Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation Tanzania vs Jesca Rutta (Civil Appeal No. 542 of 2022) [2026] TZCA 577 (15 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT PAR ES SALAAM (CORAM: LEVIRA. 3.A.. MASHAKA. 3.A. And NGWEMBE. J.A.^ CIVIL APPEAL NO. 542 OF 2022 COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY BASED REHABILITATION TANZANIA ............................................. APPELLANT VERSUS 3ESCA RUTTA................................................................. RESPONDENT (Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division at Dar es Salaam) (Maqhimbi, 3.) dated the 21st day of February, 2022 in Labour Revision No. 135 of 2020 RULING OF THE COURT 22n d April & 15th May, 2026 LEVIRA, J.A.: This ruling determines the competence of the appeal before the Court as far as time limitation is concerned. The appellant preferred this appeal having been aggrieved by the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, Labour Division (the Labour Court) in Revision No. 135 of 2020 which confirmed the award by the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration for Ilala (the CMA) in Labour Dispute No. CMA/DSM/ILA/R. 184/17/1178. i The record of appeal reveals that, the respondent was employed by the appellant as a Procurement Officer in the year 2011. Her employment ended in 2017 when she was terminated on ground of misconduct for breach of trust. Aggrieved, she lodged her complaint with the CMA claiming to be unfairly terminated from employment. The CMA found in her favour that the termination was unfair both, substantively and procedurally. She was awarded compensation equivalent to 36 months' remuneration and one month salary in lieu of notice. The appellant was not satisfied with the CMA's award. She thus preferred Revision to the Labour Court subject of the present appeal. The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal which for the purposes of this ruling, we find no reason to reproduce them. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was represented by Ms. Miriam Bachuba, learned advocate assisted by Ms. Edna Mwankenja, also learned advocate, whereas the respondent had the services of Dr. Abdon Rwegasira, learned advocate. In addressing the issue of competence of the appeal raised by the Court, Ms. Bachuba submitted that the appeal was filed within time basing on the certificate of delay issued to the appellant by the Registrar of the High Court on 6th October, 2022. According to her, the certificate 2 of delay found at page 699 of the record of appeal excludes days from 24th February, 2022 when the appellant applied for necessary documents for appeal purposes to 6th October, 2022, when the appellant was notified that the documents were ready for collection, a total of 195 days. She acknowledged that the referred letter of the Registrar notifying the appellant that the documents were ready for appeal purposes of 6th October, 2022 is missing from the record of appeal. Nonetheless, she was quick to argue that despite the fact that there is no letter notifying the appellant, the appeal is within time because it was lodged within 60 days after the certificate was issued. She argued further that the date (6th October, 2022) referred in the certificate of delay to be the date when the documents were ready for collection, was the date indicated in the letter from the CMA to the appellant of 19th September, 2022 found at page 695 of the record of appeal. The said letter indicated that the documents requested will be ready on or before 6th October, 2022. Therefore, according to her, it was proper for the Registrar to consider that date and indicate it in the certificate of delay. Ms. Bachuba argued forcefully that, the proviso to Rule 90 of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules) which confers powers to the Registrar of the High Court to issue certificate of delay does not demand that all documents be supplied by the Labour Court. She thus submitted that the appeal was filed within time. She exonerated the appellant from liability in case we find that the certificate of delay was not properly issued and urged the Court to proceed with the hearing of the appeal on merit under overriding objective principle. In reply, Dr. Rwegasira, without mincing words, submitted that the appeal was filed out of time as for it to be within time, it was supposed to be filed either within 60 days of the date of lodging the notice of appeal or being supported by a valid certificate of delay. According to him, the present appeal was filed within 60 days from the dates excluded by the certificate of delay, but the said certificate is invalid. He referred us to page 681 of the record of appeal with a view of showing that, the letter of the appellant to the Registrar requesting for necessary documents for appeal purposes was of 24th February, 2022. He also referred us to page 685 of the record of appeal indicating that the Registrar responded to the appellant's request on 16th May, 2022 informing her about the readiness of the requested documents. Therefore, he argued, the date of notification by the Registrar was the one to be reflected in the certificate of delay. He added that, even if there were missing records, the cippellant, under Rule 96 (6) or (7) of the Rules could apply to file supplementary record of appeal. According to him, the appellant took a risk option of writing straight to the CMA. He argued that the letter of the CMA to the appellant of 19th September, 2022 was not addressed to the Registrar of the High Court. Besides, he said, the CMA is not a competent authority to issue notification regarding documents to the parties appealing to the Court. In addition, Dr. Rwegasira argued that the letter from the CMA to the appellant notified her that the documents will be ready on or before 6th October, 2022, thus they may be ready before that date. The said letter was received by the appellant on 19th October, 2022 and on 21s t October, 2022 the appellant wrote a letter to the Registrar requesting for a certificate of delay, but the Registrar indicated 6th October, 2022 when the documents were not requested and nothing in the certificate of delay showing that the documents were ready for collection on that date. He insisted that, in the absence of notification, there was no material which would enable the Registrar to exclude the number of days excluded. This state of affairs, he added, makes the certificate of delay invalid and it cannot support the delayed appeal. It was his firm argument that, there were no basis for the Registrar to rely on that date 5 (6th October, 2022). The appellant ought to have filed the appeal and later lodge a supplementary record, if necessary. Therefore, in conclusion, he submitted and urged us to find that the appeal at hand is time barred. In her rejoinder, Ms. Bachuba agreed with Dr. Rwegasira that, the appellant had an option of filing the appeal after being supplied with the documents by the Registrar and later apply to file supplementary record of appeal. However, she said, the appellant did not opt to file appeal as she thought she had to wait to be supplied with the complete set of proceedings. According to her, the CMA was a competent authority to issue a notification to the appellant because the Registrar recognized its letter. While responding to the question by the Court, Ms. Bachuba said that the letter relied upon by the Registrar was neither addressed nor copied to him. Therefore, he could not rely on the date indicated therein to exclude days. Having heard the rival arguments by the counsel for the parties, the issue for our determination is whether the certificate of delay under consideration can rescue the appellant's appeal filed out of 60 days of 6 the date of lodging the notice of appeal. It is settled position of law that appeals to the Court shall be instituted within 60 days of the date when the notice of appeal was lodged; unless certificate of delay is issued by the Registrar of the High Court (Labour Court) upon request as having been required for preparation and delivery of the copy of proceedings to the appellant. This position is clearly provided under Rule 90 (1) of the Rules in the following terms: "90 (1) subject to the provisions o f rule 128, an appeal shall be instituted by lodging in the appropriate registry, within sixty days o f the date when the notice o f appeal was lodged with - (a) a memorandum o f appeal in quintuplicate; (b) the record o f appeal in quintuplicate; (c ) security for the costs o f the appeal, save that where an application for a copy o f proceedings in the High Court has been made within 30 days o f the date o f decision against which it is desired to appeal, there shall, in computing the time within which the appeal is to be instituted be excluded such time as may be certified by the Registrar o f the High Court as having been required for the i preparation and delivery o f that copy to the appellant. "[Emphasis added]. The proviso to the above provision is very clear that, exception to the 60 days of instituting an appeal can only be considered if the appellant applies for copies of proceedings in the High Court within 30 days of the date of the impugned decision. The law provides in clear terms where the application for copy of proceedings is supposed to be made, that is, in the High Court. In the present case, the impugned decision was delivered on 21s t February, 2022. Being aggrieved by that decision, the appellant ought to have instituted her appeal on or before 21s t April, 2022. However, for apparent reason that she was yet to be supplied with the copies of proceedings she requested on 24th February, 2022, the appeal was lodged on 22n d November, 2022. The Registrar wrote to the appellant informing her about the readiness of the requested documents on 16th May, 2022 as it can be seen at page 685 of the record of appeal. However, in computing number of days to be excluded, the Registrar considered the date (6th October, 2022) which was different from the notification date. 8 The learned counsel for the appellant argued that 6th October 2022 was the date which was indicated by the CMA that the exhibits forming part of the proceedings were expected to be ready for collection. Further that, the proceedings supplied to the appellant by the Registrar did not include the exhibits tendered at the CMA as indicated in the letter found at page 688 of the record of appeal. Her argument was opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent who submitted that upon receiving the applied proceedings, the appellant could lodge her appeal and if there were missing records, could apply to the Court under Rule 96 (6) or (7) of the Rules to file supplementary record of appeal after receiving them. We wish to state at once that, by making reference to the date indicated in the letter from the CMA to the appellant, the certificate of delay at hand becomes defective. We so state because in the record of appeal there is no letter or notification of that date from the Registrar informing the appellant that the documents were ready for collection. Even if we have to agree with Ms. Bachuba that, although the said letter from the CMA was neither addressed nor copied to the Registrar of the High Court, 6th October, 2022 was the notification 9 date; the said letter defeats that position. We shall let the relevant part of it to speak for itself hereunder: "3. By this letter you are notified that the records officers are searching for the file containing the listed exhibits. It is expected that the exhibits will be ready on or before 6t hOctober, 2022." Reading the above excerpt, one will find no difficult to understand that the author of that letter was not certain of the date on which the requested exhibits will be ready for collection. The law is very clear that exclusion of dates will start from the application date to the date of notification that the documents are ready for collection, not otherwise. Since the date mentioned in the letter was just speculative, it cannot rescue the defective certificate of delay at hand. Besides, as clearly provided by the law, the authority to notify the applicant about the readiness of the copy of proceedings for appeal purposes to the Court is the Registrar of the High Court. The logic is simple, appeals to the Court are preferred against the decisions of the High Court and not directly from the lower courts or the CMA. We therefore agree with Dr. Rwegasira that, the date which ought to be reflected in the 10 certificate of delay, was the date of notification by the Registrar of the High Court, that is 16th May, 2022. We, as well, agree with Dr. Rwegasira that there was a possibility of filing the appeal and later supplementary record of appeal in terms of Rule 96 (6) and (7) of the Rules, but the appellant opted not to take that route. Ms. Bachuba told the Court that the appellant did not take that route because she thought she should wait for the documents to be complete. We find and hold that, the option was taken at her own peril. We note that the Registrar's letter informing the appellant that the requested document were ready for collection was of 16th May, 2022 and was received by the appellant on 23r d May, 2022. Having received the requested documents, the appellant discovered that there were missing records as the exhibits tendered at the CMA were not included in the package. However, she did not inform the Registrar of the High Court until on 6th June, 2022 as per her letter found at page 686 of the record of appeal. It is not stated, and indeed, tasked our minds why did it take the appellant more than 12 days to inform the Registrar about the missing record. This unexplained delay renders the appeal time barred. li We are alive of the practice of the Court when we find the certificate of delay is defective; normally it is returned for rectification. However, following the endeavoured discussion above, the defects in the current certificate of delay make it incurable. This is due to the fact that one; the purported notification date (6th October, 2022) was not the notification in real sense as it based on speculation and there was no specific letter of the Registrar to that effect; two, the said notification was issued contrary to the proviso to Rule 90 (1) of the Rules as it was issued by the CMA instead of the Registrar of the High Court; three; the certificate of delay excludes the days which the appellant did not account for and which the Registrar of the High Court did not spend in preparation of the requested documents to justify the exclusion and certification he made. We note that, even if we order for rectification, the notification date by the Registrar of the High Court was 16th May, 2022. Therefore, indicating that date in the certificate of delay will not save the appeal right as the same was filed on 22n d November, 2022 far beyond 60 days after the notification date. In the upshot, the appeal at hand is time barred for being filed out of time and supported by an incurable defective certificate of 12 delay. Since time limitation is not among the technicalities, the overriding objective principle cannot save this appeal in anyhow. We therefore proceed to strike out the appeal for being time barred. This is a labour matter, we make no order as to costs. DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 14th day of May, 2026. M. C. LEVIRA JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. L. MASHAKA JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. 1 NGWEMBE JUSTICE OF APPEAL Ruling delivered this 15th day of May, 2026 in the presence of Ms. Edna Mwankenja, learned counsel for the Appellant and Dr. Abdon Rwegasira, learned counsel for the Respondent and Ms. Janekissa Bukuku, Court clerk, is hereby certified as a true copy of