Bujagali Energy Limited v Kafumba (Civil Appeal 18 of 2021) [2025] UGSC 3 (27 February 2025)

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA Coram: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza; Tuhaise; Chibita; Musoke; Musota; IISC CIVI APPEAL NO.18 OF2O2I BUJAGALI ENERGY LTD...... .."""""APPELLANT VERSUS RICHARD KAzuMBA. ....... RESPONDENT (Appeal ftom tlrc tiecision of thz Court of Appeal i" giuil Appeal No ' 207 of 2015 before Kakuru, Kiryabtoire, ancl Madtama JlA, deliuered on the -l't of April 202'1) r ]udgment of Percy Night Tuhaise, fSC This is a second appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal which setasidetherulingofNamundi,jinHighCourtMiscellaneousApplication No.002of2002andorderedthatthematterbereferredbacktothetrial @( Court for hearing of the case. Background The Respondent, by notice of motion filed in the High Court at Jinja vide MiscellaneousApplicafiottNo.002of2002,claimedthatlandbelongingto affected persons was compulsorily acquired for purposes of the Bujagali i) The applicant on his otpn and on behalf of others fled an application for the enforcement of fundamentnl rights and fteedoms under article 50 (1) €' (2) of the Constihttion toithout permission of Court to bring representatitte action. vq ii) The 4tn respondent trtas not in existence by 2002 zphen the application was filed and tohen the alleged acts tpere committed and thus could not be bound by the pre-incorporation contract executed on its behalf' iii)Theorderssoughtbytheapplicantuterenotatlailableasthiscourthasno juisdiction to grant a constituhonal declnration' itt)The application utas made under rules that uere declarecl unconsfitutional and the CPR could not be used to fle the application' a) The application does not disclose a cause of action against flle'lst 6nfl )nLt respondents. Anglin j overruled all the obiections. She ordered that the matter be heard on its merits, and that costs would abide the outcome' Upon the transfer of Anglin J, the matter was subsequently heard by Namundi J' who gave guidelines for the parties to file written submissions' In his ruling delivered on 4n May, 2015, Namundi J dismissed the application with costs to the then respondents, on grounds that it was improperly before court. The applicant (Richard Kafumba)' was aggrieved by the ruling. He appealed against it vide Court of Appeal Cittil Appeal No. 207 of 2015, on two grounds, that:- 3 1. The learned trial Judge erred in law to hold that Miscellaneous Application No. 002 of 2002 was improPerly before court' 2. The learned trial Judge erred in law in refusing to deal with the merits of the application. , \ v\ On 1't April 202], the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court decision. The same court also ordered that the suit proceeds with the full hearing on its merits before another Judge of the High court without any further delay. It awarded costs of the appeal to the appellant (Richard Kafumba). M/S Bujagali Energy Ltd, the respondent in giuil Appeal No' 207 of 20-15 ' was aggrieved by the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, and filed this appeal on grounds that:- 1. The learned |ustices of Appeal erred in fact and in law in finding thatthelearnedtrialiudgewasprecludedfromdismissingthe suit on legal matters that were raised before him in final submissionsafterhehadtakenoverconductofthecasewhich matters differed from the earlier obiections decided by his predecessor |udge. 2. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in law in deciding to remit the suit for a fresh trial after the parties had closed evidence and madefinalsubmissionsinsteadofcarryingontheirdutytore- evaluate the evidence as first appellate court and make a decision on the merits. 4 3. The learned |ustices of Appeal erred in law in failing to evaluate the correctness of the initial interlocutory decision by her Lordship |ustice Anglin before treating it as a fetter on the Powers of her brother, ]udge Namundi thereby resulting in a failure of--- 1vl \ iustice. 4. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in law and fact in faulting the learned trial judge for his finding that the suit before him could only be properly determined if filed by ordinary plaint' Representation At the hearing of this appeal, the Appellant was represented by Counsel Bazira Anthony holding brief for Counsel Byenkya Ebert' The Respondent was rePresented by Counsel Galisonga Julius' Appellant's Submissions Learned Counsel for the Appellant, in his written submissions, informed this Court that the Appellant had abandoned grounds 1' 3 and 4 of the of the appeal, and that he would Pursue only ground 2' He maintained that ground 2 provides sufficient basis for this Court to resolve the dispute relating to the appeal on the merits once and for all' This' in effect' rendered ground 2 the sole ground of appeal' Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted on the sole ground of appeal, that Kakuru JA (RIP), observed in his lead judgment that the dispute has taken almost 18 years in the courts which was unacceptable 5 and regrettable. Counsel contended that, in light of the said observation made in the lead judgment, it is somewhat surprising that the Court of Appeal decided to remit the case for retrial to the High Court rather than taking the