was able to present a user login trail PEx72 which showed a series of logins with the user narne sentonpl2l which was used to login successfully at the appellant's known IP address 10.156.1.128 and other IP addresses. That the machine where the user narne sentonp 121 first carne onto the system was 10.156.1.L28, the appellant's workstation. In addition, that the username started logging in on the 2ll2l2ol1 and was terminated on the 23 ll2 l2ol1, the same date the appellant tendered in his resignation. The learned Justices of Appeal considered the various pieces of evidence and came to the proper conclusion that the appellant created the username sentonp121. Ground three The Respondent's counsel submitted that the appellant restricted his argument with regard to this ground on Section 29 (5) (c) of the Computer Misuse Act, 2011 and did not consider the options under sub-sections (a) and (b) of the sarne provision. Counsel submitted that sub-sections (a) and (b) cater for admissibility of an electronic record where the record was recorded or stored by the adverse party. The best evidence rule was satisfied upon proof of the authenticity of the electronic records system by which the data was recorded. Counsel argued that the learned Justices of Appeal extensively considered the evidence on record and the provisions of the Computer Misuse Act with regard to authenticity and admissibility of the system generated reports from the mobile money platform and the testimonies of the witnesses that vouched for integrity of the MTN system to produce authentic data. In addition, counsel submitted that the learned Justices of Appeal considered the evidence of PW2 who gave a detailed background of the mobile money system at MTN, registration of agents, activation on the mobile money platform, identifier number, subscriber number, transaction limits and the role of the appellant in the fraud and how it was discovered. Page 10 of 28 Counsel submitted that the evidence of PW3 was referred to as instructive about the manner in which the evidence was extracted from the system to be provided to the auditors and used in their report marked PEx18. Ground four Counsel submitted that the learned Justices of appeal addressed their minds to the law concerning the maximum sentences for the offences with which the appellant was convicted. Submissions in rejoinder The appellant submitted with regard to ground one, that whereas an appellate court will not consider an €rrgument raised for the lirst time on appeal, this rule has an exception where it is an illegality. The appellant relied on the decision in Dr. Kiiza Besigye and others Vs Attorney General Constitutional Petition No. 7 of 2OOZ rn which the Constitutional Court held that court cannot sanction any continued prosecution of the petitioners where during the proceedings their human rights had been violated. The appellant referred to the evidence of PWS and submitted that as the Senior Manager Treasury, PW5 told court that there were 18 Finance Administrators on the system and that people in the records section could also be given access codes. The appellant argued that he was not the only one with access codes. That PW3 testified that the user name Sentonp12l first came onto the system on 10. 156.1.128 IP address. However, PW3's testimony was that the same IP address was tagged to another user named Brian Okurut. Consideration ofthe appeal by the Court. Page 11 of 28 This is a second appeal and this court is mindful of its duty as a second Appellate Court, to decide whether the first Appellate Court failed in its duty to re-eva-luate the evidence presented before the trial Court to reach its own conclusion. Consequently, this Court can only interfere with the conclusions of the Court of Appeal if it appears that in consideration of the appeal as the first appellate court, the Court of Appeal lailed to re-evaluate the evidence as a whole. See Rwabugande Moses versus Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2OL4. The duty of a second appellate Court is intertwined w'ith the duty of a hrst appellate Court although the two are different. The Supreme Court has distinguished clearly the duties cast on each Court in the case of Kifamunte Henry v. Uganda Criminal Appeal No. 1O of 1997 thus: "We agree that on a first appea| from a conuiction bg a Judge the appellant is entitled to haue the appellate Court's own consideration and uiews of the euidence as a whole and its oun decision thereon. The first appellate court has a dutg to reuiew the euidence of the case and to reconsider the mateials before the tial judge. The appellate Court must then make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully ueighing and consideing it. When the question arises as to which witness should be belieued rather than another and that question turns on manner and demeanour the appellate Court must be guided bg the impressions made on the judge taho sana the witnesses. Horueuer, there may be PaBe 12 of 28 Furthermore, even where a trial Court has erred, the appellate Court will interfere where the error has occasioned a miscarriage of justice: It does not seem to us that except in the clearest