North Mara Gold Mine Limited vs Patrick Sahani Ojwang (Civil Appeal No. 553 of 2023) [2026] TZCA 553 (13 May 2026)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT TABORA (CORAM: LILA, J.A.. MASOUD. J.A. And MLACHA. J.A .^ 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 553 OF 2023 NORTH MARA GOLD MINE LIMITED .................................................. APPELLANT VERSUS PATRICK SAHANI OJWANG.............................................................RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania, at Musoma) (Mbaqwa, J.) dated the 17th day of October, 2022 in Labour Revision No. 05 of 2022 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 4th & 13th May, 2026 MASOUD, J.A.: When the instant appeal was called on for hearing today, the appellant was represented by Mr. Faustin Anton Malongo who was assisted by Ms. Caroline Lucas Kivuyo, learned advocates. On the other hand, the respondent appeared in person. On record, there were rival written submissions lodged by the parties respectively. There was also a notice of preliminary points of objection lodged by the respondent against the appeal. i

Before we proceed any further, it is worthwhile to recall from the record that, the respondent was employed by the appellant on 1st October, 2011 as a technician on permanent and pensionable terms. His employment came to an end on 10th June, 2020 when he was terminated on ground of operational requirements. Aggrieved, the respondent challenged the termination at the CMA in Labour Dispute No. CMA/MUS/114/2021. The CMA dismissed the dispute on ground that it was time barred. Aggrieved, he successfully applied for revision before the High Court against the decision of the CMA refusing condonation. The High Court in Revision No. 05 of 2022 granted him extension of time of 30 days within which to file his dispute before the CMA. Dissatisfied by the latter decision, the appellant lodged in this Court the instant appeal challenging the decision of the High Court which extended the time within which the respondent could file the dispute before the CMA. At the very early stages of the hearing of the appeal the respondent abandoned all preliminary points of objection he raised in his notice of preliminary objection which as a result gave room for the hearing of the appeal on the merit. There were only two grounds of appeal. However, following the prayer by Mr. Malongo to abandon the second ground, the 2

Court was as a result left with only one ground which sought to challenge the decision of the High Court that extended time to the respondent to institute a labour dispute before the CMA. As Mr. Malongo was arguing the ground having adopted written submissions the appellant had lodged earlier, we also invited him to address us on whether the ground was in conformity with the requirement of section 58 of the Labour Institutions Act, Cap. 300 read with rule 93(1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 2009 (the Rules). That, provisions of section 58 of the LIA read with that of rule 93 (1) require grounds of appeal in a memorandum of appeal to specify points of law which are alleged to have been wrongly decided. Addressing the Court on the remaining ground which reads "the Honourable High Court Judge erred in iaw in extending the tim e for filin g the dispute a t the Commission for M ediation and A rb itratio rl' and the question that we put to him, Mr. Malongo was firm that that was in compliance with the requirements of the law. When asked as to whether the form and substance of the ground specify any point which is alleged to have been wrongly decided, Mr. Malongo referred us to the gist of the appellant's written submissions drawing our attention to arguments alleging acting on wrong principles and 3

failure by the High Court Judge to properly exercise his discretion in extending time as the respondent did not account for each and every day of the delay. Besides the foregoing, he added that, the decision was reached without there being evidence to the effect that the respondent was continuously attending medical clinics at Mwanza during the period of the delay. Mr. Malongo, nevertheless, agreed that the points in respect of which the appellant alleges that they were wrongly decided by the learned Judge were not at all specified in the ground of appeal given the way it was formulated. He seemed also to agree that there was no way those points could have been known before hand by the respondent upon being saved with the record of appeal. The respondent, on the other hand, did not have much to say after adopting his written submissions in reply, other than insisting that the appeal was devoid of merit as the decision sought to be appealed against was interlocutory and no appeal could lie against it in terms of rule 50 of the Labour Court Rules, GN No. 106 of 2007 (the Rules). On our part, we considered Mr. Malongo's submissions on the point whether there was a competent ground of appeal before us. We understood him as admitting that the ground was not reflective of the above mentioned

provisions of law although that was not fatal to the appeal as the points wrongly decided were clear and apparent in the submissions which the appellant lodged. Mr. Malongo had no issue with the requirements of the law in the above cited provisions. That, whereas section 58 of the LIA has it that a party to the proceedings in the Labour Court may appeal against the decision of that court to this Court on a point of law only, rule 93 (2) of the Rules has it that that party shall in his memorandum of appeal set forth the grounds of objection to the decision appealed against specifying the points which were allegedly wrongly decided. We think that the substance of the provisions of law above cited requires the memorandum of appeal and not the written submissions to set forth grounds of objection specifying the points of law alleged to have been wrongly decided. We say so because, the submissions which come at a later stage only deal with grounds of appeal which are competent in the eyes of law. They are not intended to serve as a means of rescuing a wrongly formulated ground of objection to the decision appealed against. We henceforth disagree with the appellant's counsel's line of argument. At best, we view the ground as one that was challenging the outcome of the decision of the High Court without specifying any point that was 5

allegedly wrongly decided by the High Court and which resulted to that outcome that is sought to be challenged. With this finding, we need not dwell on the merit of the appeal. For the above reasons, we are of the finding that the appeal is incompetent for want of a competent ground of appeal that complies with the requirements of the law. We strike it out with no order as to costs since it arose from a labour dispute. DATED at TABORA this 11th day of May, 2026. S. A. LILA JUSTICE OF APPEAL B. S. MASOUD JUSTICE OF APPEAL L. M. MLACHA JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered this 13th day of May, 2026 in the presence of the Appellant who appeared in person, Ms. Caroline Lucas Kivuyo, learned counsel for the Respondent by virtual Court, and Ms. Rehema Peter Makakala, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.