Stratagies Insuarance (T) Limited vs Deogratias Massenga (Civil Appeal No. 614 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 599 (22 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: LEVIRA J.A.. MASHAKA. 3.A. And NGWEMBE. J.A /> CIVIL APPEAL NO. 614 OF 2023 STRATAGIES INSUARANCE (T) LIMITED ................................. APPELLANT VERSUS DEOGRATIAS MASSENGA .................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at Dar es Salaam) (Mqanqa, J.) dated the 17th day of March, 2023 in Revision Application No. 420 of 2022 RULING OF THE COURT 7th & 22nd May, 2026 MASHAKA. 3.A.: This appeal is against the decision of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) (the Labour Court) at Dar es Salaam in Revision Application No. 420 of 2022. The Labour Court reversed the award of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA) to compensation of 38 months remuneration and severance pay, a total of TZS. 135,625,000.00 for unlawful termination of employment.

Briefly, the respondent was employed by the appellant on 17/08/2018 as Underwriting Manager. His employment was terminated on 30/08/2021 for attempted fraud and gross misconduct. It was alleged that on 25/06/2021 the appellant issued a marine cargo policy and receipt with reference number 3544 amounting USD 75,000 to a Dubai based company called Palladin Power Assets Limited contrary to Company Policy. The allegations were totally denied by the respondent. But the appellant found that there was evidence of the misconduct and dismissed him from employment. The respondent referred the dispute before the CMA complaining that the termination was substantively and procedurally unfair. He sought for 78 months remuneration as compensation; severance pay; and reinstatement without loss of earning. After the hearing, the CMA awarded the respondent compensation as alluded to above. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed application for revision before the Labour Court, which partly allowed the appeal in respect of the compensation. It reduced the compensation for 79 months to 38 months remuneration. Still aggrieved, the appellant preferred this appeal based on two grounds. For reasons to be known shortly, we shall not endeavour to state the grounds of appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant and the respondent had the services of Messrs. Mudhihir Athuman Magee and Charles Mathias, both learned advocates, respectively. Before we could proceed in earnest to hear the appeal on merit, Mr. Mathias intimated to us that they had filed a notice of preliminary objection on 23/4/2026 that: - " The appeal is incompetent and liable to be struck out with costs for being time barred for contravening rule 90 (1) and (3) o f the Tanzania Court o f Appeal Rules 20019 read together with rule 24 o f the Tanzania Court o f Appeal (Amendment) Rules 2024 for failure to effect service o f the letter/application for proceedings, upon the respondent within the prescribed time, and thus cannot benefit from the exclusion o f time." M r. Mathias prayed to the Court to hear and determine the point of objection as it hinges on the jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. Mathias in support of the objection contended that, the letter dated 5/4/2023 to the Registrar requesting for copies of certified CMA proceedings and endorsed exhibits in Revision NO. 428 of 2022 originating from labour dispute no. CMA/DSM/KIN/349/21/134/21 was served to the respondent on

25/4/2023 beyond the 30 days' time limit. In this same letter, the appellant had admitted to have collected certified copies of the proceedings, judgment and decree of the High Court in Revision No. 428 of 2023 vide a letter with Ref. No. AB. 14/70/03/260 dated 17/3/2023. The impugned judgment of the High Court was delivered on 17/3/2023 and the notice of appeal was lodged on 14/4/2023 and served on the respondent on 25/4/2023. The learned counsel argued that, compliance with rule 90 (1) of the Rules is mandatory. Under this rule, the letter requesting certified copies of the impugned judgment must be served on the respondent within thirty (30) days from the date the judgment was delivered. Consequently, failure to serve the letter within this time limit renders the appeal time-barred. Furthermore, he contended that the certificate of delay cannot be relied upon because it is invalid in such circumstances. To bolster his argument, the learned counsel referred to our decision in IBM Tanzania Limited v. Commissioner General (TRA) (Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 1240 (8 December 2025). In that case, it was held that an appellant is required to serve the letter requesting for certified copies on the respondent within thirty days of the date the impugned judgment was delivered. As a consequence of non-compliance,

the Court proceeded to strike out the appeal. Relying on this authority, he implored us to strike out the present appeal with no order as to costs. In reply, Mr. Magee contended that rule 90 (3) of the Rules, was amended in 2024 whereas the letter referred to by learned counsel was written on 25/4/2023, thus the said rule 90 (3) is inapplicable to this appeal. It was his argument that rule 90 (1) and (3) of the Rules is not relevant to this matter because the requested certified copies of documents were from the CMA and not the High Court which is properly covered by rule 90 (1) and (3) of the Rules. He further contended that the notice of preliminary objection is based on fact rather than a point of law and it required more evidence. He concluded that the preliminary objection has no merit, it ought to be dismissed and proceed with hearing of the appeal on merit. In a brief rejoinder, Mr. Mathias asserted that the submission by the learned counsel does not dispense with the requirement of law. On the position of rule 90 (1) and (3) of the Rules, he referred the Court to its stance before and after its amendment explained in IBM Tanzania Limited v. Commissioner General (TRA) (supra). He reiterated his