of cases, we are required to re-evaluate the evidence like is a first appellate Court save in Constitutiona-l cases. On second appeal, it is sufficient to decide whether the first appellate Court on approaching its task, applied or failed to apply such principles. Therefore, the duty of a second appellate Court is to examine whether the principles which a first appellate Court should have applied were properly applied and if it did not, for it to proceed and apply the said principles. The appellants' contention is that the learned Justices of Appeal upheld the trial Judges' decision to convict the appellant from a trial founded on the illegality of torture. The appellant referred to the ruling of the learned trial Judge after holding a trial within a trial to determine admissibility of the charge and caution statement made by the appellant. During the trial, the appellant raised an objection to admissibility of the charge and caution statement Page 13 of 28 other circumstances quite apart from the manner and demeanour, uhich mag show whether a statement is credible or not ulhich mag warrant a court in dilfering from the Judge euen on a question of fact turning on credibilitg of uitness tuhich the appellate Court has not seen. See Pandga a. R [1957] EA 336, Okeno a. Republic [1972] EA 32 and Charles Bitwire a. Ugand.a Supremc Court Crimlnat Appeal No. 23 oJ 19aS at page 5. Page 14 of 28 necessitating holding of a trial within a trial. In the ruling, the learned trial Judge held as follows: "The keeping of A1 from Friday 15th Febnrary to Monday 18th February 2OL3. without granting him access to his relatives and legal counsel offended the provisions of Article 23 (51 paragraph (a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution. Confessions which amount to the admission of a crime by an accused person should be recorded following police inquiries after arrest before charges have been read to the accused in a court of law. Once an accused person appears in court and denies the charges before a court competent to try the offence the accused has been charged with, the only way the position can change to admission, is through the change ofPlea to that ofguilty. A confession obtained during the trial ofa case should not be entertained by the court because the accused having had his or her day in court has full opportunity to either admit or deny the charges. It is my finding that a confession obtained from A1 six months after he had denied the charges in court and only after he had been re-arrested and detained was not voluntary, was illegal, and fell far below the standard expected of a police investigation. The accused was harassed into submission and any purported confession resulting from those circumstances is not permissible and cannot be admitted in evidence..." From our reading of the above extract, it is clear that the learned trial Judge disallowed the admission of the Appellants' confession into evidence on grounds of the confession having been obtained involuntarily. The trial Judge considered the circumstances surrounding the taking of the alleged confession especially after the appellant had pleaded not guilty to the offences, and disa-llowed the admission of the confession. The appellant, after having been convicted and sentenced by the trial court filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal but did not raise the ground of him having been tortured prior to his trial. The appellant seeks to fault the learned Justices of Appeal for failing to adjudicate on a matter that was never raised before their Lordships. Section 4 of the Judicature Act Cap 13 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from such decisions of the Court of Appeal as are prescribed bg the Constitution, this Act or any other law. We agree with the Respondent's counsel that the law, under this provision, envisages that the Justices of Appeal should have made a decision on a mater before it is entertained by this Court. This court in the case of Osherura Owen and Tumwesigye Frank Vs Uganda (S.C.C.A No. 50 of 2O15) 2018 UGSC 24 (14 June 2018) held as follows: Page 15 of 28 "This court has preuiouslg found that it is erroneous to fault the learned Justices of Appeal as hauing erred uhen the complaint was not raised before them fo, consideration. See Twinomugisha Alex Allss Twine, Pattlck Kwezl qnd John Srlngu Kcll.trannu a Uganda, Crinino.l Appeal No. 35 of 2002. In the recent decision of Bogere Asilmwe Jtloses and Sengonga Sund.ag v Ugandd Supretne Court, Crim:inql Appeal No. 39 of 2O76, this court dismlssed a ground of appeal not raised before the Court of Appeal. It held that the Court of Appeal justices neuer had opportunity to handle the issue of conuiction, which the appellants were then raising, uthen theg heard the appeal. The Court of Appeal could not therefore be faulted on a matter which was neuer raised before them. We associate with the aboue decision and consider it an error for counsel to haue leuelled citicism on the Justices of the Court of Appeal on a matter which tDas not auailed to them to entertain." In the instant case, the appellant admitted that this ground was never placed before the Justices of Appeal for their consideration, but sought to invoke the illegality principle to have this court address the issue of torture. No leave was sought by the appellant under Rule 98 (a) of the Supreme Court Rules to adduce this PaBe 16 of 28 ground of appeal. We have no basis to consider this ground as it was never canvassed before the Court ofAppeal. That notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court (Petitions and Reference) Rules, 2OO5 makes provision for a procedure to be taken by any person whose rights have been infringed, to seek redress before the Constitutional Court. The Appellant can also seek redress under the Human Rights Enforcement Act and Article 50 of the Constitution. To date, the Appellant has not sought any remedy from the Constitutional Court regarding his torture while in custody. This court, therefore, cannot grant the prayers sought by the Appellant in ground one of the appeal. Ground two The appellant faults the learned Justices of Appeal for having upheld the conviction on the assumption that the usernarne Sentonpl2l was the correct usernarne belonging to the Appellant whereas not. The appellant argued that the learned Justices of Appeal mistook Sentonp to be the same as Sentonpl2l, yet Sentonpl2l was never referred to anylvhere by the prosecution. The learned Justices of Appea,l faulted the learned trial Judge for referring to the usernarne Sentop12l instead of Sentonpl2l and added that the error originated from the report of the forensic investigator, M/s Grant Thornton marked PEl7. The question to be addressed by this court is, on what basis did the Justices of Appeal find that there was an error in PW4's report and that the correct user naJne was the one referred to in PW3's testimony. Page L7 of 28 The Justices of Appeal, at page 58 of the Record of Appeal, held as follows; "It will be recalled that PW3, the MTN Computer Analyst, testified that the machlne 10.156.L.L2a where the uaername sentonpl2l flrst came onto the system was the appellant's workstatlon. The uaername sentonp12l started logging in on 2d December 2OLL at the appellant's workstation and terminated on 23'd December 2OLL, around the time that the appellaut resigned from MTN. According to the report of the auditors, PEX17, the appellant's resignation from MTN took effect on 23'd December zOLl. There ls therefore no doubt that the appellant disabled sentonpl2l in preparation for hls departure from MTN. We therefore find that the trial judge erred when he referred to the uaername sentop121 instead of sentonp121. But the error originated from the report of the forensic investigators, M/s Graat Thorntoa, PEX17. The trial judge lifted the error from the report and referred to the useraamea responsible for the fraud, as sentop121, brianokuruol and ayolo4, all created by the appellant. Page 18 of 28 We accept the submlsslon of the appellant's counsel that the appellant did not create the contested username seutop12l; neither dtd he use lt. However, we find that there is ample evidence to prove that the appellant created and also used the username sentonpl2l to log in into the MTN Mobtle Money Computer 122 times, as shown in the table above. He did this at his workstation, identified as 1O.156.L.L28 and other workstations in the Mobile Money Department at the MTN Offices." We have carefully read and anaJyzed the above quoted findings of the Appellate Court. Court observed that the usernalne sentop121 was referred to by the learned trial Judge in error and the Court of Appeal went ahead to rectify the error in the Grant Thornton Report, P817, which referred to the usernarne sentopl2l as the one used to syphon the said monies off the MTN Mobile Money Accounts. We note, as was a-lso noted by the Justices of Appeal, that the usernarne sentopl2l was the mastermind of the fraud and it was crucial to establish whether the appellant was behind the creation of this usernarne. We have carefully perused the Grant Thornton Report marked PEl7, in particular Appendix B, which had the list of trust violators and amongst them was the appellant. The report indicated his usernarne to be 'sentopl2l'. However, the description of the persons that participated in the fraud was largely two names including that of the appellant, Sentongo Patrick, the Finance Administrator. The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the evidence on record and found that there was overwhelming evidence that the appellant was linked to the fraud Page 19 of 28 committed in MTN and participated in the syphoning of the money from MTN Mobile Money system. The court held as follows: "The statements for htblic Access for the 2Vt' June 2011 and 7At' June 2O11 which were Annentre 7 to Appendix A, PEX77, showed the receipt of these deposits on the Public Access Account- The appellant denied that he transfened this moneg to the Public Access Account. He said he did not euen know through which account this moneg tuas exited. Hotueuer, A2 stated in her testimong that she receiued UGX 27,73O,OOO on 7/ 6/ 2O11 from the appellant. That immediatelg afi.er the moneg hit her accoun| UGX 4,5OO,OOO was taken away bg the appellant. And immediatelg afier that another UGX 8,OOO,OOO uas taken auag bg the appellant. These transactions Luhere the appellant took some of the money back are shoun in PEX26, the statement for Public Access shop as reuersals bg the appellant. A2 retained the UGX 77,OOO,OOO. She further stated that she did not raise an alarm about the balance of UGX 77,OOO,OOO but she admitted that she traded uith it normallg.A2 also admitted that she traded with the UGX 39,899,085 uhich was deposited on the Public Access Shop account bg the appellant. PaBe 20 of 28 PW4 testified, on the basis of the findings in PEX77 that the moneA that was sent to A2 bg the appellant wqs shown as purchase of uirtual moneA bg subscibers bg use of physical cqsh. Howeuer, the uirtual moneA had been created using fictitious journal entries by the appellanL PW3 and PW4 testified that the FUNDAMO sgstem had features that enabled tlrc recording of all transactions carried out on it automaticallg.PW3 testified that the sgstem was proued to be working well, and was capable of generating necessary trading reports. He and PWS ertracted the reports from the sgstem in the inuestigation carried out bg Grant Thornton. We find that the mouement of moneg from the Sales Tax Account bg the appellant uas unauthorized. It utas also moued for the wrong reasons qnd to the urong account. By so mouing it, the asportation of the moneA on the system was complete. The thefi. of UGX 67,000,000 uas proued bg the prosecution against the appellant begond reasonable doubt. The tial judSe therefore cannot be faulted for conuicting him of embezzlement in Count 2. The cantention in Ground 3 that the trial judSe conuicted the appellant on the basis of the weak euidence of the prosecution while ignoing the euidence of the appellant also falls bg the wagside. The trial judSe considered the strong and uncontrouerted testimong of PWS which clearlg countered the Page 21 of 28 defence that the moneA u)as remoued from the sgstem to pay sales tax. Ground 3 of the appeal therefore also fails." The perusal of the entire record of appeal indeed revea-ls that the there is sufficient evidence that points to the participation of the appellant in the offence. Whereas the report indicated the appellant's usernarne as sentopl2l in the description appendix, there was evidence that the appellant created and a-lso used the usernarne sentonpl2l to log in into the MTN Mobile Money Computer 122 times, as rightly found by the Justices of Appeal, at his workstation, identified as 10. 156. 1. 128. It is a well-established principle that a second appellate court does not ordinarily re-evaluate evidence unless it is demonstrated that the first appellate court failed in its duty to properly re-evaluate the evidence on record or where its findings are perverse or unsupported by the evidence on record, the second appellate court is justified in stepping in to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, the learned Justices of Appeal properly discharged the duty and found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant participated in the syphoning of the money off the MTN Mobile Money account. Ground three Ground three faults the decision of the learned trial Judge for having admitted evidence of Electronic Records and Data, disregarding the provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act and Computer Misuse Act. PaBe 22 of 28 The burden of proving authenticity of an electronic record is discharged when the prosecution produces evidence on how the electronic records were recorded or stored. The electronic records in this case were generated by PW2 but were first admitted for identification pending production of evidence regarding integrity of the computer system at MTN to record, store and generate reports. Section 29 (5) (b) and (c) of the Computer Misuse Act makes provision for options where the authenticity of a data message or electronic record can be presumed by court. It provides as follows; 29. Admlssibilitg and. euldential ueight of a data fitessdge or qn electronic record @ fhe authenticitg of the electronic records sgstem in which an electronic record is recorded or stored shall, in the absence of euidence to the contrary, be presumed uhere- (a) there is euidence that supports a finding that at all mateiql times the computer system or other similar deuice was operating properlg or, if it u)as not, the fact of its not operating properlg did not affect the integity ofthe electronic record and there are no other reasonable grounds on which to doubt the authenticitg of the electronic records sgstem; (b) it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored bg a partg to the proceedings uho is aduerse in interest to the partg seeking to introduce it; or Page 23 of 28 (c) it is established that the electronic record was recorded or storedinthe usual and ordinary course ofbusiness bg a person uho is not a partg to the proceedings qnd who did not record or store it under the control of the party seeking to introduce the record. The above provision of the Act allows Court to presume authenticity of an electronic record where there is evidence that supports a finding that at all material times, the computer system or other similar device was operating properly or, if it was not, the fact of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic record. The evidence relied on by the learned Justices of Appeal was that of PW2, the Finance Manager Easy Money Ltd and PW3, a systems analyst with MTN Uganda at the time. Their Lordships held as follows; "The euidence of PW2, Barbara Naluktaago, Finqnce Manager. Easg Moneg Limited set the pace. She explained that she carried out the first audit requested bg A6 who was her superuisor and uanted to knou uhether the moneg on the sgstem was safe. This was in uiew of the sudden resignation of the appellant. PW2's testimony was a detailed exposition of the history of mobile moneA at MTN, the first companA to start that business enterprise in Uganda; the registration of agents and how theg were actiuated on the mobile moneA platfonn and giuen a number to identifg them; the opening of subscriber accounts; Page 24 of 28 limits of moneA on the sAstem for subscribers and agents; and the trading model resticted to subscribers accessing funds through agents, not directlg from mobile moneA accounts in the bank or from the sgstem. She also explained the role of agents and the uqrious staff of MTN in the Mobile Money Department, including the major role plaged by the appellant as the Finance Administrator with super user rights, as opposed to other Finance Administrators and Administrators. PW2 also explained the different accounts that utere used in the business and the relationship betueen them, the rules of operating them and the ights and obligations of the agents and the subscibers. She foansed on explaining the roles of the accounts in issue such as the Adjustment for Discrepancies Account as a non-trading account and the dispute ond mobile moneA accounts as a trading account. She further explained terms such as "Jloat" and its "liquidation," the main subjects of the fraud in this case. PW2 also explained hotu the mobile moneA sgstem uas linked to Bank Accounts, and the system of reconciling the internal and erternal accounts. She testified about the background to the mobile moneg fraud and how it was discouered. PW3's testimong uas most instructiue about tlrc manner in uthich euidence raas ertracted from the sgstem in order to prouide information for the auditors, M/ s Grant Thornton, who Page 25 of 28 doubled as forensic inuestigators. It is this euidence thqt was the basis for the charges in the indictment and the report used in euidence, PEX77; although the appellant's counsel onlg found fault utith PEX74 which uas just a list of users of FUNDAMO. PEX74 simplg specified the names of staff, roles in the Mobile Moneg Department and their userrLames on the computer sAstem." This evidence indicated that the procedure taken in admission of PExT and PEx9 through the MTN systems analyst, PW3, was reliable and in conformity to Sections 7, 8 and 29 l5l (b) and (c) of the Computer Misuse Act. The learned Justices of Appeal were a-live to these principles and we find no reason to interfere with their frnding on admissibility of the data. Ground three accordingly fails. Ground 4 The Appellant submitted that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in fact and law when they conhrmed the overly severe custodial sentence of 1O years on counts 3, 4 and 5 respectively. This ground, faults the decision of the learned Justices of Appeal confirming the 1O-year sentence imposed on the appellant as being harsh and excessive. We note that the sentence being harsh and excessive are matters that raise the severity of the 1O-year sentence. Section 5 (2) and (3f of the Judicature Act does not allow an Appellant to appeal to this Court on severity of sentence. It provides as follows; Page 26 of 28 "5. Appeals to the Supreme Court in ciminal matters. (3) In the case of an appeal against a sentence and an order other than one fixed bg latu, the acansed person mag appeal to the Supreme Court against the sentence or order, on a matter of laut, not including the seueritg of the sentence." The Appellant, is precluded from appealing sentence to this Court. As a result, this consequently, the appeal is dismissed. agalnst ground severity of fails and Final orders The appellant should continue to serve the lO-year sentence upheld by the Court of Appeal from the date of conviction. We so order. Dated at Kampala this 2025 Page 27 of 28 (2) Subsection (1) shall applg with necessary modifi.cations to an appeal to the Supreme Court from a conuiction a.nd sentence or acquittal in the cq.se of an oJfence not punishable bg a sentence of death, in respect of conuictions and acqtittals bg the High Court and the Court ofAppeal; except that in ang such case, an appeal shall lie on a matter of law onlg. l**"r Seg.kr++/*e< !-vta -..f-*-rr-,.".*-- Prof. Lillian Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT F ike ibita JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT l,L4 Stephen Musota JUSTICE OF THE SUPRTME COURT (a Christopher Madrama JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT Catherine Bamugemereire JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT Page 28 of 28