option of re-evaluating the evidence on record and delivering ,^ its own decision on the merits of the case. \' Q/\ Counsel, in connection with the foregoing point, referred this Court to the record and submitted that, in the High Court, the parties had supplied affidavit evidence to support their respective cases, and had filed written submissions for court's consideration. Counsel contended that, other than delivering a judgment on the merits, there was nothing left for a new trial court to ,,hear,,;that the only effect of remitting the case to the High Court for a fresh trial would be to allow a new High Court Judge to pass judgment on the matter; and that this would not serve the interests of justice any more than the Court of Appeal making its own decision on the matter since evidence by affidavit was already on record' Counsel also submitted that no attempt was made by the first appellate court to address the merits of the substantive case between the parties; that this amounted to an omission by the said court which is required to subject the evidence and submissions to fresh scrutiny, with a view to making its own decision on the merits. He relied on section 11 of the ]udicature Act; plus the cases of Father Begumisa and Others Vs Eric Tibebaga, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 1-72O02; and Rwakashaiia 6 Azarious and Others Vs Uganda Revenue Authority, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.8/2009. tff Counsel contended that in cases where the Court of Appeal has failed in its obligation as a first appellate court to re-evaluate evidence and make its own decision, then the supreme Court, as a second appellate court is obliged to do so; that this is consistent with section 7 of the Judicature Act. Counsel further submitted that the leamed Justices of Appeal never addressed themselves to the notice for affirmation filed by the present Appellant in the Court of Appeal. Counsel argued that the notice for affirmation of the trial court judgment was filed by consent of all the parties on 14fr November, 20-1,6; and that this notice should have alerted the learned Justices of Appeal on the need to re-evaluate the evidence on record and make their own decision, because, by nature, a notice of affirmation introduces legal grounds or considerations that a trial judge would not have relied on or considered in making his decision' Counsel accordingly maintained that, as a consequence, due consideration of such a notice necessitates a decision of the Court of Appeal on the merits of the grounds set out in the notice. In conclusion, the Appellant's counsel pointed out that the matter had been in court for L8 years by the time of the judgment of the Court of Appeal;whichwouldpresentlymakeithaveabout20yearsofexistence in the court system. He prayed that the decision of the Court of Appeal be setasidebythisCourtandbesubstitutedwithadecisiondismissingthe 1 suit for want of meri! and also that this Court, exercising its original jurisdiction, be pleased to deliver judgment on the merits of the case based on the pleadings and submissions of parties in the trial court, and that costs in this Court and courts below be granted to the Appellant' Respondent's Submissions The Respondent's written submissions addressed all the initial grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant in the appeal' However, for purposes of this appeal where the Appellant opted to pursue only ground 2 of the appeal, this Court will only consider the Respondent's submissions relating to the said sole ground of appeal. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted on the sole ground of appeal that Section 11 of the ]udicature Act vests the Court of Appeal with the Jurisdiction of the court of original jurisdiction that heard the suit from which the appeal arises. counsel also cited Rule 30 (1)(a) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal) Rules SI 13-10 which states that, on any appeal from a decision of the High Court acting in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the court may reappraise the evidence and draw inferences of fact. counsel submitted that the suit was filed in 2002, almost 20 years ago, and that Arricle "126 (1) & (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda enjoins court hearing cases to ensure that justice is not delayed. Counsel argued that, considering how protracted the case has been, the foregoing constitutional provision would have been well served if the Court of 8 Appeal had determined the suit on its merits, considering that the final submissions had been concluded. Counsel, in his submissions, also agreed with the Appellant that the learned Justices of Appeal erred when they remitted the case back to the High Court for trial after it had heard submissions of the parties on the merits of the case. Counsel contended that the Court of Appeal ought to have exercised its duty as a first appellate court and re-evaluated the evidence and made its decision' Counsel prayed that this Court allows the sole ground of appeal and invokes its powers under Article 126 (1) & (2) (b) of Constitution of the RepublicofUganda,andSectionToftheJudicatureAct'todecidethesuit on its merits. 9 Resolution of the ApPeal This Court is alive to its role as a second appellate cour! as set out in Rule 30 (1) of the ]udicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions SI 13 - 11' This being a second appeal, this Court is not required to re-evaluate the findings of fact of the trial court, unless the first appellate court failed to do so, even if it would not have itself come to the same conclusion. This Court will only interfere where it considers that there was no evidence to support the finding of fact, this being a question of law' On a second appeal, it is sufficient to decide whether the first appellate court' in approaching its task, applied or failed to apply such principles' See The Executive Director National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) Vs Solid State Limited, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No' 15 of 2015 and Kifamunte Henry Vs Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal AppealNo.l0 of 7997. ...M The sole ground of this appeal is that the leamed Justices of Appeal erred in law in deciding to remit the suit for a fresh trial after the parties had closed evidence and made final submissions, instead of carrying on their duty to re-evaluate the evidence as first appellate court and make a decision on the merits. The gist of the submissions from each side, is that the leamed Justices of Appeal did not re-evaluate the evidence in Miscellaneous Application No' 002p.002; that they therefore erred when as a first appellate court' the learnedJusticesofAppealdidnotdeterminethemeritsofthecaseas required by Section 11 of the Judicature Act; that instead' they ordered thatthematterbereferredbacktothetrialcourtforhearing' The essence of this appeal therefore, in my considered opinion' is that sincetheCourtofAppealdidnot,asafirstappellatecourt'determine Miscellaneous Application No. 002/2002 on the merits' then the Supreme Court, as a second appellate court, should' pursuant to Section 7 of the Judicature Act (cap 16 Revised Edition 2023) proceed to do so' as the trial court should have. Section 7 of the Judicature Act provides as follows:-:- 10 "For the purposes of lrcaing and determining an appeal' tlrc Supreme Court shall hntte all tlrc powers, autlnity and iurisdiction ttested under any tuitten lmo in tlu court frotr the exercise of tlu original iuisdiction of which the appeal oiginally emanated." v@'i Before delving into the issue of the propriety of this Court hearing the matter on its merits as a trial court, it is important to first determine whether the leamed Justices of Appeal erred when' instead of determining Miscellaneous Application No. 00212.002 on the merits as a first appellate court, they remitted it back to the trial court for trial on the merits. The record shows that Namundi J, dismissed Miscellaneous Application No. 0022002 for being improperly before court' The reasons for the dismissal were that upon perusal of the pleadings and submissions of both parties, he found that the matters raised in the application which included fraud cannot be determined in an application by notice of motion; that the applicant ought to have proceeded under Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Act by way of ordinary sui! that the application ought to have been brought as a representative suit and not as an action under Article 50 of the Constitution; that the remedies sought by the applicant under Article 50 are not available to the applicant because they are limited in nature; and that the applicant in his submissions raised issues which were not contained in his Pleadings. 11 The learned trial Judge concluded, as reflected on page 346 of the record of appeal, that:- ,,For the reasons 11fispe, I decline to deal with the meits of this Application. It is improperly before this Court and it is dismissed uith costs to the Respondents as against the Applicant." \-AC The foregoing extract of the ruling clearly shows that the trial court did not hear the matter on merits' The record shows that the appeal that was filed in the Court of Appeal arose from the trial court's dismissal of the matter on a technicality that the matter was improperly before the trial court. Indeed, the appellant (Richard Kafumba, who is the Respondent in this appeal), in Cittil Appeal No. 207/ 2015 which he filed in the Court of Appeal, indicated that he was aggrieved that the merits of the case were not considered by the learned trial Judge. He accordingly prayed that the file be remitted back to the High Court in Jinja, for trial on its merits. The Court of Appeal found in his favour. It set aside the decision of Namundi J, and ordered that Miscellaneous Application No' 002,t2'002, without any further delay' proceeds with a full hearing on its merits before another Judge of the High Court The power of the Court of Appeal and supreme Court, as appellate courts, to re-appraise evidence where a court below fails to properly evaluate the t2 evidence on record, is derived from Rules 30 (1) of the said courts' respective Rules of Court. -dDi It has already been established that the trial court has never heard Miscellwrcous Applicntion No. 02/2002 on its merits. In my considered opinion, it would only be on the basis that the matter was heard on the merits by the trial court that the Court of Appeal, sitting as a first appellate court, would be duty bound to re-appraise the evidence and give its decision in the matter. In the circumstances of this appeal, where the trial court declined to determine the matter on its merits, the contention by the parties to this appeal that the Court of Appeal erred by not giving its own independent decision of Miscellaneous Application No. 02/2002 would, in my considered opinion, and with respec! be misplaced and erroneous. There is no way the first appellate court would have re-evaluated the evidence adduced in Miscellaneous Application No. 02/2002 to make its own independent analysis when the trial court itsetf did not evaluate such evidence in the first place, but rather dismissed the matter for being improperly before it. The Appellanfls prayer, as reflected in his submissions, is that this Court exercising its original jurisdiction, be pleased to deliver iudgment on the merits of the case based on the pleadings, the evidence on record, and the submissions of parties in the trial court, and that costs in this Court and courts below be granted to the Appellant. The Respondent, through his counsel similarly prayed in his submissions that this Court allows the sole 13 ground of appeal and invokes its powers under Article 126 (1) & (2) (b) of Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, and Section 7 of the Judicature Act, to decide Miscellaneous Application No' 02/2002on its merits' l'gf In the circumstances of this appeal where it is clear that Miscellaneous Application No. 002/2002 has never been heard on its merits' it is my well- considered opinion that this Court, being the last appellate court, should not be the court to determine the matter on the merits as if it was the court of first instance. I would, with respec! differ from the Appellant's counsel,s submissions that this Court is a court with original jurisdiction to hear Miscellaneous Apptication No' 02/2002 on its merits' Inmyconsideredopinion,acourtbeingvestedwithpowers'authority and jurisdiction of another court (in the instant case, the court with original jurisdiction), of which the appeal originally emanated does not necessarilymeanthatthatcourtenjoysorhasoriginaljurisdictionto determine a case. As a matter of fact, the only original jurisdiction this Court enjoys is that of hearing and determining Presidential election petitions under Article 104 of the Constitution of Uganda' and Section 58 of the Presidential Elections Act 2000 (No' 17 of 2000)' As such' the powers, authority or jurisdiction vested in this Court' as if it was a court with original jurisdiction, as envisaged in Section 7 of the Judicature Act' is for the purposes of hearing and determining an appeal emanating from a decision of a court with original jurisdiction, or a court of first instance' Regarding the Court of Appeal, such power is envisaged in Section l1 of t4 the same Act, which on basis of the same reasoning, would not nece render that court to be a court of first instance or a court with o jurisdiction regarding the initial suit or matter from which the before it arose. Thus, on basis of the foregoing, the court which has original jurisdiction (court of first instance) to hear and determine Miscellaneous Application No' 02/2002 is the High Court where the matter was filed' This Court' as a second appellate court, would only invoke section 7 of the judicature Act if the court of first instance had determined the matter on the merits, and the first appellate court, in determining the appeal arising therefrom, had failed in its duty to re-appraise the adduced evidence at trial stage as to come to an indePendent decision. It is also deducible from the grounds of appeal at the Court of Appeal that the issue before that court was not in respect of the merits of Miscellaneous ApplicationNo.002/2002.Inthatappeal,theappellantfaultedthehial court's ruling that Miscellnneous Ayrplication No' 002/2002 was improperly before court. His consequent prayer lhat Miscellaneous Application No. 0022002beremittedbacktoHighCourtJinja,fortrialonitsmeritswas indeed granted bY that court. The record of appeal shows, at pages "16 & "17, that the Court of Appeal found as follows:- ssarily riginal uPP"t r^ r\4v\ 15 t "Wthere a party raises issues of fact that are not pleaded by way of eaidence or during submissions, the Court toould simply ignore them' Where a party prays for damages that are not pleaded, proaed or applicable, the Court may decline to azpard them. lt does not dismiss suit on that account on a preliminary part (sic) of lato. r@r A party may proceed under Article 50 of tlrc Constitution alorc or with others. The parties to a suit under Article 50 may or may not be aggrieaed. A party has a choice to proceed by Article 50 or by a representatiue suit.They are not exclusiae. Article 50 is for enforcement of ights. ln this case thc parties brought a suit to protect their ight to the land under Article 126 from being compulsory acquired toithout pior prompt and adequate compensation' Proceeding by zoay of ffidaoit eaidence does not exclude oral eaidence by toay of cross examination or othenttise. A fnding that fraud utas not prooed is determined after the hcaing and not hefore. Remedies auailable to a pttlty seeking redress unrler Article 50 are for all intents and purposes the same as those aaailable to any litigant proceeding under Cioil Procedure Rules on any