prayer that the preliminary objection be sustained and the Court proceeds to strike out the appeal. After hearing the submissions in support and against the point of objection and having considered the record of appeal, the issue for our determination is the competence of the appeal. It is not disputed that the appellant wrote a letter with reference number LFA/Rev428/2022/DSM/5/4/23, filed on 14/4/2023, to the Registrar Labour Court requesting to be supplied with certified copies of CMA proceedings and endorsed CMA exhibits in Revision No. 428 of 2022 and was mandatorily required to serve the respondent within the time limit. The time limit within which the appeal to the Court and a letter to the Registrar requesting for proceedings have to be lodged has been stipulated under rule 90 (1) and (3) of the Rules which reads: - "(1) Subject to the provisions o f Rule 128, an appeal shall be institute by lodging in the appropriate registryt within sixty days of the date when notice of appeal was lodged with- (a) a memorandum o f appeal in quintuplicate; (b) the record o f appeal in quintuplicate; (c) security for costs o f the appeal, save that where an application for a copy of the proceedings in the High Court has been 6

made within thirty days of the date of the decision against which it is desired to appealthere shall, in computing the time within which the appeal is to be instituted be excluded such time as may be certified by the Registrar of the High Court. (3) An appellant shall not be entitled to rely on the exception to sub-rule (1) unless his application for the copy was in writing and a copy of it was served on the respondent [Emphasis added] The above provision entails itself, a party wishing to appeal must take certain steps within strict time limits. The core requirement is that an appeal shall be instituted by lodging within sixty days from the date the notice of appeal was filed. However, the exception to the sixty days rule is upon a condition that, the appellant has applied for a copy of the proceedings from the High Court within thirty days of the decision being appealed against, then the time taken to obtain that copy as certified by the Registrar is excluded for lodging the appeal. Nevertheless, this exception is not automatic. Sub-rule (3) of the cited rule above makes it clear that an appellant cannot relyon this exclusion unless two conditions are met: first, the application for the copy of proceedings must have been made in writing; and second, a copy of

that written application must have been served on the respondent. Without such written proof and service, the appellant remains bound by the original sixty-days deadline, and the benefit of the time extension is extinguished. In the present appeal, the letter written to the Registrar requesting the certified copies of proceedings gleaned at page 577 of the record of appeal was served on 25/4/2023 to the respondent while the notice of appeal seen at page 448 of the record was lodged on 14/4/2023. The appeal was lodged on 9/10/2023. The issue for the Court to determine is whether the appellant was duty bound to serve the respondent within the time limit of thirty days. Mr. Magee argued that at the time he was filing the appeal and wrote a letter to the Registrar requesting for the certified documents, there was no time limit within which the said letter could be served upon the respondent. This argument is unfounded, as the time limit to serve the respondent with the letter was established way back in the case of The Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence and National Service v Devram Devram P. Valambhia [1992] TZCA 115 (18 December 1992), the Court had this to say: -

"There must be a time limit within which the appellant is to serve the respondent with a copy of the letter to the Registrar. We think that the period of 30 days within which the appellant is required under rule 83 (1) [now rule 90(1)] to apply to the Registrar for a copy of the proceedings should be construed to be co extensive with the period within which the appellant has to send a copy of that letter to the respondent "[Emphasis added] The provision establishes a clear and mandatory time limit. It requires that the appellant must not only apply to the Registrar for certified copies of the proceedings but also serve a copy of that application letter on the respondent. Crucially, the time allowed for serving the respondent is co-extensive with the 30-day period prescribed under rule 90 (1) (formerly rule 83 (1)) for applying to the Registrar. In other words, within thirty days from the date the impugned judgment is delivered, the appellant is obliged to both lodge the request for copies with the Registrar and serve a copy of that letter to the respondent. Failure to serve the respondent within that period renders the appeal time-barred, and the appellant cannot rely on any certificate of delay to cure the defect. 9

We subscribe to the argument by Mr. Mathias, that the time limit to serve the respondent with the request letter was established before the amendment of the Rules in 2024, as the Court held in IBM Tanzania Limited v. Commissioner General (TRA) (supra) as follows: - "...we say so because , even before the amendment o f the Rules, the law was quite settled way back since 1990's that the letter requesting for documents must be served on the respondent within thirty days from the date o f the decision to be challenged. This stance was stated in the case of The Principal Secretary Ministry of Defence and National Service v. Devram P. Valambhia (supra)/' Therefore, the failure by the appellant to serve the respondent the letter to the Deputy Registrar requesting to be supplied with copies of certified documents for purposes of appeal within the required time under rule 90 (1) and (3) of the Rules, is a fatal irregularity which hinges on limitation of time for lodging appeal. Since the respondent was not served with the request letter within thirty days from the date of the decision, the appellant could not rely on the exclusion under the certificate of delay; hence, the appeal is time barred. 10

In line with our discussion, we sustain the point of objection. The present appeal is incompetent for being time barred and we accordingly strike it out. Considering the origin of the appeal is from a labour dispute, we make no order as to costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 15th day of May, 2026. M. C. LEVIRA JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. L. MASHAKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. J. NGWEMBE JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered this 22n d day of May, 2026 in the presence of Mr. Mudhihiri Athuman Magee, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Charles Mathias, learned counsel for the Respondent and Ms. Janekissa Bukuku, Court clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. F. ArMTARANIA DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL li