Frank Rashid vs SSC Tanzania Limited (Civil Appeal No. 851 of 2025) [2026] TZCA 573 (14 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT MWANZA (CORAM: MWANDAMBO, J,A.. KENTE, J.A. And MGONYA, J.A.: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 851 OF 2025 FRANK RASHID.................................................................................APPELLANT VERSUS SSC TANZANIA LIMITED ...........................................................RESPONDENT (Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) at Mwanza) (Chuma, 3J dated the 11th day of October, 2024 in Labour Revision No. 20638 of 2024 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 6th & 14th May, 2026 MGONYA, J.A.: This appeal arises from a ruling of the High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) at Mwanza delivered by the Honourable W. M. Chuma 1, on 11th October 2024, in Labour Revision No. 20638 of 2024. In that ruling, the learned Judge upheld a preliminary objection raised by the respondent and dismissed the appellant's application for revision on the ground that it was time-barred. The brief background of this matter is as follows: The appellant, a former employee of the respondent (SBC Tanzania Limited), instituted

revision proceedings in the High Court seeking to revise an arbitral award issued by the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (the CMA) on 5th July, 2024. In response, the respondent raised a preliminary objection contending that the application for revision was hopelessly time-barred, having been filed outside the statutory period prescribed under section 91(l)(a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap. 366 (the ELRA). The said provision requires an application for revision of a CMA award to be filed within six weeks (forty-two days) from the date the award was served upon the party concerned. It is common ground that the arbitral award was served upon the appellant on 5th July, 2024. Consequently, the statutory forty-two (42) days' limitation period expired on 16th August, 2024. The appellant maintained that he had electronically lodged his application on 7th August, 2024, which was well within time, and relied on the court's electronic admission receipt bearing Admission No. 000055320 as proof thereof. However, the learned High Court Judge observed that court fees in respect of the application were paid on 22n d August, 2024, after a control number had been generated. It was upon this basis that the preliminary objection was upheld and the revision application dismissed for being time barred.

Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant has preferred the present appeal, advancing five grounds. Upon close scrutiny, however, we are of the considered view that the fifth ground of appeal is the most material and dispositive of the entire appeal, as it subsumes and determines all the other grounds. The said ground may be stated as follows: "That the learned Judge o f the High Court (Labour D ivision) erred in taw when he held that, the revision application is tim e barred" At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant appeared in person and was unrepresented. On the other hand, the respondent was ably represented by learned counsel, Ms. Hidaya Haruna. In compliance with rule 106(1) and 106(7) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009, both parties had filed their written submissions in support of and in opposition to the appeal. When the appeal was calied on for hearing, the appellant sought and was granted leave of the Court to adopt his written submissions as his arguments in support of the appeal. In his submissions, the appellant contended that a close perusal of the record of appeal reveals that the Labour Revision Application was filed and admitted online in the High Court on 7th August 2024, under

Admission No. 000055320. However, on 9th August 2024, the admitting officer noted in the system that although the application had been admitted, it was not exempted from payment of filing fees. Consequently, the application could not be forwarded to the relevant court officers for further processing due to non-payment of the prescribed fees. The appellant further averred that, his personal representative made several unsuccessful follow-ups under the honest belief that the application was exempt from payment of fees. Eventually, on 22n d August 2024, a court IT Officer directed him to the court cashier, who issued Payment Control Number 991401183930 for the sum of TZS. 50,000.00. The said amount was duly paid by the appellant's personal representative, who was issued with Exchequer Receipt No. 924235271649505 (a copy of which appears at page 684 of the record of appeal). It was only thereafter that the Labour Revision Application was released and forwarded to the registry for further necessary action. Insisting that his revision application was lodged within the prescribed time, the appellant contended that the payment of filing fees was made in error. He referred us to section 50(6) of the Labour Institutions Act and Rule 51(1) of the Labour Court Rules, 2007, submitting that no filing fees were payable in respect of Labour Revision