other' A party has a chance to proceed under Article 50 by plaint or by notice of motion. The defnition of a suit includes notice of motion. A suit therefore can be commenced by notice of motion anel that tpould not ttitiate it in anyTl)ay. lll. IV vl. vll. v1u. 16 lx. Lastly (sic) learned tial ludge erred uthen lu dismissed the suit on account of procedural impropriety, a matter that hnd nlrendy been determined by anotlur ludge in tlrc same suit." " . . .Be that as it may, the question of procedural impropiety had been fully canoassed by parties and resoloed in its finality by the same Court by Lady Justice Flaoia Anglin. None of the parties appealed the decision. lt was binding on the Court. The Court had become functus oficio in respect of that specifc quesfion. See:- Goodman Agencies Ltdtts Attorney Ceneral I Another, Consfitutional Court Constitutional Petition No. 03 of 2008. lt had no juisdiction to re-open it. By doing so Justice Namundi sat on appeal in respect of a decision of his sister ludge Lady Justice Anglin. Not only did he sit in appeal on her Ruling, he effectioely set it aside and substituted it toith his outn. He had no power to do so. There is only one High Court of Ugnnda. Tlrc personnlity of the indittidunl ludges does not matter. One Judge of the High Court cannot ret'erse l)ary, or set aside a decision of another in the same case in the same proceedings, t7 The learned Justices of Appeal, based on their findings as extracted above, found that the reasons set out in the Ruling of Namundi J, had no basis at law, and they consequently set it aside. The learned Justices of Appeal, went on, at pages "19 & 20 of the record of appeal, to analyze the circumstances of the two rulings emanating from the trial court regarding Miscellaneous Application N o. 002p002, that- except in an application for reoieto brought under Order 46 of tlrc Cittil @.i Procedure Rules S.l 71--1. It is common practice that is absolutely legal for one suit fle to motte from one Judge to another. Wuneoer that happens, the next Judge simply continues from tohere the lnst one had stopped. The proceedings are nll rleemerl to be before one Court. T'he High Court. There was alrendy a decision on record that the suit proceeds and be detemrined on merit. That order coukl only haoe been set aside on appeal or reltietrt. Issues for determination ought to hatte been adiudicated upon by Namundi, I as there tuas already an order on record directing tlmt the Court to proceed toith the full luaing. This u'as not donc " "" some of the findings of the Court of Appeal, as extracted above, may bear no relevance to the appeal before this Court, especially since the Appellant abandoned those grounds of appeal under which such findings would have been covered. I will therefore not venture into those matters that do not form the basis of the appeal before this Court, especially where such matters had initially been raised in the appeal, but were later abandoned by the APPellant. The important factor deducible from the findings of the Court of Appeal, as a first appellate court, however, is that the said court fully addressed the issue in the appeal before it, that is, the issue of the learned trial Judge,s declining to determine Miscellaneous Application No. 002/2002 on the merits and dismissing it on a technicality that the suit was improperly 18 before it. To that extent, the leamed Justices of Appeal rightly re- evaluated the evidence on record pertaining to the High Court's dismissal of Miscellaneous Application No.002/2002 and came to the right conclusion.,- v\Qr Regarding the delay in this matter as alluded to by both sides, the Appellant relied on Article 126 (2) @) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which states that, in adjudicating cases of both a civil and criminal nature, the courts shall, subject to the law, apply certain principles, including that justice shall not be delayed. It is not disputed, as is deduced from the record, that this case has taken more than 20 years in the court system. Be that as it may, there is no substantive decision by the lower courts on the merits of the case, which would be a basis on which this Court would invoke the powers vested in it under Section 7 of the Judicature Act to adjudicate upon as if it was the court of first instance. The proper procedure in the instant case, in my considered opinion, given its circumstances, would be that, the trial court having handled the preliminary objections and directed the parties to file written submissions on basis of the affidavit evidence already on record, the trial court should have proceeded to determine the matter on its merits, since the pleadings, the evidence in form of affidavits, and the submissions were already on record. In the eventuality of any matter arising at the stage of judgment writing which would require the parties to be heard, the option to recall such parties to be heard on the matter, even at the stage of judgment 19 writing, in the interests of natural justice, would always be open, as was held by this Court in IVI/S Fangmin Vs Belex Tours & Travels Ltd, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 05 of 2013, consolidated with Crane Bank Ltd Vs Belex Tours & Travels Ltd, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2014; and Uganda Vs Haji Eriasa Namunyu & 5 Others, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2020. Since none of the foregoing was done, High Court Miscellaneous ATrplication No. 002/2002 is still pending hearing and determination on its merits by the High Cour! '{A/\ which is the court of first instance. The record in the instant case shows that the Court of Appeal, after regretting the delay, ordered that Miscellnneous Application No.02/2002be heard on its merits in the High Court without delay. Instead of pursuing the expeditious handling of the application, the Appellant chose to file this appeal, praying for the same order it appealed against, that the case be determined on its merits. In my well-considered opinion, the Appellant has wasted time which should have been utilized to pursue the orders of the Court of Appeal with a view to having the matter heard on the merits by the High Court. Thus, based on the reasons given above, ground 2 of this appeal, which is the sole ground of appeal, would fail. In the result I would dismiss this appeal and uphold the orders of the Court of Appeal. Since the Respondent acquiesced to the sole ground of appeal, no order is made as to costs. 20 Dated at Kampala this...... ?I.fr....o^, * .......2025 .*..... Percy Night Tuhaise Justice of the Supreme Court 21 5 10 15 20 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA ICORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; TUHAISE; CHIBITA; MUSOKE; MUSOTA; JJSC.] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2L BETWEEN BUJAGALI ENERGY LIMITED : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT RICHARD I{AFUMBA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RE]SPONDENT [Appeal aising from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Uganda in Ciuil Appeal No.207 of 2015 before (Kakuru, Kiryabuire and Madrama, JJA) dated l"t ApnI, 2021 at Kampala.l JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC. I have had the benef-rt of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, Percy Night Tuhaise, JSC. I concur with her judgment and the reasoning therein. I also concur with the orders she has proposed. As the rest of the members on the Coram agree, this appeal is hereby dismissed without costs. rh 30 Dated at Kampala this 77 d['" day of 2025. \r"-.& '.<- PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-TKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPRIME COURT. 1 25 AND THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (CORAM: IN THE SUPREME COI]RT OF UGANDA AT KAMPAI.A TIBATEIVTWAEKIRIKTIBINZA TUHAISE, CHIBITA MUSOKE, MUSOTAJU.SC.) CwIL APPEAL NO: l8 OF 2021 BTryAGALI ENERGY LTD APPELI-ANT VERSUS RICHARD KAFUMBA RESPONDENT lAppal frun the derisiott of fie but of Appal in Auil Appal No. 207 of 20tJ bcforc Kakuru, Kirybwirc nd Madruna IIA" dad f April,202il ruDGMENT OFCHIBru{.. TSC I have ltatl the bcltclit ol leit<littlg in <lrali tlrc ju<lgrnent ol rny leiurrc<l sistcr Hon. .fustit'e Pcrcy Niglrt 'l-uhaisc,.JSC, in thc alxxe appcal. I aglce with her t.hat this al4real shoul<l be <lisrnisse<1. I also ag'r'cc with the oxlels she has pr'olxrsctl. tl. I Datcrl at Klrrnpal;r this .. rlay ol 2025 orr. .f ustit c \like Clri )lta ruSTICE OFTHE STIPREME COI.]RT m!fl,'t hlltt L!-a/ uL{ * 7trL 0&s- tt-qs,, $ L'I lfr* n$ 1" {" K, SC -/g THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2I BU]AGALI ENERGY LTD: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ; : : : : i I : : : : : : : : : : : : :APPELLANT VERSUS RICHARD KAFUMBA RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision ofthe Court ofAppeal (Kakuru, Kiryabwire and Madrama, JJA) in Civil Appeal No. 207 of 2015 dated li April, 2021) CORAM: JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned sister Tuhalse, JSC. For the reasons which she gives, I, too, would dismiss the appeal but make no order as to costs. Dated at Kampala this day of..... Elizabeth Musoke lustice of the Supreme Court HON. LADY ]USTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA - EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE PERCY NIGHT TUHAISE, JSC HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE J. CHIBITA, JSC HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC HON. MR, ]USTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC 2MJo&f THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA CTVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2I [CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; TUHNSE; CHIBITA; MUSOKE & MUSOTA; JJSCI BUJAGALI ENERGY LTD : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS RICHARD I(AFUMBA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : RISPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the Coun of Appeal tn Ciuil Appeal No. 2O7 of2O15 before Kakuru, Kiryabtuire and Madrama, JJA deliuered on the 1't of Apfl 2021) JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC I agree with the analysis, judgement and orders made by my sister Percy Trrhaise, JSC that ground 2 of this appeal, which is the sole ground of Appeal, would fail. I would order that the appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs since the Respondent acquiesced to the sole ground ofappeal. Dated this 2{ day of Q[tu*, 7ov5-w q-1, Stephen Musota JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT @ n",4'