No. 20638 of 2024. According to him, the erroneous demand and receipt of the said fees was the sole basis upon which the High Court (Labour Division) treated the revision as having been filed out of time, This, he maintained, was a grave misdirection. The Appellant drew our attention to the decision in Josiah Zephania Warioba v. Bouygues Energies & Services, Misc. Labour Application No. 28 of 2021 [2022] TZHC (24 January 2022), where it was held, inter alia, as follows: "According to the Electronic Filing Rule 10 o f the G.N. No. 148 o f 2018 (the Judicature and Application o f Laws (Electronic Filing) Rules, 2018), a docum ent is deemed to have been file d when it is subm itted and adm itted. More so, a party cannot be condemned due to technical error caused by the ju d icia l staff, be it due to la xity or negligence on the p art o f the court's sta ff or technical error in the filin g system ." In support of his appeal, the appeiiant cited a number of cases, among them, Ernest Benard Mkoiela & Another v, Tanzania Union of Industrial & Another (Civil Appeal No. 411 of 2022) [2025] TZCA 726 and M/S Vidoba Freight Company Limited v. Mvomero District Council (Civil Appeal No. 373 of 2022.) [2025] TZCA 786.

In conclusion, the appellant prayed that this appeal be allowed in its entirety. He further prayed that the impugned Ruling and Order of the High Court be quashed and set aside and that the matter be remitted to the High Court with appropriate directions that the revision proceedings be heard and determined expeditiously on the merits by another Judge. In response, the respondent's counsel contends that the appellant's complaint is legally untenable. She argued that, in terms of Section 91(1) of the ELRA, an application for revision must be lodged within six weeks (42 days) from the date the award was served upon the party. The counsel submitted that, it is undisputed that the appellant was served with the impugned award on 5th July 2024. Consequently, the statutory clock began to tick on that material date, expiring on 16th August 2024. She further contended that, the appellant seeks to circumvent the reality that the application was filed through the Online Filing System on 22n d August 2024. By simple arithmetic, this was 48 days after service of the award, well outside the 42 days window prescribed by law. Ms. Haruna went further to submit that the legal position regarding the date of filing in this digital era is no longer a matter of conjecture. Under Rule 21(1) of the Judicature and Application of Laws (Electronic Filing) Rules, GN. No. 148 of 2018 (the Rules), the date of filing is the

date the document is submitted electronically into the system. To bolster her submission, she cited a recent decision of the Court in Mwasa Security Limited v. Mw Rice Millers Limited (Civil Appeal No. 354 of 2023) [2025] TZCA 637 where the Court underscored the mandatory terms of rule 21 of the Rules. It was the learned counsel's stance that, since the record of this appeal reflects that the award was served to the appellant on 5th July, 2024, then the time limit to file an application for revision was on 13th August, 2024. Thus, as the application was electronically filed on 22n d August, 2024, the same was hopelessly filed out of the prescribed time limit. Referring us to our previous decision in Ernest Benard Mkoiela & Another v. Tanzania Union of Industrial & Another (supra), the learned counsel was of the view that, since it is a legal position that the plea of time limitation touches on the jurisdiction of the court, the High Court had no jurisdiction to handle the appellant's application for revision. Based on her submission, the learned counsel urged us to find the instant appeal devoid of merit and dismiss it. Having heard the rival submissions of the parties, the sole issue falling for determination in this appeal is whether the application for review before the High Court was filed within the prescribed time. 7

As alluded to earlier, the appellant has strenuously contended that his application was electronically filed within time and was received by the Court on 7th August, 2024, and not on 22n d August, 2024, as alleged by the Respondent. Electronic filing of documents in our jurisdiction is governed by the Judicature and Application of Laws (Electronic Filing) Rules, 2018 (Government Notice No. 148 of 2018) (hereinafter referred to as GN No. 148 of 2018). In particular, Rule 8 of the said Rules provides: "AHpleadings, petitions, applications, appeals and such other documents sh all be file d electronically in accordance with these R ules”. At what time is the electronic filing said to be successfully lodged in court? Rule 21(1) of GN. No. 148 of 2018 as amended by GN. No. 609 of 2025, is very clear that, a document shall be considered to have been filed if it is submitted through the electronic filing system before midnight, East African time, on the date it is submitted. Elaborating further on that position, this Court in Fredrick Anthony Mlboma v. Bamm Solution Limited & Others (Civil Appeal No. 606 of 2022) [2025] T7CA 790, held that: "The filin g process isf as a general rule, taken to be com plete upon the filin g o f a docum ent in question electronically in term s o f rule 21(1) o f

the Electronic Filing Rules and upon paym ent o f the relevant filin g fee for a docum ent”. Section 51(6) of the Labour Institutions Act, Cap. 300 R.E. 2023 which re-enacts section 50(6) of the Labour Institutions expressly and in the clearest that: "Fees, cost or interest sh all not be payable in respect o f any proceedings before the Court under the provisions o f this A ct." This position is further fortified by the clear and unambiguous provisions of Rule 51(1) of the Labour Court Rules, 2007 (G.N. No. 106 of 2007) which provides that: "No costs, fees or interests whether com m ercial or court fees or interests whatsoever sh all be payable before the Court in respect o f any proceedings under the provisions o f the Acts". The imposition by the Registry Officer of a filing fee of TZS 50,000.00 upon the appellant on 22n d August, 2024 was illegal as the appellant was under no legal obligation whatsoever to pay court fees in order to institute Labour Revision No. 20638 of 2024. Consequently, the date on which that fee was paid is legally irrelevant and cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as the operative date of filing.

To ascertain the true date of filing, recourse must be had to the Judicature and Application of Laws (Electronic Filing) Rules, 2018 (G.N. No. 148 of 2018). Rule 21(1) provides in clear terms that a document shall be deemed to have been filed if it is submitted through the electronic filing system before midnight on the date of submission. This position is reinforced by Rule 22(a) thereof which stipulates that, where a document is transmitted electronically to the Registry, it is deemed filed on the date and at the time the transmission is received by the electronic system. The record before us, particularly the admission details generated by the e-filing system unequivocally establishes that the appellant submitted the application online on 7th August, 2024. Since no filing fees were lawfully payable, the filing process was completed on that very date and there was no further process in the office of the Registrar. See for instance our previous decision in Ernest Benard Mkolela & Another v. Tanzania Union of Industrial & Another (supra), where the Court held: "....we have the view that , ; it was im portant to take into account rule 21 (1) o f the Electronic Filing Rules, 2018 in determ ining the filin g date because it is a legal requirem ent and more so, what was before the Judge was a labour m atter 10

which had no requirem ent fo r paym ent o f court fees. That means that, there was no further process in the office o f the Registrar after lodging the documents. It foi/ows that\ a document, in a labour case ; is deemed to have been duly file d in court once it is file d and received electronically through the ju d icia l electronic system ." The statutory period of 42 days prescribed under Section 91(l)(a) of the ELRA expired on 16th August, 2024. The Appellant's application having been lodged on 7th August, 2024, was therefore filed well within the prescribed time limit In our considered view, the learned Judge of the High Court fell into error by penalizing the appellant for the Registry's unlawful demand for payment of a court fee and by placing reliance on general civil precedents which are clearly inapplicable to fee-exempt proceedings under the labour jurisdiction. We are satisfied that the preliminary objection raised by the respondent in the High Court was misconceived and lacked merit. It was founded upon a fundamental misapprehension of the provisions of the Labour Institutions Act and the Labour Court Rules. li

In the result, this appeal succeeds in its entirety. The impugned ruling and order of the High Court are hereby quashed and set aside. We direct that the record be remitted to the High Court (Labour Division) for hearing and determination on the merits before a different Judge. DATED at MWANZA 13th day of May, 2026. L. S. MWANDAMBO JUSTICE OF APPEAL P. M. KENTE JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. E. MGONYA JUSTICE OF APPEAL Judgment delivered this 14th day of May, 2026 in the presence of the appellant in person, unrepresented via virtual Court, Ms. Hidaya Haruna, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. John Banene, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original. 12